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While the social influence of confidence has been shown to be an influential factor in 
persuasion, previous research, using numerically expressed confidence, has identified a 
number of factors that mediate its influence (e.g. Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Price and 
Stone, 2004; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). However, it is 
important to take a more ecological approach to this research to look at confidence as it 
is commonly expressed in our day-to-day lives. Hence, this thesis reports a series of 
nine inter-linked experiments examining the influence of different levels of  verbal 
confidence on choice and interpersonal perceptions. Chapter 2 identifies the levels of 
confidence associated with some everyday expressions of confidence, expressions that 
are used as ‘confidence cues’ in subsequent experimental chapters. Chapter 3 examines 
the influence of confidence cues with different types of task, and Chapter 4 relates these 
influences to individual differences. Task type is found to have a significant effect on 
the extent of influence confidence exerts, with Need for Closure further mediating this. 
Chapter 5 considers our perceptions of speakers who express different levels of 
confidence. Increasing levels of speaker confidence lead to speakers being perceived 
more positively in terms of competency, but too much confidence is detrimental in 
terms of how much a speaker is liked. Chapters 6 and 7 then examine whether these 
perceptions, and the subsequent use of their information, change when performance 
feedback is made available. Feedback is shown to have a considerable impact upon 
these factors, although the influence of confidence does not become redundant. Chapter 
8 examines whether our own confidence level affects the extent to which a speaker’s 
confidence influences us, then Chapter 9 determines if a speaker’s confidence exerts a 
positive or negative influence, while Chapter 10 investigates how the influence of 
confidence is influenced by the timing of the advice. Overall, the results indicate that 
confidence is a potent form of influence, providing evidence that a confidence heuristic 
is used, whereby a speaker’s confidence is taken as a cue to their accuracy, knowledge, 
and competency. The extent to which the confidence heuristic is used when making 
choices strongly depends on one’s own level of confidence, whether this was due to the 
type of task being tackled, the difficulty of the task, or the timing of the advice, with 
people relying more on the confidence heuristic as their own confidence decreased. 
Issues raised by this thesis, and directions for further research are considered in the 
Discussion. 
 CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements   
Abstract   
Contents   
Table of Contents: Figures   
Table of Contents: Tables   
Table of Contents: Appendices   
Conferences and Publications   
   
CHAPTER 1 – The Communication and Influence of Confidence   
What is confidence?   1 
The function of communicating confidence  3 
The communication of confidence  5 
Numerical and verbal expressions of confidence  6 
Confidence-uncertainty continuum  7 
Epistemic modality  8 
Powerful and powerless speech styles  8 
Gender differences  9 
Directionality of expressions  10 
Variants of uncertainty  11 
Non-answers  12 
Verbal uncertainty research  12 
The influence of confidence in judgement and decision-making  13 
Task type  15 
Sources of information  16 
Group size and consensus  17 
Mode of expression  18 
Communication channel  19 
Levels of confidence  20 
Argument quality  23 
Accuracy  24 
Overconfidence  24 
Feedback  26 
Individual differences  27 
Gender differences in influence  28 
Interpersonal perceptions of confidence  29 
Trust and expertise  30 
Gender differences  31 
Too much confidence?  31 Influence of confidence on decision quality  32 
The social influence of confidence – theoretical perspectives  33 
Influence of confidence within groups  33 
Decision-making environment  34 
Interpersonal perceptions of confidence  35 
Models of persuasion  36 
Making Choices  37 
Confidence heuristic  38 
Contextual framework  41 
Rationale  42 
Aims of thesis  44 
   
CHAPTER 2 – Pilot Study: Development of Confidence Cues   
Introduction  47 
Method  49 
Participants  49 
Materials  49 
Procedure  49 
Results and Discussion  50 
   
CHAPTER 3 – The Influence of Confidence and Task Type   
Abstract  54 
Introduction  55 
Rationale for Experiment  59 
Method  60 
Participants  60 
Design  60 
Materials  61 
Intellective task: General Knowledge  61 
Judgmental task: Opinions  62 
External Judgement task  62 
Procedure  63 
Results  64 
Influence of Confidence Cues on Chosen Answers  64 
Intellective task  66 
Judgmental task  66 
External Judgement task  67 
Influence of Confidence Cues on Choice Confidence  68 Influence of Confidence Cues on Perceptions of Speakers  70 
Chosen Team-Mate  70 
Competency  71 
Likeability  71 
Speaker Confidence  71 
Speaker Gender  72 
Summary of Results  72 
Discussion  73 
Conclusions  77 
   
CHAPTER 4 – Individual Differences in the Influence of Confidence   
Abstract  79 
Introduction  80 
Need for Closure  80 
Need for Cognition  81 
Rationale for Experiment  83 
Method  84 
Participants  84 
Materials  84 
Need for Closure  84 
Need for Cognition  84 
‘Big-Five’ Personality Factors  84 
Design and Procedure  85 
Results  86 
Covariates  86 
Need for Closure  86 
Need for Closure and Choice  86 
Need for Closure and Confidence in Answers  89 
Need for Closure and Perceptions of Speakers  90 
Need for Closure – Additional Analysis  91 
Need for Cognition  92 
Need for Cognition and Choice  92 
Need for Cognition and Confidence in Answers  93 
Need for Cognition and Perceptions of Speakers  94 
Need for Closure and Need for Cognition  94 
Gender  94 
Summary of Results  95 
Discussion  96 Need for Closure  96 
Need for Cognition  99 
Gender  99 
Limitations  99 
Conclusions  100 
   
CHAPTER 5 – The Influence of Expressed Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers 
Abstract  101 
Introduction  102 
Speech style and influence/persuasion  102 
Speech style and impression formation  103 
Speech style and gender  103 
Speech style and expressed confidence  105 
Rationale for Experiment  105 
Method  107 
Participants  107 
Materials  107 
Background  107 
Photo line-up  107 
Witness testimonies  108 
Question sheet  109 
Design and Procedure  109 
Results  110 
Influence of Speaker Confidence on Choice of Answers  110 
Influence of Speaker Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers  110 
Gender Effects  118 
Summary of Results  118 
Discussion  119 
Conclusions  120 
   
CHAPTER 6 – Perceptions of Confident Speakers and their Judgmental Biases   
Abstract  122 
Introduction  123 
Rationale for Experiment  125 
Method  126 
Participants  126 
Materials  126 
Design and Procedure  127 Results  129 
Perceptions of Speakers  129 
Perceived Accuracy  130 
Choice of Team-Mate and Perceptions of Speakers  130 
Overconfidence  133 
Summary of Results  135 
Discussion  136 
Limitations  139 
Conclusions  139 
   
CHAPTER 7 – Prior Interaction, Feedback and the Influence of Confidence   
Abstract  141 
Introduction  142 
Rationale for Experiment  144 
Method  145 
Participants  145 
Materials  145 
Design and Procedure  145 
Results  147 
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Choice  147 
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Confidence in Answers  148 
Influence of Feedback on Accuracy  149 
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Choice of Team-Mate  149 
Choice of Team-Mate and Speaker Agreement  150 
Summary of Results  152 
Discussion  153 
Limitations  155 
Conclusions  156 
   
CHAPTER 8 – How does One’s Own Uncertainty affect the Influence of Confidence? 
Abstract  157 
Introduction  158 
Rationale for Experiment  159 
Method  161 
Participants  161 
Materials  161 
Design  162 
Procedure  162 Results  164 
Influence of Confidence on Choice  164 
Influence of Confidence on Confidence in Answers   165 
Accuracy  167 
Influence of Confidence on Choice according to Levels of 
Overconfidence 
 
167 
Influence of Confidence on Choice according to Initial Confidence  168 
Changes in Confidence according to Initial Confidence  171 
Summary of Results  172 
Discussion  173 
Limitations  175 
Conclusions  175 
   
CHAPTER 9 – The Confidence Heuristic: Positive or Negative Influence of Confidence? 
Abstract  177 
Introduction  178 
Rationale for Experiment  179 
Method  180 
Participants  180 
Materials  180 
Design and Procedure  181 
Results  183 
Confidence Heuristic Use on Choice of Answer  183 
Accuracy  184 
Confidence in Choice of Answer  184 
Ratings of Speakers’ Answers  185 
Perceptions of Speakers’ Overall Accuracy  187 
Perceptions of Speakers’ Characteristics  188 
Summary of Results  192 
Discussion  193 
Limitations  195 
Conclusions  196 
   
CHAPTER 10 - Influence of Confidence in Different Decision-Making Situations   
Abstract  198 
Introduction  199 
Rationale for Experiment  201 
Method  203 Participants  203 
Task Materials  203 
Design and Procedure  204 
Results  206 
Influence of Speaker Confidence and Decision-Making  Condition on 
Choice 
 
206 
Choice according to Speaker Accuracy  208 
Accuracy  209 
Influence of Speaker Confidence and Condition on Confidence  in 
Choice 
 
210 
Influence of Confidence and Condition on Perceptions of Speakers  212 
Speaker Accuracy  212 
Speaker Confidence, Knowledge, Friendliness, Competence 
and Trustworthiness 
 
212 
Team-Mate  214 
Summary of Results  214 
Discussion  215 
Limitations  218 
Conclusions  219 
   
CHAPTER 11 – General Discussion   
Discussion of findings  220 
Influence of confidence on choice  221 
Uncertainty and the influence of confidence  226 
Influence of confidence on confidence  228 
Interpersonal perceptions of confidence  229 
The confidence heuristic  231 
Nonverbal communication of confidence  236 
Age differences  237 
Further research   238 
Experimental limitations  239 
Applications of research  240 
Conclusions  242 
   
REFERENCES  244 
   
APPENDICES  257 Table of Contents: Figures 
 
Figure 3.1.  Percentage change in chosen speaker between the control (C) and 
experimental (E) conditions across intellective (I), judgmental (J) and 
external judgment (EJ) task types 
 
 
 
66 
Figure 3.2.   Percentage change in answer confidence between the control (C) and 
experimental (E) conditions across task type 
 
 
69 
Figure 4.1.  Percentage change in chosen speaker according to task type, split by 
Need for Closure 
 
 
88 
Figure 5.1.  Significant interactions relating to perceptions of speakers speaking with 
different levels of confidence 
 
 
117 
Figure 6.1.  Example slide from PowerPoint presentation. 
 
126 
Figure 6.2.  Perceptions of speaker accuracy according to chosen team mate 
 
131 
Figure 6.3.  Perceptions of speakers according to chosen team-mate 
 
132 
Figure 6.4.  Perceptions of speaker accuracy according to under/overconfidence 
 
134 
Figure 7.1.  Mean percentage change in agreement with speakers between feedback 
conditions 
 
 
148 
Figure 7.2.  Percentage agreement with each speaker according to chosen team-mate 
 
150 
Figure 8.1.  Mean percentage change in agreement with speakers 
 
165 
Figure 8.2.  Mean percentage change in confidence in answer 
 
166 
Figure 8.3.  Change in answers according to initial confidence in answers 
 
171 
Figure 9.1.  Example slides from control and experimental conditions 
 
180 
Figure 9.2.  Percentage change in choice of speaker’s answers between the control 
(C) and experimental (E) conditions 
 
 
184 
Figure 9.3.  Percentage change in accuracy likelihood ratings of speaker’s answers 
between the control (C) and experimental (E) conditions 
 
 
186 
Figure 9.4.  Significant interactions relating to perceptions of speakers expressing 
different levels of confidence 
 
 
191 
Figure 10.1.  Example slides from the control and experimental conditions 
 
203 
Figure 10.2.  Changes in using different speaker’s advice according to condition 
 
208 
Figure 10.3.  Change in confidence in answers according to speaker confidence and 
condition.   
 
211 
 Table of Contents: Tables 
 
 
Table 2.1  
 
Mean ratings of expressions, confidence cue level and distribution of cues 
across experiments 
 
 
 
51 
Table 2.2   A comparison of mean ratings of confidence cues 
 
53 
Table 3.1  Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker across tasks 
 
64 
Table 3.2  Mean confidence (%) in answers for agreement with each speaker across 
tasks 
 
 
68 
Table 3.3  Perceptions of speakers in the presence and absence of confidence cues 
 
 
71 
Table 4.1  Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker across tasks split by 
high/low Need for Closure 
 
 
87 
Table 4.2  Mean confidence in answers (%) for each task, split by high/low Need for 
Closure 
 
 
90 
Table 4.3  Mean confidence in answers (%) for each task, split by high/low Need for 
Cognition 
 
 
93 
Table 5.1  ANOVA Summary Tables  111 
Table 5.2   Ratings of speakers in the absence and presence of confidence cues 
 
115 
Table 6.1  Perceptions of speakers using different confidence levels  
 
129 
Table 7.1  Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker in each Feedback 
Condition 
 
 
147 
Table 7.2  Mean percentage of confidence in answers for agreement with each 
speaker in each Feedback Condition 
 
 
149 
Table 8.1  Initial, final and change in choice in the absence and presence of 
confidence cues 
 
 
164 
Table 8.2  Initial, final and change in mean confidence in answers in the absence 
and presence of confidence cues 
 
 
166 
Table 8.3  Mean accuracy scores 
 
167 
Table 8.4  Initial, final, and changes in agreement with each speaker according to 
initial confidence  
 
 
170 
Table 8.5  Initial, final, and changes in confidence in answers according to initial 
confidence 
 
 
172 
Table 9.1  Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker 
 
183 
Table 9.2  Mean confidence in answers for agreement with each speaker 
 
185 
Table 9.3  Mean ratings of accuracy likelihood for each speaker 
 
185 
Table 9.4  Mean estimates of perceived speaker accuracy  
 
188 
Table 9.5   Ratings of speakers in the absence and presence of confidence cues  189  
Table 10.1  Mean percentage agreement with each speaker 
 
206 
Table 10.2  Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker according to speaker 
accuracy 
 
 
209 
Table 10.3  Mean confidence in chosen answers 
 
210 
Table 10.4  Estimates of speaker accuracy 
 
212 
Table 10.5  Perceptions of speakers split by levels of speaker confidence  213 
 
 Table of Contents: Appendices 
 
   
APPENDIX A  Chapter 2:  Pilot Study Questionnaire 
 
APPENDIX B  Chapter 2:  Pilot Study Descriptive Statistics and T-tests  
 
APPENDIX C  Chapter 3:  Examples of Task Materials 
Chapter 3:  Example of Debriefing Details 
 
APPENDIX D  Chapter 3:  Data 
 
APPENDIX E  Chapter 4:  Personality Questionnaires 
 
APPENDIX F  Chapter 4:  Data 
 
APPENDIX G  Chapter 5:  Examples of Task Materials 
 
APPENDIX H  Chapter 5:  Data 
 
APPENDIX I  Examples of Questions used in Chapters 6, 7, 9 and 10 
Chapter 5:  Overconfidence Questionnaire 
 
APPENDIX J  Chapter 6:  Data 
 
APPENDIX K  Chapter 7:  Data 
 
APPENDIX L  Chapter 8:  Pilot Study Means and Questions used in Main Study 
 
APPENDIX M  Chapter 8: Data 
 
APPENDIX N  Chapter 9: Data  
 
APPENDIX O  Chapter 10: Data 
 
   
   
  
Conferences and publications arising from this thesis 
 
Wesson, C. & Pulford, B. (2006). Verbal expressions of confidence and doubt. Paper submitted 
to Behavior Research Methods. 
 
Wesson, C. & Pulford, B. (2005). Individual differences in the influence of confidence: The 
effects of Need for Closure and Need for Cognition [Abstract]. Proceedings of the British 
Psychological Society, 13(2), 163. 
 
Wesson, C. (2004). Factors mediating the influence of another’s confidence: The role of task type 
on choice and confidence in choice. Paper presented at the PsyPAG Annual Confidence, July 
2004. 
 
Wesson, C. (2004). Factors mediating the use and influence of another’s confidence. Paper 
presented at Departmental Seminar Series, University of Wolverhampton, May, 2004 
 
Wesson, C. (2003). The Communication and Influence of Confidence and Uncertainty. Paper 
presented at the School of Applied Sciences Research Seminar Series, University of 
Wolverhampton, June, 2003 
 CHAPTER 1 
The Communication and Influence of Confidence 
 
What is confidence? 
The aim of this thesis is to consider if, and how, we are influenced in the judgements we 
make, and the decisions we opt in or out of, by the confidence that another person 
expresses. Confidence can be defined as having a firm trust in one’s ability, having a 
sense of reliance or certainty. When making decisions or expressing our knowledge, 
opinions or beliefs about something we will have a feeling of confidence that 
accompanies this. When we are sure that the option we are choosing is the right or best 
one we can be said to have confidence or certainty in that choice. In this way we take 
confidence as being a person’s belief that a statement represents the best possible 
response and it describes a person’s strength of belief about the accuracy or quality of a 
prediction, judgment or choice (Peterson and Pitz, 1988; Sniezek, 1992). Confidence is, 
however, a continuum  - one may have complete confidence or certainty in one’s 
position, or there may be an element of doubt in what one believes, i.e. uncertainty or a 
lack of confidence. Confidence in one’s choice is the converse of uncertainty in one’s 
choice and the two terms can be seen as referring to the same construct (Sniezek, 1992). 
The terms confidence and certainty will be used interchangeably in this thesis, as 
conversely will a lack of confidence and uncertainty. 
How does confidence relate to making judgments and decisions? The level of 
confidence or uncertainty associated with a judgement determines if and how that 
judgement will be used  – not only by ourselves, but also by others (Sniezek, 1992; 
Sniezek and Henry, 1989). Hence, confidence can determine what course of action we 
take. If we have complete confidence in a belief, then common sense dictates that this 
will strongly influence the choice we will go with (the terms decisions and choices will 
be used interchangeably in this thesis). For example, if we are confident that it is going 
to rain then we will choose to take an umbrella when we go shopping, whereas if we are 
certain it is going to be sunny all day we will not. We will then be confident that the 
choice was the right one. However, we are not always confident in our decisions. The 
sky outside may be grey but we still do not know if it is going to rain or not. Should we 
take the umbrella with us and risk the inconvenience of having to walk round with it 
unused all day, or should we leave it at home, and risk getting drenched?    
As much of the knowledge that we possess is uncertain (Peterson and Pitz, 1988) we 
often have the need to seek information, advice and opinions from others. Although 
many judgments are made by individuals they are typically formed in a social context  
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(Sniezek and Henry, 1989). Ultimately these decisions are down to the individual, but 
that person has a number of sources of information that they can consult before reaching 
their decision. In addition to the objective information, such as facts and statistics, an 
individual is also surrounded by the subjective judgements of others (Sniezek and 
Henry, 1989). The amount of confidence with which these subjective judgements are 
expressed can influence our subsequent behaviour, since we use confidence as a way of 
assessing the quality of a speaker’s information. In the case of whether it will rain or not 
we may seek information from a television weather forecaster. If they say that they are 
sure it will rain then we are more likely to take the umbrella with us than if they say 
they’re fairly sure it will rain. This example is a fairly light-hearted one, and the 
consequences of making the wrong decision are no more severe than a minor 
inconvenience. However, we sometimes have to make important or difficult decisions, 
in which making the right or wrong choice is more serious. Is the person on trial guilty? 
Is the evidence of an eyewitness accurate? Which political party do we vote for? Do we 
opt to give our child the MMR vaccine?  
Although we may base our decisions on how confidently someone expresses their 
information, are we right in doing so? A great deal of research has focused on the 
relationship between one’s confidence level and the accuracy of their information, 
finding that many people show a tendency for overconfidence: their subjective 
confidence exceeds the objective accuracy of the outcome (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and 
Phillips, 1982). Not surprisingly decisions based on overconfidence, or even 
miscommunicated confidence, can have serious consequences. For example, in relation 
to eyewitness evidence, confidence can be seen as the witness’s belief in the accuracy of 
their memory (Wells and Murray, 1984). The eyewitness’s confidence can affect the 
decisions of the prosecution, in terms of the reliability of the evidence and consequently 
whether to go to trial or not. Indeed for thirty years, since the Neil v. Biggers (1972) 
case, American courts have used an eyewitness’s confidence to determine the accuracy 
of an eyewitness’s identification (Wells, Olson, and Charman, 2002). This view has 
long been held, for example Deffenbacher (1980) cites Gardner (1933) as saying that a 
testimony given in an assertive and positive way is treated by the courts as being 
accurate and truthful. However, Wells and Murray (1984) questioned whether 
eyewitness confidence should be used in this way. It would appear not, given that a 
study of the causes of miscarriages of justice in the US revealed that more than three 
quarters were based upon extremely confident, but mistaken, eyewitnesses (Wells,  
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Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, and Brimacombe, 1998). As Loftus (1979) warns, high 
confidence should not be taken as an absolute guarantee of anything. 
Given the potential consequences of basing our decisions on the level of confidence 
someone expresses in their information or advice it is surprising how little research has 
been carried out in this area. In relation to advice seeking, Yaniv (2004) observes that 
the act of seeking advice occurs far more often in everyday life than the amount of 
research dedicated to this area would suggest.  More specifically, Zarnoth and Sniezek 
(1997)  note that confidence research has focused on identifying the various 
determinants of confidence, or what causes us to be confident, whilst ignoring the 
influence that this confidence has, not just on ourselves but also on others. This latter 
issue is the focus of this thesis, which aims to answer some questions regarding if, how, 
and why we are influenced by the confidence expressed by other people in their 
knowledge, judgements and opinions. To begin with, this review of the literature will 
consider how we communicate confidence and what the purpose of this communication 
is. Then the focus will turn to how communicated confidence can influence a listener, 
before considering why this should be, drawing upon theoretical perspectives identified 
in the literature. Finally, the aims of the thesis will be laid out in more detail.    
 
The function of communicating confidence 
We frequently rely on advice or information passed on by others in a variety of 
realms, such as relationships, law, finance, health and education (Nelson, Kruglanski, 
and Jost, 1998). In receiving this advice, and deciding whether or not to take it, we must 
decide on the extent of the advisors’ knowledge. But how do we know what they know? 
Trying to establish what other people know is a primary  basis of interpersonal 
communication, playing a key role in social influence and decision-making (Nelson et 
al., 1988).  
When we ask for advice, or are given information by a speaker we must determine 
the quality of that information. Is it reliable, accurate, or justified? We can use our own 
knowledge to determine how good the information we are receiving is (Fussell and 
Krauss, 1991; Nickerson, Baddeley, and Freeman, 1987; Nickerson, 1999). But many 
decisions are made under uncertainty - in fact we are most likely to seek advice when 
we are uncertain. If we do not know something ourselves, we cannot use our own 
knowledge as a way of assessing another’s knowledge and so we must rely on other 
cues to help us, such as how confidently a speaker expresses their information.    
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A primary objective of the expression of confidence is to communicate information 
to another person, often a decision-maker (Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001). In other 
words we are communicating what we know about a given subject or issue  – our 
epistemological knowledge. As Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) point out, 
two aspects of knowledge are what we believe to be true and how confident we are in 
that belief. When someone is speaking to us, they are not only passing on information, 
they are also communicating their strength of belief in the validity of that information. 
We in turn, base our own strength of belief about the validity of the information that we 
are receiving on the level of confidence that is being expressed.        
Grice’s (1975) ‘logic of conversation’ states that speakers should adhere to the 
maxim of quality, by not saying anything they believe to be false, or for which they lack 
evidence. In other words, a speaker should say that they’re uncertain when they are, as 
to do otherwise could suggest certainty in one’s belief. Such rules of conversation apply 
most directly to situations in which people are attempting to exchange information or 
get things done, such as in a decision-making environment. Communicated information 
is viewed as coming with a guarantee of relevance and on this basis, listeners are 
entitled to assume that the speaker is trying to be informative, truthful, relevant and 
clear (Schwartz, 1996). The expectation that a person should follow these rules is seen 
in many applied settings. For instance, when giving evidence in a court the witness 
gives an oath that ‘...the evidence which I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth.’   
A listener’s task is to determine the quality of the information that they are receiving, 
and a speaker must assess the validity of their own beliefs through a process of 
metacognition  – cognitions about cognitions (Lories, Dardenn, and Yzerbyt, 1998; 
Nelson et al., 1998). Olson and Astington (1993) distinguish between language  for 
thinking, involving numerical systems and the verbalisation of these, and language 
about thinking, language representing and describing the thinking process. The latter 
encompasses ordinary language, covering terms such as think, know and believe. It is 
suggested that talking about cognition - using language that represents our mental states 
- represents metacognitive talk, and may constitute ‘sincerity conditions’ for speech acts 
(Astington and Olson, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Olson and Astington, 
1993). Indeed, “a common function of mental terms – besides referring to mental states 
– is to mark the degree of certainty with which a statement is made” (Furrow and 
Moore, 1990, p. 377).   
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So far the story is straightforward. We truthfully convey our confidence to indicate 
the quality of what we are saying. Hence, the level of confidence that we express 
provides a listener with valid cues to our knowledge level, strength of belief, and the 
accuracy of our information. However, in reality this is not always the case. Firstly it 
can be difficult to identify and use valid cues of another person’s accuracy, especially 
when information can be intentionally or unintentionally miscommunicated (Sniezek 
and Henry, 1989). This miscommunication may occur because the language used is 
ambiguous or imprecise (Sniezek and Henry, 1989). But we may also miscommunicate 
our confidence more intentionally, expressing an inappropriate level of confidence for 
reasons of impression-management (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). A speaker may 
want to appear more knowledgeable than they really are, and so overstate their 
confidence relative to their knowledge level. For example, a candidate at a job interview 
who wants the interviewers to believe they possess certain skills may confidently say 
they can do something that they have little experience of doing, in the hope of 
maximising their chances of landing the job.  
Teigen (1990) suggests that there is a ‘preciseness paradox’. People are not always 
truthful or accurate in their responses, but bluffs or guesses may still be confidently 
voiced despite being typically false. Alternatively, we may want a particular outcome to 
occur, and so miscommunicate confidence to get our own way. We may also 
miscommunicate our confidence for less selfish reasons, perhaps simply because we are 
lacking self-confidence. A lack of self-confidence, or social confidence, may inhibit the 
behavioural expression of confidence on an issue, even if that issue is important to the 
individual (Scherer, 1978; Visser, Krosnick, and Simmons, 2003). Given that a great 
deal of important information can be communicated by expressing our confidence in 
something, it is important to consider the ways in which we can do this.  
 
The communication of confidence 
When communicating what we do or do not know, we may express ourselves using 
either quantitative or qualitative terms. Quantitative expressions convey confidence in 
numerical terms, and we may use these to represent our belief that a particular event 
will occur. For example, when asked what we think the weather will be like the next 
day we may state, “there’s a 50/50 chance it will rain”. Alternatively we may attach a 
confidence rating to an answer, such as saying “I’m 90% sure it will rain”. Confidence 
research traditionally treats confidence in this way, as a subjective probability, using  
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numerical scales on which to measure confidence. Conversely we may express our 
confidence in qualitative terms, through a range of familiar expressions relating to 
expectations, epistemic modalities and subjective probabilities. Not only can confidence 
be communicated verbally, through the words that we use to express ourselves with, it 
can also be communicated nonverbally, through body language and paralinguistics. 
However the focus of this thesis is on the verbal communication of confidence in the 
written form, as this reflects much of the communications we receive in the modern age, 
for instance in the form of emails and texts. Hence, a review of literature relating to the 
nonverbal communication of confidence will not be conducted here, although 
consideration will be given to the nonverbal communication of confidence in Chapter 
11, the General Discussion.    
 
Numerical and verbal expressions of confidence  
Confidence may be expressed numerically as a subjective probability – formally, the 
mapping of a person’s belief onto a real number between 0, indicating an impossible 
event, to 1, indicating a certain event, although this is more commonly translated into a 
percentage (e.g. assigning a probability of .5 to an event occurring may also be 
expressed as a 50% chance of that event happening). “We use the term ‘subjective 
probability’ to denote any estimate of the probability of an event” (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982, p. 32).  
While people appear to have a preference for receiving numerical probabilities, as 
communicators they often feel more comfortable using verbal phrases (Brun and 
Teigen, 1988; Clark, 1990; Druzdzel, 1989; Hamm, 1991; Renooij and Witteman, 
1999). Verbal expressions of confidence are commonly used to convey chances and 
beliefs, not only by lay people but also by experts such as doctors, lawyers, and 
politicians. For example, a doctor may tell a patient, ‘I think X is the problem’, and a 
lawyer may say, ‘I believe you have a good case’. 
The preference for receiving numerical expressions of confidence may be due to 
their precision (Budescu and Wallsten, 1985; Olson and Budescu, 1997; Renooij and 
Witteman, 1999).  Numerical expressions convey a definite, quantifiable amount of 
confidence, allowing us to precisely express how confident or uncertain we feel to 
others, who in turn understand the level of confidence that we are conveying. Druzdzel 
(1989) though argues that numerical expressions actually carry a misleading illusion of 
precision suggesting that the probability of an event is measurable, which it frequently  
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is not. Indeed, Renooij and Witteman (1999) suggest that people prefer to use verbal 
expressions rather than numerical, except in situations where there is an objectively 
measurable outcome. The preference for expressing confidence using verbal expressions 
may be because people do not feel familiar with the concept of probability, or have 
trouble attaching a numerical value to their beliefs (Renooij and Witteman, 1999). 
Hence, when people communicate confidence and probabilities, more often than not 
they choose to do so using words rather than numbers.  
Verbal expressions of confidence do have their disadvantages, mainly because they 
are vague, do not clearly denote a particular amount, and can be extremely imprecise 
and ambiguous (Sniezek and Henry, 1989). However, Renooij and Witteman (1999) 
argue that numbers may be just as vague as words when expressing uncertainty, and are 
just as easily influenced by context and personal opinions as verbal expressions are. In 
fact the preference for verbal or numerical expressions is not universal across people, 
events or situations, and rather depends, in part, on the degree of vagueness, source of 
uncertainty and the nature of the communication (Olson and Budescu, 1997). For 
instance, Budescu, Weinberg, and Wallsten (1988) found that people preferred verbal 
expressions when dealing with gains, and numerical estimates when dealing with losses. 
It would seem then that people view everyday events according to psychological or 
subjective probabilities rather than mathematical or objective probabilities (Cohen, 
1964). The richness and variability of verbal expressions means that they are capable of 
communicating more information than numerical expressions are, conveying the 
vagueness and imprecision of much real world information, and making them more 
suited to how individuals think about uncertainty in everyday life (Druzdzel, 1989; 
Hamm, 1991; Moxey and Sanford, 1993; Windschitl and Wells, 1996). Natural 
language is more understandable and easier to digest than its numerical equivalent, and 
can be used to communicate a range of confidence. 
 
Confidence-uncertainty continuum 
We use verbal expressions of subjective probability to indicate our degree of 
certainty, with terms being placed along a continuum, indicating increasing certainty: 
suppose,  think,  sure,  certain, and positive  (Berry, 1960; Foley, 1959). Consistent 
findings for the ordering of these expressions on the continuum have been found in 
other languages, such as  Hebrew (Beyth-Marom, 1982), French (Fabre, 1991) and 
Dutch (Renooij and Witteman, 1999).   
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Many other intermediate terms of confidence are used in addition to those mentioned 
above, along with the addition of many different intensifiers and qualifiers. Qualifiers 
are words used to strengthen or weaken the belief that is being communicated. Adding 
the qualifier probably to a statement is going to convey to a recipient that the 
communicator has less strength in their belief than one who adds the qualifier certainly. 
For example, if asked the question, “Which city is the capital of Australia?” the 
response “I think that the answer is probably Canberra” conveys less confidence than “I 
think that the answer is certainly Sydney”, despite the former response being correct. As 
with expressions of subjective probability, qualifier terms of certainty are represented 
by degrees of quantification: possibility-likelihood-certainty (Feezel, 1974). The way in 
which a speaker expresses their level of confidence conveys what a speaker knows or 
believes and so can be taken as expressions of epistemic modality.  
 
Epistemic modality 
Expressions of epistemic modality relate to the speaker and their state of belief, 
knowledge, or their degree of certainty, signified by words such as know and think, 
along with the degree of likelihood that something is the case, with the use of words 
such as possible, probable, and certain (Westney, 1986).  
In everyday language, belief terms function to regulate the degree of certainty with 
which a statement is expressed and the strength of epistemic modality may be structured 
in terms of likelihood, from possible to probable to certain (Moore, Harris, and 
Patriquin, 1993; Westney, 1986). Strong (certain) values may be represented by terms 
such as I know, I’m sure, It’s certain. Weak (possibility) values are those such as It’s 
possible, perhaps, may, might. Intermediate (probable) values may be represented by 
terms such as  It’s probably, likely, I think. So for instance,  know indicates that the 
speaker is more certain than they are when they say think.  
 
Powerful and powerless speech styles  
One’s degree of confidence or uncertainty may also be communicated via the speech 
style one opts for. Speech style refers to linguistic features that determine  how a 
message is said rather than what is said in terms of verbal content. An aspect of speech 
that can lead to attributions being made about the speaker is how powerful their speech 
style is, as some words or phrases are associated with powerful persons, whereas others 
are associated with those who are weak or powerless. O’Barr (1982) defines powerless  
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speech as being characterised by a higher frequency of hedges, intensifiers, hesitations 
and gestures, whereas powerful speech should be low these.  
What is the result of using ‘powerless’ speech? On the positive side it shows 
politeness, but on the negative side it may make the speaker appear uncertain (Bradley, 
1981; Myers, 1991). Powerful speakers may be perceived as having more confidence in 
their position due to the straightforwardness and clarity with which they present their 
communication, whereas powerless language may indicate a speaker’s lack of 
confidence (Berger and Bradac, 1982; Bradley, 1981; Erickson, Lind, Johnson, and 
O’Barr, 1978; Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Parton, Siltanen, Hosman, and 
Langenderfer, 2002).  
Why does powerless speech indicate uncertainty? Aspects of powerless speech, such 
as tag questions and disclaimers, express uncertainty and marginal commitment to 
one’s remarks, thus indicating a lack of confidence. A tag question can be defined as 
midway between an outright statement and a yes-no question, in that it is less assertive 
in the former and more confident in the latter (Lakoff, 1975). The questioning forms of 
tag questions request the listener’s confirmation of the truth of an assertion. So if 
someone says, “That’s the correct answer, isn’t it?” they are seeking confirmation, 
taking a tentative approach and as such they are communicating uncertainty in their 
statement.  
Disclaimers - introductory expressions that may explain or excuse what is to follow - 
may also communicate uncertainty. Bradley (1981) notes that whilst linguists have 
identified at least five different kinds of disclaimer, only two project uncertainty: 
hedging (e.g. I’m no expert but…) and cognitive disclaimers (e.g. I could be mistaken 
but…). However, Myers (1991) suggests that hedges may be used to convey politeness 
rather than uncertainty alone, making it difficult to establish a person’s true meaning. 
For example, hedging a criticism towards a suggestion for reasons of politeness would 
be difficult to distinguish from expressing uncertainty in that suggestion.  
 
Gender differences 
There have been suggestions that the use of a powerless speech style is more 
characteristic of women’s speech than of men’s, with differences in speech style 
resulting from, and reinforcing, sex stereotypes  (Bradley, 1981; Lakoff, 1975). Hence, 
the way men speak maintains images of their being assertive, self-confident and definite 
whilst women’s speech conveys them as non-assertive, vague and lacking in confidence  
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- attributes traditionally associated with Western cultures stereotyped expectations of 
feminine behaviour. However, Newcombe and Arnkoff (1979) point out that Lakoff’s 
observations were presented without the support of empirical evidence. Furthermore, 
times have changed in the last 30 years, and such gender specific stereotypes may no 
longer be applicable - in the west at least.  
There is evidence though to suggest that sex differences in language may be more 
apparent in mixed-sex rather than same-sex interactions (Carli, 1990; McMillan, 
Clifton, McGrath, and Gale, 1977). This may be because listeners feel less confident 
attributing a speaker’s speech style to their level of certainty when the speaker is of the 
opposite sex, presumably because the listener’s own speech style cannot be used as a 
reference point (Erickson et al., 1978). Carli (1990) views differences in language usage 
in mixed-sex and same-sex interactions as a function of status differences between men 
and women, with women said to possess lower status in Western society than men do.  
Furrow and Moore (1990) point out that the issue is not that women use aspects of 
powerless speech more than men, but rather that they use them more to express 
uncertainty.  In support of this they cite Holmes’ (1986) observation, that women’s use 
of phrases such as “I know” and “I think” functioned more to express confidence and 
certainty than tentativeness and uncertainty, contrary to Lakoff’s (1975) suggestion that 
women used terms such as “I think” to express uncertainty. However, it has also been 
argued that the use of tentative, or powerless language is due to status or social power 
alone, with men and women using powerful speech being viewed more favourably than 
those using powerless speech (Erickson et al., 1978; Lind and O’Barr, 1979). Powerless 
communicators may be perceived less favourably not because of their gender, but 
because of the extra cognitive effort that it takes to understand their more complex 
manner of communication. 
 
Directionality of expressions 
Verbally expressing one’s level of confidence does not only convey how confident or 
uncertain we are in a belief or a given piece of information, it can also indicate the 
directionality of our uncertainty. It has been argued that numerical expressions of 
confidence are uni-directional, in that they either affirm or negate a statement, whereas 
verbal expressions can be bi-directional, with some expressions suggesting a continuum 
from weak-strong affirmation, whereas others suggest a weak-strong negation (Teigen 
and Brun, 1995; Teigen and Brun, 1999). Different advice may be given, or different  
  11 
action taken, depending on directionality of the phrase used, even when both 
expressions refer to the same objective probability. Phrases may be termed positive 
when they ask the listener to consider the outcome described, e.g.  likely, whereas 
negative phrases suggest negations of the described outcome, e.g. unlikely, (Teigen and 
Brun, 1999).  
Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) suggest that in the everyday usage of 
language, the notion of probability refers to several distinct states of mind;  
 
A statement of confidence expresses one’s uncertainty in a prediction, estimate or 
inference to which one is already committed. Thus, it is natural to ask, “how 
confident are you that you are right?” but it is anomalous to ask, “how confident 
are you that you are wrong?”. Confidence is the subjective probability or degree 
of belief associated with what we ‘think’ will happen (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982. p.150). 
 
In relation to this, Teigen (1990) found that when people were asked how confident they 
were about the believability of  a statement, people preferred specific (numerical) to 
more general (verbal) statements. However, when asked which statements they felt most 
sceptical about, they again chose the specific statements, which aroused their suspicion.  
One’s choice of expression can indicate not only the direction of one’s confidence but 
also the source of one’s uncertainty. This will be discussed in the next section.   
 
Variants of uncertainty 
A distinction can be made between uncertainty attributed to the external world, or 
our state of knowledge in relation to a public body of knowledge, and uncertainty 
attributed to one’s own mind, or one’s own ignorance, rather than to external forces 
(Howell and Burnett, 1978; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As such, internal 
uncertainty refers to events which one can control, and external uncertainty to those that 
cannot be controlled (Howell and Burnett, 1978).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) point out that from a Bayesian perspective all 
probabilities are subjective and personal, whereas natural language differentiates 
between internal and external uncertainty. They suggest that external and internal 
uncertainties are often distinguished by the use of a personal pronoun. In this way “It is 
uncertain that…” refers to external, real world, uncertainty, whereas “I am uncertain  
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that…” refers to internal uncertainty, or degree of confidence. Fox and Irwin (1998) 
distinguish internal and external statements in a slightly different way, proposing that 
internal phrases convey knowledge of one’s own abilities, e.g. “I am fairly sure that…” 
or “I am  reasonably confident that…”, whereas external phrases reflect external 
probabilities, e.g. “I think there is a good chance that…” or “I think there is a high 
probability that…”.  
 
Non-answers 
A speaker’s non-answers can also convey their level of uncertainty in an answer 
(Smith and Clark, 1993). Non-answers such as “I can’t remember” and “I don’t know” 
convey different levels of uncertainty. Saying that you can’t remember suggests that 
you may know the answer but you just can’t bring it to mind immediately – if faced 
with options, such as multiple choice questions, it would suggest that you may 
recognise the answer. Saying “I don’t know” on the other hand indicates less 
confidence, as it is an outright statement of not having that knowledge. Smith and Clark 
suggest that the use of non-answers such as “I can’t remember” may be used to save 
face, as the respondent wants to point out that they do in actual fact know the answer 
but they can not recall it at present. 
 
Verbal uncertainty research 
According to Druzdzel (1989), the main question verbal uncertainty expression 
researchers have been asking is “do the verbal uncertainty phrases have a reasonably 
precise, communicable probabilistic meaning”? This has focused on the mapping of 
quantitative terms to qualitative terms and back again. The literature on this area is 
fairly extensive and will not be discussed here at length (see Clark, 1990, and Druzdzel, 
1989, for reviews of verbal uncertainty expression research). The main findings from 
these literature reviews are that there is a great deal of between-subject variability in the 
numerical values assigned to expressions of confidence/subjective probability, but 
considerably less within-subject variability (Clark, 1990; Druzdzel, 1989). Furthermore, 
numerical and verbal expressions of confidence/uncertainty are deemed to be 
interchangeable, with neither being better or worse than the other, and both being 
sufficient for communicating uncertainties (Clark, 1990; Renooij and Witteman, 1999).  
Druzdzel (1989) suggested that an area of research worth pursuing is to combine the 
findings of verbal uncertainty research with that of human reasoning under uncertainty,  
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as the latter area often uses numerical probabilities. This can also be applied to 
judgement and decision-making research. Specifically, whether the biases demonstrated 
in such experiments also appear if verbal expressions are used, and if so, do the 
magnitudes of such biases change. As many of the decisions that we make in our daily 
lives are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events, beliefs that are 
usually expressed in terms of verbal probabilities, by statements such as, ‘I think 
that…’, ‘Chances are…’, and ‘It is unlikely that…’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982), 
this is an area worthy of further research. Although we may prefer to receive numerical 
expressions of confidence, the review of the literature has shown that we tend to express 
our confidence in more natural language. Given this, it is surprising that much of the 
research into confidence relies on the numerical expression of confidence in terms of 
probabilities. The research in this thesis aims to rectify this by using verbal expressions 
of confidence.  
Throughout this thesis the source of communication will be referred to as the speaker 
and the recipient as the listener, because although information will be conveyed using 
written statements, most of the conclusions will likely apply more generally to 
situations in which information can be transmitted through alternative modalities such 
as speech.  
 
The influence of confidence in judgement and decision-making 
The review of the literature so far has shown that there are many different ways in 
which we can communicate our confidence to others. We have also seen that by 
communicating our confidence we can indicate our strength of belief in the information 
that we are imparting to others, whether the level of confidence that we opt to use is 
appropriate or not. But what is the influence on other people when we express different 
levels of confidence?  
The confidence that a speaker expresses can influence us in a number of ways: it can 
influence the choices that we make, as well as influencing how we perceive that 
speaker. However, speech style research has focused on impression formation but not, 
as Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) observe, on how persuasive the use of powerful and 
powerless speech is. In the realm of judgment and decision-making on the other hand, 
confidence can be considered from two perspectives: as an outcome of the decision 
process and as a factor that influences the decision process (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; 
Sniezek and Henry, 1989). Most research has focused on the former, identifying what  
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makes people confident (e.g. Bradfield,  Wells, and Olson, 2002; Gill, Swann, and 
Silvera, 1998; Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Kelley and Lindsay, 1993; Koehler, 1991; 
Wells and Bradfield, 1999). The relationship between a person’s confidence and the 
quality, or accuracy, of their information has been of particular interest, with the 
prevalent finding being that people are overconfident, which has in turn spawned a body 
of research interested in finding out what causes people to be overconfident (see 
Lichtenstein et al., 1982 for an overview). However, what the influence of confidence, 
whether biased or not, is on other people has been relatively ignored (Budescu et al., 
1988; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), although recent research by Wheatcroft, Wagstaff, 
and Kebbell (2004) have looked at a forensic application. How do we perceive 
confident speakers, and what influence does a speaker’s confidence have on our 
choices? The lack of research relating to the influence of confidence, specifically in 
relation to the choices we opt in and out of is surprising as we frequently base decisions, 
or form opinions, on the advice or information communicated to us by other people.  
Communicating how confident we are conveys information to other people, for 
example how strongly we hold a belief, or our apparent level of knowledge in a given 
subject area. This not only serves to inform others, but can also be used to persuade 
others. Indeed, London, Meldman, and Lanckton (1970) suggest that it is the expression 
of confidence that persuades people during a discussion, stating that, “the single 
significant behavioral difference between persuaders and persuadees was in the 
expression of confidence” (p. 82).  
Research shows that people who confidently express their views exert more 
influence on the choice behaviour of others than less confident people do, and a 
decision-maker is more likely to accept the recommendation of an advisor as that 
advisor’s confidence increases (Gill, Swann, and Silvera, 1998; Sniezek and Van Swol, 
2001). This has been found in many different areas, from knowledge-based tasks (Lee, 
2005; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 
2001), and perceptual identification tasks (Pulford and Colman, 2005), to jurors’ 
verdicts and the acceptance of eyewitness testimonies (Leippe, Manion, and 
Romanczyk, 1992; London et al., 1970; Wells and Murray, 1984). However, not all 
research has found confidence to be an influential factor (Sniezek, 1989; Sniezek and 
Henry, 1989; Zalesny, 1990). Why is this? Zarnoth and Sniezek (2002) suggest that 
rather than this indicating that confidence is a weak or unpredictable aspect of 
persuasion, it may just be that the social influence of confidence is mediated by other  
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factors. Some of the factors that could lead to the conflicting research findings are 
identified below.  
 
Task type  
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) suggest that the influence confidence has on our 
decisions may differ according to the type of task undertaken. They provide evidence 
for this in their review of the literature, finding that confidence predicted influence on 
recognition tasks (Hinsz, 1990) and maths puzzles (Johnson and Torcivia, 1967), but 
not on tasks such as marketing forecasts (Sniezek, 1989) and mock jury verdicts 
(London, 1973). They suggest that confidence predicts influence  on tasks that are 
intellective but does not, or does but to a lesser extent, on tasks that are judgmental.  
Tasks may be placed along a continuum, anchored at either end by intellective and 
judgmental tasks (Laughlin and Ellis, 1986). Intellective tasks are problems or decisions 
for which there exists a demonstrably correct answer, the accuracy of which can be 
proven. Judgmental tasks, are evaluative or aesthetic judgements for which there does 
not exist a demonstrably correct answer, and involve evaluating the problem according 
to preference. Tasks may lie on a variety of locations along the continuum. Some are 
highly intellective (e.g. general knowledge) or highly judgmental (e.g. opinions), 
whereas others are less so (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). For instance, forecasts are less 
judgmental than opinions because a correct answer does eventually become available.  
To investigate whether the influence of confidence varied on different types of task, 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) presented participants with multiple-choice questions 
covering six different task types. Participants chose their answers and provided 
numerical estimates indicating how confident they were that they had chosen the correct 
response, first alone then again as a member of a group.  Higher confidence led to group 
members being more influential, regardless of the accuracy of their answers and the 
type of task they were completing, although confidence exerted greater influence on 
intellective than on judgmental tasks. It is suggested that both confidence and accuracy 
exert an influence, but the influence exerted by accuracy is strongest on intellective 
tasks, but the influence that can be attributed to confidence is fairly constant regardless 
of accuracy or task type. Further research relating to a speaker’s accuracy will be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
Although the results from Zarnoth and Sniezek’s study indicate that there are 
differences in the influence of confidence depending on whether a task is intellective or  
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judgmental, the full effect of task type may have been obscured as a result of combining 
the tasks. Recall that 6 tasks were used in this study, each representing a different 
position on the intellective-judgmental task type continuum, which were then combined 
to produce two task type categories: either intellective or judgmental. However, there is 
still variation within these categories with regards to the influence of confidence. For 
instance, the intellective category consisted of a very intellective task at one end, in the 
guise of difficult maths questions, and a less intellective task, leaning towards 
judgmental, in the form of analogies, at the other end. Differences in the influence of 
confidence on these two tasks that fall within the same task type category were 
observed. The most confident group member’s response was chosen more frequently on 
the difficult maths task (dyads: 88% and pentads: 70%) than on the analogies task 
(dyads: 72% and pentads: 58%). The influence of confidence on the analogies task 
seems closer to that observed on the opinion-based task (dyads: 67% and pentads: 
50%), despite this being classed as the most judgmental task. Therefore to understand 
more fully the way in which task type may mediate the influence of confidence it may 
be beneficial to use more discrete categories of task type.  
Additionally, Zarnoth and Sniezek view judgmental tasks as being the most difficult 
tasks on account of the demonstrability of a correct answer. However, a decision-maker 
could take a different view, and may instead see tasks for which they can generate an 
answer – any answer, regardless of its demonstrability - as being ‘easier’. Hence, it may 
not be the type of task per se that we are tackling that mediates the influence of 
confidence but how much information the task itself allows us to bring to it. 
 
Sources of information  
If a task allows a decision-maker to bring information to it, then that decision-maker 
can utilise internal information, or their own knowledge concerning the task in hand. 
Alternatively the decision-maker may have to utilise external information, taking advice 
from others (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995).  
Sniezek and Buckley propose that when we receive another’s input is important in 
determining which source of information we use. If advice from another person comes 
after we have made an initial decision then we will already have accessed internal 
information so we can choose to use or ignore the external information subsequently 
received. Other times we may receive advice before making our initial decision. This 
gives a decision-maker the opportunity to use information from internal and external  
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sources, but it also means that they could forgo their own knowledge and just follow the 
information provided by another. In other situations we may have to make a decision 
blindly, having only external information to rely upon, for example when we have no 
knowledge in a particular domain.  
Although Sniezek and Buckley found the most confident person exerted the most 
influence upon the choices people made, this advice was followed to different degrees 
depending upon when it was received. When an initial decision was made before 
receiving input, the most confident advisor’s recommendation was followed 63.1% of 
the time, whereas receiving input prior to making any form of decision resulted in the 
most confident advisor’s recommendation being followed on 70.6% of occasions. When 
the decision-maker had to rely solely on the input of another they followed the most 
confident advisor’s recommendation 90.2% of the time.  
Sniezek and Buckley’s methodology allows for some consideration to be given to the 
extent to which an individual relies upon their own knowledge, compared to knowledge 
offered by another person. However, it still does not address the issue of how easily an 
individual can bring an answer to mind, and whether this ease of generating an answer 
mediates the influence of confidence. Instead the study suggests that a speaker’s 
confidence can curtail a listener’s information processing, in terms of generating 
alternative answers once this external information has been received. It would be 
worthwhile therefore to take into account task difficulty, as opposed to just task type, 
and what sources of information are called upon as a function of this.   
In addition to the sources of information one uses, the number of external 
information sources available may also be a factor in the influence of confidence. Of 
relevance here is the number of people within a decision-making group.  
 
Group size and consensus 
The number of people in a group can dampen the influence of the most confident 
group member. Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) compared groups with two and five 
members, finding that the most confident group member’s response was chosen more 
frequently within the smaller group (72% vs. 57%).   
However, the most confident group member may only exert the most influence when 
all of the group are in disagreement. When group members agree on an answer 
confidence plays a subservient role, with a speaker’s confidence being a less powerful 
persuader than advisor consensus (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). Here it does not even  
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matter how confident the group members are, as the number of people being in 
agreement with one another has the strongest influence. Indeed, the tendency to go 
along  with the consensus opinion was so prevalent that it occurred even when the 
confidence expressed in that opinion was so low it indicated that the answers were mere 
guesses. Problems relating to group decision-making are highlighted later on in this 
chapter, under the sections on the influence of confidence within groups, and decision-
making environment.  
A number of factors directly relating to the communication of confidence can affect 
the influence of confidence. Literature relating to the mode of expression, 
communication channel, and levels of confidence will now be reviewed. 
 
Mode of expression  
How a speaker chooses to express their confidence, and not just the level of 
confidence they express, can affect the influence that they have over the decisions of 
other people (Fox and Irwin, 1998).  
The review of the literature relating to the communication of confidence indicated 
that people prefer to receive confidence in a numerical form because of the apparent 
preciseness of these expressions compared to their verbal equivalents, which can be 
more ambiguous. On this basis it might be expected that peoples’ choice behaviour 
would be different depending on which form of expressed certainty they are basing a 
decision on. This has not been found to be the case. Renooij and Witteman (1999) found 
that the same decisions were made, with the same level of confidence, regardless of 
whether the information was communicated with verbally or numerically expressed 
confidence attached, with similar results being found by Budescu et al. (1988).                 
Lee (2005) did however find some gender differences in the influence of verbally 
and numerically expressed confidence. Men were influenced (to change their answers) 
more than women when a partner’s answers had numerically expressed confidence 
attached, whereas women were influenced more than men by verbally expressed 
confidence. However, this was only found when the participant and partner were of 
differing sexes. When receiving information from a same sex partner no differences 
were found in participants’ sensitivity to numerical expressions of confidence. Gender 
differences in the influence of confidence will be returned to later in this chapter. 
The amount of research that uses verbal expressions of confidence in relation to their 
influence is limited. The tendency is to use numerically expressed confidence (e.g.  
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Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Price and Stone, 2004; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997, but see 
London, McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Pulford, 2002; Pulford and Colman, 2005). 
Although this is advantageous in that it is easily controllable, and can be clearly 
communicated, it does not represent day-to-day communication of confidence and 
uncertainty, where confidence is rarely expressed numerically.  
Whether we express our confidence using internal or external expressions may also 
exert differing influence on a decision-maker. Fox and Irwin (1998) cite a study by Fox 
and Malle (1997) that found people were more willing to bet on events whose outcomes 
were expressed using internal expressions of confidence than when equivalent external 
terms were used. This may be because events over which people perceive themselves as 
exerting some control tend to be judged as more certain than the evidence warrants, and 
convey more responsibility than external statements do  (Fox and Malle, 1997; Howell 
and Burnett, 1978). When a listener attributes outcomes to factors internal to the 
speaker, such as effort or ability, the listener may overvalue their certainty, leading to a 
confidence bias. 
However, Feezel (1974) found that statements expressed using the external mode 
were accepted more than equivalent statements expressed in the internal mode, 
suggesting that expressions in the external mode, which are preceded by terms such as It 
is, may “imitate a general consensus making the assertion more certain, probable or 
possible” (p. 353).  
The conflicting findings relating to the influence of external and internal expressions 
could be due to differences in how these concepts are defined.  Whereas Feezel follows 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) definition of external and internal uncertainty, 
whereby they are distinguished by the use of a personal pronoun (i.e. It is vs. I am), Fox 
and Malle define internal expressions as conveying knowledge of one’s own abilities 
and external expressions as reflecting external probabilities (i.e. fairly sure vs. good 
chance).  
 
Communication channel 
Chaiken and Eagly (1976) compared the persuasive impact of different 
communication modalities, finding that message difficulty mediated persuasion but 
speaker’s confidence did not. However, confidence was manipulated, by an actor, in just 
the audio and video modes and not in the written format meaning that a full comparison 
across modalities was not conducted. Sparks, Areni, and Cox (1998) found that the  
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influence of speech style on persuasion was dependent on communication modality. 
Speech style did not influence persuasion in the written format, but in the audio mode it 
had a significant effect on listener’s attitudes towards a recommendation, and 
approached significance in the video modality. However, the influence of speech style 
on perceptions of the speaker was found to be largely independent of modality.  
Sparks et al. (1998) suggest that when a listener has to evaluate a speaker’s 
recommendation, rather than the speaker themselves, they may rely on different cues, 
the influence of which may depend on the modality of communication. They advise that 
the communication modality used in research should depend on the dependent variables 
of interest. When the dependent variables are source-related perceptions, the written 
modality will adequately convey features of speech style. However, when the focus is 
on attitudes toward the speaker’s recommendation, the written mode may not 
effectively communicate speech style’s persuasive qualities. 
The experiments reported in this thesis use communication in the written format, 
focusing on the language of confidence. Other channels of communication bring with 
them a wealth of other cues, and while these are interesting, and certainly worthy of 
further research (and will be considered in the discussion), they are beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Further consideration will now be given to literature relating to the language 
of confidence. 
 
Levels of confidence 
The literature review so far has focused on factors that may mediate the influence of 
confidence in relation to the observation that some researchers have found the most 
confident speaker to be the most influential, whereas others have found no relationship 
between confidence and influence. A further possibility to consider is that we may be 
influenced by a speaker’s confidence, but not necessarily the most confident speaker.  
Many experiments have looked at the influence of a confident speaker relative to that 
of an uncertain speaker. For instance, speech style research compares the influence of 
powerful speech, which indicates confidence, to that of powerless speech, which 
indicates uncertainty. Invariably this shows powerful speech to have the greatest 
(positive) influence (Erickson et al., 1978; Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999). Similarly, 
Carli (1989; 1990; 1995) pits confident speech against tentative speech, again reaching 
the same conclusion.   
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However, as we have already seen, we can use expressions to cover a wide range of 
confidence, indicating many different positions along the confidence-uncertainty 
continuum, and hence the influence of confidence is not as black and white as some 
research would suggest. Research into the influence of confidence should not just cover 
the two extremes, be it powerful and powerless speech, confidence versus 
doubt/uncertainty, or high and low confidence.  
What is the influence of confidence when a broader range is used? Some research, 
using interacting groups or dyads covers a naturalistic range of confidence examining 
the influence of confidence in situ so to speak. Again, this tends to find that the most 
confident speaker has the greatest influence over the rest of the group or the partner 
with whom they are interacting (e.g. Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 
1997). However, the problem here is that we do not know what level(s) of confidence 
we are comparing the most confident speaker’s influence to  – is the partner/group 
totally uncertain, or fairly confident, or even very confident, but just not the most 
confident? Also there is a reliance on numerical expressions of confidence. As was 
pointed out previously these can be easily interpreted, and hence we have a preference 
for receiving them, but this is often not the way in which we choose to communicate. 
Verbal expressions are far more ambiguous and open to interpretation. What then is the 
influence of verbal expressions of confidence? 
Presenting participants with high, medium, or low confidence arguments, London, 
McSeveney, and Tropper (1971) found that people were most persuaded by the medium 
confidence argument. Furthermore, as a speaker’s confidence increased, so to did the 
listener’s feelings of antagonism towards that speaker. This suggests that confidence is 
positively related to persuasion up to an optimum point, after which confidence has a 
detrimental effect, leading to a reduction in persuasion and an increase in negative 
feelings and antagonism on the part of the listener toward the speaker (London et al., 
1971; Maslow, Yoselson, and London, 1971). In other words there is a curvilinear 
relationship between expressed confidence and persuasion, and so once an individual is 
persuaded, to continue to try to persuade, with increasing confidence, only has negative 
effects (London et al., 1971).  
In London et al.’s study, only female participants were used. It may be that men and 
women respond differently to a speaker’s confidence. This is what Pulford (2002) 
found. Here a similar effect to London et al.’s was found for females in that they were 
influenced by a medium confidence speaker the most. Men, on the other hand, were not  
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persuaded to change their answers by a speaker, regardless of that speaker’s level of 
confidence.  
Initially these results seem at odds with the other literature reviewed in this chapter, 
with the finding that the medium confidence speaker, and not the high confidence 
speaker, exerts the most influence. However a number of methodological issues may 
contribute to theses findings.  
Firstly, the number of items over which the influence of confidence was measured 
may be a contributing factor to these results. Pulford (2002) measured the influence of 
confidence over nine definition-type questions, whereas London et al. (1971) used a 
single jury-method based task. It may be that a strong influence of (high) confidence 
manifests over a longer period, perhaps as the individual develops a strategy to aid their 
decision-making. The brevity of these tasks may not have given individuals sufficient 
opportunity to do so, whereas experiments using the numerical expression of 
confidence, that tend to use more task items, do so. The influence of confidence as 
numerical confidence has been measured over 24-items (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), 
60-items (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993), and 70-items (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995), studies 
that have all shown the most confident speaker to exert the most influence. Future 
studies could consider the influence of confidence over time. 
London et al. (1971) and Pulford (2002) also use verbal expressions of confidence, as 
opposed to the numerical expression of confidence. This may indicate that the influence 
of verbal confidence is different to the influence of numerical confidence. However, in 
face-to-face interactions, where speakers used verbal expressions of confidence, Pulford 
and Colman (2005) found that the most confident speaker was the most influential. 
Hence, further research relating to the influence of verbal expressions of confidence is 
needed to clarify the nature of its influence.  
There are also differences between the two studies in terms of how the influence of 
confidence was measured. In London et al.’s study persuasion was determined by 
considering changes in the intensity of a participant’s position. Here they were asked, 
before and after viewing a persuasive message, to indicate how confident they were that 
the defendant should, and should not be held liable, on a 0-100% scale. As London et al. 
report, participants in the medium confidence condition actually became less confident 
in their initial position, whereas those in the high and low conditions became more 
confident. In Pulford’s study however, changes in choice of answer, as reported above, 
as well as changes in confidence in answer, were considered. In the case of the latter,  
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men, although not changing their answers after viewing a speaker’s confidence, did 
become more confident in their answers when the speaker expressed high confidence, 
whereas women became more confident in their answers when a speaker expressed any 
level of confidence (high, medium or low). 
A further consideration is that the influence of different levels of confidence may be 
associated with the appropriateness of a given level of confidence. Research findings 
relating to the match between confidence and argument quality and accuracy, including 
aspects of overconfidence literature, will now be reviewed.  
 
Argument quality  
It should not automatically be assumed that for maximum persuasiveness one should 
adopt a highly confident manner of speech (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 2002). As has already 
been seen, the influence of confidence is not consistent. After finding that a highly 
confident speaker was more influential than a low confidence speaker when presenting a 
strong argument, but the low confidence speaker was more influential when the 
argument was of poorer quality, Zarnoth and Sniezek suggested that the effect of a 
speaker’s confidence on persuasion is moderated by argument quality. In other words, 
to be effective expressed confidence needed to match argument quality. 
Zarnoth and Sniezek related their findings to those of London et al. (1971) with the 
suggestion that the mismatch between argument quality and expressed confidence in the 
argument may have led to the speaker being perceived as overconfident, and therefore 
unlikeable in some way, which results in a detrimental effect on influence. So, 
expressing too much confidence can actually make you less persuasive than someone 
expressing less confidence in their position.  
In a related study Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen (2002) considered the effects of 
argument quality and power of speech style on persuasion. Contrary to Zarnoth and 
Sniezek’s results it was found that whilst argument quality affected persuasion, with 
strong arguments being more persuasive than weak arguments, speech style had no 
direct effect on persuasion. However, as with Zarnoth and Sniezek’s results and those of 
London et al. (1971), the speech used did influence a listener’s attitude towards the 
speaker, which in turn could affect the listener’s attitude towards the topic. How a 
speaker’s expressed confidence affects interpersonal perceptions will be discussed later. 
However, argument quality does not always dampen the influence of confidence. In 
relation to eyewitness testimonies, confident witnesses have been found to influence  
  24 
jurors’ decisions even when the evidence does not support their claims (Lindsay, Wells, 
and Rumpel, 1981; Whitley and Greenberg, 1986).  
 
Accuracy 
Similar to the notion of argument quality is a speaker’s accuracy. An accurate answer 
can be seen as strong evidence, and hence expressing high confidence in that answer 
would be justified, whereas an inaccurate answer would not justify high confidence. The 
question can be asked, are we more influenced by a speaker’s confidence or accuracy? 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found that greater confidence made speakers more 
influential regardless of their accuracy. In dyads the most confident speaker’s answers 
were chosen on 89% of occasions when they were correct and 62% of occasions when 
they were incorrect. In pentads the correct, and most confident responses were chosen 
85% of the time, with the incorrect, but most confident answers being chosen 40% of 
the time. So even though these speakers were giving wrong answers they could still 
convince other people to choose their incorrect answer. Zarnoth and Sniezek conclude 
that a speaker’s confidence has a significant impact upon the influence that they exert 
over others beyond the influence that can be attributed to the speaker’s accuracy alone.  
However, whilst individuals within a group have been found to be able to identify the 
most accurate member of a group under conditions of uncertainty (Henry, 1993), this is 
not always the case, and the accuracy of another person’s information is not always 
directly observable (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993). As Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) point 
out, most real-life tasks do not have a demonstrably correct answer that can be proven at 
the time of interaction, if at all. A speaker’s accuracy is only useful as a way of 
determining the quality of a speaker’s information if we can prove that accuracy. If we 
do not know an answer ourselves then we must rely on other ways of assessing 
accuracy. The confidence that a speaker expresses is frequently used to make inferences 
about that speaker’s accuracy. With this in mind, it is also important to take into account 
the issue of over- and underconfident speakers.  
 
Overconfidence 
For a speaker’s confidence to be useful to a decision-maker, it is important that their 
confidence is appropriate. Given that confidence can be viewed as the subjective 
probability that one’s own judgement is correct (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993), confidence 
and accuracy are inextricably linked, and we expect subjective probabilities to predict  
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the truth as often as they promise (Fox and Irwin, 1998). In other words we expect 
people to be well calibrated. To be well calibrated one’s confidence should be equal to, 
or at least close to the external reality of an outcome, be it an event occurring or an 
answer being correct. Thus, confidence should equal accuracy.  
Although we often take the subjective experience of confidence as evidence of 
objective fact, in reality this is not always the case. Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found 
the most confident individual to exert the most influence even when they were 
inaccurate. Indeed, confidence does not always correspond with accuracy, and much of 
the input that we give and receive is prone to overconfidence. This may be  an 
intentional or unintentional bias, with people miscommunicating their confidence for 
reasons such as impression management, motivational factors or individual differences 
(Thomas and McFadyen, 1995).  
Whilst there has been a lot of research from the perspective of the overconfident 
individual, very little of this research has looked at the influence of this overconfidence 
from a listener’s viewpoint (Price and Stone, 2004). Sniezek and Buckley (1995) say 
that if confidence is an effective means of influence, people communicating high 
confidence may get their own way more often than those who are underconfident or 
even well-calibrated. Paese and Kinnaly (1993) consider how biased confidence in 
judgement can affect the accuracy, and confidence, of those receiving such input. As 
people are generally unaware of their own overconfidence, would they expect it in 
others? Participants answered a set of questions, selecting their answer from the two 
alternatives. They then answered the same set of questions again, this time accompanied 
by a speaker’s input, which was either overconfident, underconfident, or well-
calibrated. When a speaker’s accuracy was high, well-calibrated input improved 
participants’ accuracy more than underconfident input did. Underconfidence also 
resulted in fewer changes towards that speaker’s answers than being confident and well-
calibrated did. When the speaker’s accuracy was low, well-calibrated input improved 
participants’ accuracy more than overconfident input did. Paese and Kinnaly say that 
this latter result is puzzling, as lower confidence resulted in better accuracy than high 
confidence did. However, when considered in relation to Zarnoth and Sniezek’s (2002) 
results it would make sense  - people are sensitive to the match between argument 
quality, or in this case accuracy, and confidence. 
Paese and Kinnaly suggest that overconfident input may be representative of 
everyday experience, although as they themselves point out, the experiment does not  
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reflect everyday life as face-to-face communication is not used, and people rarely 
express their confidence numerically as it was here. However, the question still remains 
as to whether someone who is overconfident can detect such bias in other people.  
Detecting a speaker’s judgmental biases may become easier if feedback is provided 
about the quality of their previous judgements and decisions.  
 
Feedback 
Although we cannot always prove the accuracy of someone’s information at the time 
of interaction, over time or following repeated interaction we may begin to pick up on 
the quality of someone’s judgments, and whether or not they are prone to judgmental 
biases such as overconfidence. For example, in real life situations we may have 
information about a person’s past performance. We may stop using a financial advisor 
after receiving inaccurate advice in the past, or we may lose faith in our GP after a 
series of misdiagnoses. But do people actually use this information when it is available 
to them? Using a methodology where feedback is provided is advantageous as it 
demonstrates the extent to which listeners may rely on a speakers confidence in a 
situation where their accuracy is directly observable, thus countering the arguments 
highlighted earlier relating to the relative influence of confidence versus accuracy (e.g. 
Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001).  
Price and Stone (2004) suggest that people are more sensitive to confidence alone 
than the match between confidence and accuracy. Providing participants with feedback 
relating to an advisor’s judgments they found that a majority of participants (74%) 
preferred an advisor who expressed extreme confidence, but was overconfident, to a 
more moderate, but well-calibrated advisor. They suggest that this preference for high, 
but misplaced, confidence may be due to participants taking confidence as 
representative of competence, knowledge and accuracy.  
Not everyone though showed this preference – there was still a fairly high minority 
of participants (26%) who preferred the moderately confident advisor. Although Price 
and Stone suggest that it may be because extreme confidence may be seen as 
overcompensating for a lack of knowledge, or alternatively moderate confidence may be 
taken as indicative of greater honesty, no evidence to support this suggestion was found. 
It may be that there are individual differences mediating the influence of confidence, 
in terms of personality factors and gender differences. Literature relating to these issues 
will now be discussed.   
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Individual differences 
In addition to situational factors, a number of individual differences may affect the 
ways in which we process confidently communicated information, and the subsequent 
influence this has. Our tendency to be high or low in Need for Cognition (NFC) or Need 
for Closure (NFClo), whether we are certainty or uncertainty-orientated, and whether 
our cognitive style is closed-minded or dogmatic can determine whether we pay more 
attention to the content of what is being said to us, or to how confidently that 
information is expressed.  
The Need for Cognition refers to an individuals “tendency to engage in and enjoy 
thinking” (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982, p. 116). Individuals high in NFC attend more to 
the central task at hand, such as the informational content of a message, rather than 
responding to peripheral cues that are associated with the task, such as the confidence 
with which that information is communicated, as people low in NFC tend to do 
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris, 1983).  
Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, and Hewitt (1988) argue that the level of personal 
relevance of a task is also important in determining which information we attend to. 
They suggest that people have different approaches to uncertainty, termed uncertainty 
orientation. Uncertainty-orientated individuals are motivated by situations that allow for 
the resolution of uncertainty, engaging in central processing in situations of high 
personal relevance, and peripheral processing otherwise, whereas certainty-orientated 
individuals, who are motivated by situations that do not involve uncertainty, show the 
opposite pattern. Sorrentino et al. (1988) suggest that the key difference between need 
for cognition and uncertainty orientation may be that, whereas need for cognition 
provides a measure of motivation to think, uncertainty orientation is a measure of when 
to think.  
How confident a person is in the information they are receiving may also depend on 
what sort of person they are. For example, Heslin, Rotton, and Blake (1977) found that 
people who are closed-minded attend more to the surface quality of a message, such as 
the confidence with which it is expressed, whereas those who are more open-minded 
penetrate below this surface to pay attention to other factors, such as the motivation of 
the source. Closed-mindedness forms a subscale of the Need for Closure - the general 
tendency to prefer certain knowledge to uncertain knowledge (Webster and Kruglanski, 
1994). Whilst a relatively stable dimension of individual differences, NFClo may be  
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situationally induced, and furthermore may be culture dependent, resulting from sources 
such as cultural norms which place a premium on confidence (Kruglanski and Webster, 
2000; Vermeir, Van Kenhove, Vlerick, and Hendrickx, 2002; Webster and Kruglanski, 
1994).  NFClo may affect how an individual thinks, feels, acts towards and speaks about 
other people (Kruglanski and Webster, 2000). People who are high in NFClo are 
motivated to produce quick and confident judgments (Mayseless and Kruglanski, 1987), 
and so may rely on peripheral cues to achieve this. For instance, people high in NFClo 
may rely more on a speaker’s expressed confidence than people who are low in NFClo. 
This possibility is explored in Chapter 4, where the influence of confidence in relation 
to Need for Cognition and Need for Closure will be covered in more detail.  
 
Gender differences in influence  
One factor that may lead to differences in the influence of confidence is the gender of 
participants used in the experiments. For instance, many studies have found the most 
confident speaker to be most influential (e.g. Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and 
Sniezek, 1997), yet London et al. (1971) found a speaker expressing a medium level of 
confidence to be more influential than one expressing high or low confidence. Why was 
this? It is feasible that this result was due to the use of female participants only. Perhaps 
if they had used male participants too the results would have been different.  
Evidence does suggest that there may be differences in people’s use of a speaker’s 
confidence. Pulford (2002) found that while women’s choices were influenced by a 
speaker’s level of confidence, men’s were not. Although men did not change their 
choices, they did raise the level of confidence they had in their choices after receiving 
high confidence input, whereas women’s confidence in their choices was raised after 
receiving input at any level of confidence. It has been suggested that women are more 
easily influenced than men (Carli, 1989; Eagly and Carli, 1981), although Burgoon and 
Klingle (1998) argue that rather than it being that women are more susceptible to 
influence, it is possible than men are more resistant to persuasion. However, Lee (2005) 
found that both men and women were influenced by a speaker’s confidence.  
Carli (2001) points out that most research on gender differences in social influence 
focuses on the extent to which men and women are influenced by others, rather than the 
effect of a person’s gender on their ability to influence others. Carli (1990) found that 
women using tentative, uncertain speech increased their ability to influence men but  
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decreased their ability to influence women. For men using equivalent language, there 
were no differences in the extent of influence they had over men or women.  
Carli (1990) suggests that the use of uncertain or tentative speech may be functional 
for women. When a woman wants to influence a man they may adopt the subtle 
approach of using tentative language, whereas when they are communicating with 
another woman, using tentative language may be less influential than using a more 
assertive, confident style. Carli (1990) suggests that women may use tentative speech 
when interacting with men because they expect men to be overconfident in their speech. 
Women therefore become more conscious of their speech in front of men as they are 
making a concerted effort not to behave in the same overconfident manner.  
Women may be sensitive to overconfidence. Pulford (2002) found that women 
preferred advice spoken with medium confidence, and were averse to answers given 
with high confidence, irrespective of speaker gender. However, women showed a 
dislike of answers expressed with low confidence by men, but not when given by 
another woman. Price and Stone (2004) considered whether men and women differed in 
the preferences for an overconfident and a more moderately confident (male) speaker. 
Although a higher proportion of men than women preferred the overconfident speaker 
this difference was not significant.  
Clearly then, mixed results relating to the presence of gender differences in the 
influence of confidence have been found. This may be due to the way in which 
confidence is expressed within these experiments, with some using numerical 
expressions of confidence (Price and Stone, 2004), some using verbal expressions of 
confidence and uncertainty (Carli, 1990; Pulford, 2002), and other using both (Lee, 
2005). Gender differences in the influence of confidence will be considered further in 
Chapter 5. 
 
Interpersonal perceptions of confidence 
The confidence that a speaker expresses can affect not only how influential they are 
in what they are saying but also how they are perceived (Erickson et al., 1978; Sparks et 
al., 1998). These perceptions may in turn affect the influence of a speaker’s confidence. 
Two major personality dimensions have been identified in relation to speech – one 
encompassing competence and the other relating to likeability (Apple, Streeter, and 
Krauss, 1979; Erickson et al., 1978; Lind and O’Barr, 1979; Scherer, 1979). A speaker’s 
level of confidence can affect how they are perceived on these two dimensions.  
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Confident speakers are generally viewed more favourably than less certain speakers are 
(Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999; Hosman et al., 2002). Specifically, a highly confident 
speaker is viewed as being more accurate, competent, credible, intelligent, 
knowledgeable, likeable, and believable than a less confident or uncertain speaker 
(Carli, 1990; Carli, LaFleur, and Loeber, 1995; Erickson et al., 1978; Gibbons, Busch, 
and Bradac, 1991; Haleta, 1996; Leippe et al., 1992; Parton, Siltanen, Hosman, and 
Langenderfer, 2002; Price and Stone, 2004).  How trust and expertise affects 
interpersonal perceptions of confidence has been considered in direct relation to the 
influence of confidence.  
   
Trust and expertise 
Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) suggest that higher confidence should exert more of an 
influence than lower levels of confidence because it is taken as indicative of expertise 
and trustworthiness. They found high confidence to be positively related to a judge’s 
trust of the speaker, and suggest that once trust is developed a listener is more likely to 
follow the trusted speaker and in turn place more confidence in decisions based on their 
advice. 
But whether or not we are influenced by a speaker’s perceived expertise may depend 
upon a decision maker’s assessment of their own capability of making good judgements 
(Harvey and Fischer, 1997). Someone who sees themselves as capable of making good 
judgements, rightly or wrongly, should be less influenced by another person’s expertise 
when a decision is important because they are willing to engage in the extra cognitive 
effort it takes to reach the decision themselves. On the other hand, if someone does not 
believe themselves capable of making good judgements, then they are more likely to be 
influenced by an advisors level of expertise.  
Furthermore, our own expertise, relative to an advisor’s, can be taken into account – 
we tend to take advice from people we consider to have more expertise than ourselves. 
Non-experts are influenced by information they think is diagnostic of an advisors 
expertise, such as their confidence. The more expertise we attribute to an advisor, the 
more likely we are to take their advice. Low self-confidence, and hence perceived low 
levels of our own expertise makes us more likely to put our trust in information from a 
source other than ourselves (Lee and Moray, 1994; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001).  
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Important in how people perceive a speaker’s confidence is who the speaker is. The 
discussion above focussed on speaker expertise. The gender of the speaker, and the 
impact this has upon interpersonal perceptions of confidence will now be considered.  
 
Gender differences  
Men and women who express the same level of confidence as each other may not 
necessarily be perceived in the same way. Women using assertive, confident language 
have been found to be viewed as more confident and knowledgeable than those using 
tentative, uncertain speech, by men and women alike (Bradley,  1981; Carli, 1990; 
Hawkes, Edelman, and Dodd, 1996). Confidence in language did not seem to effect how 
men are perceived, with men being judged as more knowledgeable than women 
speakers, based on their gender alone, rather than any other factor (Bradley, 1981; Carli, 
1990). On the other dimension of speech cue, likeability, a tentatively speaking woman 
is viewed as being more friendly by men than one speaking assertively (Carli, 1989; 
Carli, 1990; Carli et al., 1995). However, contrary to the expectations of Carli et al. 
(1995), women who spoke confidently were not viewed as less likeable, or more 
threatening, than men who spoke confidently. Rather, Carli et al. (1995) found that 
people using confident language were disliked more than those using tentative 
language, regardless of the gender of the speaker. Other studies have found no gender 
differences (Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999; Lind and O’Barr, 1979; Newcombe and 
Arnkoff, 1979; Parton et al., 2002). Reasons for these inconclusive results  will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
Too much confidence?  
Although the research reviewed so far relating to listeners’ perceptions of confident 
speakers has found confident speakers to be viewed more favourably than less confident 
or uncertain speakers, this is not always the case. As previously mentioned, too much 
confidence can be ineffective, and a speaker may correctly be perceived as being 
overconfident, which in turn may lead to them being disliked (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 
2002). Research findings support this notion. London et al. (1971) found that increasing 
levels of speaker confidence led to increasing feelings of antagonism towards that 
speaker on the part of the listener. It was not just the most confident speaker that had 
this effect either  - medium and high confidence speakers markedly elicited more 
antagonism than low confidence speakers did. Whether or not this effect was due to  
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perceived overconfidence is unclear as the nature of the task used, a jury method, did 
not allow accuracy to be taken into account. Nevertheless, others have suggested that 
overt indications of confidence are sometimes distrusted (Erickson et al., 1978; Kimble 
and Seidel, 1991).  
 
Influence of confidence on decision quality 
We have seen some of the factors that can determine whether or not we take 
someone’s advice or not, but what affect does taking someone’s advice have on the 
subsequent decisions that we make, particularly when those decisions are based on their 
level of confidence? Are we right in using such a strategy? And what are we trying to 
achieve when we seek advice? 
People typically seek advice or opinions from other people when they are faced with 
a difficult or important task. We seek advice because we want to improve the accuracy 
of our judgments and believe that receiving advice will help (Yaniv, 2004). But does it, 
especially when our assessment of that advice is based on the confidence with which it 
is expressed? Not necessarily.  
First of all, being able to observe how confident someone is may be a good thing. 
Bloomfield, Libby, and Nelson (1996) found that decreasing the ability to do so 
decreased group accuracy. Hence, they suggest that the performance of interacting 
groups partly depends upon their ability to observe the communication of confidence 
between group members. However, in Bloomfield et al.’s study, confidence was 
conceptualised as individuals’ willingness to trade shares, rather than directly 
communicating confidence, be it verbally or numerically. Nevertheless, basing our 
decisions on a speaker’s confidence can be a good strategy. For example, Sniezek and 
Van Swol (2001) believe that participants in their experiment were wise to follow the 
advice of the most confident speaker, as this advice was valid.  
This strategy doesn’t always work effectively, and following a confident speaker’s 
advice can harm the quality of subsequent decisions. The general finding is that 
confidence in decisions increases more than the accuracy of those decisions does, if at 
all (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Ronis and Yates, 1987; 
Sniezek, Paese, and Switzer, 1990). Such increases in confidence following interaction 
have been found to occur regardless of whether initial choices were the same or 
different from the advisors (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993), and regardless of the speaker’s 
level of confidence (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Pulford, 2002).   
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As we have seen, people are often overconfident in their beliefs. What effect does 
this have on the quality of our decisions? The general expectation is that interaction 
with others will reduce overconfidence, although this has not being found to be the case 
(Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993). Paese and Kinnaly (1993) found 
that not only did overconfident input considerably increase participants’ own 
overconfidence, but underconfident input did not eliminate overconfidence, and was not 
more effective at reducing biases than appropriately confident advice was. However, 
Paese and Kinnaly (1993) still maintain that basing decisions on a speaker’s confidence 
in their input is not a bad strategy, arguing that it is actually quite valid, given that 
people who are extremely confident do actually end up being more accurate than those 
who are less confident.  
  
The social influence of confidence – theoretical perspectives 
Influence of confidence within groups 
In a group decision-making environment a consensus must be reached most of the 
time. Freely interacting groups will choose the position of their best member on which 
to base the group decision (Einhorn, Hogarth, and Klempner, 1977). The best member is 
often identified on the basis of the level of confidence that they communicate. The 
information they offer or position they hold may not necessarily be the one that all 
group members hold or agree with. Group decision-making has many issues 
surrounding it that may hide or obscure an individual’s true preference, with group 
members being susceptible to group pressures and norms. Such issues led to Zarnoth 
and Sniezek (1997) identifying a confident speaker’s behavioural style or resistance to 
group norms as potential reasons for their greater persuasiveness.  
The behavioural style of a group, rather than their expression of confidence, may 
make individual members more, or less, persuasive (Moscovici, 1976). Someone who is 
a confident person may also be more talkative or argumentative, making the influence 
of confidence difficult to determine. For example, extroverts have been found to speak 
louder than introverts, indicating a more forceful use of the voice in social interactions, 
which in turn may lead to such a person exerting a greater influence within a group 
setting (Scherer, 1978). Conversely, within a group the norm to be pleasant and non-
confrontational is probably at least as strong as the motive to be as accurate as possible 
(Henry, 1995), which may lead to some people suppressing their views choosing instead 
to go along with the group consensus. A confident individual may also be more resistant  
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to the social influence of others, vehemently sticking to their views to the extent that 
others are forced to give in and agree (Stasser and Davis, 1981; Visser et al., 2003). 
Group decision-making involves trade-offs and negotiation in order to reach a 
consensus (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995). However, decisions are not always made within 
groups, as shall be discussed in the next section.  
 
Decision-making environment  
Much of the research relating to determinants of confidence focuses on decisions 
made by the individual, whereas group decision-making is the focus of much research 
relating to the influence of confidence. However, many important decisions are made in 
systems that cannot be clearly dichotomised as either an individual or group 
environment (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). Decision-making can also be social in 
nature, an element not represented in individual decision-making, and there is not 
necessarily always the need to reach a consensus, as is commonly found in group 
decision-making.  
An alternative approach is that of interactive decision-making, where we gather 
information from others but make the final decision alone, giving us the option to use or 
ignore other people’s advice (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). 
Interactive decision-making is termed a Judge-Advisor System (JAS) by Sniezek and 
colleagues (e.g. Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001), whereby 
one or more advisors communicate their information and recommendations to a judge, 
who has the sole responsibility for the final decision.  
Interactive and group decision-making are treated interchangeably in the literature, 
with emphasis on the group process, even though both methods may lead to different 
outcomes (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995). The study of interactive decision-making has 
many advantages. Firstly many of our decisions are made in such a way   - we 
infrequently have to reach a consensual decision, and we often ask others for advice on 
our individual decisions. The interactive environment is also more ecologically valid 
than group decision-making as it allows for the influence of others to be investigated 
upon the individual, while avoiding the complications that accompany group decision-
making (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). The influence of 
confidence may be different in an interactive environment than in a group environment 
for reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter. Judgement and decision-making 
within this thesis is examined from an interactive decision-making perspective.  
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Interpersonal perceptions of confidence  
It does seem that the information that one conveys is not the only factor in the 
influence of confidence. How we perceive a speaker, resulting from their level of 
expressed confidence is also important in determining the influence of confidence. As 
previously mentioned, there are two major dimensions of speech cues – competence and 
likeability, covering factors such as a speaker’s perceived trustworthiness. Lind and 
O’Barr (1979) suggest that the acceptance of a communication is often influenced by 
judgements concerning the communicator’s competence - their ability to make valid 
statements - and by judgements concerning the communicator’s trustworthiness - their 
intention to convey only statements that they consider to be truthful. However, 
Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau (1990) point out that although it is assumed that credibility 
leads to persuasion rather than vice-versa, it is just as plausible that that being persuaded 
by a speaker leads one to view that speaker as credible. 
While Western society generally expects a competent  communicator to speak 
fluently and confidently, deviating from these expectations may reduce a 
communicator’s effectiveness (Krauss and Chiu, 1998). Furthermore, simply appearing 
competent may not be enough. Aspects of competency may also work against 
persuasiveness by decreasing liking for a person (Heslin and Patterson, 1982). Scherer 
(1979) suggests that to be truly persuasive a communicator needs to be seen as both 
competent and trustworthy. Of course, it may be that some people value competency 
more than likeability or vice-versa and so may not be influenced by the same level of 
confidence in the same way. 
For instance, the extent to which a female speaker can influence a man may depend 
on how friendly that speaker is perceived as being, with a tentatively speaking woman 
being viewed as more friendly by men than an confidently speaking woman (Carli, 
1989; Carli, 1990; Carli et al., 1995). However, Carli et al. (1995) found that people 
using confident language were disliked, regardless of the gender of the speaker, and this 
dislike was greater for confident speakers than it was for tentative speakers. Even so, 
Carli et al. suggest that with a male audience, perceptions of likeability are more 
important determinants of influence for female speakers than for male speakers. 
Additionally, a man is more likely to be influenced by a woman when she is perceived 
as competent and likeable, rather than just competent.  
In contrast to Carli’s (1990) finding that the role of speech style on persuasion is 
determined by speaker-listener gender combinations, Holtgraves and Lasky (1999)  
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found that powerful speech was perceived more positively, and powerless speech more 
negatively, regardless of either speaker or listener gender. These results are consistent 
with those found by others (e.g. Erickson et al., 1978; Lind and O’Barr, 1979; 
Newcombe and Arnkoff, 1979).  
Differences in the results may be due to how perceptions of the speakers are 
conceptualised. For instance, while Carli et al. (1995) considers perceptions of speaker 
competency and likeability, Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) combine ratings of likeability 
and competency, amongst others, to give an overall impression of the speaker.  
It is important to take into account how speakers are perceived in relation to the 
influence of confidence, as a listener may use this to help validate a speaker’s 
information. This suggestion has direct relevance to the models of persuasion discussed 
in the next section.  
 
Models of persuasion 
There are two dominant theories of persuasive communication within which 
confidence can be considered: the Heuristic-Systematic Model (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; 
Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly, 1989) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986). Both of these models rely on essentially the same principles. When a 
listener is involved, motivated or has the capacity to do so, they will engage in 
thoughtful processes. Systematic, or central, processing of the message occurs, and a 
message’s arguments are evaluated. However, processing at this level is not always 
possible, for example when a person is not  sufficiently  motivated to think about a 
message, or when cognitive capacity is reduced. This is when heuristic, or peripheral, 
processing may be used. Cognitive heuristics provide ‘rules of thumb’ or shortcuts to 
making decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Chaiken (1980) suggests that we 
learn certain persuasion heuristics that provide shortcuts around the more effortful 
processing of the actual information contained within a message. If engaging in 
heuristic or peripheral processing, other factors become important in persuasion. For 
example, the context the message is delivered in, or the style of speech used, will be 
more persuasive than the message content itself.  
Where does confidence fit in within these models? The role of confidence here is not 
straightforward. Does it facilitate systematic or heuristic processing? Research relating 
the influence of confidence to theories of persuasion has being mainly done so from a 
speech style perspective. To recap, speech style is related to the expression of  
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confidence in that the use of a powerless language style, with its hesitations and hedges, 
suggests that a speaker is uncertain about the position or beliefs that they are 
advocating, whereas a powerful style may indicate suggests that the recipient believes 
their statements to be correct. When a strong argument is expressed in an uncertain way 
this discrepancy may cause the listener to process the message differently to how they 
would if the strong argument was accompanied by a more confident speech style. For 
example, in the case of the former, speech style would facilitate systematic/central 
processing in persuasion, as the important variable is the message. In the case of the 
latter, Berger and Bradac (1982) suggest that a powerless speech style could be 
attributed to speaker uncertainty, acting as a peripheral cue to persuasion, facilitating 
heuristic processing as argument relevant thinking is not carried out. 
Information conveyed in a powerful speech style is given more weight than that 
conveyed in a powerless style (Erickson et al., 1978; Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999). 
Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) suggest that this is a result of how a listener perceives the 
speaker and the message argument. They found that when the message was delivered in 
a powerless style both speaker and message were viewed more negatively than when a 
powerful style was used, which in turn reduced the likelihood of any attitude change 
occurring. However, the listeners’ ability to process a message has no effect on 
persuasion, leading to the suggestion that speech style may affect via both 
peripheral/heuristic processing (when distracted) and central/systematic processing 
(when not distracted).  
Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen (2002) investigated whether powerful speech has a 
central, peripheral, or biasing role. If it has a central role, then powerful speech may 
inform listeners about the merits of the given argument. If it acts as a peripheral cue, 
then it will provide information about the speaker. If speech style has a biasing role, 
then it will strengthen only strong arguments. It was found that whilst argument quality 
affected persuasion, with strong arguments being more persuasive than weak 
arguments, speech style had no direct effect on persuasion. They suggest that speech 
style acts as a peripheral cue, influencing cognitive responses about a speaker’s personal 
attributes, which in turn affects attitudes toward a topic. 
 
Making choices 
Evidence for the role of confidence as a  peripheral or heuristic cue comes from 
overconfidence research. Theories of overconfidence identify the cognitive processes  
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people engage in when making choices, with overconfidence being attributed to biases 
in information processing. Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) suggest that 
overconfidence occurs because people generate evidence to support an answer, and this 
biases the subsequent search for additional information in the direction of that initial 
answer. The confidence with which information is expressed may be taken as such 
supporting evidence.  
Griffin and Tversky (1992) further this notion by suggesting that overconfidence 
results from attending too much to the strength of available information and not enough 
to the weight of that information. This can be directly related to the influence of 
confidence, whereby previous research (e.g. Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997) has found that 
the confidence, or strength, with which information is expressed can exert a greater 
influence that the accuracy, or weight, of that information.  
Sniezek, Paese, and Switzer (1990) found that overconfidence increases when people 
are presented with cued choices. Pre-selection of an answer leads to people favouring 
that answer in their subsequent choices, as opposed to when they have a free-choice 
between a set of answers, as such cueing reduces the need, or want, to search for 
evidence favouring alternatives. One way in which an answer may be cued is to attach a 
confidence rating to an answer. Sniezek and Buckley (1995) found that when such cues 
are available choices are made on the basis of these confidence cues, with the highest 
confidence exerting the most influence. Hence, it would seem that confidence is used as 
a way of simplifying decision-making, in that confidence is taken as evidence to favour 
or support an answer.  
 
Confidence heuristic 
As we have seen, the task of assessing the knowledge that another person has may be 
simplified by relying on the use of cognitive heuristics (Fussell and Krauss, 1991; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). The level of confidence that is expressed may be one 
such heuristic. People use confidence as a heuristic “according to which they use a 
[speaker’s] confidence as a cue to his or her knowledge, competence or correctness” 
(Price and Stone, 2004. p.40). Price and Stone (2004) suggest that people rely on a 
confidence heuristic when making decisions or judgements because they are more 
sensitive to overall confidence than the match between confidence and accuracy – they 
assume that the most confident individual is the one most likely to be correct.  
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Thomas and McFadyen (1995) propose a game-theoretical model of decision-
making, in which it is assumed that in social interactions people are strategic in making 
decisions, and optimum interaction may be based on the mutual use of a confidence 
heuristic. Confidence being used heuristically has been suggested by others (e.g. 
Chaiken et al., 1989; Erickson et al., 1978; Lieppe et al., 1992; Sniezek and Buckley, 
1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), yet no thorough investigation of this has been 
conducted, although recent research is addressing this (e.g. Price and Stone, 2004; 
Pulford and Colman, 2005). 
Thomas and McFadyen note that social psychologists focus on two forms of social 
influence in group behaviour: informational and normative (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). 
The former sees an individual as being influenced by the informational content of an 
argument whereas the latter is based upon social relations and relates to conforming to 
the positive expectations of others. Burnstein and Sentis (1981) suggest that normative 
processes describe the real or imagined impact of rewards and punishments, e.g. to fit 
in, to be liked and so on. Informational influence is influence based on the belief that 
the information one is receiving is representative of objective reality (Turner, 1991).  
Each type of influence is likely to be dominant in different situations determined by 
factors such as the type of task being undertaken. For instance, it was noted earlier that 
tasks can be intellective or judgmental (Laughlin and Ellis, 1986). Informational 
influence has been found to exert a greater influence on intellective issues whereas 
normative influence exerts a greater influence on judgmental issues, for mock juries at 
least (Kaplan and Miller, 1987). However, Thomas and McFadyen draw on evidence 
suggesting that in situations where informational influences are expected to be 
dominant, a lot of weight is placed upon the confidence with which arguments are 
presented, as opposed to the content of those arguments (London et al., 1970). While 
expressed confidence is not informational influence it is still not necessarily normative 
either. It may be though a  means by which informational influence is transmitted 
(Thomas and McFadyen,  1995). In other words, informational influence may be 
mediated via the expression of confidence.  
Hence, it is suggested that there is a confidence heuristic that people use to try and 
assess the reliability of the information that they are receiving. In this way, someone is 
judged as being likely to hold more reliable information if they express that information 
confidently rather than tentatively. Additionally, Thomas and McFadyen argue that 
there may be a social norm whereby in social interactions people should argue with a  
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level of confidence that is in proportion to their information. This norm forms the basis 
of the confidence heuristic, and when it is followed, the confidence heuristic will work. 
In a similar vein, Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) suggest that confidence may be used as a 
default option, either because people believe confidence to be a valid indicator of 
accuracy or because they believe that such behaviour is dictated by social norms of 
fairness and courtesy.  
Thomas and McFadyen point out that there are some social contexts in which the 
model is most likely to work, namely those where both individuals have common 
interests and want to exchange information efficiently. In such cases following the norm 
allows an efficient information exchange, as it pays to be persuaded by some with more 
reliable information. However, there are also situations where the model will not work 
as well, and as with other heuristics, the confidence heuristic is prone to error (see 
Tversky and Kahnemen, 1974). Such errors may occur, for instance, when an individual 
argues confidently despite having unreliable information. Such a person may be aware 
of the social norm and purposefully exploit it so as to appear more knowledgeable than 
they actually are, simply by arguing confidently. This may achieve its goal in the short 
term but can be detrimental in the long run, possibly leading to a loss of reputation once 
others realise that a speaker frequently overstates their confidence. On the other hand, 
the norm may also be exploited by not expressing enough confidence relative to one’s 
information, for reasons such as a lack of self-confidence. As Paese and Kinnaly (1993) 
note, if we do infer accuracy on the basis of a speaker’s confidence then it is important 
that the level of expressed confidence is appropriate. 
Thomas and McFadyen stress that when modelling the confidence heuristic they are 
not thinking of situations in which the information that each person possess relating to 
the best choice can be directly communicated, rather the information must be ‘signalled’ 
through the style of argumentation. Hence, it is assumed that because it is not possible 
to directly verify another’s arguments, expressed confidence is a major signal for 
decision-making. As such the confidence heuristic allows for decision-making based on 
a simple comparison of the confidence in arguments.  
However, Thomas and McFadyen (1995) did not conduct an empirical study of their 
model of the confidence heuristic. How would it stand up in different situations and 
with different types of people? For example, Thomas and McFadyen’s 
conceptualisation of the confidence heuristic is in terms of collective decision-making, 
where there are common interests to reach the most beneficial decision, and therefore  
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provides no reason to deviate from the norm. But how does it apply to interactive 
decision-making? How is the confidence heuristic used when taking advice from 
another (so there are not necessarily common interests)? Furthermore Thomas and 
McFadyen question whether it can be assumed that the confidence heuristic is a general 
cognitive heuristic since there may be gender, or other information-irrelevant, 
differences in the way we perceive speakers with confident speech styles. Price and 
Stone (2004) go on to suggest that it may be that only some people use a confidence 
heuristic. They argue that the important issue when researching the confidence heuristic 
is the extent to which confidence is relied upon to evaluate a speaker in the presence - 
and absence - of other  relevant information. “It is becoming increasingly clear that a 
complete understanding of confidence judgements must include this social dimension” 
(Price and Stone, 2004, p. 54). Fox and Irwin (1998) provide a contextual framework 
that provides a basis of factors that could be considered in relation to this social 
dimension. Their contextual framework is outlined below.   
 
Contextual framework 
Fox and Irwin (1998) argue that while people do make judgements via heuristics, the 
communication and influence of confidence is actually much broader than this, and the 
social context also needs to be considered, specifically judgements made on the 
interpretation of a speaker’s statement. Indeed, communicating one’s confidence to 
others is essentially a social process, making it subject to many sources of social 
influence. Furthermore, decisions are often social in nature, in that decision makers use 
information provided to them by others. Hilton (1995) argues that in ignoring the social 
context, assumptions made about a speaker within this context are also ignored – such 
assumptions may determine which information we attend to and how we use this. 
Hence, it is important to take into account the social context in which the confidence is 
used.   
Fox and Irwin suggest that a listener, after receiving the communication, must decide 
on what to do with it. Rather than viewing the listener’s task as one of mapping natural 
language into numbers to determine just how confident the speaker is that a particular 
outcome will occur, Fox and Irwin argue that it is more productive to view the listener’s 
task as one of constructing a representation of the speaker’s state of mind. Hence, when 
trying to interpret what a speaker is saying a listener must ask themselves three 
questions: what does a speaker mean by their statement? What do they truly believe?  
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And what is the true propensity of an outcome? The answers to these three questions 
may not necessarily coincide. For instance, a speaker’s beliefs may not necessarily 
match the propensity of the event. Furthermore speakers do not always intend to express 
what they truly believe.  
Fox and Irwin (1998) provide a framework of contextual factors that may influence 
the process of how a listener interprets a speaker’s verbal expressions of confidence. 
Firstly there are social informational factors. For instance, the listener may be 
influenced by their prior beliefs about the likelihood of an event occurring, drawing 
upon base rate information. The listener may also have certain assumptions about the 
world, including their ideas of what is just and fair. There are also social motivational 
factors to consider. For instance, is the speaker susceptible to judgmental biases, such as 
overconfidence? Does the listener perceive the speaker to be credible or sincere in what 
they are saying? Does the speaker have any motivation to misrepresent the likelihood of 
a particular event occurring?  Finally there are social discourse factors to take into 
account. This includes information that is directly, and indeed indirectly, conveyed by 
the verbal expressions the speaker chooses to use or the way in which they opt to 
communicate. For instance, what channel of communication was used – were there 
nonverbal cues in addition to verbal cues to aid the listener in their interpretation of the 
speaker’ statement? What linguistic mode of expression did the speaker use – was 
confidence expressed using internal (e.g. I’m certain) or external  (e.g.  It’s certain) 
language? In terms of ongoing discourse, it can also be asked whether the speaker and 
listener share common ground, or what their relationship is. Throughout the review of 
the literature some of these factors have been discussed, and so do not need to be 
expanded upon again.  
 
Rationale  
The review of the literature has shown that for the social influence of confidence is 
an influential factor in persuasion. With a few exceptions, the literature reviewed 
indicates that the higher a speaker’s confidence is, the more influence is exerted by that 
speaker. Although it has been noted that a speaker’s influence increases as their 
confidence does, the extent to which a highly confident speaker can influence another 
person’s judgements and decisions depends upon a number of inter-linked factors 
identified within the literature. These may be situational factors, individual factors, or 
communicative factors.   
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Situational factors that have been identified as important in mediating the influence 
of confidence include the type of task being tackled (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), the 
sources of information available to the decision-maker (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995), 
and the decision-making environment one is in (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995). Individual 
factors are also important. For instance, the gender of both the speaker and listener may 
have an effect on how a speaker is perceived and their subsequent influence (e.g. Carli, 
1990; Pulford, 2002), as can perceptions of a speaker’s judgmental biases (Price and 
Stone, 2004). Personality factors, such as the Need for Cognition (Cacioppo and Petty, 
1982) and the Need for Closure (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994), which place high 
emphasis on the role of heuristics and confidence in the way we process information,  
also seem to be highly relevant to the influence of confidence. Factors relating to how 
confidence is communicated can also affect its influence. Some of these are beyond the 
scope of the present research, such as the communication modality used (Sparks et al., 
1998), whereas others, namely the mode of communication, provide the basis for the 
research presented in this thesis. The rationale for the current research will now be 
outlined.  
Previously the communication and influence of confidence has been viewed mainly 
from a cognitive perspective. However a number of contextual factors may mediate the 
influence of confidence. It is important to take a more ecological approach to this 
research than has been previously used, primarily looking at confidence as it is 
commonly expressed in our day-to-day lives. Previous research has tended to use 
subjective probabilities or confidence ratings to see how this influences other people’s 
judgements and decisions (e.g. Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Price and Stone, 2004; 
Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). While the findings from these 
studies provide a useful basis for theoretical perspectives of the influence of confidence, 
and indeed for further research, they largely ignore the importance of the how 
confidence is communicated. The experiments reported in this thesis aim to rectify this. 
It is important to take the communication of confidence into consideration, and not just 
the influence of confidence, as this would allow the findings from this research to be 
applied more directly to the communication and influence of confidence in real-life 
situations. As many judgmental errors may occur due to miscommunicated or 
misinterpreted confidence this issue is of utmost importance.  
Secondly, a more ecological approach is taken by looking at the influence of 
confidence in an interactive rather than group environment. Decisions in the real world  
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are often made interactively  – we gather information from those around us but 
ultimately the final decision is up to the individual – rather than individually or within 
groups, as has been the main focus of previous research (e.g. Henry, 1995; Zarnoth and 
Sniezek, 1997).  
 
Aims of thesis 
This thesis aims to find out if verbal expressions of confidence serve as an effective 
form of influence, in terms of choice, confidence in choice, and interpersonal 
perceptions of speakers. In conducting this research, an empirical investigation of the 
confidence heuristic will be undertaken, identifying some factors that may determine if 
it is used, who by, when and why. Therefore this research looks at the confidence 
heuristic and argues that the use of this is mediated by contextual factors. Having 
identified in the literature review a number of factors that may mediate the influence of 
numerical expressions of confidence, in terms of subjective probabilities and confidence 
ratings, the current research draws upon these findings to investigate whether the 
influence of verbal expressions of confidence is also mediated by these factors. Hence, 
the focus is on the extent to which people will rely on confidence cues to evaluate 
communicators in the presence, and absence, of other relevant information. Following 
Sniezek and Buckley (1995), effectiveness of confidence as influence refers to the 
ability to get participants to choose a (confident) speaker’s answers, regardless of their 
accuracy.  
As the experiments within this thesis use verbal expressions of confidence, as 
opposed to numerical expressions, it is first necessary to identify and develop a pool of 
confidence cues for use in the experiments. Chapter 2 reports the pilot study in which 
this is done. Chapter 3 examines how we are influenced by different levels of 
confidence expressed by a speaker in their recommendations/answers. This chapter 
considers the influence of confidence upon choice behaviour and how confident people 
are in those subsequent choices. In particular, attention is given to how different types 
of task, lying at various positions along the intellective-judgmental task type continuum, 
mediate this influence. Chapter 4 goes on to consider if there are individual differences 
in the extent to which we are influenced by another person’s expression of confidence 
in their answers, focussing on two personality measures of direct relevance to this 
research – the Need for Cognition and the Need for Closure. Chapter 5 changes the  
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focus from choice behaviour to the perceptions of the speakers who express different 
levels of confidence. 
The first part of this thesis therefore examines how we are influenced by another 
person’s expression of confidence, in terms of the dependent variables of choice, 
confidence in choice, and interpersonal perceptions when we have little other 
differentiating information available to us. Chapters 6 and 7 consider how making 
feedback available, regarding the accuracy/performance of speakers, affects the 
influence that expressed confidence has on these variables. Does confidence have the 
same influence when feedback is made available compared to when it is not? Do we 
pick up on a speaker’s judgmental biases, learning that their level of expressed 
confidence does not necessarily, or always, match their level of accuracy? Do we place 
more weight on how confidently someone expresses an answer than to the actual quality 
of the information they are conveying? Chapter 6 considers these questions in relation 
to interpersonal perceptions of confidence, taking into account the participants’ own 
judgmental biases as well – do people who are themselves overconfident pick up on this 
in others more than people who are underconfident or more well-calibrated? Chapter 7 
examines how having prior opportunity to observe the way in which people answer 
questions, and hence having the opportunity to observe their judgmental biases, affects 
our subsequent use of their advice. 
Chapters 8, 9, and 10 revisit some of the issues raised in earlier chapters to create a 
more comprehensive picture of how and why we are influenced by other people’s 
expressions of confidence. Chapter 8 asks whether our own level of confidence in an 
answer affects how we are influenced by another person’s level of confidence in their 
answers. This experiment uses a within-subjects design, as opposed to the between-
subjects design used in previous chapters, to examine how we are influenced in our 
choices and the confidence we hold in those choices when we have made an initial 
choice. Are we influenced by another person’s expressed confidence in an answer even 
though we have already made a choice? Do we become more or less confident when 
asked to revise our answers? Does this depend upon another person’s expression of 
confidence? Are we more susceptible to being influenced by another person’s 
confidence the more uncertain we are ourselves in the first place? Chapter 9 asks 
whether the influence of another person’s confidence is due to a positive or a negative 
influence  – do we choose highly confident answers because they offer the most  
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attractive alternative or is it because uncertain answers offer the least attractive 
alternative?  
Chapter 10 brings the experimental chapters full circle, tying together the findings 
from previous chapters. In this chapter, consideration is given to how the influence of 
confidence may alter according to the timing of when advice is given. Are we swayed in 
our answers by a highly confident person more so when we have made an independent 
choice before receiving another person’s recommendation or when we receive their 
recommendation before we have had chance to make an independent choice? Finally, 
issues raised by the research in this thesis, applications of the findings, and ideas for 
further research will be examined in Chapter 11, the discussion chapter. 
 CHAPTER 2 
Pilot study: Development of Confidence Cues 
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Previous research into the influence of confidence tends to use numerically expressed 
subjective probability estimates to represent confidence (e.g. Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; 
Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). These provide a 
straightforward, seemingly easily interpretable indication of another’s confidence. For 
instance, we know that being 100 percent confident means we are certain, and we know 
that being 80 percent certain indicates more confidence than being only 60 percent sure. 
But, while people appear to have a preference for receiving numerical probabilities, as 
communicators they often feel more comfortable using verbal phrases (Brun and 
Teigen, 1988; Hamm, 1991). Verbal expressions may facilitate thinking about 
uncertainty, as they are better at expressing the vagueness and ambiguity of judgements 
than numerical expressions are (Hamm, 1991). Windschitl and Wells (1996) argue that 
it is the lack of formal constraints characteristic of verbal probabilities that makes them 
better suited to represent how we think about uncertainty in everyday life. 
A lot of research has focused on the mapping of quantitative terms to qualitative 
terms and vice-versa, attempting to identify the numerical values we place on different 
expressions (see Clark, 1990, and Druzdzel, 1989, for reviews), yet very little research 
has looked at how verbal expressions of confidence influence us. If people 
communicate using verbal rather than numerical expressions of confidence in everyday 
life then this has implications for the ecological validity of previous research (c.f. Price 
and Stone, 2004) into the influence of confidence that has relied solely on numerical 
subjective probability confidence estimates.  
In order to consider the influence of verbal expressions of confidence it is first 
necessary to compile a list of words and phrases that convey different levels of 
confidence. Although it can be argued that for reasons of validity one should use actual 
samples of speech, this itself has implications. Specifically, the study and use of verbal 
expressions of confidence/uncertainty is problematic, mainly because there are a huge 
number of words and expressions that can be used to express one’s state of uncertainty, 
and people do use many different ones in everyday conversation (Astington and Olson, 
1990; Hamm, 1991; Teigen and Brun, 1995). Renooij and Witteman (1999) 
demonstrated this when they attempted to draw up a list of commonly used probability 
expressions. Although 144 different expressions were generated by 53 participants, 77% 
of the expressions generated were done so by just three participants. Similar results  
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were found by Budescu, Weinberg, and Wallsten (1988). Therefore, it is advantageous 
to use a predefined list of verbal expressions of confidence to ensure that consistent 
levels of confidence are being communicated.  
With this in mind a list of confidence cues (interchangeable statements that are used 
preceding/in conjunction with responses) was constructed using expressions identified 
in previous research as indicating varying levels of confidence, such as I know and I 
think (Berry, 1960; Fabre, 1991; Feezel, 1974; Foley, 1959; Furrow and Moore, 1990; 
Moore, Harris, and Patriquin, 1993; Pulford, 2002; Westney, 1986). Although Druzdzel 
(1989) and Clark’s (1990) reviews of the verbal uncertainty expression literature point 
out that there is a great deal of between-subject variability in the numerical values 
assigned to expressions, the general ordering of these expressions in relation to one 
another is consistent. People may assign different numerical values to expressions such 
as  I know and I think, but they always tend to place  I know as indicating more 
confidence than I think. Feezel (1974) suggests that terms of confidence/certainty lie 
along a continuum, ranging from certainty and descending through likelihood to 
possibility. Consistent results have been found for the positioning of words along this 
continuum, with terms such as  suppose,  think,  sure,  certain, and positive  indicating 
increasing certainty (Berry, 1960;  Beyth-Marom, 1982; Fabre, 1991;  Foley, 1959; 
Moore et al., 1993; Renooij and Witteman, 1999; Westney, 1986). 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is said to be characterised by the more frequent use of 
tag questions and disclaimers (Bradley, 1981; Erickson et al., 1978). However, Bradley 
points out that whilst there are many kinds of disclaimer, only two are associated with 
uncertainty – hedges and cognitive disclaimers. So, uncertainty may be expressed with 
the use of tag questions (It’s…, isn’t it?),  hedges (I’m no expert but…) and cognitive 
disclaimers (I could be mistaken but…); 
 
Hedging indicates the tentative nature of a statement, communicating some 
measure of uncertainty about the likely response to it [whereas] cognitive 
disclaimers are used when a person believes that his opinion may be questioned 
and/or that some doubt exists concerning his capacity to deal adequately with the 
facts (Bradley, 1981, p. 77-78). 
 
     Thus, the aim of this pilot study is to create a list of expressions covering the 
confidence-uncertainty continuum that may then be used as confidence cues in the 
subsequent experimental chapters.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
26 participants (9 males and 17 females) ranging in age from 19 – 49 years (M = 
26.69, S.D. = 9.25) completed the pilot study. None of these participants took part in the 
main studies reported in experimental chapters of this thesis.  
 
Materials 
A list of 62 confidence cues was constructed. In addition to the expressions noted in 
the introduction to this chapter, further expressions that are commonly used in natural 
language to express confidence and uncertainty (e.g. I’m not sure but  it could be…) 
were added to the list of confidence cues. These were taken from various sources 
including conversations, television quiz shows and court transcripts. However as Hamm 
(1991) points out, there are a large number of different expressions people can, and do, 
use to indicate their level of confidence, thus making it extremely difficult to 
comprehensively cover all of these. As such the list of confidence cues uses those 
expressions identified in previous research, and some of the more naturalistic 
expressions of everyday life. It is hoped that a broad range of ways of expressing 
confidence and uncertainty are thus covered. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to rate the 62 confidence cues for how confident they would 
be that their answer was correct if they answered a question using such expressions. 
Participants indicated their confidence in each answer on a seven-point scale, where 1 = 
“Not at all confident”, 4 = “Moderately Confident” and 7 = “Highly confident”. To 
allow for greater freedom of use of the confidence cues in the subsequent experiments, 
half of the participants rated cues that were presented in present tense (e.g. I’m confident 
that it is…) with the other half rating cues that were presented in past tense (e.g. I’m 
confident that it was…). Questionnaires and instructions issued to participants in the 
pilot study can be found in Appendix A.  
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Results and Discussion 
 
The mean rating of each confidence cue was calculated. Between-subjects t-tests on 
the ratings given by participants viewing the confidence cues presented in past and 
present tense revealed no significant differences in any of the ratings (all p > .05, see 
Appendix B). Therefore the ratings given in past/present tense were pooled, and the 
cues rank ordered based on the overall means, which ranged from 2.15 to 6.38 (Table 
2.1).  
The expressions were then divided into high, medium and low confidence cues based 
on their mean ratings (Table 2.1). Expressions with means falling between 2.73 and 
3.54 were classed as low confidence cues (n = 18). Means between 3.88 and 4.77 were 
assigned as medium confidence cues (n = 17). Finally, means falling between 5.58 and 
6.38 were classed as high confidence cues (n = 13). Each category of confidence cues 
covered a similar range of means (.81, .89 and .80 respectively). Although there were 
uneven numbers of cues assigned to each confidence level, an equal number of cues 
from each level were used in a majority of the experiments in this thesis. 
However, not all the expressions rated in the pilot study were selected as 
experimental confidence cues, as in retrospect some of the expressions were not deemed 
to be suitable for use in the subsequent experiments. For example, I’m not sure it’s kind 
of… was removed from the list of confidence cues, as it was not suitable for appending 
to a majority of short answers. Furthermore, cues preceded by utterances such as Yes, 
Err and Erm were also excluded. Eight confidence cues in total were removed on this 
basis. 
Druzdzel’s (1989) review of the verbal uncertainty expression literature points out 
that there is often a great deal of overlap between terms. For this reason words should 
be selected that are rated sufficiently apart from each other to eliminate this overlap, and 
hence ambiguity of terms. Hence, a continuous range was not used, so as to create a 
distinction between levels of confidence cues, avoiding ambiguity between the levels. 
Expressions with mean ratings higher than 3.54 but lower than 3.88 were not used, to 
create distinct categories of low and medium confidence cues. Similarly, expressions 
with mean ratings higher than 4.77 but lower than 5.58 were omitted to distinguish 
between medium and high confidence cues. This resulted in a further six cues being 
excluded.  All excluded cues are shown in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1  
Mean ratings of expressions, confidence cue level and distribution of cues across 
experiments 
Chapter  Q. 
No.                                                           
                                                             
Expression 
     
M 
       
S.D.  
Confidence 
Level 
 3/4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
5  Err, I think it’s…  2.15  0.97  Low               
17  I’m not sure, it’s kind of…  2.54  1.14  Low               
15  I suppose it could be…  2.73  0.96  Low  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
31  I think it’s…. isn’t it?  2.73  1.34  Low  ü ü ü ü ü ü    
28  I’m guessing, but I would say 
it’s… 
2.81  0.90  Low  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
16  Well, it’s…. I guess.  2.81  1.10  Low  ü ü ü ü ü ü    
50  Oh, I don’t know, I suppose 
it’s… 
2.81  1.10  Low  ü ü           ü    
29  Erm, I think it’s…  2.85  1.35  Low               
2  Is it…?  2.96  1.40  Low        ü ü ü ü    
53  It could be…. but I don’t 
know. 
3.00  1.10  Low  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
6  Perhaps it’s…  3.04  0.77  Low     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
54  Isn’t it…?  3.04  1.28  Low        ü ü ü ü    
9  I’m not sure, but it may be…  3.11  1.14  Low        ü ü ü ü ü 
32  It’s…. I think.  3.11  1.34  Low           ü ü     ü 
3  I could be wrong, but I think 
it’s… 
3.15  1.32  Low     ü     ü ü     ü 
38  I guess it’s…  3.15  1.08  Low     ü     ü ü     ü 
44  I think, I think it’s….  3.15  1.08  Low               
7  It could be…  3.27  0.87  Low     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
35  I’m not sure but, it could be…  3.31  1.01  Low     ü        ü     ü 
26  It might be…  3.54  1.10  Low           ü ü       
57  Could it be…?  3.54  0.76  Low           ü ü       
34  It’s possibly…  3.54  0.99  Low                    
21  It may be…  3.58  0.99  N/a               
12  I think it’s…. but I can’t be 
sure. 
3.58  0.99  N/a               
25  I’m not certain, but it could 
be… 
3.58  1.24   N/a               
46  Chances are it’s…  3.73  .96  N/a               
14  I’m not completely confident, 
but I think it’s… 
3.77  .76  N/a               
33  I could be mistaken but I’m 
sure it’s… 
3.88  1.07  Medium     ü     ü          
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4  I should say it’s…  3.88  1.07  Medium           ü ü      
36  As far as I can recall, it’s…  3.88  0.95  Medium           ü ü      
30  I would say it’s…  3.88  0.95  Medium  ü ü     ü ü      
56  Oh, I think it’s…  3.92  1.29  Medium  ü ü               
43  It’s around about…  3.92  1.02  Medium               
49  I think it’s…  3.92  0.98  Medium  ü ü     ü ü     ü 
60  I can’t say for sure, but I think 
it’s… 
3.92  0.98  Medium  ü        ü ü ü ü 
23  I suspect it’s…  4.00  1.06  Medium  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
47  It is probably…  4.08  1.09  Medium     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
51  I believe it’s…  4.15  1.08  Medium  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
10  There’s a good chance it’s…  4.35  0.98  Medium        ü ü ü ü ü 
18  If I remember correctly, it’s…  4.35  0.98  Medium     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
42  I seem to recall it’s…  4.54  0.99  Medium     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
27  There are, I believe…  4.58  1.06  Medium               
37  I have no doubt, I mean I’m 
sure it’s… 
4.69  1.64  Medium        ü ü     ü   
52  I remember it’s…  4.69  0.97  Medium     ü ü ü ü ü   
62  Surely it’s…  4.69  1.19  Medium     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
1  It must be…  4.77  1.42  Medium        ü        ü ü 
19  I’m fairly confident it’s…  5.11  1.14  N/a               
45  Oh yes, it’s…  5.38  1.27  N/a               
13  I’m sure it’s…  5.58  1.10  High     ü     ü ü       
24  It’s…  5.58  1.55  High     ü     ü ü       
58  It is…without a doubt.  5.85  1.41  High       ü ü ü ü    
55  I have no doubt it’s…  5.85  1.26  High          ü ü ü ü 
8  I’m certain it’s…  5.96  1.37  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
22  It’s obviously…  6.04  1.00  High     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
61  It’s certainly…  6.08  1.06  High     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
20  I know it’s…  6.11  1.40  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
40  Yes, it’s…  6.19  .94  High               
11  I’m positive it’s…  6.27  1.25  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
48  I know for a fact that it’s…  6.27  1.08  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
41  I’m confident that it’s…  6.35  0.85  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
39  It’s definitely…  6.38  0.90  High     ü ü ü ü ü ü 
59  I’m absolutely certain it’s…  6.38  1.10  High  ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
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The three levels of confidence cue developed in this pilot study concur with previous 
research that has found expressions of confidence/certainty to fall along the certainty-
probability-possibility continuum (Berry, 1960; Fabre, 1991; Feezel, 1974; Foley, 
1959). The high confidence cues convey the certainty of the statement – what one 
knows to be true. E.g. It’s definitely and I’m confident it’s. The medium confidence cues 
convey what one thinks is probably true. E.g. It’s probably and I think it’s. The low 
confidence cues convey what one thinks is possibly true. E.g. It’s possibly and I guess 
it’s. Additionally the ordering of the words positive, certain, sure, think and suppose, in 
terms of the confidence that was associated with them, was consistent with other studies 
(Berry, 1960; Fabre, 1991; Foley, 1959). 
To further consider the reliability of the confidence levels of the confidence cues 
used in this study comparisons were made where possible with similar expressions used 
by Pulford (2002). Table 2.2 indicates that the ratings given for the cues in the present 
pilot study are largely in agreement with those found by Pulford. 
 
Table 2.2  
A comparison of mean ratings of confidence cues  
 
Confidence Cue 
Pulford (2002) 
M         S.D. 
Wesson  
M         S.D. 
 
I’m absolutely positive/I’m positive… 
 
6.34     1.10 
 
6.27      1.25 
 
Certainly, this is a/It’s certainly… 
 
5.91     1.00 
 
6.08      1.05 
 
I’m certain…  
 
5.76      1.16 
 
5.96      1.37 
 
I’m fairly confident…  
 
5.06      1.29 
 
5.11      1.42 
 
It’s probably… 
 
4.00      1.05 
 
4.08      1.09 
 
It may be… 
 
3.73      1.06 
 
3.69      1.16 
 
Perhaps this could be/Perhaps it’s… 
 
3.31      1.23 
 
3.04      0.77 
Note. N = 20 for Pulford (2002) and N = 26 for Wesson 
     
Overall, the confidence cues developed in this pilot study have been found to cover a 
range of expressions of confidence and uncertainty, and the ratings given in the present 
pilot study are in concordance with previous findings. The three distinct levels of 
confidence cues (high, medium and low) that have been developed in this pilot study are 
used in the subsequent experiments reported in this thesis, and reference will be made 
back to this pilot study in the following chapters. The use of these cues across each of 
the eight experimental chapters is also illustrated in Table 2.1  CHAPTER 3 
The Influence of Confidence and Task Type 
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This experiment investigates the role of task type upon the influence of confidence. In a 
mixed factorial design 116 participants completed three different tasks, each consisting 
of 12 questions with three alternative responses from which participants selected their 
answer. Each response was given by a different ‘speaker’. In the experimental condition 
speaker’s answers were preceded by confidence cues; one speaker answered each 
question with high confidence, one with medium confidence and one with low 
confidence.  In the control condition speaker’s answers were given in the absence of 
confidence cues. A significant interaction between speaker confidence and condition 
showed that the addition of high confidence cues had the most positive influence upon 
choice, and low confidence cues had the most negative influence, on all three tasks. A 
significant speaker confidence, condition and task type interaction indicated that the 
extent of this influence depended upon task type. Speaker confidence of any level also 
served to increase participant’s confidence in their answers with the extent of this 
influence again depending on task type. Furthermore, different levels of speaker 
confidence led to differences in how the speakers were perceived. The results indicate 
that when we are uncertain we use another person’s confidence level as a way of 
distinguishing between information we are receiving, taking high confidence as 
indicative of the ‘best’ answer.   
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The Influence of Confidence and Task Type 
 
Decision-making is often social in nature - we turn to others for their opinions or advice 
when we are uncertain. How we evaluate and interpret this information can determine 
whether or not we use it in making our final decision. A potential method of evaluating 
the quality of another person’s information is by attending to the level of confidence 
with which they express themselves, where confidence is defined as the strength of a 
person’s belief that a specific statement represents their best or most accurate response 
(Peterson and Pitz, 1988). 
Previous research has found information expressed confidently to be used more than 
that which is expressed tentatively or with some element of doubt in many situations, 
including eyewitness testimony (Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992), knowledge 
based tasks (Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001), and group-decision making (Zarnoth and 
Sniezek, 1997). But the extent of this influence is not constant, with high confidence 
exerting more influence in some of these situations than in others. Additionally, as 
outlined in Chapter 0, expressing too much confidence has been found at times to have a 
detrimental effect, leading to a reduction in that speaker’s influence (London, 
McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Pulford, 2002). So what determines how much 
influence a particular level of a speaker’s expressed confidence has?  
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) studied the social influence of confidence in group-
decision making. After participants had individually answered a series of multiple-
choice questions, and indicated their confidence in each of their given answers, they 
generated a group response for the same questions. Group size was found to affect the 
influence of confidence, with two-member groups choosing the answer given by the 
most confident member 72% of the time, and five-member groups choosing the most 
confident members answers on 57% of occasions. The extent to which participants 
agreed with the most confident group member also varied according to task type. Based 
on Laughlin and Ellis’ (1986) terminology, Zarnoth and Sniezek divided the questions 
into a series of intellective and judgmental tasks. Intellective tasks are those for which 
there exists a demonstrably correct answer, such as general knowledge questions, 
whereas judgmental tasks are those for which there is not a demonstrably correct 
answer, instead being based on aesthetic judgements or preferences, such as opinion-
based questions.   
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Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found that the most confident group members answers 
were chosen more frequently on tasks that were intellective than on those that were 
judgmental. Whilst this could partly be attributable to the accuracy of the most 
confident faction on the intellective task, the most confident group member still exerted 
the most influence over the final decision on both task types, regardless of whether they 
were correct or incorrect.  
Zarnoth and Sniezek conclude that the relationship between confidence and influence 
is not constant. Although the social influence of confidence is constant, in that the most 
confident individual was found to exert the most influence on both task types, it is not 
constant in the extent of this influence, with confidence being a greater predictor of 
influence on intellective rather than judgmental tasks.  
Why does the most confident group member exert the most influence? As Zarnoth 
and Sniezek (1997) suggest it may be due to behavioural styles, in that confident group 
members may be more talkative or confrontational. In turn confident group members 
may also be more resistant to persuasion from others, a suggestion supported by Visser, 
Krosnick, and Simmons (2003) who found that people who hold their attitudes with 
certainty are less susceptible to social influence. These suggestions are unique to group 
decision-making situations, or at least to situations where a consensus must be reached. 
However, decisions in the real world are often made interactively, rather than having to 
reach a group consensus, in that we consult with others but ultimately make the final 
decision alone, deciding whether or not to use the information that we have collected 
(Heath and Gonzalez, 1995). When we have the final say on a decision and do not have 
to bow to group pressures, do we still rely on other peoples’ high confidence when 
selecting which information we use and which we ignore?  
Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) looked at the influence of confidence within an 
interactive decision-making environment, using the Judge-Advisor System (JAS). On a 
knowledge-based task there was a significant positive relationship between an advisor’s 
confidence, how much the judge trusted that advisor, and how accurate that advisor was. 
The advisor’s confidence was also found to influence the judges’ final decisions, with 
the advice being taken from individuals who expressed higher confidence.  
In an interactive decision making environment, not having to reach a consensual 
decision means that the influence of confidence should not be due to group decision 
procedures, such as conceding to a confident individual because they are more 
confrontational. Why then does the most confident individual’s answers still exert the  
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most influence? It has been suggested that the most confident individual’s answers may 
be selected as a default option, using confidence as a heuristic by which to simplify the 
decision-making process (Leippe et al., 1992; Thomas and McFadyen, 1995; Zarnoth 
and Sniezek, 1997). In utilising the confidence heuristic more weight is placed on a 
person’s expressed confidence than on the actual content of what they are conveying. 
Expressed confidence is taken as a cue to accuracy, knowledge and competency, and the 
expectation is that someone is more likely to possess reliable information if it is 
expressed confidently rather than tentatively. When all else is equal we may reach a 
decision based on a comparison of other people’s expressed level of confidence 
(Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). We should not have to pay close attention to what 
someone says, just how they say it in terms of the confidence that they express, as this 
should give us enough information on which to base our decision. In other words, the 
higher the confidence the greater the influence that should be exerted.  
If confidence does indicate accuracy reliably then using the confidence heuristic is an 
effective strategy as in, for example, Sniezek and Van Swol’s (2001) experiment, where 
high confidence was a valid indicator of an advisor’s accuracy. However this is not 
always the case. People may use the confidence heuristic to their advantage, arguing 
confidently so as to appear more knowledgeable than they really are. As such, receiving 
input from others may enhance our confidence more than it enhances the accuracy of 
the decisions we make (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993).  
Does this mean that we abandon our own knowledge when faced with confident 
knowledge from another, regardless of the quality of that information? Paese and 
Kinnaly (1993) say no, pointing out that in their experiment participants’ accuracy 
should have increased if this was the case, as the information they were receiving was 
either 60% or 90% accurate. However, given that accuracy actually fell to around 40%, 
this would indicate that participants did not abandon their own perceived knowledge for 
that of another’s confident knowledge. But Sniezek and Buckley (1995) disagree, 
stating that ‘confidence is power’ as the very act of communicating one’s confidence to 
another serves to influence that person’s final decision. The influence of confidence as 
they see it is a two way process - confidence enhances the influence one has upon others 
yet uncertainty makes one more susceptible to social influence.  
The extent to which another’s confidence influences us may depend upon our source 
of information (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). A decision-maker can utilise internal 
information, their own knowledge concerning the task in hand, or they can utilise  
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external information, taking advice from others. As the amount of information one can 
bring to a task decreases, the power of another person to influence and manipulate our 
choices via their confidence level increases (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995).   
The above studies rely on numerically expressed confidence, such as “I’m 80% 
sure”, to convey the confidence of another person. However in real-life situations, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, uncertainty is rarely expressed numerically. People more usually 
express their level of confidence or uncertainty using verbal expressions, through 
expressions such as “I’m certain” or “I’m not sure”.  
In Sniezek and Van Swol’s (2001) experiment, advisors had the opportunity to add 
written comments in support of their answers in addition to the numerical estimates of 
confidence they had provided. The extent to which judges trusted these advisors was 
positively correlated to the frequency of additional confidence comments, such as “I’m 
definite about this”, that were given by the advisor. 
High confidence can however have a negative influence. Pulford (2002) found that a 
highly confident speaker was the least trusted and least liked when compared to 
speakers expressing their answers with medium or low confidence. High and low 
confidence actually led to reductions in agreement with those speakers whereas medium 
confidence increased agreement. The speaker who expressed medium confidence not 
only exerted the most influence over the choices made by individuals but they were also 
trusted and liked the most. This concurs with London, McSeveney, and Tropper’s 
(1971) suggestion that there is a curvilinear relationship between confidence and 
influence. They also found that too much confidence led to increased feelings of 
antagonism towards a speaker  – the higher the confidence the more negatively the 
speaker was perceived.   
It would appear then that the level of confidence with which a person expresses 
himself or herself can affect how that speaker is perceived, as well as the influence that 
their expressed confidence exerts. Previous research has identified two major 
dimensions of speech cue attributions – those relating to speaker competency and those 
relating to speaker likeability (e.g. Chaiken and Eagly, 1976; Erickson, Lind, Johnson, 
and O’Barr, 1978; Scherer, 1979). Some researchers have also suggested that speech 
styles serve as a cue to the gender of the speaker (Bradley, 1981; Lakoff, 1975; but see 
Erickson et al., 1978; Newcombe and Arnkoff, 1979). How speakers using different 
levels of expressed confidence are perceived in relation to these dimensions may in turn 
mediate their influence.   
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Rationale for Experiment 
The research reviewed here has shown that people assess the quality of another’s 
knowledge by attending to their expressed level of confidence. This would suggest that 
people use confidence as a heuristic to simplify the decision making process. While 
confidence as a heuristic has been suggested previously (e.g. Leippe et al., 1992; 
Thomas and McFadyen, 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), empirical research has not 
focused on this. Do people use confidence as a heuristic on which to base their 
judgements and decisions? Do they use it all of the time or only in some situations?  
     This experiment considers the influence of verbal expressions of confidence on 
different types of task, replicating Pulford’s (2002) methodology. Verbal expressions 
are used as they are more representative of how we communicate uncertainty in 
everyday life than numerical expressions are, although research has tended to focus on 
the latter. Additionally, three levels of confidence are used – high, medium and low – to 
represent a broader range of confidence than the traditional high/low, 
confident/tentative dichotomy. It is also important to consider the influence of 
confidence across a range of task types as some tasks allow the decision-maker to bring 
more information to the task than others. For this reason three different tasks are used. 
The first, a general knowledge task, represents an intellective task and allows the 
individual to bring their own knowledge to hand, or use the information provided by 
another. The second task, an opinion-based task, represents a judgmental task, and 
allows the individual to use their own opinions, or the opinions provided by another. In 
some situations we may have to make a decision blindly, having only external 
information to rely upon. The third task was used to represent this as it allows the 
individual to bring no prior knowledge or opinions to the task, and is therefore classed 
as an external judgement task.  
Drawing upon the research findings discussed, the hypothesis of this experiment is 
that higher levels of speaker confidence will exert a greater influence upon participants’ 
choices than low confidence, but the extent of this influence may be dependent upon the 
task being completed. Additionally, in relation to previous research (Heath and 
Gonzalez, 1995; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993), it is hypothesised that being able to view 
another person’s confidence will lead to increases in confidence. How speakers using 
different levels of confidence are perceived, and the relation of this to the influence of 
confidence upon choice, is also considered to investigate the underlying reasons for any 
changes in choice that occur.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
116 participants (86 women and 30 men), both members of  the public and 
undergraduate students from the University of Wolverhampton’s participant pool, took 
part in the study. The participant pool is a reciprocal scheme, consisting of first and 
second year undergraduate psychology students who gain access to the participant pool 
for their own final year research upon completion of a set number of participant hours 
for which they have volunteered. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 57 years (M = 
21.69, S.D. = 5.95). Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental (n = 
59) or control condition (n = 57).  
 
Design  
The study was a 2 (Condition: Experimental with confidence cues; Control with no 
confidence cues) x 3 (Task Type: Intellective; Judgmental; External judgement) x 3 
(Speaker Confidence: High/Speaker A; Medium/Speaker B; Low/Speaker C) mixed 
design, with repeated measures on the last two variables. The dependent variables were 
the percentage of time each speaker’s answers were chosen on each of the three tasks, 
the participant’s mean confidence in their answer, the mean accuracy of their answer 
(only on the intellective/general knowledge task), and their perceptions of each speaker.  
The correct answer to each question was placed in a counterbalanced design, so that 
each correct answer appeared equally often in answer position 1, 2 and 3. In a similar 
way the order of presentation of each speaker was counterbalanced to reduce any 
response biases. Finally the presentation of task type was counterbalanced so that, 
within each condition, a third of the participants received the intellective task first, a 
third the judgmental task first and a third the external judgmental task first. 
The control condition allowed for the number of participants who chose each 
multiple-choice answer in the absence of the independent variable of confidence cues to 
be determined. The answers each of the three speakers gave in the control condition 
were exactly the same as those in the experimental condition apart from the omission of 
confidence cues. In doing so, the answers that participants opted for in the control group 
were not due to the confidence in each speaker’s answer but due to their own 
knowledge. 
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Materials 
All participants responded to 12 questions on three different types of task. Across the 
tasks, questions were presented in the same format, in that each question was followed 
by three alternative responses from which participants had to select their answer. In the 
experimental condition the responses had confidence cues attached, with each speaker 
expressing a different level of confidence in their answer - either high, medium or low. 
Six cues from each confidence level were selected, with 18 confidence cues being used 
in total (see Table 2.1, Chapter 2). A relatively small number of cues were used to 
maintain consistency across the experimental tasks. The chosen cues were then 
randomly assigned to the answers given in the experimental condition, where each 
question was followed by three answers, one preceded by a high confidence cue, one by 
a medium confidence cue and one by a low confidence cue. Each confidence cue was 
used six times, each time in a different combination, so that no two cues were used 
together more than once.  
Each task was designed to represent elements of popular game shows, with the 
intellective task mirroring the style and format of the popular TV show “Who Wants to 
be a Millionaire?”, the judgemental task representing questions that would be used on 
“Family Fortunes” and the external judgment task being based on a section of “The 
Generation Game”.  Instructions issued to participants and the task materials used can 
be seen in Appendix C. 
  
Intellective task: General Knowledge. 12 general knowledge questions were selected 
from Nelson and Narens’ (1980) database of general-information questions for which 
they had developed norms. As the experiment required difficult questions to be used, in 
order to increase participant uncertainty so that they would utilise the ‘advice’ of the 
speakers, only those with a low probability of recall were selected (M = 0.07, S.D. = 
0.06). Questions were also chosen with a low Feeling-of-Knowing score (see Hart, 
1965) (Mdn = 3.5, based on a 1-9 range), as the experiment utilised a multiple-choice 
format. Therefore using such questions meant that people were more likely to use the 
‘advice’ given to them, rather than to answer questions due to a Feeling-of-Knowing.  
In addition to the correct answer, two alternative incorrect responses were given to 
each question. These consisted of either related answers, (e.g. “What is the longest river 
in Asia”? Indus; Yenisei;  Yangtze), or similar answers (e.g. “What is the name of 
Alexander Graham Bell’s assistant?”  Watson; Walker; Warner).   
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For example, in the experimental condition,  
“What is the longest river in Asia”? 
Friend C said, I think the Indus is the longest river, isn’t it?  
Friend B said, I suspect the longest river is the Yenisei 
Friend A said, I know the longest river is the Yangyze 
 
In the control condition,  
Friend C said, the Indus is the longest river  
Friend B said, the longest river is the Yenisei 
Friend A said, the longest river is the Yangyze 
 
Judgmental task: Opinions.  30 participants who did not take part in the main study 
participated in a pilot study conducted to generate responses to 30 opinion-based 
questions. The frequency of each response was logged, and then 12 questions were 
selected from the original 30 that had clear “top” answers, i.e. those that had the highest 
response frequency.  Two alternative responses were selected from the second and third 
most frequent responses for each of the chosen questions.  
 
For example in the experimental condition,  
“Name a famous Saint” 
Friend A said, I know the top answer is Saint Patrick?  
Friend B said, I believe the top answer is Saint Paul 
Friend C said, I’m guessing but I would say that the top answer is Saint Christopher 
 
External Judgement task. To give a greater range of task types an external judgement 
task was also used, where a decision was required on the basis of externally provided 
information only. This took the form of a ‘memory’ game. Participants were told that 
their ‘friends’ had been shown pictures of twelve different objects, which they had to 
name in the correct order of appearance. From the three responses given, participants 
had to select which answer they thought was correct.   
 
For example in the experimental condition,  
“What was the fourth object you were shown?” 
Friend B said, I would say the fourth object was the book  
Friend A said, I have no doubt that the fourth object was the wine bottle 
Friend C said, I suppose the fourth object could have been the clock   
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As the aim of the study was to consider the influence of different levels of speakers’ 
confidence on different task types in the absence of other differentiating information 
about the speaker such as age or gender, the speakers were identified only as ‘Friend A’, 
‘Friend B’ and ‘Friend C’. In the experimental condition ‘Friend A’ was the high 
confidence speaker, ‘Friend B’ medium confidence and ‘Friend C’ low confidence. In 
the control condition, no confidence cues were attached to any of the friends’ answers. 
Whilst the use of these labels may be argued to possess less validity than using peoples 
names, Allwood (1994) points out that by simply “presenting subjects with a situation 
where another person had actually selected the answers in the belief that they were 
correct [as opposed to simply using MCQs], realistic possibilities [are] created that 
subjects would pay attention to content of a social nature” (p. 200). 
 
Procedure       
All the experiments reported in this thesis required participants to sign informed 
consent forms before taking part. Each participant was then given written instructions 
and a booklet containing task materials. For each task the participants were asked to 
circle the ‘name’ of the speaker who had given the correct answer (A, B or C) and also 
to indicate how confident they were in this answer on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = not 
at all confident and 100 = completely confident. The questionnaire was administered in 
a group but completed individually and without interaction.  
After all three tasks had been completed the participants were presented with another 
questionnaire which asked a series of questions regarding their impressions of the 
speakers on the basis of how they had responded on the three tasks. Firstly they were 
asked to indicate who they would choose as a team-mate to take through to the ‘next 
round’, based on their overall performance. This was to see if participants overall 
preference for a particular speaker was the same as the speaker whose answers they had 
selected the most. It may be that whilst on each individual question the participants 
attend to each answer, overall one particular level of confidence may be more salient.  
Participants were also asked to indicate  which speaker they thought was the most 
competent and the least competent, which they liked the most and the least, and which 
sex they thought each speaker was. As a manipulation check participants were also 
asked to indicate which speaker they thought was the most confident and which they 
thought was the least confident. After the questionnaires had been completed 
participants were debriefed and thanked. (See Appendix C for debriefing details).   
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Results 
 
The percentage of times each participant chose the answers given by each of the 
three speakers was calculated for each task, along with participants mean confidence in 
their answers when choosing the answers of each speaker. Throughout this thesis results 
relating to the speakers and their level of confidence will be referred to as the high, 
medium or low confidence speaker (as opposed to Speaker A, B or C in this experiment, 
for example) in both the experimental and control conditions. In the case of the latter, 
although no confidence cues are actually used, these labels refer to the answers given by 
the equivalent speaker in the absence of confidence cues. The influence of a speaker’s 
answers in the presence and absence of confidence cues was investigated through the 
use of a mixed design Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with planned comparisons 
between conditions made using t-tests. The use of other tests is specified when 
necessary. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests within this thesis, unless 
stated otherwise.  
 
Influence of Confidence Cues on Chosen Answers 
 
Table 3.1 
Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker across tasks  
Speaker Confidence   
Task Type  High                        Medium                        Low 
Intellective 
Control 
Experimental 
 
33.19 
66.81 
 
(14.81) 
(30.30) 
 
37.13 
21.61 
 
(18.44) 
(22.80) 
 
29.68 
11.58 
 
(13.91) 
(14.10) 
Judgmental 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.89 
47.74 
 
(12.44) 
(28.48) 
 
27.48 
29.80 
 
(13.08) 
(19.46) 
 
39.62 
22.46 
 
(13.84) 
(19.03) 
External Judgement 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.16 
76.84 
 
(22.02) 
(30.72) 
 
31.58 
17.23 
 
(21.63) 
(25.18) 
 
36.11 
5.93 
 
(25.02) 
(16.08) 
Total 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.73 
63.76 
 
(11.87) 
(25.15) 
 
32.07 
22.88 
 
(11.59) 
(17.69) 
 
35.08 
13.32 
 
(12.73) 
(12.37) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.   
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The influence of speaker confidence on participants’ choice of answers was analysed 
using a Condition x Task Type x Speaker Confidence mixed ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last two variables. The mean percentage of agreement with each of the 
three speakers’ answers, in the absence and presence of confidence cues, is shown in 
Table 3.1. There were no main effects of the between-subjects factor of Condition, F(1, 
114) = 1.05, p = .31, or the within-subjects factor of Task Type, F(2, 228) = 1.05, p = 
.35, although a significant main effect of Speaker Confidence was observed, F(2, 228) = 
51.02, p < .001; the ‘high’ confidence speaker’s answers were chosen more frequently 
when combining the results from the control and experimental conditions (M = 48.27) 
than the medium and low confidence speakers’ answers were (M = 27.47 and  M = 
24.23).  
There was no Task Type x Condition interaction, F(2, 228) = 1.03, p = .36, but a 
significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction was found, F(2, 228) = 57.11, 
p < .001. As Table 3.1 indicates, in the absence of confidence cues (Control) there is no 
difference in the amount of times each speakers’ answers were chosen, whereas there 
was when confidence cues were added (Experimental). Here participants chose the 
answers given by the high confidence speaker (M = 63.76) more than those given by the 
medium (M = 22.88), and in turn low confidence speakers (M = 13.32). A signficant 
Speaker Confidence x Task Type interaction was also found, F(4, 456) = 13.41, p < 
.001. This can be explained in relation to the significant three-way Speaker Confidence 
x Task Type x Condition interaction, F(4, 456) = 13.46,  p < .001. This three-way 
interaction is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows the mean difference in the amount 
of times each speaker’s answers are chosen between the control and experimental group 
for all three tasks.   
On all three tasks there was a shift towards answers expressed with high confidence 
and away from those expressed with low confidence, although the extent of these 
changes do depend upon task type. The influence of a speaker using medium confidence 
cues also depends on task type with there being either no change or a decrease in the 
amount of times that speaker’s answers are chosen. Table 3.1 shows that on all tasks 
high confidence answers were chosen more frequently than either medium or low 
confidence answers and in turn answers expressed with medium confidence were 
chosen more frequently than those expressed with low confidence. The results for each 
task type shall be reported separately below in more detail. 
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Figure 3.1. Percentage change in chosen speaker between the Control (C) and 
Experimental (E) conditions across Intellective (I), Judgmental (J) and External 
Judgement (EJ) task types. 
 
Intellective Task  
On the intellective task, compared to when no confidence cues were used, a 
speaker’s answers were chosen 33.62% more often when expressed with high 
confidence, t(114) = 7.55, p < .001. Speakers expressing their answers with medium or 
low confidence saw comparable decreases in the amount of times their answers were 
chosen (-15.52% and -18.10%), t(114) = 4.02, p < .001, and t(114) = 6.96, p < .001.  
As this was an intellective task a correct answer existed for each question. However 
it was not the intention of this experiment to provide any cues to the accuracy of the 
answers, with each speaker being correct an equal amount of times. The addition of 
confidence cues made no difference to the participants’ accuracy on this task, with mean 
accuracy for the control and experimental groups being no better than would be 
expected by chance alone (M = 34.06% vs.  M = 37.85%), t(114) = 1.28,  p = .20. 
Therefore the differences between chosen speakers, on the intellective task at least, is 
due to their expressed confidence and not the accuracy of their answers. 
 
Judgmental Task  
On the judgmental task the addition of confidence cues led to a much less 
pronounced change in the choice of speaker whose answers were selected. There is 
again a shift towards a speaker’s answers when expressed with high confidence, t(114) 
= 3.62, p < .001, albeit to a lesser extent than on the intellective task (14.85% vs. 
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33.62%), with the high confidence speakers answers being chosen less often on this task 
than on the intellective task (M = 47.74% vs. M = 66.81%), t(58) = 4.94, p < .001. The 
shift towards high confidence is to the detriment of the speaker answering with low 
confidence, whose answers were chosen 17.16% less often when they used confidence 
cues than when they did not, t(114) = 5.54,  p < .001. However, the low confidence 
speaker’s answers were still chosen more frequently on this task than on the intellective 
task (M = 22.46% vs.  M = 11.58%),  t(58) = 4.23,  p < .001. Whilst the addition of 
medium confidence cues made no difference to the amount of times that speaker’s 
answers were selected on this task, t(114) = .75,  p = .46, the answers given by this 
speaker were chosen more often here than on the intellective task (M = 29.80%  vs. M = 
21.61%), t(58) = 2.33, p = .02.  
 
External Judgement Task 
The most substantial choice shifts from the absence to the presence of confidence 
cues were seen on the external judgement task.  Here a speaker’s answers were chosen 
44.68% more often when expressed with high confidence, t(114) = 8.97, p < .001, and 
30.18% less often when expressed with low confidence,  t(114) = 7.76,  p < .001, 
compared to when no confidence cues were used. Medium confidence cues also 
decreased selection of that speaker’s answers by -14.35%, t(114) = 3.29, p = .001. The 
answers expressed with high confidence were chosen more often on this task than on 
either the intellective (M = 76.84% vs. M = 66.81%, t(58) = -3.34, p = .001) or the 
judgmental task (M = 76.84% vs. M = 47.74%, t(58) = 7.34, p < .001). As can be seen 
in Table 3.1, out of the three tasks the answers expressed with a medium or low level of 
confidence were chosen least often on this task. The medium confidence speaker’s 
answers were chosen less often here than on either the intellective, t(58) = 2.16, p = .04, 
or the judgmental task, t(58) = 3.40, p = .001, as were the low confidence speaker’s 
answers, t(58) = 3.09, p = .03 and t(58) = 5.71, p < .001.  
The three-way interaction therefore appears to arise from the judgmental task being 
very different to the intellective or external judgement task in how strongly it evokes the 
use of the confidence heuristic. The addition of confidence cues does seem to serve as a 
means of distinguishing between different sources of information one is receiving. But 
although the experimental group shows a preference towards answers expressed with 
high confidence the extent to which a speaker expressing their answers with high 
confidence influences people’s choices depends upon the type of task being undertaken.    
  68 
Influence of Confidence on Choice Confidence 
Due to the strong positive effect that high confidence had upon choice in the 
experimental condition, and conversely the strong negative effect of low confidence, the 
results relating to participant confidence were analysed separately for each speaker’s 
confidence level using ANOVA, with comparisons being made across conditions and 
task type. The analysis of these data was conducted in this way because the small 
number of participants who chose the answers given by the low confidence speaker 
made analysis for all three speakers together problematic. The low numbers of 
participants choosing the answers given by the low confidence speaker, in the 
experimental group meant there were a lot of missing data for confidence in these cells.   
 
Table 3.2 
Mean confidence (%) in answers for agreement with each speaker across tasks  
Speaker Confidence   
Task Type  High                      Medium                      Low 
Intellective 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.52 
58.89 
 
(17.41) 
(24.93) 
 
35.24 
52.51 
 
(17.47) 
(26.73) 
 
35.55 
53.09 
 
(19.67) 
(28.73) 
Judgmental 
Control 
Experimental 
 
62.64 
72.30 
 
(16.01) 
(16.37) 
 
64.16 
70.94 
 
(16.44) 
(14.66) 
 
61.15 
67.77 
 
(13.89) 
(14.91) 
External Judgement 
Control 
Experimental 
 
29.29 
65.33 
 
(20.04) 
(25.96) 
 
26.73 
56.39 
 
(19.33) 
(24.56) 
 
30.71 
48.21 
 
(23.11) 
(20.30) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
There was a main effect of Condition, whether participants were agreeing with the 
high confidence speaker, F(1, 101) = 61.40, p < .001, the medium confidence speaker, 
F(1, 72) = 24.91, p < .001, or the low confidence speaker, F(1, 61) = 5.47, p = .02.        
From Table 3.2, which shows the mean confidence participants had in their answers 
when agreeing with each of the three speakers, it can be seen that participants’ 
confidence in their answers was higher in the experimental condition than the control 
condition. There was also a main effect of Task Type for agreement with the high, F(2, 
202) = 64.94,  p < .001, medium,  F(2, 202) = 65.26,  p < .001, and low confidence  
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speaker, F(2, 202) = 20.79, p < .001. As Table 3.2 indicates, this can be attributed to 
higher levels of participant confidence on the judgmental task. 
Figure 3.2. Percentage change in answer confidence between the control (C) and 
experimental (E) conditions across task type. 
 
The extent of these increases did appear to depend upon the speaker’s confidence 
level and the task. There were significant Task Type x Condition interactions for the 
high and medium confidence speakers, F(2, 202) = 22.09, p < .001, F(2, 144) = 10.46, p 
< .001, respectively, with this result nearing significance for the low confidence 
speaker, F(2, 122) = 3.06, p = .051. As a rule, participants’ confidence increased the 
most on the external judgement task, where high confidence cues raised participants’ 
confidence by 36.03%, t(104) = 7.93, p < .001, medium confidence by 29.66%, t(75) = 
5.83, p < .001, and low confidence by 17.50%, t(64) = 2.42, p = .02. Similar increases 
were also seen on the intellective task, albeit to a lesser extent. On this task high 
confidence increased participants’ confidence in those answers by 26.37%, t(112) = 
6.53,  p < .001, medium confidence by 17.27%,  t(91) = 3.77,  p < .001, and low 
confidence by 17.54%,  t(87) = 3.41,  p = .001. Figure 3.2 shows the increases in 
participants’ confidence when confidence cues are added to the speakers’ answers.  
The Task Type x Condition interactions again appear to arise from the nature of the 
task. Much smaller increases in confidence were seen with the addition of confidence 
cues on the judgemental task. For the high confidence speaker the listeners’ confidence 
in their choices increased by only 9.65% compared to when no confidence cues were 
used,  t(111) = 3.27,  p = .001, with the increases being just 6.78% for the medium 
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confidence speaker and 6.62% for the low confidence speaker, t(104) = 2.23, p = .03 
and t(97) = 2.27, p = .03, respectively.  
The cause of this Task Type x Condition interaction can be explained with reference 
to the level of confidence given in the absence of confidence cues (control group). From 
Table 3.2 it can be seen that, in the absence of confidence cues accompanying the 
speakers answers, participants’ confidence in the answers they chose was similar across 
all three speakers on the intellective and external judgement tasks (ranging from 26.73% 
- 35.55%). However on the judgmental task participants were much more confident in 
the answers they gave (61.15% - 64.16%). This further reinforces the suggestion that 
this task is different in nature to the other two tasks leading to differences in 
participants’ choice behaviour and the confidence they have in those choices. 
 
Influence of Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers 
After completing all the tasks participants were asked a series of questions relating to 
their perceptions of the three speakers. Table 3.3 summarises the results, as percentage 
of participants, in the presence and absence of confidence cues, for chosen team-mate, 
competency and likeability.  
 
Chosen Team-mate 
The control and experimental groups differed in their choice of team-mate, χ
2 = 
27.13, df = 2, p < .001. In the absence of confidence cues there is no clear preference for 
any speaker as participants’ choice of team-mate. When confidence cues are added a 
majority of participants selected the high confidence speaker as their team-mate (70%), 
although a sizeable minority opted for the medium confidence speaker as a team-mate 
(29%). Virtually no one selected the low confidence speaker to join their team. 
 
Competency 
The control and experimental groups differed in terms of the speaker they perceived 
as being the most competent, χ
2 = 27.03, df = 2, p < .001, and the least competent, χ
2 = 
50.87, df = 2, p < .001. As with choice of team-mate, there was little difference between 
speakers in the absence of confidence cues. However, the addition of confidence cues 
resulted in the high confidence speaker being seen by 71% of the participants as the 
most competent of the three speakers, with the low confidence speaker being seen as the 
least competent by 88% of the participants.  
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Likeability 
Differences were also seen between conditions in terms of who they liked the most, 
χ
2 = 17.18,  df = 2, p < .001, and the least, χ
2 = 8.66,  df = 2, p < .001. Again little 
difference between speakers was seen in the control group (Table 3.3).  When 
confidence cues were added the medium confidence speaker was most liked by 53% of 
participants, followed by the high confidence speaker (39%). The high and low 
confidence speakers were each liked the least by 45.8% of the participants, with only 
8.5% of participants liking the medium confidence speaker the least. 
 
Table 3.3 
Perceptions of speakers in the presence and absence of confidence cues  
Speaker Confidence   
  High                Medium              Low 
Team-mate 
Control 
Experimental 
 
36.8 
69.5 
 
22.5 
28.8 
 
40.4 
1.7 
 
Most Competent 
Control 
Experimental 
 
29.8 
71.2 
 
28.1 
23.7 
 
42.1 
5.1 
 
Least Competent 
Control 
Experimental 
 
36.8 
8.5 
 
40.4 
3.4 
 
22.8 
88.1 
 
Most Liked 
Control 
Experimental 
 
40.4 
39.0 
 
22.8 
52.5 
 
36.8 
8.5 
 
Least Liked 
Control 
Experimental 
 
36.8 
45.8 
 
29.8 
8.5 
 
33.3 
45.8 
 
 
Speaker Confidence 
As a manipulation check participants were asked to indicate which speaker they 
thought was the most, and the least, confident. The addition of confidence cues led to 
significant differences between conditions. In the absence of confidence cues all three 
speakers were seen as more or less equal in terms of being the most/least confident.  
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When high confidence cues were added 98.3% of participants correctly identified the 
high confidence speaker as the most confident, χ
2 = 59.63, df = 2, p < .001. When low 
confidence cues were used the low confidence speaker was correctly identified as the 
least confident speaker by 94.9%, χ
2 = 55.84, df = 2, p < .001.  
 
Speaker Gender  
In the absence of confidence cues participants did not identify any of the speakers as 
being predominantly male or female, χ
2 = .02, df = 1, p = .45, χ
2 = .86, df = 1, p = .18, 
and χ
2 = .44, df = 1, p = .26, (one-tailed). As expected, the use of confidence cues did 
serve as gender markers. More participants identified a speaker using high confidence 
cues as being male than female (68% vs. 32%), with 68% of participants seeing the 
medium confidence speaker as female, both χ
2 = 7.48, df = 1, p = .003, (one-tailed). The 
low confidence speaker was also seen by more participants as female than male (61.0% 
vs. 39.0%), χ
2 = 2.86, df = 1, p = .05, (one-tailed). 
 
Summary of Results 
In relation to the influence of confidence cues on chosen answers, a significant main 
effect for Speaker Confidence was found, but not for Task Type or Condition, nor was 
there a Task Type x Condition interaction. Significant two-way interactions between 
Speaker Confidence and both Condition and Task Type, and a significant three-way 
Speaker Confidence x Task Type x Condition interaction indicates that the addition of 
confidence cues has a strong influence upon chosen answers, an effect that is mediated 
by the different tasks.  
Similarly, in relation to the influence of confidence on confidence in answer, 
significant main effects of Task Type and Condition were observed for all three 
speakers (high, medium and low confidence). Task Type x Condition interactions found 
for the high and medium confidence speakers, with this nearing significance for the low 
confidence speaker, indicating that the addition of confidence cues has a strong 
influence upon confidence in answers, an effect again mediated by the different tasks.  
The addition of confidence cues also had significant effects on participants’ 
perceptions of the speakers, in terms of their choice of team-mate, and who they viewed 
as being most/least competent and likeable.   
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Discussion 
 
In the present study it was found that the confidence expressed by a speaker in their 
answers influences the extent to which a listener chooses those answers, with increasing 
levels of confidence exerting the greatest influence upon choice. The results therefore 
indicate that confidence is used as a means of differentiating between different sources 
of information, and the greater our uncertainty is the more we rely on the level of 
confidence with which information is expressed by others to help us reach a decision.  
     The answers given by the highly confident speaker were chosen most frequently 
overall, but the extent to which their answers were chosen did depend on the task. 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found that high confidence exerted more influence on 
intellective tasks than judgmental tasks. This was supported in the present study, with 
answers expressed with high confidence being chosen more often on the intellective, 
knowledge-based task than on the judgmental, opinion-based task. The extent to which 
participant’s chose the high confidence speaker’s answers on these two tasks paralleled 
those seen in Zarnoth and Sniezek’s experiment. On the external judgement task, that is 
not knowledge or opinion-based, and of which there is no comparable task in Zarnoth 
and Sniezek’s experiment, reliance on the high confidence speaker’s answers was the 
highest out of all three tasks.  
Why is another’s confidence more influential on some tasks than on others? One’s 
own level of uncertainty does appear to be important. Taking confidence in answers in 
the control group as a baseline, confidence was lowest on the external judgement task, 
closely followed by the intellective task, and was highest on the judgmental task. In the 
experimental group the answers given by the highly confident speaker were chosen 
most frequently on the external judgement task, followed by the intellective task, and 
were chosen least often on the judgmental task. So the lower the participants’ 
confidence in their answers, the more frequently the high confidence speaker’s answers 
were chosen. This suggests that when we are uncertain we are more susceptible to social 
influence and when we are certain we are less influenced. This concurs with findings by 
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) and Vissers et al. (2003).  
But why are we more uncertain on some tasks than on others? The amount of 
information that one can bring to the task appears to be the important factor here. On the 
external judgement task participants could not bring any prior knowledge or opinions to 
the task and although theoretically they could do on the intellective task this was not the  
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case because hard questions were selected, and participants’ accuracy was no better than 
would be expected by chance in either condition. With control group confidence for 
these two tasks being low it would seem that participants’ choices of answers were no 
more than guesses. This would indicate that participants approached these two tasks in 
similar ways. Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) point out that although a task may be classed 
as intellective, if it is outside one’s own knowledge domain it may involve a judgement. 
This clearly seemed to be the case here. The judgmental task though provided 
participants with the opportunity to use their own opinions, meaning that the answers 
given were more than just guesses, indicated by the much higher level of confidence in 
answers in the control group. 
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) suggested the influence of confidence depends on 
whether we use internal or external information to reach a decision, determined by when 
we receive input from other sources. They found that the influence of high confidence 
was lowest when one’s own knowledge could be utilised and greatest when this 
opportunity was removed. This can also be applied to task type, as on some tasks we 
can bring internal information and on others we can not. In relation to the present 
results, on the judgmental task, where participants used their own opinions, the 
influence of high confidence was lowest, whereas on the other two tasks where 
participants could not or did not bring much or any of their own knowledge the 
influence of the high confidence speaker was greatest. This may explain why Zarnoth 
and Sniezek (1997) found high confidence exerted more influence on some tasks than 
on others – people may feel that they can bring more information to a judgmental task 
than to an intellective task, at least when that task is not in their domain. 
Not being able to bring any internal information to a task means that one must search 
for another basis on which to make a decision. This leaves us relying heavily on 
external information. When we receive information from a number of external sources 
we need a way of distinguishing between these.  We could attend to the accuracy of the 
information to do this, but accuracy is of no use if one has no way of knowing which 
answer is correct and which is not, and some tasks do not have a correct answer at all. 
This leaves us relying on communicative cues to help us, comparing the confidence 
with which different sources of information are expressed (Leippe et al., 1992; Thomas 
and McFadyen, 1995). The greater our own uncertainty, the more we will use and rely 
upon the confidence that another person expresses as a way of making a decision.  
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What is our basis for comparing different levels of confidence even when we can not 
confirm the quality of that information? Previous research has shown that confidence is 
taken as a cue to a speaker’s accuracy, competency and credibility (Erickson et al., 
1978; Leippe et al., 1992; Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). In the present experiment 
high confidence was seen as indicative of high competence and low confidence as 
indicative of low competence. However many participants in the present study liked the 
high confidence speaker the least even if they thought this speaker was the most 
competent, whereas using a more moderate, medium, level of confidence increased 
liking for that speaker. Previous research has also shown that too much confidence to 
have a detrimental effect on how much a speaker is liked (London et al., 1971; Pulford, 
2002). 
Although the discussion so far has focused on the influence of high confidence cues, 
the effects of the other confidence cues should also be considered.  The results appear to 
indicate that the higher a speaker’s confidence the greater their influence upon the 
choices made by a listener. Speaking with high confidence leads to a shift towards one’s 
answers while speaking with low confidence results in a shift away from one’s answers. 
It may be that only the high confidence cues had any real influence – the decrease for 
low confidence may simply be because this is where the high confidence speaker’s gain 
came from. High confidence cues make an answer more appealing but choosing to take 
this answer means that the medium or low confidence speakers must lose out. But it is 
also conceivable that these shifts in choice are not due to the positive influence of high 
confidence, but rather the negative influence of low confidence. It may in fact be the 
case that the high confidence speaker does not offer the most appealing answers, but 
that the low confidence speaker offers the least appealing answers.  
While the choice shifts seem to be due to either the high or low level of confidence 
the influence of the medium confidence speaker should not be overlooked. Although 
there was a reduction in agreement with the medium confidence speaker as a whole, this 
speaker was still agreed with on almost one quarter of occasions overall. One might 
expect that if it were the low confidence speaker that exerted the strongest (negative) 
influence, then people would choose the answers given by the high and medium 
confidence speaker equally often. But this was not the case. Yes, the medium 
confidence speaker had their answers chosen more often than those given by the low 
confidence speaker, but this was far less frequently than those given by the high 
confidence speaker.   
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Why would this be? It may be that medium confidence is not seen as being more or 
less appealing than high or low confidence but that the other two afford more salience. 
Indeed, the medium confidence speaker was the most liked, and least disliked, speaker. 
But high confidence suggests a definite, certain answer, providing (seemingly) strong 
evidence for that answer, whereas low confidence offers an indefinite, uncertain answer, 
providing reason to doubt an answer. In a way low confidence cues can be seen as being 
more definite than medium confidence cues because they more clearly indicate doubt in 
an answer, whereas medium confidence is ambiguous.  
If the influence of confidence is due to the clarity of the high or low confidence, with 
medium confidence being too ambiguous then this would suggest that people do use 
confidence as a heuristic, be that a positive or negative use of the confidence heuristic. 
Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts, enabling a decision-maker to engage in less 
cognitive effort. Attending to either the high or low confidence speakers allows a fairly 
simple comparison of answers – is the answer certain or uncertain – and on this basis a 
quick answer can be reached without having to process too much informational content 
of the answer. But to attend to the medium confidence speaker’s answer means that the 
decision-maker has to decipher that speaker’s confidence level – just how uncertain are 
they? Are they fairly confident or fairly uncertain? High and low confidence statements 
can be seen as more distinguishable one way or the other than medium confidence – 
high confidence is certain, low confidence is uncertain but medium confidence could be 
interpreted either way. This may take too much effort for someone who wants to reach a 
quick decision. Although participants in this experiment did not have a time limit 
imposed upon them to complete the tasks, being in an experimental situation may have 
imposed pressure on some participants to complete the task quickly.  Additionally, some 
people may be more compelled to make quick decisions for reasons such as individual 
differences. This will be considered in Chapter 4.  
The problem with relying on confidence as a heuristic is its effect on decisions when 
that confidence is miscommunicated. Previous research has shown that interaction 
increases decision confidence but not decision quality, or accuracy, resulting in 
overconfident decisions (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993). This 
appears to be the case here also, on the intellective task as least, where participants’ 
confidence in their answers increased after viewing a speaker’s confidence but their 
accuracy did not increase significantly. But why does participants’ confidence increase? 
Being able to view another’s confidence in addition to their answer provides the  
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decision-maker with additional information.  After selecting our answer we may 
interpret the confidence with which it is expressed as supporting that decision, with 
another person’s confidence acting as confirmatory evidence for our initial choices (see 
Nickerson, 1998 for review of the confirmation bias). Alternatively social interaction 
may force people to better organise and elaborate on their choices, leading to increased 
confidence in those choices (Heath and Gonzalez, 1995). 
     There were a number of limitations to the present study. As has been mentioned 
previously, the strength of the manipulation, resulting in large choice shifts from the 
answers given by the low confidence speaker to the high confidence speaker, made 
analysis of some of the data problematic. These large choice shifts also raise the 
question of whether they are due to a positive or negative use of the confidence 
heuristic, which the methodology used here does not fully answer. It would be 
worthwhile developing a methodology whereby peoples’ use of the confidence heuristic 
in their choice behaviour can be investigated without the issue of one speaker’s gain 
being another’s loss. Chapter 9 will take this issue into account. 
     The present experiment also provided no clues to the speakers’ identity. For the 
purposes of this experiment it was necessary to label the speakers simply as Friend A 
and so on, to allow perceptions of speaker gender to be considered and to provide no 
differentiating personal information about the speakers. However the participants may 
have seen this as fairly abstract. Giving the speakers’ names may create a more realistic 
situation, helping participants to engage in the social nature of the interaction. Further 
research should give consideration to who the speaker is. For instance, the results from 
the present experiment indicated that people made stereotypical judgements of a 
speaker’s gender on the basis of their confidence. A confident speaker was believed to 
be male, whereas those expressing some element of doubt were believed to be female. 
This too has implications for the influence of confidence, as a communicator who 
deviates from our expectations may be reducing their effectiveness (Krauss and Chiu, 
1998). By taking into consideration both speaker and listener gender Chapter 5 
addresses these issues.  
      
Conclusions 
     Communicating one’s confidence can influence the choices made by others, the 
confidence that they have in those choices, and the way in which one is perceived. But 
which level of confidence should one use? If one is communicating confidence then the  
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appropriate level of confidence could depend on what the aim of the communication is – 
is it more important to appear competent and get people to agree with you or to get 
people to like you? The situations in which these factors are important are worth further 
investigation. The finding that task type mediates the influence of confidence indicates 
that it also depends on what your audience already knows – if they already have an 
opinion or the appropriate knowledge then they are less likely to change their decisions 
for you, no matter how confident you are.  
As indicated in the literature review, apart from situational factors there may be 
individual factors that mediate the influence of confidence. Particularly relevant to this 
line of research are the personality variables of Need for Cognition (Cacioppo and Petty, 
1982) and the Need for Closure (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Given that these place 
high emphasis on the role of heuristics and confidence in the way we process 
information, consideration should be given to how these affect the influence of 
confidence. Chapter 4 takes this into account.  CHAPTER 4 
Individual Differences in the Influence of Confidence 
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The aim of this study was to determine whether the confidence heuristic is a general 
cognitive heuristic or is mediated by individual differences. 110 participants completed 
the same tasks as used in Chapter 3, as well as completing two personality 
questionnaires measuring Need for Closure and Need for Cognition. The general results 
replicated those from Chapter 3, with the extent of shifts in answer and increases in 
confidence being dependent on task type. In relation to the personality measures used, 
Need for Closure had an effect on participants’ choice of answer whereas Need for 
Cognition affected participants confidence in their chosen answers. High (vs. low) Need 
for Closure participants showed a greater shift towards answers expressed with high 
confidence and away from those expressed with medium confidence. High (vs. low) 
Need for Cognition participants were more confident in their chosen answers. Hence, 
people do appear to use a heuristic that uses the confidence of a person as an indicator 
of the validity of their information. People use the heuristic when they are uncertain as a 
means of making choices and having confidence in those choices. However, the extent 
to which the confidence heuristic is used, and the way in which it is used, is influenced 
by individual differences. 
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Individual Differences in the Influence of Confidence 
 
We infer certain traits about speakers on the basis of how they express themselves, and 
this can give us sufficient information on which to base our decision. For instance we 
may apply the rule that “a speaker’s confidence indicates accuracy”. Attending to a 
speaker’s confidence level may therefore be used as a heuristic, enabling quick 
decisions to be made. However the confidence heuristic may not be a general cognitive 
heuristic, in that it may not be used by everyone, or at least not by everyone all of the 
time, or even in the same way (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). In Chapter 3 it was 
suggested that individual differences might influence who relies on the level of 
confidence with which information is expressed as a basis for making a decision. This 
possibility is explored in this chapter.  
Two measures of individual differences are of direct relevance to the present 
research. The first, Need for Closure, refers to the general tendency to prefer certain to 
uncertain knowledge, the desire for a firm answers and an aversion to ambiguity 
(Kruglanski, Webster, and Klem, 1993; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). People who are 
high in Need for Closure are motivated to produce quick and confident judgements 
(Mayseless and Kruglanski, 1987). The second, Need for Cognition, is the tendency for 
an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking, an individual’s need to organise, abstract 
and evaluate information (Cacioppo and Petty, 1982). It has been suggested that low 
Need for Cognition individuals rely more on the use of heuristic cues when evaluating 
information than those who are high in Need for Cognition, who actively think about 
the content of the information (Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris, 1983; Chaiken, Liberman, 
and Eagly, 1989; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Both Need for Closure and Need for 
Cognition may affect how people use the confidence heuristic.   
      
Need for Closure 
The Need for Closure may be situationally induced, such as when an individual finds 
a task difficult or dull, but it also represents a dimension of stable individual differences 
(Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Individuals high in Need for Closure are said to ‘seize’ 
upon an initial judgement, in that they make it quickly, and then ‘freeze’ upon it, in that 
they fix on this choice, (Kruglanski and Webster, 2000). High Need for Closure 
individuals take less information into account, make quicker decisions, and are more 
confident in those decisions than low Need for Closure individuals (Mayseless and 
Kruglanski, 1987). As such, high Need for Closure leads to less information processing  
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being engaged in before committing to a judgement, but higher confidence in those 
judgements because fewer alternatives are considered than individuals under low Need 
for Closure, who may savour uncertainty. Hence, people who are high in NFClo will 
rely on the use of heuristics in their choice behaviour more than those low in NFClo 
(Vermeir, Van Kenhove, Vlerick, and Hendrickx, 1999).  As high Need for Closure 
individuals have a desire for confident knowledge and are motivated to produce quick 
and confident decisions, it is hypothesised that they will rely more upon the confidence 
heuristic as a basis for making a choice than individuals who are lower in Need for 
Closure. Higher Need for Closure participants are also expected to be more confident in 
their answers than those who are lower in Need for Closure. 
The tendency to seize upon an initial judgement and then to freeze upon this choice 
means that when high Need for Closure individuals are in possession of prior 
information they are more resistant to persuasion, but less resistant to persuasion when 
they are lacking such information (Kruglanski et al., 1993). Having prior information 
allows the individual to seize and freeze on this, and to ignore subsequent information. 
Not having prior information means that the high Need for Closure individual is more 
open to persuasion because they want to reach a quick and confident decision on the 
basis of subsequent information that is supplied.  
In addition to the motivational aspect of knowledge construction, i.e. Need for 
Closure, there is also the social character – other people may provide the information 
that we construct our knowledge from (Kruglanski and Webster, 2000). Need for 
Closure may “significantly affect the way a person thinks about, feels about,  acts 
towards, and even talks about significant others” (p. 357). High Need for Closure 
individuals tend to rely more on stereotypes and pay less attention to individuating 
information, as stereotypes represent pre-existing knowledge structures that can be 
instantaneously utilised, whereas attending to differentiating information requires more 
extensive cognitive effort  (Dijksterhuis, Van Knippenberg, Kruglanski, and Schaper 
1996). Compared to individuals low in Need for Closure, high Need for Closure 
individuals tend to perceive groups in more stereotypical terms, and recall less 
stereotype-inconsistent behaviours (Dijksterhuis et al., 1996).  
 
Need for Cognition 
High Need for Cognition individuals have been found to pick out and think about the 
arguments in a message more than low Need for Cognition individuals (Cacioppo and  
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Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1983). If people who are low in Need for Cognition look 
for short cuts to avoid cognitive effort, then they may pay more attention to how 
information is expressed rather than the actual content of the information that is being 
expressed. Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen (2002) investigated this possibility in 
relation to powerful and powerless speech styles (see Erickson, Lind, Johnson, and 
O’Barr, 1978). Based on the assumption that the more certain and direct language used 
in a powerful style may provide low NFC individuals with sufficient information on 
which to base their attitudes, choices or opinions, it was expected that individuals low in 
NFC would engage in less argument processing when the argument is communicated in 
a powerful speech style compared to when it is communicated in powerless speech 
style. No significant effects were found for Need for Cognition. However, as Cacioppo 
et al. (1983) point out, Need for Cognition may be a contributory factor rather than a 
necessary cause of persuasion. As with Need for Closure, situational factors should also 
be considered, as low involvement can reduce both high and low Need for Cognition 
individuals to simpler, less cognitively demanding methods of evaluation (Cacioppo et 
al., 1983; Hosman et al., 2002). In other words, if the motivation is not there, a quick 
way of processing the information one is receiving may be undertaken, regardless of 
whether we usually like to take more time and care. Hosman et al., agree, suggesting 
that the ambiguous personal relevance of the persuasive argument used in their study 
may have caused participants to process the message in similar ways, regardless of their 
Need for Cognition. However, Sorrentino, Bobocel, Gitta, Olson, and Hewitt (1988) 
suggest that whilst individuals who are high in NFC engage in more central processing 
than those who are low in NFC, as personal relevance increases, central processing 
should also increase for both high and low NFC individuals.  
If people do use confidence as a heuristic, is this because it is a general cognitive 
heuristic, perhaps being situationally induced, or is it used more by some people than 
others due to reasons such as individual differences? It is hypothesised that while 
answers expressed with high confidence will be used more than those expressed with 
some level of uncertainty, participants who are higher in Need for Cognition will use 
answers expressed with high confidence more frequently than participants who are 
lower in Need for Cognition. In other words, high Need for Cognition participants will 
utilise the confidence heuristic more frequently. 
While Need for Closure and Need for Cognition both have a motivational basis, 
these two scales have been found to have a low, negative correlation, indicating that  
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they are unlikely to represent the same underlying construct (Webster and Kruglanski, 
1994). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) argued that Need for Cognition seems to exert a 
quantitative influence on cognitive activity, affecting the extent to which one thinks 
about an issue. Need for Closure on the other hand, refers to the desired cognitive end 
state that may be obtained, the desire for confident knowledge, regardless of the amount 
of information processing engaged in.  
 
Rationale for Experiment 
Need for Closure and Need for Cognition both indicate a tendency for some people 
to engage in as little extensive cognitive effort as possible, in order to make quick but 
confident decisions. One way in which this could be achieved is by paying more 
attention to non-content cues than to the actual information that is being conveyed. 
One’s level of expressed confidence may provide such a cue. Chapter 3 showed that 
participants relied more heavily on confidently expressed answers than on those 
expressing some level of uncertainty, indicating that the confidence heuristic was used 
as a decision-making strategy. But did everyone behave in this way and to the same 
extent? Are some people more predisposed to relying on heuristics? The aim of this 
chapter is to see if the confidence heuristic is a general cognitive heuristic or whether 
there are individual differences operating.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
Out of the participants who took part in the experiment reported in Chapter 3, 110 
(86 women and 24 men) volunteered to complete a series of further questionnaires. This 
group of participants ranged in age from 18 – 46 years, with a mean age of 21.20 years 
(S.D. = 4.81). 
 
Materials 
The materials used to measure confidence heuristic use were described in Chapter 3. 
Following completion of the tasks described in Chapter 3, participants were presented 
with the following personality questionnaires which can be seen in full in Appendix E.  
Need for Closure. The Need for Closure (NFClo) scale (Kruglanski et al., 1993) 
consists of 42-items, measured on a six-point scale, ranging from 1 ‘strongly agree’ to 6 
‘strongly disagree’. The items on this scale are designed to tap into an individual’s 
general tendency to  prefer certain to uncertain knowledge (Kruglanski, 1989). 
Individuals with higher scores on this scale display a need for closure, whereas those 
with lower scores on this scale show a need to avoid closure. Kruglanski (1989) views 
these two needs as functionally opposite, conceptualised as ends of a continuum. 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found the overall scale to have high reliability (α = .84).  
     As an individual differences dimension, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) reason that 
Need for Closure may manifest itself in a number of ways. The Need for Closure scale 
therefore consists of five major subscales: Preference  for Order, Preference for 
Predictability, Decisiveness, Discomfort with Ambiguity, and Closed-Mindedness. 
Cronbach’s alpha for these subscales ranges from .62 to .82 (Webster and Kruglanski, 
1994).  
Need for Cognition. The short-form Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, 
Petty, and Kao, 1984) consists of 18 items relating to one’s enjoyment of engaging in 
the thinking process, and rated on a five-point scale from 1 ‘extremely characteristic’ to 
5 ‘extremely uncharacteristic’. Individuals with high scores on this scale have a high 
Need for Cognition, whereas low scores represent a low Need for Cognition. Cacioppo 
et al. (1984) found this scale to have high reliability (α = .88). 
‘Big-Five’ Personality Factors. The 50-item IPIP scale (Goldberg, 1999) measuring 
the ‘big-five’ personality factors again on a five-point scale was also used to control for  
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any covariates. This has items relating to extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability and intellect. Alpha values for these scales range 
from .79 to .87, with the overall reliability being .84 (Goldberg, 1999).  
 
Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were largely identical to those described in Chapter 3, 
apart from the addition of the personality questionnaires. These were administered, after 
completion of the three tasks described in Chapter 3, to the participants who had agreed 
to take part in the further study. Need for Closure and Need for Cognition were treated 
as independent variables according to high/low scores on these. For each measure, 
individuals with scores in the upper 40% of the distribution were labelled as the ‘high’ 
group, and those in the lower 40% of the distribution were labelled as the ‘low’ group. 
Participants with scores in the middle tripartite were excluded from analyses, following 
Cacioppo, Petty, and Morris’ (1983) advice that doing this, as opposed to a true median 
split, minimises errors in classification that could result when there are clusters of 
scores falling around the median.  
To see if individuals who were high/low on these measures differed in the extent to 
which they chose each speakers’ answers and their confidence in answers, two analysis 
of variance were carried, one for Need for Closure and one for Need for Cognition. 
Differences in how the speakers were perceived by the high/low Need for Closure/ 
Need for Cognition individuals were also considered. All other personality measures 
used were inspected to see if they correlated with the dependent variable and treated as 
covariates where appropriate.  
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Results 
 
Covariates 
Correlational analyses indicated that Conscientiousness (IPIP Factor 3) had a 
positive relationship with the percentage of times the high confidence speaker’s answers 
were chosen on the intellective task, r(52) = .30, p = .03, and a negative relationship 
with the percentage of times the low confidence speaker’s answers were chosen on the 
intellective and external judgement tasks, r(52) = -.42, p = .002 and r(52) = -.28, p = 
.04. No other significant correlations were observed. Hence, Conscientiousness was 
taken into consideration as a covariate in the choice analyses.  
The lack of any robust correlations between the personality measures used and 
participants’ confidence in their chosen answers meant that no covariates were used in 
the confidence in answers analyses.  
 
Need for Closure  
The Need for Closure scores ranged from 78 – 206, with a median score of 150. 
Allocating participants to Need for Closure groups using the method described above 
resulted in 48 participants in the low Need for Closure group (Group Mdn = 134) and 
44 participants in the high Need for Closure group (Group Mdn = 166). 18 participants 
with mid-range scores (147 - 154) were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Need for Closure and Choice. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of agreement with each 
of the three speakers for the two Need for Closure groups. To test whether Need for 
Closure affected participants choice of answer, when the answers were expressed with 
different levels of confidence, a Speaker Confidence x Condition x Need for Closure 
ANCOVA was conducted, with repeated measures on the first variable. Each of the 
three task types was investigated separately.  
After adjusting for Conscientiousness, there were no main effects of Speaker 
Confidence, Condition or Need for Closure for either the intellective, F(2, 162) = .47, p 
= .40, F(1, 81) = .37, p = .55 and F(1, 81) = 2.78, p = .10, judgmental, F(2, 162) = .93, p 
= .63, F(1, 81) = .04, p = .84 and F(1, 81) = 1.39, p = .24, or external judgement tasks, 
F(2, 162) = 1.04, p = .36, F(1, 81) = .81, p = .37 and F(1, 81) = .77, p = .38. Reflecting 
the findings from the previous chapter, that the addition of confidence cues affects 
choice, significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions were found for the  
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intellective, F(2, 162) = 36.74, p < .001, judgmental, F(2, 162) = 11.99, p < .001, and 
external judgement tasks, F(2, 162) = 48.44, p < .001.  
There were no Condition x Need for Closure or Speaker Confidence x Need for 
Closure interactions for the intellective, F(1, 81) = 1.51, p = .22 and F(2, 162) = 2.88, p 
= .06, judgmental, F(1, 81) = 1.27, p = .26 and F(2, 162) = 1.47, p = .23, or external 
judgement tasks, F(1, 81) = .69, p = .41 and F(2, 162) = 2.11, p = .13. However, there 
were significant Speaker Confidence x Condition x Need for Closure interactions on 
the intellective and external judgement tasks, F(2, 162) = 3.29, p = .04, and F(2, 162) = 
3.63, p = .03, but not on the judgmental task, F(2, 162) = .22, p = .80.  
 
Table 4.1 
Mean percentage of speaker agreement across tasks split by high/low Need for Closure 
Need for Closure 
High  Low 
Speaker Confidence  Speaker Confidence 
 
High  Medium  Low 
 
High  Medium  Low 
Intellective 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.99 
81.25 
 
39.58 
11.46 
 
27.43 
07.29 
   
32.08 
59.30 
 
37.92 
25.64 
 
30.00 
15.06 
Judgmental  
Control 
Experimental 
 
35.76 
53.12 
 
26.04 
28.12 
 
38.19 
18.75 
   
31.24 
43.91 
 
26.67 
32.37 
 
42.08 
23.72 
External Judgement 
Control 
Experimental 
 
29.86 
94.27 
 
31.25 
03.12 
 
38.54 
02.60 
   
32.08 
69.23 
 
30.00 
20.83 
 
37.92 
09.93 
 
To investigate where the differences lay in the significant interactions, Need for 
Closure  x Condition between-subjects ANCOVAs were conducted, separately for 
agreement with each speaker on the intellective and external judgement tasks. It was 
expected that differences between Need for Closure (NFClo) groups would arise from 
the answers expressed with high confidence being chosen more frequently in the high 
NFClo group, whereas answers not expressed with high confidence would be chosen 
more frequently in the low NFClo group. All following analyses in this section are one-
tailed to reflect the directional hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.1. Percentage change in chosen speaker according to task type, split by Need 
for Closure. 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the pattern of results for each task, showing the change in 
chosen speaker with the addition of confidence cues for both Need for Closure groups. 
The addition of confidence cues to answers given on the intellective task led to a greater 
shift towards the high confidence speaker’s answers, F(1, 81) = 4.11, p = .03, and away 
from the medium confidence speaker’s answers, F(1, 81) = 3.61, p = .03, for the high 
(vs. low) NFClo group. Both NFClo groups showed comparable shifts away from the 
low confidence speaker’s answers when confidence cues were added, F(1, 81) = .44, p 
= .25. Hence, when speakers accompanied their answers with confidence cues on the 
intellective task, the high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen 21.95% more 
frequently, and the medium confidence speaker’s answers were chosen 14.18% less 
frequently, by the high (vs. low) NFClo group. 
Figure 4.1 also shows that the addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answer on 
the external judgement task results in more robust choice shifts than on the intellective 
task.  Again there is a greater shift towards the high confidence speaker’s answers, and 
away from the medium confidence speaker’s answers for the high (vs. low) NFClo 
group, F(1, 81) = 5.84, p = .01, and F(1, 81) = 4.36, p = .02. The high NFClo group 
chose the high confidence speaker’s answers 25.04% more frequently than the low 
NFClo group, but the medium confidence speaker’s answers 17.71% less frequently. 
The high and low NFClo groups both show similar size shifts away from the low 
confidence speaker’s answers when confidence cues were used, F(1, 81) = .42, p = .26.  
 
Need for Closure and Confidence in Answers. In Chapter 3 the effect of task type 
appeared to be due to the confidence participants had in their answers. To investigate 
whether differences in confidence also contributed to the present results, participants’ 
overall confidence on each task was calculated and a Task x Condition x Need for 
Closure mixed ANOVA was performed. Overall confidence in answers on each task is 
shown in Table 4.2. There were significant main effects of Task, F(2, 174) = 54.31, p < 
.001, and Condition, F(1, 87) = 36.36, p < .001 but not of Need for Closure, F(1, 87) = 
.01, p = .91. As in Chapter 3, on all three tasks participants’ confidence in their answers 
increased when confidence cues were added, as indicated by a significant Task  x 
Condition interaction, F(2, 174) = 16.45, p < .001. There were no significant Condition 
x Need for Closure, F(1, 87) = .11, p = .74, Task x Need for Closure, F(2, 174) = .49, p 
= .62, or Task x Condition x Need for Closure interactions, F(2, 174) = .60, p = .55,  
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indicating that Need for Closure made no difference to participants’ confidence in 
answers overall, or on the different tasks. 
 
Table 4.2 
Mean confidence in answers (%) for each task, split by high/low Need for Closure 
Need for Closure   
Task  High                             Low 
Overall 
Intellective 
Control 
Experimental 
 
34.78  (15.57) 
56.03  (28.86) 
 
31.08  (19.81) 
56.68  (21.72) 
 
32.73  (17.95) 
56.43  (24.40) 
Judgmental 
Control 
Experimental 
 
63.71  (17.52) 
69.55  (10.25) 
 
60.26  (11.02) 
69.46  (15.24) 
 
62.17  (14.92) 
69.49  (13.40) 
External Judgement 
Control 
Experimental 
 
32.09  (23.85) 
61.91  (27.44) 
 
27.13  (19.88) 
63.64  (26.89) 
 
29.87  (22.08) 
62.97  (26.80) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Need for Closure and Perceptions of Speakers. Did Need for Closure make a difference 
to how participants viewed the speakers who used different levels of confidence? Chi-
square analysis comparing participants’ perceptions of the high, medium and low 
confidence speakers according to the Need for Closure groups revealed expected counts 
of less than 5 on more than one occasion. For this reason, responses to chosen team-
mate, most/least competent and most/least liked speaker were recoded, producing two 
new categories for analysis: ‘high confidence speaker’, which was the same category as 
used in Chapter 3, and ‘lower confidence speakers’, which resulted from amalgamating 
the medium and low confidence speakers. As the hypothesis regarding the participants’ 
perceptions of the speakers was that the high Need for Closure group would view the 
high confidence speaker more positively than speakers expressing some element of 
doubt in their answer, this re-categorisation was felt to adequately reflect the variables 
being investigated.  
88.9% of the high NFClo group chose the high confidence speaker as their team-
mate, compared to 55.6% of the low NFClo group, χ
2 = 5.60, df = 1, p = .02. Thus, only  
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11.1% of the high NFClo group chose the lower confidence speakers as their team-mate 
compared to 44.4% of the low NFClo group.  
Both Need for Closure groups thought the high confidence speaker was the most 
competent, but this occurred to a far greater extent in the high than the low NFClo 
group (88.9% vs. 59.3%), χ
2 = 4.62, df = 1, p = .03. Chi-square was not calculated for 
least competent speaker, as two cells had expected counts less than 5. However, 100% 
of the high NFClo group and 85.2% of the low NFClo group thought the lower 
confidence speakers were least competent.  
For the speaker chosen as the most liked by participants, the high NFClo group 
showed no strong preference for either the high or lower confidence speakers (55.6% vs. 
44.4%), whereas 70.4% of the low NFClo group liked the lower confidence speakers 
the most, although this difference between the groups did not quite reach significance, 
χ
2  = 3.02, df = 1, p = .08. The high NFClo group least liked the lower confidence 
speakers (77.8%), whereas the low NFClo group least liked the high confidence speaker 
(63.0%), χ
2 = 7.20, df = 1, p = .007. In the control group there were no differences 
between higher and lower Need for Closure participants on any of the attributions, all p 
> .05.   
 
Need for Closure – Additional Analyses.  Webster and Kruglanski (1994) reason that as 
an individual differences dimension Need for Closure may manifest itself in a number 
of ways. They identify five major aspects assumed to represent this: Preference for 
Order, Preference for Predictability, Decisiveness, Discomfort with Ambiguity, and 
Closed-Mindedness. It was decided to investigate further the relationship between Need 
for Closure and people’s use of different levels of confidence as a basis for making a 
decision by correlating each of the five Need for Closure factors with the percentage of 
times each speakers answers were chosen, according to task type.   
The  Need for Closure factor of Decisiveness represents the urgency with which 
someone high in Need for Closure feels a judgement or decision should be made, i.e. 
the decisiveness of their choices. This is represented in the Need for Closure scale with 
items such as, “I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently”. 
Decisiveness was positively correlated with choosing the high confidence speaker’s 
answers on the intellective task, and negatively correlated with the medium confidence 
speakers answers on this task, r(55) = .30, p = .03 and r(55) = -.34, p = .01. A similar 
pattern was seen on the external judgement task, but this did not reach significance for  
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the high confidence speaker’s answers, r(55) = .21, p = .12 and r(55) = -.27, p = .05. 
This factor represents the urgency with which someone high in Need for Closure feels a 
judgement or decision should be made, i.e. the decisiveness of their choices. This is 
represented in the Need for Closure scale with items such as, “I usually make important 
decisions quickly and confidently”.  
Another aspect that showed noteworthy correlations was that of Closed-Mindedness. 
This factor represents an unwillingness to have one’s knowledge confronted by 
alternative opinions, (e.g. “I do not usually consult many different opinions before 
forming my own view”). On the intellective and external judgement task, the percentage 
of times the medium confidence speakers answers were chosen was negatively 
correlated with this factor, r(55) = -.30, p = .03 and r(55) = -.31, p = .02. For the high 
confidence speaker these correlations did not reach significance on either of these two 
tasks, r(55) = .25, p = .07 and r(55) = -.20, p = .15.   
On both the intellective and the external judgement task, the Need for Closure factor 
Preference for Order was negatively correlated with the amount of times the low 
confidence speakers answers were chosen, r(55) = -.37, p = .005 and r(55) = -.30, p = 
.03. This factor represents a preference for structure and order in one’s environment. 
 
Need for Cognition 
The Need for Cognition scores in the present experiment ranged from 30 – 86 and 
had a median of 60.5. Of the 110 participants who took part in this experiment, 45 
participants were classed as lower in Need For Cognition (Mdn = 50) and 46 
participants were classed as higher in Need For Cognition (Mdn = 67). Nineteen 
participants with mid-range scores (57 - 63) were excluded from the analysis for the 
reasons justified earlier. 
 
Need for Cognition and Choice. The above analyses were repeated using the measure of 
Need for Cognition in the place of Need for Closure. A Speaker Confidence  x 
Condition  x Need for Cognition ANCOVA found no main effects of Speaker 
Confidence, Condition or Need for Cognition for either the intellective, F(2, 162) = .19, 
p = .83, F(1, 81) = .10, p = .75 and F(1, 81) = 2.26, p = .14, judgmental, F(2, 162) = .35, 
p = .70, F(1, 81) = .11, p = .75 and F(1, 81) = .49, p = .48, or external judgement tasks, 
F(2, 162) = .28, p = .76, F(1, 81) = 2.90, p = .09 and F(1, 81) = .18, p = .67.  
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Reflecting the findings from the previous chapter, that the addition of confidence 
cues affects choice, significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions were found 
for the intellective, F(2, 162) = 35.96, p < .001, judgmental, F(2, 162) = 11.32, p < .001, 
and external judgement tasks, F(2, 162) = 44.50, p < .001.  
There were no Condition x Need for Cognition or Speaker Confidence x Need for 
Closure interactions for the intellective, F(1, 81) = .70, p = .41 and F(2, 162) = 2.89, p = 
.06, judgmental,  F(1, 81) = .03,  p = .87 and  F(2, 162) = .37,  p = .69, or external 
judgement tasks, F(1, 81) = .68, p = .41 and F(2, 162) = .54, p = .58, nor were there any 
Speaker Confidence x Condition x Need for Cognition interactions on either the 
intellective, judgmental or external judgement tasks, after adjusting for the co-variate of 
conscientiousness, F(2, 162) = 1.88, p = .16, F(2, 162) = 1.02, p = .36, and F(2, 162) = 
2.39, p = .10. Hence, Need for Cognition did not appear to affect people’s use of the 
confidence heuristic.  
 
Table 4.3 
Mean confidence in answers (%) for each task, split by high/low Need for Cognition 
Need for Cognition   
Task  High                             Low 
Overall 
Intellective 
Control 
Experimental 
 
34.93  (20.87) 
67.82  (19.72) 
 
33.31  (13.18) 
46.30  (25.80) 
 
34.02  (16.76) 
59.02  (24.57) 
Judgmental 
Control 
Experimental 
 
61.30  (14.67) 
73.81  (13.76) 
 
63.24  (15.12) 
66.79  (14.94) 
 
62.39  (14.79) 
70.94  (14.51) 
External Judgement 
Control 
Experimental 
 
28.10  (23.43) 
72.17  (21.87) 
 
32.88  (21.10) 
56.80  (30.54) 
 
30.80  (22.02) 
47.95  (29.95) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Need for Cognition and Confidence in Answers. Significant main effects of Task, F(2, 
172) = 51.53,  p < .001, and Condition,  F(1, 86) = 42.05,  p < .001, were found on 
confidence in answers, but not of Need for Cognition, F(1, 86) = 3.75, p = .06. There 
was a Task x Condition interaction, F(2, 172) = 16.71, p < .001, but no Task x Need for 
Cognition interaction, F(2, 172) = 2.11, p = .13. However, Need for Cognition did make  
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a difference to participants’ confidence in their chosen answers (Table 4.3). A 
significant Need for Cognition x Condition interaction indicated that high and low Need 
for Cognition groups did not differ in their confidence in the absence of confidence cues 
(M = 41.44 vs. M = 43.14), but when confidence cues were added the high Need for 
Cognition group were more confident overall in the answers they chose than the low 
Need for Cognition group (M = 71.27 vs. M = 56.63), F(1, 86) = 5.99, p = .02. The lack 
of a significant Task x Condition x Need for Cognition interaction indicated that this 
pattern was the same across all three tasks, F(2, 172) = 1.00, p = .37. 
 
Need for Cognition and Perceptions of Speakers.  Need for Cognition made no 
difference to participants’ choice of team-mate in either the control or the experimental 
condition, χ
2 = .94, df = 1, p = .32 and χ
2 = .98, df = 1, p = .32. With the exception of the 
result for the control condition for they speaker perceived as being most competent, χ
2 = 
3.54, df = 1, p = .06, Need for Cognition had no affect on how participants perceived the 
three speakers in terms of who they thought was most competent, χ
2 = .53, df = 1, p = 
.47 (experimental condition), least competent, χ
2 = .14, df = 1, p = .71 and χ
2 = .79, df = 
1, p = .38, who they liked most, χ
2 = .01, df = 1, p = .92 and χ
2 = .36, df = 1, p = .55, and 
who they liked least, χ
2 = 2.58, df = 1, p = .11 and χ
2 = .77, df = 1, p = .38.  
 
Need for Closure and Need for Cognition 
The observed correlation between Need for Cognition and Need for Closure was low 
and negative (r = -.18, p = .06). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) also found a low, 
negative correlation between these two constructs (r = -.28), suggesting that these two 
scales do not reflect the same underlying construct.  
 
Gender 
A Speaker Confidence x Task Type x Condition x Participants’ Gender ANOVA 
was conducted, to see if there were any gender differences in the amount of times each 
speaker’s answers were chosen. Apart from a main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 
212) = 30.09, p < .001, no other main effects were significant for either Task Type, F(2, 
212) = .28, p = .76, Condition, F(1, 106) = .28, p = .60, or Gender, F(1, 106) = .28, p = 
.60. Other than significant Speaker Confidence x Condition, F(2, 212) = 30.06, p < 
.001, and Speaker Confidence x Task Type interactions, F(4, 424) = 9.65, p < .001, 
there were no other two-way interactions, for Speaker Confidence x Gender, F(1, 106)  
  95 
= .28, p = .60, Task Type x Condition, F(2, 212) = .27, p = .76, Task Type x Gender, 
F(2, 212) = .28, p = .76, or Speaker Confidence x Gender, F(2, 212) = .51, p = .60. 
There were no significant three-way interactions for Speaker Confidence x Condition 
x Gender, F(2, 212) = .94, p = .39, Task Type x Condition x Gender, F(2, 212) = .28, 
p = .76, Task Type x Speaker Confidence x Gender, F(4, 424) = .85, p = .49, apart 
from a Task Type x Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, F(4, 424) = 8.62, p < 
.001, nor was there a Task Type  x Speaker Confidence x Gender x Condition 
interaction, F(4, 424) = .45, p = .77. Hence, men and women did not respond differently 
to the confidence cues as a whole or on the three different tasks.  
A Task Type x Condition x Participants’ Gender ANOVA indicated that there were 
no gender differences between men and women’s confidence overall or on the different 
tasks. The main effects of Task Type, F(2, 210) = 43.55, p < .001, and Condition, F(1, 
105) = 35.15, p < .001, were significant, but not of Gender, F(1, 105) = .67, p = .42. 
There was a Task Type x Condition interaction, F(2, 210) = 12.65, p < .001, but no 
interactions with Gender: Condition x Gender, F(1, 105) = .006, p = .94, Task Type x 
Gender, F(2, 210) = .14, p = .87, Task Type x Condition x Gender, F(2, 210) = 1.61, p 
= .20. The lack of any significant effects of gender could perhaps be due to uneven 
sample sizes, as the number of female participants who took part in this experiment 
vastly outnumbered the male participants who took part.  
 
Summary of Results 
In relation to participants’ choices, there were significant Speaker Confidence  x 
Condition x Need for Closure interactions on the intellective and external judgement 
tasks, but not on the judgmental task. For participants’ confidence in choice there was 
no Task Type x Condition x Need for Closure interaction. Hence, Need for Closure 
affected choice but not confidence in choice. Need for Closure also had an effect on 
participants’ perceptions of the speakers.  
There was no Speaker Confidence x Condition x Need for Cognition interaction for 
choice, but there was a Condition x Need for Cognition interaction on confidence in 
choice. However there was no three-way interaction with Task Type. Hence, Need for 
Cognition did not affect choice but it did affect confidence in choice. Need for 
Cognition had no affect on participants’ perceptions of the speakers. 
The lack of any significant interactions with Gender indicated that participants’ 
gender had no effect on choice or confidence in choice.   
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Discussion 
 
The possibility of there being individual differences in peoples’ use of the confidence 
heuristic was explored in this chapter. It was found that participants’ Need for Closure 
affected the extent to which they chose the answers of a highly confident speaker and 
how they perceived such a speaker, whereas Need for Cognition affected participants’ 
confidence.  
 
Need for Closure 
The extent to which individuals rely upon the confidence heuristic as a decision-
making strategy was related to their Need for Closure. Those higher in Need for Closure 
utilised the confidence heuristic substantially more often than those who were lower in 
Need for Closure, who appeared in turn to be more accepting of less confident speaker’s 
input. As Need for Closure is the general tendency to prefer certain to uncertain 
knowledge, a desire for confident knowledge (Kruglanski and Webster, 2000), this is as 
expected. However the high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen most frequently 
by participants regardless of whether they were high or low in Need for Closure, 
indicating that the confidence heuristic was to some extent used by everyone. 
Additionally, differences between Need for Closure groups were only seen on some 
tasks. Why was this?          
The Need for Closure can be situationally induced as well as being a stable 
individual difference (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). The experimental situation used 
here may have led to  situational  Need for Closure on the intellective and external 
judgement tasks at least, as these were difficult tasks. If they did find the tasks too hard 
then participants, looking for a means of closure, could have relied heavily upon the 
confidence heuristic as a means of making the decision-making process less cognitively 
taxing. This could account for why the high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen 
most frequently regardless of how participants scored on the measure of Need for 
Closure  – when faced with uncertainty, people operate a confidence heuristic rule, 
whereby they agree with the most confident advice available. However, there were 
differences in the extent to which the high and, to a lesser extent, the medium 
confidence speaker’s answers were chosen which could be due to the  individual 
difference of Need for Closure. Hence the extent to which someone uses the confidence  
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heuristic rule of ‘agree with the confident speaker’ varies according to whether they 
have a high or low Need for Closure.  
What is it about Need for Closure that could lead to differences in one’s use of the 
confidence heuristic? Webster and Kruglanski (2000) suggest individuals high in Need 
for Closure ‘seize’ upon an initial judgement (i.e. quickly make it) and then ‘freeze’ 
upon it (i.e. fix on this choice). In relation to the confidence heuristic, this would 
indicate that individuals who are high in Need for Closure look for a means of quickly 
reaching closure by utilising the confidence heuristic to reach a decision and fix upon 
this as a decision-making strategy. Individuals lower in Need for Closure on the other 
hand do not stick so rigidly to this strategy, giving some consideration to alternatives. 
Indeed, this would appear to be the case, as the Need for Closure aspects of decisiveness 
and closed-mindedness were of particular importance. The more decisive and closed-
minded an individual was, the more reliant they were on highly confident answers, and 
hence the confidence heuristic. So it would appear that participants choosing the high 
confidence speaker’s answers wanted to make quick and confident choices, represented 
by the factor of decisiveness, but with the minimum of effort, represented by the factor 
of closed-mindedness, whereby decisions are reached without consulting many sources. 
In other words, a decision-making strategy is developed by using high confidence as a 
heuristic, with the confidence heuristic satiating the desire for confident knowledge. 
Differences between the Need for Closure groups were only seen on the intellective 
and external judgement tasks, and not on the judgmental task. In Chapter 3 the 
differences between these tasks was attributed to participants’ level of confidence in 
their chosen answers. Were the differences on these two tasks due to low Need for 
Closure participants being more confident in their answers (in the control group), and 
thus using another’s input less? Previous research suggests that the opposite should 
occur – high Need for Closure individuals have been found have more initial confidence 
in their answers, and for subsequent shifts in their confidence to be higher than low 
Need for Closure individuals (Mayseless and Kruglanski, 1987). This was not the case 
here. Control group confidence in answers was the same for both Need for Closure 
groups, as were subsequent changes in confidence with the addition of confidence cues. 
However this may be because Mayseless and Kruglanski found differences in 
confidence on a task where the information on which individuals were giving 
confidence judgments was their own, rather than coming from an outside source, as in 
the present experiment.   
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Why then were there differences between the tasks? Both Need for Closure groups 
were equally uncertain on the intellective and external judgement tasks, and equally 
certain on the judgmental task. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that people relied upon the 
confidence heuristic less on the judgmental task because they could utilise their own 
(internal) information to a greater extent than on the other two tasks where their greater 
level of uncertainty led to a greater reliance on other’s (external) information. Could this 
be why there were differences between the Need for Closure groups on the intellective 
and external judgement tasks? It has been suggested that high Need for Closure 
individuals should be more resistant to persuasion when in possession of prior (internal) 
information, but less resistant to persuasion when they are lacking such information 
(Kruglanski et al., 1993). On this basis one would expect there to be little difference in 
confidence heuristic use on the judgmental task between Need for Closure groups, as 
participants’ higher confidence levels on this task indicates that they used internal 
information in their choices. On the intellective and external judgement tasks however, 
participants’ confidence was much lower, indicating that they had less internal 
information to rely upon, and were more susceptible to influence from external sources 
of information. If Kruglanski et al.’s. (1993) suggestion is correct then high Need for 
Closure participants were more influenced by the confidence heuristic than those who 
were lower in Need for Closure because this lack of prior/internal information made 
them less resistant to persuasion. So it may be that an individual’s Need for Closure 
affects choice only when external information is involved.  
There were also differences between Need for Closure groups in how they perceived 
the speakers. As expected, those higher in Need for Closure viewed the confident 
speaker far more positively than the speakers who expressed some element of 
uncertainty in their answers, associating confidence with competency and 
overwhelmingly choosing this speaker as their team-mate. Individuals lower in Need for 
Closure did not view the high confidence speaker as positively, but they did view the 
speakers who expressed some uncertainty in their answers far more positively than the 
high Need for Closure participants did. This provides some support for the argument 
that high Need for Closure individuals rely more on stereotypes and pay less attention to 
individuating information than those who are lower in Need for Closure (e.g. 
Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Mayseless and Kruglanski, 1987). For high Need for Closure 
individuals, confidence is assumed to be a good thing, and the stereotype of confidence  
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equating quality, in that one’s level of confidence should match the quality of one’s 
information, applies, even when there may be evidence to the contrary.  
 
Need for Cognition 
The hypothesis that individuals who were high in Need for Cognition would choose 
the high confidence speaker’s answers less frequently than those lower in Need for 
Cognition was not supported. Participants in the low Need for Cognition group did not 
seem to rely on confidence as a heuristic any more those in the high Need for Cognition 
group.  This may be due to situational factors, such as those suggested previously, as 
low involvement and/or task difficulty can reduce high and low Need for Cognition 
individuals to simpler, less cognitively demanding methods of evaluation (Cacioppo et 
al., 1983; Hosman et al., 2002). Hence, if the participants did not fully engage in the 
task or found it too hard they may have evaluated and used each speaker’s answers in 
similar ways, in this case relying on the high confidence speaker, regardless of their 
Need for Cognition. Alternatively it may indicate that the confidence heuristic is a 
general cognitive heuristic that is used by most people, or at least most of the time. 
There were, however, still differences between Need for Cognition groups in the 
confidence they had in their answers. It may be that individuals who are high in Need 
for Cognition do still try and engage in more cognitive effort when choosing their 
answers and their higher confidence represents this – they have possibly generated more 
reasons for why this speaker’s answers are the best, rightly or wrongly. 
 
Gender 
No gender differences were found in the present experiment. However, it may be that 
gender differences only emerge when the speaker’s gender is apparent. For instance, the 
results from Chapter 3 indicated that people made stereotypical judgments of a 
speaker’s gender on the basis of their expressed level of confidence. A confident 
speaker was believed to be male, whereas those expressing some element of doubt were 
believed to be female. Therefore further research should give consideration to the 
gender of both the speaker and the listener, as there may be differences in men and 
women’s use of confidence cues (Pulford, 2002). This is addressed in Chapter 5.  
 
Limitations 
It would appear that an important factor in the extent to which the confidence 
heuristic is used is one’s own level of uncertainty. A limitation of the present design  
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was that the use of a between-subjects design, rather than a within-subjects design for 
individual’s choices and confidence in those choices in the presence and absence of 
confidence cues, meant that each individuals’ own level of uncertainty could not be 
considered, instead relying on uncertainty in each condition as a whole. However, the 
design used here is advantageous in that participant’s choices and confidence in those 
choices is due to the presence and absence of confidence cues and not to familiarity 
with the questions.  
The confidence heuristic may also manifest itself in different ways in different 
situations. Although the task used here was designed to consider this, in terms of the 
type of information one can bring to a task, it does lack somewhat in realism. In day-to-
day life we encounter many situations, ranging from the mundane to the life changing, 
where we need to turn to other sources of information. Evidence does suggest that in 
more realistic settings, such a simulated juries, people continue to make use of the 
confidence heuristic (e.g. Leippe et al., 1992). The importance of the task may also 
effect confidence heuristic use, as may the source of information, depending on their 
status, gender, age or experience, thus leaving plenty of scope for future research.   
 
Conclusions 
To conclude, people’s use of confidence as a heuristic may be situationally induced, 
when uncertainty is high and/or motivation is low, however the extent to which 
confidence is used as a heuristic may be due to factors related to the individual. Some 
people, such as those high in Need for Closure, have a greater desire to possess 
confident information, regardless of the validity of that information, and so become 
more reliant on the confidence heuristic. Further differences in people’s use of the 
confidence heuristic may become apparent in different situations, such as who is 
communicating confidence, in addition to who the recipient of the communication is.  
Of particular relevance here is the gender of both the speaker and the listener. As 
noted earlier, results from the previous chapter indicated that a speaker’s level of 
confidence led to stereotyped judgements of gender being made. Leading on from this, 
it may be that people perceive male and female speakers expressing the same level of 
confidence in different ways, particularly if a given level of confidence is deemed to be 
more appropriate to one gender than another. This may also depend on the gender of the 
speaker. This issue will be considered in the next chapter.   CHAPTER 5 
The Influence of Expressed Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers 
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This study examines how speakers who express different levels of confidence are 
perceived. 119 participants each read the testimonies of three witnesses, expressed in 
the experimental condition with high, medium and low confidence. Half the participants 
read testimonies from male speakers and half from female speakers. Participants 
answered questions relating to information contained in the testimonies as well as 
questions relating to the speakers, measured on a series of 7-point scales. Increasing 
levels of speaker confidence resulted in higher ratings of factors relating to perceived 
speaker ability and confidence, as well as an increase in agreement with that speaker. 
However, too much confidence had a detrimental effect on ratings relating to the 
speakers’ social attractiveness.  Neither speaker or listener gender had an effect on the 
influence of a speaker’s confidence on choice or perceptions of the speakers. The results 
are discussed in relation to peoples’ basis for using another person’s expressed 
confidence as a heuristic.  
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The Influence of Expressed Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers  
 
Although the confidence of another person has been shown to act as a form of social 
influence (Lieppe, Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek 
and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) pointed 
out that why this should be so is unanswered.  Why do people opt for answers or 
opinions that are expressed confidently at the expense of those that are expressed with 
some element of uncertainty?  
One suggestion is that this may be due to people utilising the confidence heuristic, 
whereby a speaker’s confidence is used as a way of differentiating between the 
information that one is receiving (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). In this way a speaker 
expressing high confidence in their information is judged to hold more reliable 
information than one who expresses their information tentatively. However a lack of 
empirical research into the confidence heuristic still leaves the question unanswered, 
what exactly is it that makes us place more faith in confidently expressed information 
over that which contains some element of uncertainty? Is it, as Price and Stone (2004) 
have suggested, because people use confidence as a heuristic, “according to which they 
use [a speaker’s] confidence as a cue to his or her knowledge, competence or 
correctness” (p. 40). Furthermore, are there, as Thomas and McFadyen (1995) suggest, 
gender differences in perceptions of speakers, which would mean that the confidence 
heuristic is not a general cognitive heuristic?  
 
Speech Style and Influence/Persuasion 
To begin to try to shed some light on this matter, parallels can be drawn between 
expressed confidence and an area that has received far more extensive empirical 
attention - power of speech style. Powerless speech is characterised by the frequent use 
of intensifiers, hedges, hesitations, questioning forms and polite forms, whereas 
powerful speech should be low on these categories (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, and 
O’Barr, 1978; O’Barr, 1982). Powerless speech indicates a tentative, uncertain 
approach, whereas powerful speech is more assertive, and can indicate that the 
communicator is confident in the position they are advocating (Erickson et al., 1978). 
Using a powerful speech style has been shown to lead to greater acceptance of a 
speaker’s communication than a tentative or  powerless style (Erickson et al., 1978; 
Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999), although it has been argued that this is dependent on other  
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factors, such as gender (Carli, 1990), communication modality (Sparks, Areni, and Cox, 
1998) or argument strength (Hosman, Huebner, and Siltanen, 2002).  
Numerous researchers argue that the influence of power of speech style may actually 
be mediated by how a speaker is perceived (e.g. Erickson et al., 1978; Holtgraves and 
Lasky, 1999; Lind and O’Barr, 1979). Indeed, Hosman et al. (2002) suggested that 
power of speech style does not have a direct effect on persuasion and instead acts a 
peripheral cue, influencing cognitive responses about a speaker’s personal attributes that 
in turn affect the recipient’s attitude toward the topic. Sparks et al. (1998) support this 
notion in part, suggesting that communication modality  (e.g. written, audio, audio-
visual) encourages heuristic (peripheral) processing, with power of speech style being 
used as a heuristic cue. Hence it is important to consider how different speech styles 
affect how a speaker is perceived.  
 
Speech Style and Impression formation 
The way in which we communicate may hold cues as to what sort of person we are 
(or are perceived to be). Scherer (1979) for instance suggested that there are two major 
dimensions of speech cues: one encompassing aspects relating to competency and the 
other relating to likeability. Indeed, power of speech style has been found to affect 
impression formation, with powerful speakers being viewed as more confident, 
competent, intelligent and knowledgeable than speakers using powerless or tentative 
language (Carli, 1990; Erickson et al., 1978; Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999; Sparks et al., 
1998). Furthermore, Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) found that a speaker using a powerful 
style of speech was rated as more likeable and trustworthy than one using a powerless 
style. Such speech style effects have been demonstrated in many different situations, 
from simulated courtrooms (Lind and O’Barr, 1979) to classrooms (Haleta, 1996) and 
employment interviews (Parton, Siltanen, Hosman, and Langenderfer, 2002), as well as 
in different communication modalities (Sparks et al., 1998).  
 
Speech Style and Gender 
The notion of power of speech style is said to reflect differences in speaker status. A 
communicator with low social status is said to typically utilise a ‘powerless’ mode of 
speech, whereas communicators with high social power, such as a professional in a 
court setting, use ‘powerless’ speech much less frequently (Erickson et al., 1978). 
Following on from this suggestion, it has been argued in the past that the use of  
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uncertain or powerless language characterises the way in which women speak and 
reflects their unequal gender status with men in Western society (Bradley, 1981, Lakoff, 
1975). On this basis there may be differences in how speakers are perceived, not only as 
a result of the power of speech style they communicate with but also because of their 
gender. As a powerless speech style is associated with being feminine, the assumption is 
that women speaking in such as way will be perceived more favourably than their male 
counterparts, whereas the opposite should be true for a woman using a powerful speech 
style. However, findings relating to this have been mixed, possibly reflecting changes in 
Western society that have addressed unequal gender statuses.  
A number of studies have found gender differences in relation to the influence of 
power of speech style. Women speaking assertively have been found to be regarded as 
more intelligent, knowledgeable and competent than those using a tentative speech 
style, whereas for men language has no affect on how they are perceived in this manner 
(Bradley, 1981; Carli, 1990). The gender of the listener may also be important. Carli 
(1990) found that women liked and trusted an assertive speaker more than tentative 
speaker, whereas men trusted the assertive speaker less but found both speakers equally 
likeable. Erickson et al. (1978) have argued that differences in how a speaker is 
perceived may depend on whether they are the same sex or different sex as the listener, 
finding that differences in perceptions of powerful and powerless speakers’ credibility 
was more apparent when the speaker and listener were of the same sex than when they 
were of opposite sexes. They suggest that this may be because listeners cannot refer to 
their own speech behaviour when the speaker is of the opposite sex and so feel less 
confident making attributions on the basis of their speech style.   
However other studies have failed to find any significant gender effects as a result of 
speech style on impression formation (e.g. Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999; Lind and 
O’Barr, 1979; Newcombe and Arnkoff, 1979; Parton et al., 2002). Newcombe and 
Arnkoff  (1979) argued that differences relating to how speakers using different speech 
styles are perceived could be due to status rather than gender. Hence, if speakers are 
perceived as possessing equal status, no gender differences should be apparent. Indeed, 
Lind and O’Barr (1979) have suggested that men and women using a powerful speech 
style elicit more favourable attributions than those using powerless speech. Powerless 
communicators may be perceived less favourably, not because of their gender, but 
because of the extra cognitive effort that it takes to understand their more complex 
manner of communication.  
  105 
 
Speech Style and Expressed Confidence 
While parallels can be drawn between power of speech style and the expression of 
confidence and uncertainty, these remain two distinctly separate constructs. Powerful 
speakers may be perceived as having more confidence in their stated positions due to 
the clarity with which they express themselves, whereas powerless language may 
indicate a speaker’s lack of confidence or certainty (Berger and Bradac, 1982; Bradley, 
1981; Erickson et al., 1978; Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Parton et al., 
2002). However, Parton et al. point out that whilst powerless language may signify 
uncertainty, in one’s self or the position one is advocating, powerful language may not 
necessarily be indicative of confidence. In support of this they refer to Hosman and 
Siltanen’s (1994) conclusion that powerful speech may only indicate certainty when 
compared to a powerless speech style. The converse may also be true. For instance, 
Myers (1991) has suggested that elements of powerless speech, such as tag questions 
and hedges, may actually serve to communicate politeness rather than uncertainty alone.  
Hosman and Siltanen’s (1994) conclusion is an important point to consider. 
Traditional research paradigms of speech style contrast two extremes (e.g. 
powerful/powerless; assertive/tentative) whereas natural language is much broader, and 
confidence and uncertainty can be seen as covering a continuum of expressions. While 
the speech style research reviewed here indicates that powerful, assertive speech has 
more of a positive influence upon how we perceive a speaker, and our attitudes towards 
that speaker’s recommendation, than powerless, tentative speech, this is not to say that 
the same would apply to different levels of expressed confidence. While Price and Stone 
(2004) found that a communicator expressing high confidence was judged to be more 
knowledgeable than one expressing a more moderate confidence level, this again relies 
on only two levels of confidence. However, others have shown that increasing levels of 
confidence can lead to an increase in negative feelings towards a speaker, resulting in a 
more moderate expression of confidence being viewed more favourably (London, 
McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Maslow, Yoselson, and London, 1971; Pulford, 2002).  
 
Rationale for Experiment 
The aim of this experiment is to explore how speakers expressing different levels of 
confidence are perceived - what is our basis for using the confidence heuristic? While a 
confident speaker may be perceived more positively than an uncertain one, how is a 
speaker falling in between these two extremes perceived? On the basis of the previous  
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research reviewed here it is hypothesised that there will be differences in how speakers 
who use extreme confidence expressions are perceived, in that high confidence speakers 
will be perceived more positively than low confidence ones. How speakers expressing 
medium confidence are perceived is expected to lead to one of two results.  There will 
either be a progression, in that increasing confidence leads to increases of a particular 
attribute, or an inverse U shaped relation. For example, high confidence may be rated as 
more knowledgeable than medium confidence, which in turn is seen as more 
knowledgeable than low confidence. Alternatively a speaker expressing a medium level 
of confidence may be perceived more positively than speakers at the extremes.   
     In this study gender, of both the speaker and listener, is also taken into account, to 
consider any differences that may result. Are there any differences here in relation to 
participants’ attitudes towards a speaker and their recommendation? Previous results 
have been mixed and so it is worth re-examining this.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
119 undergraduate students (43 men and 76 women) from the University of 
Wolverhampton’s participant pool took part in the study. Participants ranged in age 
from 18 to 52 years, with a mean age of 21.98 years (S.D. = 5.87). Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the experimental or control condition.  
 
Materials 
The previous two experiments (Chapters 3 and 4) considered the influence of 
confidence using speaker’s single answer responses. However this may not have given 
participants sufficient opportunity to form impressions of each speaker. For this reason 
a new task was developed for use in this experiment, based on witness testimonies. 
Participants were required to answer a series of questions relating to a crime on the 
basis of the information provided. This information was presented in the form of a ‘case 
booklet’ consisting of (a) the background to the ‘crime’, (b) a photo line-up, (c) three 
witness testimonies, (d) a question sheet. Each of these are described in more detail 
below. Full materials can be found in Appendix G. 
 
Background.  The first page of the case booklet consisted of an information page 
detailing the background to the crime, outlining the scene and nature of the crime (an art 
gallery theft), as well as the time period during which the crime took place. Information 
regarding three eyewitnesses was also was given. In Chapters 3 and 4 the speakers had 
been identified simply by the letters A, B or C.  As one aim of the present study was to 
consider the influence of a speaker’s gender when different levels of confidence were 
used, two versions of the questionnaire were developed – one using male speakers and 
one using female speakers only. ‘Friend A’, ‘Friend B’ and ‘Friend C’, were replaced 
by the names Matt/Sarah, Nick/Nikki, and Paul/Laura, respectively. The names were 
chosen from a list of popular baby names from 1980-1989 to reflect names common to 
the ages of a majority of participants to reduce any bias that may occur in participant’s 
perceptions of the speakers (e.g. using a name such as Joan may lead to attributions of 
an older speaker).  
 
Photo line-up. The second page of the booklet contained a photo line-up. Participants 
were given the premise that these were images taken from a working security camera in  
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the vicinity of the crime and the images were of all of the people who had entered the 
crime scene within a given time period.  
 
Witness testimonies. Three witness testimonies were provided. In the control condition 
the testimonies were given in the absence of confidence cues. In the experimental 
condition one witness spoke with high confidence (Matt/Sarah), one with medium 
confidence (Nick/Nikki) and one with low confidence (Paul/Laura), using confidence 
cues developed in an earlier pilot study (see Chapter 2, Table 2.1). 
     Each of the three testimonies was of a similar format and length (approx. 200 words) 
and was presented in a counterbalanced order. Each testimony contained ‘slots’ for the 
witnesses’ answers to be inserted into, which were also counterbalanced. All the 
testimonies were written colloquially and presented as a transcript of each witness’s 
interview with the police. However each one is slightly different in wording to maintain 
a difference between witness testimonies, other than confidence level and answers 
given. Sections of the high, medium and low confidence testimonies are reproduced 
below. Expressions in parentheses indicate the aforementioned answers, confidence 
cues are reproduced in bold. The confidence cues were omitted in the control condition, 
an example of which is also given below.  
 
“I’m certain that there had been (8) people enter the rooms in question since the 
gallery had opened, although obviously not all of them went into the room the painting 
was stolen from between 10.30 and 11 a.m.” 
 
“I seem to recall that (6) people had so far gone into those rooms you’re asking about 
since the gallery opening that day and some of these had possibly gone in there between 
10.30 and 11 a.m.”  
 
“I’m guessing but I would say that (7) visitors went into the rooms near the painting 
since I’d started that day, although some of these had perhaps gone in before 10.30.” 
 
“There had been (8) people enter the rooms in question since the gallery had opened, 
although not all of them went into the room the painting was stolen from between 10.30 
and 11 a.m.” (Control Condition) 
 
Question sheet. The final pages of the booklet contained a question sheet, of which there 
were two parts. The first part contained seven questions relating to the ‘crime’. Each 
question had three options, one taken from each of the three testimonies, which 
participants they were required to tick the box corresponding to the answer they thought 
was correct. For example Question 1 asked, “How many visitors to the gallery had 
entered the rooms near the painting before 11 a.m.?”. The answer options were “6”,  
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“7” or “8”, each of which had been given in one of the three testimonies. Using this 
method provided a less overt way of determining the influence of another person’s 
expressed confidence than in the previous experiment, where choice was indicated by 
selecting the ‘name’ of the speaker rather than the answer itself.  
The second part of the question sheet asked participants about their impressions of 
each speaker, based on findings from previous research. Participants were asked to give 
ratings of the speaker’s intelligence, honesty, competence, nervousness, optimism, 
knowledge, politeness, friendliness, self-confidence, trustworthiness, professionalism, 
likeability and credibility using a series of 7-point scales, each one with a centre point of 
‘average’. For analysis each scale was recoded so that a high score represented a high 
rating on each attribute, i.e. a score of 1 indicated that the participant thought the 
speaker was not very intelligent whereas a score of 7 indicated that they thought the 
speaker was highly intelligent.  
 
Design and Procedure 
The study was a 3 (Speaker Confidence) x 2 (Condition) x 2 (Speaker Gender) x 2 
(Listener Gender) mixed-design, with repeated measures on the first variable. The 
dependent variables were the amount of time each speaker’s answers were chosen and 
the ratings given to each speaker on the perception’s dimensions.  
Participants were presented with the information booklet, containing the background 
to the crime, a map and a photo line-up. They were asked to carefully read this 
information before reading the witness testimonies. Each booklet contained three 
testimonies, which in the experimental condition contained one high, one medium and 
one low confidence speaker. All three testimonies in the control condition were 
presented without confidence cues. Half of the participants read testimonies spoken by 
male witnesses, and half read the testimonies of female witnesses. After reading all 
three testimonies the participants were asked to answer a series of questions relating to 
the crime based on the information contained in the testimonies. They were allowed to 
refer back to the testimonies if necessary to answer the questions. When participants had 
completed the task they were then asked to give rate each of the three speakers on a 
series of 7-point scales as described in the materials section. For analysis the scores 
relating to each speaker were totalled to give an overall speaker preference score. After 
the questionnaires were completed participants were debriefed and thanked. 
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Results 
 
A mixed design ANOVA was conducted on each of the dependent variables to test 
for the influence of Speaker Confidence, Speaker Gender and Listener Gender on 
choice and perceptions of speakers in the presence and absence of confidence cues.  
 
Influence of Speaker Confidence on Choice of Answers 
The percentage of times each speaker’s answers were chosen was calculated, and 
ANOVA conducted. The ANOVA results for choice are summarised in Table 5.1. A 
significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction indicated that the addition of 
confidence cues to a speaker’s testimony led to shifts in participants’ choice of answers. 
Compared to when no confidence cues were used, speaking with high confidence led to 
a 26.55% increase in the amount of times that speaker’s answers were chosen, t(117) = 
4.38, p < .001, whereas speaking with low confidence led to a 21.62% decrease in how 
often that speakers answers were chosen,  t(117) = 4.45,  p < .001. The addition of 
medium confidence cues to a speaker’s answers made no difference to participants’ 
choice of answers, t(117) = 1.05, p = .30. There were no significant main effects of 
listener or speaker gender upon choice, nor were there any noteworthy interactions with 
gender.  
 
Influence of Speaker Confidence on Perceptions of Speakers 
Participants rated the three speakers on a range of attributes to determine which of 
these were effected by a speaker’s confidence level, thus enabling the basis for people’s 
use of the confidence heuristic to be investigated. Ratings are shown in Table 5.2. 
ANOVA was conducted on the ratings to determine whether the presence of confidence 
cues, the level of confidence cue, a speaker’s gender and a listener’s gender had any 
effect on how speaker’s were rated on each of the attributes. Table 5.1 summarises the 
ANOVA results. 
There were significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions for listeners’ 
perceptions of speaker intelligence, nervousness, optimism, knowledge, friendliness, 
self-confidence and professionalism. No Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions 
were found for credibility, likeability, honesty, politeness, trustworthiness or 
competence. 
 
 
Table 5.1  
ANOVA Summary Tables 
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DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Choice  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  20.82
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  13.75
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  20.08 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  01.63 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  20.45 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  20.12 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  20.04 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  01.16 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  20.43 
  Listener Gender  1  20.006 
  Speaker Gender  1  03.55 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  01.16 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  20.25 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  04.15
* 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  20.006 
  Error  111   
       
Intelligence  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  16.24
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  11.05
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .48 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .98 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .53 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .23 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  2.04 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.46 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  8.20
* 
  Listener Gender  1  3.95
* 
  Speaker Gender  1  .35 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  3.52 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .07 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  10.39
* 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .008 
  Error  111   
 
DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Honesty  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  .89 
  Confidence x Condition  2  .77 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .55 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  2.56 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  1.60 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .30 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .32 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.12 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  3.29 
  Listener Gender  1  .03 
  Speaker Gender  1  2.55 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  1.33 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .42 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.67 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .14 
  Error  111   
       
Competency  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  1.49 
  Confidence x Condition  2  1.91 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  1.58 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .31 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .02 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .80 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  2.43 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  6.88
** 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .01 
  Listener Gender  1  7.30
* 
  Speaker Gender  1  .02 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  3.50 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .62 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .82 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  3.09 
  Error 
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DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Nervousness  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  22.34
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  16.51
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .49 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  4.59
* 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .39 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .21 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.44 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .47 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .001 
  Listener Gender  1  3.61 
  Speaker Gender  1  .62 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .29 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .89 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  4.56
* 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.18 
  Error  111   
       
Optimism  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  8.11
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  10.44
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .73 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  2.38 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .23 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .19 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  3.05
* 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .30 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .08 
  Listener Gender  1  3.34 
  Speaker Gender  1  1.52 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  1.19 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .19 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .90 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .90 
  Error  111   
 
DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Knowledge  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  12.83
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  9.12
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .05 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  1.81 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .15 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  1.40 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .14 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .24 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .82 
  Listener Gender  1  .20 
  Speaker Gender  1  .03 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .09 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  5.27
* 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .73 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.40 
  Error  111   
       
Politeness  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  .08 
  Confidence x Condition  2  1.35 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .41 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  1.33 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .99 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  1.09 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .70 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.94 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .07 
  Listener Gender  1  .96 
  Speaker Gender  1  2.61 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .01 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .04 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .09 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .01 
  Error  111   
  
 
 
Table 5.1  
ANOVA Summary Tables 
  113 
 
DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Friendliness  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  7.23
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  5.82
* 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .02 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  2.83 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  2.73 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  1.25 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.82 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.77 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .49 
  Listener Gender  1  1.22 
  Speaker Gender  1  .01 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .08 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .69 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .24 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.90 
  Error  111   
       
Self-  Within-Subjects     
Confidence  Confidence  2  21.20
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  19.79
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .44 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .71 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .40 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  1.06 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .64 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .59 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  2.12 
  Listener Gender  1  .59 
  Speaker Gender  1  .06 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .19 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .07 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  3.08 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.33 
  Error  111   
 
DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Trustworthy  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  2.47 
  Confidence x Condition  2  1.94 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  1.12 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .27 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .26 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .03 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .01 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .30 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .40 
  Listener Gender  1  .30 
  Speaker Gender  1  .004 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .007 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  6.12
* 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .001 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  1.89 
  Error  111   
       
Professional  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  22.38
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  13.06
** 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .85 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .33 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .81 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .03 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  1.51 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .35 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  9.76
* 
  Listener Gender  1  2.60 
  Speaker Gender  1  .04 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  2.60 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  1.76 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .32 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .90 
  Error  111   
  
 
 
Table 5.1  
ANOVA Summary Tables 
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DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Likeability  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  .64 
  Confidence x Condition  2  1.20 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  2.57 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .28 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  .10 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  1.62 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .86 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .13 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  3.96
* 
  Listener Gender  1  .04 
  Speaker Gender  1  .01 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .75 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  .17 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .22 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  2.16 
  Error  111   
Note. 
* p < .05     
** p   .001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV  Source of Variation  df  F 
Credibility  Within-Subjects     
  Confidence  2  9.14
** 
  Confidence x Condition  2  2.63 
  Confidence x Listener Gender  2  .23 
  Confidence x Speaker Gender  2  .13 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender  2  1.33 
  Confidence x Condition x Speaker Gender  2  .81 
  Confidence x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .51 
  Confidence x Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  2  .34 
  Error  222   
       
  Between Subjects     
  Condition  1  .54 
  Listener Gender  1  6.33 
  Speaker Gender  1  .36 
  Condition x Listener Gender  1  .03 
  Condition x Speaker Gender  1  7.50
* 
  Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  .21 
  Condition x Listener Gender x Speaker Gender  1  3.00 
  Error  111   
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Table 5.2  
Mean ratings of speakers in the absence and presence of confidence cues 
Speaker Confidence   
High                  Medium                  Low 
 
Total 
Intelligence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.60 
5.10 
 
4.83 
4.22 
 
4.38 
3.66 
 
4.60 
4.33 
Honesty 
Control 
Experimental 
 
5.12 
4.88 
 
5.22 
4.81 
 
4.95 
4.76 
 
5.09 
4.82 
Competence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
3.92 
4.19 
 
4.00 
4.02 
 
3.93 
3.53 
 
3.95 
3.91 
Nervousness 
Control 
Experimental 
 
3.82 
2.66 
 
3.67 
3.66 
 
3.97 
4.97 
 
3.92 
3.76 
Optimism 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.18 
4.98 
 
4.28 
4.26 
 
4.30 
3.57 
 
4.26 
4.26 
Knowledgeability 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.35 
5.00 
 
4.58 
4.31 
 
4.19 
3.24 
 
4.35 
4.20 
Politeness  
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.45 
4.46 
 
4.33 
4.56 
 
4.48 
4.39 
 
4.42 
4.47 
Friendliness 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.35 
3.88 
 
4.37 
4.51 
 
4.48 
4.47 
 
4.40 
4.29 
Self-Confidence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.50 
5.64 
 
4.83 
4.32 
 
4.38 
3.17 
 
4.57 
4.38 
Trustworthiness 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.02 
4.42 
 
4.27 
4.28 
 
4.02 
3.79 
 
4.10 
4.18 
Professionalism 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.90 
5.31 
 
4.87 
4.41 
 
4.65 
3.54 
 
4.81 
4.42 
Likeability 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.60 
4.07 
 
4.52 
4.47 
 
4.55 
4.24 
 
4.56 
4.26 
Credibility 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.33 
4.63 
 
4.32 
3.97 
 
3.87 
3.58 
 
4.17 
4.06 
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All of the significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions are illustrated in 
Figure 5.1, which shows that in the absence of confidence cues there was very little 
difference in how the three speakers were perceived, whereas consistent patterns 
emerged with the addition of confidence cues. This observation is confirmed after 
conducting separate ANOVAs on each condition. In the control group no main effects 
of Speaker Confidence were seen (intelligence, F(2, 118) = 2.83, p = .06; nervousness, 
F(2, 118) = 1.16, p = .32; optimism, F(2, 118) = .32, p = .73; knowledge, F(2, 116) = 
1.40, p = .25; friendliness, F(2, 118) = .70, p = .52; self-confidence, F(2, 118) = 2.89, p 
= .06; professionalism,  F(2, 118) = 1.39,  p  = .25). Hence, it can be assumed that 
participants did not perceive differences between the three speakers on any of the above 
attributes when they did not accompany their answers with confidence cues.  
The addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answer did affect how the speakers 
were perceived.  The strongest effect of a speaker’s expressed confidence was seen on 
attributes relating to the speaker’s perceived confidence, specifically ratings of speaker 
self-confidence, F(2, 116) = 32.54,  p <.001, and nervousness,  F(2, 116) = 37.22,  p 
<.001, and, where partial Eta squared of .40 and .39 indicated that the speaker’s level of 
confidence accounted for 40% and 39% of the overall variance respectively. This was 
followed by a marked effect of speaker confidence on ratings of speaker 
professionalism, F(2, 116) = 27.36, p <.001, ηp
2 = .32, intelligence, F(2, 116) = 21.87, p 
<.001, ηp
2 = .27, knowledgeability, F(2, 114) = 20.60, p <.001, ηp
2 = .27, and optimism, 
F(2, 114) = 14.82, p <.001, ηp
2 = .21. Speaker confidence has smaller but significant 
effect on ratings of speaker friendliness, F(2, 116) = 7.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12.  
With the exception of ratings of speaker friendliness, Speaker Confidence produced a 
significant linear relationship on each attribute, indicating that the higher a speaker’s 
confidence was, the more intelligent, F(1, 58) = 28.35, p <.001, optimistic, F(1, 57) = 
16.97, p = .001, knowledgeable, F(1, 57) = 25.99, p <.001, self-confident, F(1, 58) = 
41.35, p <.001, professional, F(1, 58) = 33.79, p <.001, and lacking in nervousness, F(1, 
58) = 57.81,  p  <.001, they were perceived as being. Planned comparisons showed 
significant differences between ratings given to the high and medium, and medium and 
low, confidence speakers for intelligence, t(58) = 4.45, p < .001 and t(58) = 3.08, p = 
.003, optimism, t(57) = 3.77, p < .001 and t(57) = 3.17, p = .002, knowledgeability, 
t(57) = 3.01, p = .004 and t(57) = 4.59, p < .001, self-confidence, t(58) = 5.33, p < .001 
and t(58) = 4.27, p = .003, professionalism, t(58) = 4.98, p < .001 and t(58) = 4.04, p = 
.003, and nervousness, t(58) = 4.27, p < .001 and t(58) = 4.99, p < .001.   
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Figure 5.1. Significant interactions relating to perceptions of speakers speaking with 
different levels of confidence. 
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Ratings of speaker friendliness showed significant linear and quadratic relationships, 
F(1, 58) = 7.61, p =.008 and F(1, 58) = 8.62, p =.005. The high confidence speaker was 
rated as being significantly less friendly than either the medium or low confidence 
speakers, t(58) = 3.50, p = .001 and t(58) = 2.76, p = .008, with the medium and low 
confidence speakers both being rated as equally friendly, t(58) = .26, p = .79. However, 
from Figure 5.1 it can be seen that the ratings of speaker friendliness in the experimental 
condition are similar to those in the control condition for the medium and low 
confidence speakers both, t(117) = .71, p = .48 and t(117) = .04, p = .97, with the only 
difference being a slight decrease in ratings of perceived friendliness for the high 
confidence speaker when confidence cues were added, t(117) = 1.92, p = .06. 
 
Gender Effects 
There were no notable interactions between a speaker’s confidence level and the 
gender of either the speaker or the listener, with the exception of a four-way Speaker 
Confidence x Speaker Gender x Listener Gender x Condition interaction for ratings of 
competency, F(2, 222) = 6.89, p = .001, (see Table 5.2 for means). However, given that 
partial Eta squared for the four-way interaction was just .06, and therefore just 6% of 
the total variance in ratings of competency can be accounted for by these factors, it 
could be that this interaction emerged as a result of a certain amount of random error in 
participants’ judgement processes. Furthermore, any differences could have been 
exaggerated owing to uneven numbers of male and female participants. 
 
Summary of Results 
     In terms of the influence of confidence on choice, there was a significant Speaker 
Confidence x Condition interaction, indicating that the addition of confidence cues had 
an effect on choice. However the lack of any significant main effects or interactions 
with gender indicated that a speaker’s, or listener’s gender did not effect choice.  
Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions for intelligence, nervousness, 
optimism, knowledge, friendliness, self-confidence and professionalism indicated that 
the addition of confidence cues effected participants’ perceptions of speakers on these 
attributes, but had no effect on ratings of credibility, likeability, honesty, politeness, 
trustworthiness or competence. As with choice, lack of any noteworthy effects of 
indicated that a speaker’s, or listener’s gender did not effect participants’ perceptions of 
the speakers.   
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Discussion 
 
As in previous chapters, the addition of confidence cues had an effect on choice, in 
that high confidence cues led to an increase in agreement with a speaker’s answers, low 
confidence led to a decrease in agreement, and the use of medium confidence cues made 
no difference to agreement. The gender of either the speaker or the listener had no effect 
on participants’ choice of answers.  While these results confirm previous findings from 
Chapters 3 and 4 the main aim of this chapter was to explore the reasons behind such 
shifts in choice behaviour – just why do people choose answers more frequently when 
they are expressed with high confidence, and less frequently when expressed with low 
confidence? What is the basis for using expressed confidence as a heuristic? 
Previous research has considered the effect of a speaker’s language in terms of polar 
opposites – powerful vs. powerless language, assertive vs. tentative and so on. This 
chapter explored whether the results found in these studies translates to a range of 
confidence/uncertainty expressions. The present results indicate that, for the most part, 
they do. As a speaker’s expressed confidence increased so did listeners’ perceptions of 
their intelligence, knowledge, professionalism, optimism, self-confidence, and lack of 
nervousness. These results lend some support to the initial hypotheses that there would 
be differences in how speakers using extreme confidence expressions would be 
perceived, and that how positively a speaker was perceived would progress as a 
speaker’s confidence increased from low to medium to high. As indicated on the above 
attributes the high confidence speaker was perceived more positively than the medium 
confidence speaker, who in turn was perceived more positively than the low confidence 
speaker.   
However this progression was not seen on all the attributes that were measured. 
Whilst it was hypothesised that there would be either a progression, such as that 
discussed above, or an inverse U shaped relation regarding perceptions of the medium 
confidence speaker, the results of the present study found that speakers expressing 
medium or low confidence in their answers were viewed as being much more friendly 
than a highly confident speaker. While speech style research, comparing powerful and 
powerless speech, has not found such effects (e.g. Holtgraves and Lasky, 1999), that 
which considers a broader range of expressions of confidence has done (e.g. London, 
McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Maslow, Yoselson, and London, 1971; Pulford, 2002).  
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Hence it would appear that too much confidence does have a detrimental effect on how 
a speaker is perceived in this way.  
A speaker’s confidence did not affect how they were perceived in terms of 
credibility, trustworthiness, honesty, likeability and politeness. It may be that people do 
not relate these attributes to a person’s confidence level, or at least not in the 
experimental situation used here where there were no apparent motivational reasons for 
any of the witnesses to misrepresent the ‘truth’. Alternatively it may be that these 
attributes are not affected by a speaker’s confidence level on their own. For instance, 
Sparks et al. (2002) operationalised credibility as an amalgamation of honesty, 
credibility and trustworthiness ratings, while Holtgraves and Lasky (1999) combined 
ratings of intelligence, likeability, competence, knowledgeability, and trustworthiness to 
give an overall perception of speakers. Speech style effects were seen in both these 
instances.  
In keeping with previous research, there were limited gender effects in the present 
experiment, and hence it can be assumed that in relation to gender at least, the 
confidence heuristic is a general cognitive heuristic (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). 
Indeed, this is a promising result that has relevance in today’s modern society – much of 
the literature referring to sex differences, often as a reflection of differences in status, 
goes back twenty or thirty years (e.g. Bradley, 1981; Lakoff; 1975). Hopefully we are 
starting to see beyond gender as an indicator of what someone knows and is capable of.   
      
Conclusions 
As would be expected by the confidence heuristic, when all else is equal, a 
comparison of the confidence with which different sources express their information 
serves as a means of differentiating between that information. Greater levels of 
expressed confidence leads to more influence upon the choices we make. As with 
speech style, the influence of confidence is mediated by how a speaker is perceived. Our 
basis for using confidence in such a way appears to be because we associate increasing 
confidence with factors relating to a speaker’s ability, such as intelligence, knowledge, 
and professionalism, and to their level of confidence itself, for example their optimism, 
self-confidence and a lack of nervousness. However, too much confidence can have a 
negative effect on factors relating to a speaker’s social attractiveness, in terms of how 
friendly we think they are.   
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In the short-term these latter factors are outweighed by perceptions of a speaker’s 
ability and confidence, and so do not impact upon a speaker’s persuasive influence. It 
may not matter that we do not find someone who is giving evidence in court particularly 
friendly as we do not need to form lasting relationships with them, indeed we may never 
see them again once the trial is over. In such a situation their ability to convey their 
information in a confident way is important. Their perceived ability and confidence 
allows us to turn to the confidence heuristic as a decision-making aid, particularly when 
there is no evidence to suggest that our perceptions may be erroneous. But in the long-
term too much confidence could be detrimental to a person’s influence, with this being 
particularly apparent, as Zarnoth and Sniezek (2002) point out, when a speaker’s level 
of confidence is perceived as not being justified. In such cases the rules of the 
confidence heuristic may be perceived as being  violated, and we may learn that a 
speaker’s confidence does not necessarily represent their ability, hence making other 
factors such as those relating to the speaker’s social attractiveness more important in the 
influence process. Therefore further research should consider how prior interaction with 
speakers who express different levels of confidence impacts upon our perceptions of 
them, and their subsequent influence. This issue will be addressed in the next two 
chapters. Chapter 6 considers how being able to view a speaker’s past performance on a 
task effects how that speaker is perceived by listeners, and Chapter 7 considers this in 
relation to choice behaviour.  CHAPTER 6 
Perceptions of Confident Speakers and their Judgmental Biases 
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This experiment considers whether people apply the confidence heuristic, taking a 
speaker’s expressed confidence as a cue to their knowledge, competence and accuracy, 
when provided with information relating to the speaker’s performance and hence their 
judgemental biases. 88 participants viewed a presentation in which three people 
answered general knowledge questions with different levels of confidence in their 
answers. After every question participants received feedback relating to the accuracy of 
each speaker’s answers. The results indicate that people do, to a certain extent, continue 
to apply the confidence heuristic in their judgments of others even when there is 
evidence to suggest that the level of expressed confidence used by the speaker is 
misleading. There is some evidence to suggest that some people may be better at, or 
more willing to, monitor other people’s judgmental biases than others, making them less 
reliant on the confidence heuristic.  
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Perceptions of Confident Speakers and their Judgmental Biases 
 
We often make judgements and decisions on the basis of another person’s advice, and 
how confident they say that they are in that advice. When making decisions in such a 
way, one would expect that highly confident advice would be frequently followed.  
However, the decision that we reach may involve more than a simple comparison of the 
confidence levels with which arguments are expressed. Recent research has argued that 
it is not enough to just understand what level of confidence a speaker means to convey - 
it is also important to be aware of how an individual decision-maker perceives speakers 
expressing different levels of confidence as well (Price and Stone, 2004; Sniezek and 
Van Swol, 2001). 
Previous research has indicated that higher levels of expressed confidence made a 
person more influential, regardless of that person’s accuracy (e.g. Sniezek and Buckley, 
1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). As people appear to 
be more sensitive to another’s expression of confidence than to the quality of their 
information it has been suggested that people use confidence as a heuristic, whereby 
confidence is taken as a cue to a person’s knowledge, competence or accuracy (Price 
and Stone, 2004; Thomas and McFadyen, 1995). However, for the confidence heuristic 
to be useful to us as decision-makers, it is important that people express their 
confidence appropriately, and confidence should not be too high or too low, relative to 
one’s accuracy (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993). But while we expect people to express a 
level of confidence that is in proportion to their information, this is not always the case. 
Many people show a tendency to be overconfident: their confidence in their opinion or 
advice exceeds the objective accuracy of the outcome (see Lichtenstein et al., 1982).  
How we interpret and use the confidence expressed by other people in situations 
where no information about the quality, or accuracy, of these responses is made 
available, has been investigated (e.g. Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van 
Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). When people have little or no reason to doubt 
the quality of the information they are receiving, confidence is a powerful predictor of 
influence. But sometimes we do get feedback regarding another’s performance: we 
build relationships with people, and over time may come to trust or mistrust their 
opinions more, or less. In many real life situations we are made aware of the judgmental 
biases of others – most poignantly when they get it wrong, for example stock- brokers, 
politicians and health ministers.     
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Whitley (1987) demonstrated how confidence is still influential even when there is 
evidence to suggest otherwise, in this case information  expressed by a discredited 
witness. Although they, reassuringly, found that a credible witness is more influential 
than a discredited one, when compared to producing no witness in a case, a discredited 
witness still exerts a considerable influence. They suggest that this is because, despite 
their evidence been discredited, just the very act of communicating confidence in a 
position, albeit an inaccurate one, influences jurors because their judgements were 
based on assumptions about a witness’s confidence rather than on their competence. 
Fox and Irwin (1998) pointed out that a listener’s interpretation of a speaker’s 
statement of confidence may be influenced by the listener’s perception of the speaker’s 
susceptibility to judgmental biases. If we find out that a speaker is consistently 
optimistic in their confidence, being overconfident in their opinions of a particular 
outcome occurring, and then often being wrong, the listener may rethink their use of 
this person’s information. Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) argue that trust is also an 
important function of influence. We may use another’s expressed confidence as a cue to 
trustworthiness but if, during the course of interacting with a speaker, we discover that 
their confidence does not match their accuracy, our trust in that speaker may diminish.  
Price and Stone (2004) questioned whether people still use the confidence heuristic 
when such feedback is made available.  How do we perceive an overconfident 
individual? They found that the majority of people preferred a highly confident, but 
overconfident, advisor to a more moderately confident, but more well-calibrated one. 
Price and Stone argued that these results provide  support for people’s use of the 
confidence heuristic, in that an advisor’s confidence was taken as a cue to their 
knowledge, competence and accuracy, even when there is evidence to the contrary. 
However, some participants still preferred a more moderate advisor, although here 
advisor preference was still associated with perceptions of advisor knowledgeability. 
Price and Stone suggest that this could be because only some people use the confidence 
heuristic, but concluded that it is more likely to be an artefact of random error in the 
judgement process.  
 Yates, Price, Lee, and Ramirez (1996) argued that this preference for extreme, 
overconfident advice, as opposed to more moderately confident (and well-calibrated) 
advice, may be because some people value good judgement discrimination, i.e. 
judgements that clearly differ from one another, more than good calibration. Some 
participants were found to have disdain for moderate judgements because, as one  
  125 
participant pointed out, they had no use for such a judgement as they could say that they 
did not know themselves – the moderate judgements did not offer certainty. Another 
participant saw this moderate expression of confidence as indicative of incompetence. 
For the people that preferred the overconfident judgements, high confidence was seen as 
a positive quality – confidence is good, and is assumed to also be appropriate as we 
expect people to express a justifiable level of confidence. But some people are more 
sceptical of extreme confidence, seeing too much confidence as overcompensating for a 
lack of knowledge (Yates et al., 1996). Indeed, other researchers have found that too 
much expressed confidence can be detrimental to how a speaker is perceived, even in 
the absence of feedback (London, McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Pulford, 2002).  
It may also be the case that one’s own judgmental biases are important too. Paese 
and Kinnaly (1993) found that people were not only unaware of their own 
overconfidence, but were also insensitive to it in others. “This lack of awareness may 
mean that we are, to some extent, undiscriminating consumers of one another’s 
knowledge when faced with difficult judgement problems” (p. 2009). 
      
Rationale for Experiment 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate whether people use the confidence 
heuristic, when they are made aware of a speaker’s judgmental biases via performance 
feedback. It is hypothesised that the availability of feedback will lead to a reduction in 
confidence heuristic use, and specifically that a highly confident speaker will be 
perceived more negatively when such feedback is available compared to when it is not.  
Consideration is also given to the listener’s own judgmental biases – does this effect 
people’s use of the confidence heuristic? Do we make use of the confidence heuristic to 
a greater or lesser extent when we abuse the underlying principles of it ourselves?  It is 
hypothesised that there will be differences in confidence heuristic use according to an 
individuals own over/underconfidence.  
The present experiment uses a similar paradigm to that of Price and Stone (2004), 
where participants view judgements made by different speakers, and then evaluate those 
speakers, stating a preference for one. A number of modifications are made however. 
Firstly, three levels of confidence are used, as opposed to two used by Price and Stone, 
to consider the effect of a broader range of confidence. Secondly, verbal expressions of 
confidence are used, as opposed to numerical estimates of confidence, as these are more 
representative of how we communicate confidence and uncertainty in everyday life.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
22 male and 66 female undergraduate students from the University of 
Wolverhampton’s participant pool took part in the study (N = 88). Participants’ ages 
ranged from 18 to 39 years of age, with a mean age of 20.06 years (S.D. = 4.24).  
 
Materials 
A computer presentation was prepared consisting of thirty PowerPoint slides. On 
each slide a general knowledge question appeared, followed one-by-one with three 
responses each given by a ‘friend’. Figure 6.1 shows an example slide.  
 
Figure 6.1. Example slide from PowerPoint presentation 
 
Neutral names were used for the three speakers - ‘Alex’, ‘Jo’ and ‘Sam’ – in an 
attempt to eliminate speaker gender variables. One response was spoken with high 
confidence (Sam), one with medium confidence (Alex) and one with low confidence 
(Jo), using the cues developed in a previous pilot study (Table 2.1, Chapter 2). The 
presentation order of each speaker’s response was counterbalanced, so that each 
speaker’s answers were viewed first, second and third an equal number of times. After 
all three responses had appeared the correct answer was revealed with each speaker 
giving the correct answer ten times, i.e. 33% accuracy for each speaker. By keeping 
accuracy constant across the three speakers, but with each speaker expressing a different 
level of confidence, the high confidence speaker can, in essence, be viewed as being 
extremely overconfident since they constantly express certainty in their answers but are 
not constantly accurate. The medium confidence speaker can be seen as being 
Question 1. A ‘dybbuk’ is an evil spirit in which
folklore?
Alex said, If I remember correctly it’s Jewish
folklore
Sam said, I’m absolutely certain it’s West African
folklore
Jo said, It could be Irish folklore but I don’t know
4 The correct answer is Jewish 
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moderately overconfident, as they still express a level of confidence that suggests a 
higher level of accuracy than is warranted. The low confidence speaker may be seen as 
being the most well-calibrated of the three speakers, if not a little underconfident, as 
their expressed level of confidence best matches their true level of accuracy. Examples 
of questions used in the presentation are shown in Appendix I.  
Participants were also presented with a 20-item general knowledge questionnaire 
(Appendix I), designed by Dr Pulford at the University of Wolverhampton to measure 
overconfidence. Participants were required to select the correct answer to each question 
from one of three alternatives. For each question they were also asked to indicate how 
confident they felt that their chosen answer was correct, on a scale of 0 (no confidence 
that your answer) to 100 (total confidence that your answer is correct) and the 
probability that their chosen answer was correct, by using any number from .33 to 1.0.  
 
Design and Procedure 
Three levels of speaker confidence were used (high; medium; low), each of which 
were presented simultaneously. The dependent variables were listeners’ perceptions of 
the three speakers, including a judgement of each speaker’s accuracy. As in Price and 
Stone’s (2004) experiment, on which the current methodology was based, no control 
condition was included as the variables of interest were differences in participants’ 
perceptions of the three speakers when expressing different levels of confidence, rather 
than considering these differences in the absence and presence of confidence cues. 
Furthermore, as Chapters 3 and 5 have shown, there are no differences in how speakers 
are perceived in the absence of confidence cues.  
Further analysis was conducted to take into account the between-subjects variable of 
over/under-confidence. To determine if participants were under- or over-confident, the 
mean accuracy for each participant on the general knowledge questionnaire was 
calculated and subtracted from their mean probability estimate, giving an 
overconfidence score for each participant. Using this measurement a score of 0 would 
represent perfect calibration, where mean accuracy matched mean probability, whereas 
deviations from 0 represent either over- or under-confidence. Hence, participants with 
overconfidence scores below 0 were classed as underconfident, as this indicated that 
their mean probability estimate on the general knowledge questionnaire was lower than 
their mean accuracy, and scores above 0 were classed as overconfident, as this indicated 
that their mean probability estimate was higher than their mean accuracy.   
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After entering the computer laboratory in which the experiment was conducted and 
giving informed consent to taking part in the experiment, participants were first asked to 
complete the 20-item general knowledge questionnaire. Upon completion of this they 
watched the presentation on a computer monitor. At the beginning of the presentation a 
series of short instructions appeared on the screen detailing the task. Participants were 
instructed as follows: 
 
Imagine that you are planning on entering a quiz. The quiz covers general knowledge 
questions and has a top prize for the winning team. Teams consist of two people. Before 
you enter the quiz you need to decide who is going to be your team mate. You are 
trying to decide between three of your friends - Alex, Jo and Sam - each of whom you 
think are good at general knowledge. To help you decide which of your friends will 
perform best in the quiz, and therefore maximise your chances of winning the top prize, 
you test each of them on their general knowledge skills. The friend you think has 
performed the best will join your team. 
 
You ask each of your three friends 30 difficult general knowledge questions to assess 
their performance. After asking each question you will see how each of your three 
friends responded. Please pay attention to how each friend answers. You will then see 
the correct answer. Please pay attention to the performance of each friend. After all 30 
questions have been answered you will decide which friend you are going to ask to join 
your team. You will also be asked questions about the performance of each friend. 
Please do not make any notes. 
 
Although the presentation of each slide’s questions and answers was timed to ensure 
that none were missed out, the presentation of each complete slide was self-paced so 
that participants could study each set of questions and answers for as long as they 
required. At the end of the presentation participants were told to turn over the sheet in 
front of them on which there was a series of questions relating to the three speakers. 
Participants were asked to indicate which of the three speakers they would ask to join 
their team, which friend they liked the most and the least, who was most/least 
intelligent, most/least trusted, most/least competent and most/least optimistic. Finally 
participants were asked to indicate the percentage of questions they thought each friend 
has answered correctly. All participants were tested in small groups, without interaction, 
each facing a separate computer monitor. Participants were debriefed and thanked upon 
completion of the experiment.      
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Results 
 
Perceptions of Speakers 
Participants were asked a series of questions relating to their perceptions of the three 
speakers after receiving feedback regarding their performance. Table 6.1 summarises 
these results, presenting these as percentages for ease of comparison.  
 
Table 6.1 
Perceptions of speakers using different confidence levels (% participants) 
Speaker Confidence   
  High                Medium                Low 
 
χ
2 
Chosen Team-mate  36.4  47.7  15.9  13.73
** 
Most Liked  29.5  35.2  35.2  .57 
Least Liked  54.5  20.5  25.0  18.09
** 
Most Intelligent  39.8  40.9  19.3  7.80
* 
Least Intelligent  29.5  19.3  51.1  13.93
** 
Most Trusted  23.9  47.7  28.4  8.48
* 
Least Trusted  53.5  22.7  23.9  15.98
** 
Most Competent  43.2  45.5  11.4  19.18
** 
Least Competent  21.6  23.9  54.5  17.89
** 
Most Optimistic  63.6  20.5  15.9  36.64
** 
Least Optimistic  17.0  12.5  70.5  54.84
** 
Note. 
* p < .05     
** p < .001. Degrees of Freedom = 2 
 
Table 6.1 shows that different levels of speaker confidence affected participants’ 
choice of team-mate, with the medium confidence speaker being the most popular 
choice, followed by the highly confident speaker (M = 47.7% vs. M = 36.4%). The low 
confidence speaker was the least popular choice of team-mate, being chosen by only 
15.9% of participants.  
A speaker’s level of expressed confidence also affected how they were perceived by 
participants, with the exception of the speaker participants liked the most, where none  
  130 
of the speakers were liked any more than the others (Table 6.1). The high and medium 
confidence speakers were both equally seen as being the most intelligent and most 
competent of the three speakers, with the low confidence speaker being seen as least 
intelligent and competent. However, despite being viewed as being both intelligent and 
competent, the high confidence speaker was the least liked and least trusted of the three 
speakers, by over half of the participants in both cases. The medium confidence speaker 
was trusted the most.  
The different speakers were also perceived differently in terms of their optimism. 
The high confidence speaker was seen as the most optimistic of the speakers by two 
thirds of participants (63.6%), and the low confidence speaker is seen as the least 
optimistic by a majority of participants (70.5%). 
 
Perceived Accuracy 
Although each speaker was correct the same number of times (33.33%), participants 
still perceived differences in the accuracy of the three speakers, as indicated by a 
significant main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 174) = 12.02,  p < .001. Paired-
samples t-tests showed significant differences between the perceived accuracy of the 
high and medium confidence speaker (46.20% and 41.82%), t(87) = 2.13, p = .04, high 
and low confidence speaker (46.20% and 36.57%), t(87) = 4.62,  p < .001, and the 
medium and low confidence speaker (41.82% and 36.57%), t(87) = 3.01, p = .003. 
In relation to their actual accuracy levels (33.33%), the high confidence speaker’s 
accuracy was overestimated by 12.87%, the medium confidence speaker’s by 8.49%, 
with the low confidence speaker’s by 3.24%, thus the participants’ perceptions of the 
low confidence speaker’s accuracy were the most realistic.  
 
Choice of Team-mate and Perceptions of Speakers 
Participants’ perceptions of each speaker’s accuracy were related to their choice of 
team-mate. There was a significant main effect of Speaker Confidence on perceived 
accuracy regardless of whether participants choose the high, medium, or low confidence 
speaker to join their team, F(2, 62) = 45.51, p < .001, F(2, 82) = 15.95, p < .001, and 
F(2, 26) = 5.53, p = .008, respectively (Figure 6.2). Paired t-tests showed that when the 
high confidence speaker was the chosen team-mate this speaker was seen as being more 
accurate than the medium confidence speaker (56.50% vs. 36.37%), t(31) = 7.00, p < 
.001, and the low confidence speaker (56.50% vs. 33.69%), t(31) = 9.28, p < .001. No  
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differences were perceived in the accuracy of the medium and low confidence speakers 
(36.37% vs. 33.69%), t(31) = 1.31, p = .20. When the medium confidence speaker was 
the chosen team-mate, this speaker was viewed as being more accurate than the high 
confidence speaker (45.77% vs. 38.10%), t(41) = 3.56, p = .001, and the low confidence 
speaker (45.77% vs. 32.67%), t(41) = 6.39,  p < .001. However, the high confidence 
speaker was not seen as being more accurate than the low confidence speaker by these 
individuals, (38.10% vs. 32.67%), t(41) = 1.99, p = .053. For the small proportion of 
participants choosing the low confidence speaker as their team-mate, this speaker was 
seen as being more accurate than the medium confidence speaker (54.86% vs. 41.07%), 
t(13) = 4.06, p = .001, but not the high confidence speaker (54.86% vs. 46.93%), t(13) = 
1.73, p = .11. No differences were apparent in the perceived accuracy of the high and 
medium confidence speakers, t(13) = 1.43, p = .18.  
Figure 6.2. Perceptions of speaker accuracy according to chosen team mate. 
     
For the majority of participants the medium and high confidence speakers were the 
preferred choice of team-mate. To further investigate participants’ reasons for this, how 
all three speakers were perceived was looked at in relation to chosen team-mate, with 
analyses concentrating on participants who chose the high or medium confidence 
speaker as their team-mate.  
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Figure 6.3. Perceptions of speakers according to chosen team-mate. 
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In addition to perceived accuracy, chi-squared tests indicated that participants’ 
choice of team-mate (being either the high or medium confidence speaker) was also 
associated with the speaker who they liked the most, χ
2 = 15.06, df = 2, p = .001, and 
whom they thought was most intelligent, χ
2 = 47.31, df = 2, p < .001, trustworthy, χ
2 = 
13.00, df = 2, p = .002, and competent, χ
2 = 30.06, df = 2, p < .001, (Figure 6.3). The 
exception to this was speaker optimism. Participants viewed the high confidence 
speaker as most optimistic, whether they chose the high or medium confidence speaker 
as their team-mate (56% and 74%), χ
2 = 8.31, df = 2, p = .02 and χ
2 = 31.29, df = 2, p < 
.001, and the low  confidence speaker as the least optimistic, (69% and 81% 
respectively), χ
2 = 18.25, df = 2, p < .001 and χ
2 = 43.43, df = 2, p < .001.  
Overall then participants chose the speaker who they viewed most positively. The 
reasons behind participants’ choice of team-mate may therefore be related to how they 
perceived the speakers they did not choose. As Figure 6.3 shows, participants choosing 
the high confidence speaker as their team-mate demonstrate a somewhat equal disliking 
of the medium and low confidence speakers (37% and 47%), χ
2 = 4.94, df = 2, p = .09, a 
similar distrust of these two speakers, χ
2 = 4.94, df = 2, p = .09, and a view that both of 
these speakers were equally lacking in competence, χ
2 = .50, df = 2, p = .48.  However, 
the participants who chose the medium confidence speaker as their team-mate showed a 
strong dislike for the high confidence speaker (81%), χ
2 = 44.14, df = 2, p < .001, as 
well as a strong mistrust of this speaker (76%), χ
2 = 37.00, df = 2, p < .001.  
 
Overconfidence 
Participants mean overconfidence score was –2.25 (S.D. = 12.89). 63.6% of 
participants were underconfident (M = -10.16, S.D. = 7.64), having scores ranging from 
-0.21 to –27.47 underconfidence, and 36.4% of participants were overconfident (M = 
11.67, S.D. = 7.08), having scores ranging from 1.54 to 30.00 overconfidence.  
 Overconfidence made no difference to choice of team-mate, with over- and under-
confident participants both showing a preference for the medium confidence speaker 
(53.1% and 44.6%), χ
2 = .67, df = 2, p = .72. The only significant difference between 
under- and over-confident participants in how they perceived the three speakers, with 
the exception of accuracy reported later, was related to which speaker they liked the 
most, χ
2 = 6.38, df = 2, p = .04. Overconfident participants chose the high and medium 
confidence speakers equally often (40.6%) as being the speaker they liked the most, 
choosing the low confidence speaker least often (18.8%). Underconfident participants  
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chose the low confidence speaker as being the speaker they liked the most (44.6%), 
followed by the medium confidence (32.1%) and high confidence speakers (23.2%). No 
significant results were found for the speaker participants least liked, χ
2 = 2.89, df = 2, p 
= .24, found most or least intelligent, χ
2 = .86, df = 2, p = .65 and χ
2 = .65, df = 2, p = 
.72, trusted most or least, χ
2 = .60, df = 2, p = .74 and χ
2 = 1.57, df = 2, p = .46, found 
most or least competent, χ
2 = .48, df = 2, p = .79 and χ
2 = 2.51, df = 2, p = .28, or found 
most or least optimistic, χ
2 = 1.61, df = 2, p = .45 and χ
2 = 1.53, df = 2, p = .46. 
Figure 6.4 shows how accurate the underconfident and overconfident participants 
perceived each speaker to be. A repeated measures ANOVA found a main effect of 
Speaker Confidence on perceptions of speaker accuracy for overconfident participants, 
F(2, 110) = 8.68, p < .001, and underconfident participants, F(2, 62) = 4.74, p = .01. 
Paired t-tests showed that overconfident participants perceived the high and medium 
confidence speakers to be of equal accuracy (48.16% vs. 46.91%), t(31) = .33, p = .74, 
but the high and medium confidence speakers to be more accurate than the low 
confidence speaker (37.66%), t(31) = 2.64, p = .01 and t(31) = 2.74, p = .01. However, 
underconfident participants did perceive differences between the accuracy of the high 
and medium confidence speakers (45.08% vs. 38.92%), t(55) = 2.59,  p = .01, and 
between the high and low confidence speakers (45.08% vs. 35.95%), t(55) = 3.82, p < 
.001, but between the medium and low confidence speakers (38.92% vs. 35.95%), t(55) 
= 1.56, p = .13. 
Figure 6.4. Perceptions of speaker accuracy according to under/overconfidence. 
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significant main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 172) = 11.80, p < .001. However, 
there was no main effect of Overconfidence, F(1, 86) = 1.81, p = .18, and while the 
earlier results showed that overconfident participants viewed each of the three speakers 
as being more accurate than underconfident participants did, there was no significant 
Speaker Confidence x Overconfidence interaction, F(2, 172) = 1.31, p = .27.  
 
Summary of Results 
With the exception of which speaker participants liked the most, significant 
differences in participants’ perceptions of the three speakers were found, in terms of 
speaker likeability, intelligence, trustworthiness,  competency, optimism and accuracy. 
These results were found to be related to participants’ choice of team-mate, which was 
predominantly either the high or medium confidence speaker. Participants’ 
overconfidence had little effect on their perceptions of the speakers.   
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Discussion 
  
The results provide some support for peoples’ use of the confidence heuristic when 
feedback is made available. Higher levels of confidence were still associated with 
perceptions of competence, intelligence and accuracy, even when there was evidence to 
the contrary. The accuracy of the speakers was consistently overestimated, with the 
higher a speaker’s confidence being the higher the level of accuracy attributed to that 
speaker. However, although higher confidence was associated with higher accuracy, the 
perceived accuracy of the high confidence speaker, and to a lesser extent the medium 
confidence speaker, was still lower than those speakers expressed confidence would 
suggest. The highly confident speaker displayed extreme overconfidence, with the 
medium confidence speaker showing a more moderate level of overconfidence. In fact 
the most accurate judgement of a speaker’s accuracy was for the low confidence 
speaker, whose level of expressed confidence was more appropriate for the low 
accuracy level of their answers, but this speaker was perceived negatively in terms of 
competency related factors (least intelligent/least competent/least accurate).   
Although the high and medium confidence speakers were both seen as being the 
most intelligent and competent of the three speakers, the medium confidence speaker 
was the most popular choice of team-mate. This may be because, despite the positive 
perceptions of the high confidence speaker in terms of competency related factors (most 
intelligent/competent/accurate), they were perceived negatively in other areas related to 
likeability (least liked/trusted). The medium confidence speaker on the other hand was 
perceived positively in relation to factors of competency and likeability, being trusted 
the most. As Scherer (1979) has suggested, to be truly persuasive one should be seen as 
both competent and trustworthy. Furthermore, prior interaction can affect how we 
perceive a speaker (Fox and Irwin, 1998; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001), and repeatedly 
expressing too much confidence or optimism that is not justified can lead to mistrust, 
and hence a reduction in influence. This appears to have been the case here. However, 
both the high and medium confidence speakers expressed too much confidence in their 
answers than could be  justified by their accuracy level. It could be that participants 
found the discrepancy between a speaker’s expressed level of confidence and their 
accuracy more salient for the speaker expressing high confidence than for the speaker 
expressing medium confidence. The high confidence speaker’s extreme overconfidence 
could have led to antagonism towards the high confidence speaker, whereas the medium  
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confidence speaker’s more moderate level of overconfidence was less salient, perhaps 
not detected at all, resulting in this speaker being the most trusted and most common 
choice of team-mate.  
Although the medium confidence speaker was the most common choice of team-
mate, many chose the high confidence speaker instead. Whichever speaker was chosen 
though, it was always the one that those participants thought was the most accurate, 
competent, intelligent, trustworthy and likeable. Why then did some participants choose 
the high confidence and some the medium confidence speaker as their team-mate? Price 
and Stone (2004) found that a majority of participants preferred an extremely 
overconfident advisor to a more moderately confident one, but that a sizeable minority 
did prefer the latter. They argue that this is still consistent with the confidence heuristic 
being used by all, and that their results are due to a certain amount of error in the 
judgement process. However as more participants in the present experiment preferred 
the medium confidence speaker to the high confidence speaker, this would indicate that 
their finding is not attributable to random error as some people do prefer this speaker.  
There were a number of methodological differences between the present experiment 
and Price and Stone’s which could have led to the differences in the findings. Firstly, 
confidence in the present experiment was expressed verbally, using expressions such as 
“I know”, rather than as a probability estimate (e.g. 86%). Verbal expressions of 
confidence can be vague and ambiguous, not clearly denoting a particular amount as 
probability estimates do (Sniezek and Henry, 1989), which could have made it harder 
for participants to interpret differences between the three speakers in terms of their 
confidence in the present experiment. However it is unlikely that this led to differences 
in the results when considering that the overall accuracy of each speaker was much 
lower in the present experiment (33.33% vs. 75%). This resulted in the three speakers in 
the present experiment displaying different levels of overconfidence  – extreme 
overconfidence, moderate overconfidence and underconfidence. A final difference 
between the present experiment and Price and Stone’s was that the each speaker gave 
simultaneous judgements to each question in the former, rather than giving separate 
judgements to separate questions in the latter.  This meant that the three speakers, and 
their judgmental biases, could be more readily compared in the present experiment.     
The results relating to participants’ choice of team-mate may be attributable to 
differences in how people evaluated the speakers, possibly due to the amount of effort 
put in to differentiating between the speakers different levels of expressed confidence.  
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For those participants choosing the high confidence speaker as their team-mate, this 
speaker was seen as being more accurate than either of the other two speakers, but the 
speakers they did not choose were seen as having the same accuracy as one another. 
However, the participants who did not choose the high confidence speaker, in particular 
those choosing the medium confidence speaker differentiated far more between the 
speakers. These participants did perceive differences in the accuracy of all three 
speakers, whether it was their chosen team-mate or not. Further differences were seen in 
how the speakers they did  not choose were perceived. For those choosing the high 
confidence speaker as their team-mate, the unchosen speakers were, by and large, seen 
as equally disliked, mistrusted and incompetent. For those choosing the medium 
confidence speaker as their team-mate, there were differences in how the  unchosen 
speakers were perceived: a strong dislike and mistrust of the high confidence speaker 
was found.  
So for the participants choosing the high confidence speaker, this speaker was 
assumed to be most accurate, competent, intelligent and so on, and it would appear that 
little consideration was given to differentiating between the other two speakers. 
Therefore these participants could have utilised the confidence heuristic, attending to 
the speaker’s confidence level, and taking high confidence as the best option. High 
confidence was seized upon, and meant that other differentiating information did not 
need to be taken into account. For those choosing the medium confidence speaker it 
would appear that some consideration was given to differentiating between the speakers, 
regardless of whether these perceptions were accurate or not. But it does seem that these 
participants were sensitive to the extreme overconfidence of the high confidence 
speaker, resulting in a strong dislike and mistrust of the high confidence speaker. They 
may have seen that this speaker’s certainty was not justified by the feedback that they 
received.  
What led to this difference? The possibility of it being the listeners’ own tendency to 
judgmental biases was considered. Are we drawn to those who display levels of 
over/underconfidence to ourselves? There were no differences in over/under-confident 
participants choice of team-mate, but overconfident participants liked the higher (high 
and medium) confidence speakers the most, whereas the underconfident participants 
liked the low confidence speaker the most, followed by the medium, and then high 
confidence speakers. So it may be that we are to some extent attracted to people who 
display similar overconfidence to our own. Overconfident participants also perceived  
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higher confidence speakers to be more accurate than the low confidence speaker, 
whereas underconfident participants saw the high confidence speaker to be more 
accurate than both of the lower (medium and low) confidence speakers, who were seen 
as being equally accurate.  
 
Limitations 
There are a number of issues relating to the nature of the feedback provided in this 
experiment. In reality one may build up a picture of another person’s judgmental biases 
over a period of time, rather than following a short observation period such as that 
which was provided here. Hence, people’s perceptions of others may change over time. 
This issue would be worth further consideration. In the present experiment participants 
were also asked not to make any notes regarding the speakers’ performances on the 
task. Whether this would occur in real-life can be questioned. In some situations, 
perhaps where the outcome is relatively unimportant, it is reasonable to assume that 
people would not always make notes. In other situations where the outcome is more 
important, it is more likely that notes would be taken, for example in a job interview, 
where interviewers make notes regarding each candidate’s performance.  
 
Conclusions 
It would seem that one’s ability to monitor another’s judgmental biases is important 
in how we perceive them (and perhaps their subsequent influence), regardless of our 
ability to monitor our own judgmental biases. Some people may be better at this than 
others, making them less reliant on the confidence heuristic. Rather than the confidence 
heuristic being used by all, as suggested by Price and Stone, it may be that only some 
people use the confidence heuristic. Alternatively it may be that the confidence heuristic 
is used differently by different people. The confidence heuristic may work by matching 
confidence with quality, but some people are better at this than others – or more willing 
to out in the extra cognitive effort that is required. Those who do put the effort in realise 
that the high confidence speaker’s accuracy is not justified, but still look for confidence 
on which to base their decision, hence the compromise of medium confidence. Others 
continue to equate confidence with quality, ignoring information to the contrary.  
Although the results from the present experiment indicate that the availability of 
feedback affects how speakers expressing different levels of confidence are perceived, 
in that the most confident speaker is no longer automatically viewed most favourably, it  
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is not clear what the wider influence of this is, and its effects on people’s use of the 
confidence heuristic. For instance, how does such information influence the decisions 
we make, in particular do we take someone’s advice even when we have seen their 
information to be of disputable quality, compared to what their level of expressed 
confidence would suggest? This issue is considered in the next chapter, where the 
methodology used in the present experiment is adapted to consider participants’ choice 
behaviour when speaker feedback is provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 7  
Prior Interaction, Feedback and the Influence of Confidence 
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This study investigates whether we are insensitive to other people’s judgmental biases, 
and whether feedback reveals this bias to observers or if the influence of a speaker’s 
confidence prevails. 86 participants observed three speakers answering general 
knowledge questions, with each speaker demonstrating a different level of confidence 
and bias. Half the participants also received feedback about the speakers’ performance. 
Participants then completed a general knowledge questionnaire, choosing from answers 
given by the three speakers. A speaker’s level of confidence had a greater effect on 
choice when no feedback was given than when it was. The addition of feedback led to a 
reduction in the influence of a highly confident, but overconfident, speaker and 
increases in the influence of the medium and low confidence speakers. Feedback did 
not have any significant effects on participants’ confidence in their answers, but it did 
result in a slight increase in accuracy. Feedback also affected participants’ choice of 
team-mate.   
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Prior Interaction, Feedback and the Influence of Confidence 
 
When we have a choice to make we tend not to turn to complete strangers for their 
advice. Where possible we will seek the advice of someone who we have had some 
contact with before  – perhaps a friend or acquaintance, a colleague who we recall 
having an interest in a particular area, or a family member. Over time we may build up a 
picture of the style with which they express their advice or information - they may 
always be extremely confident in the advice they proffer or they may be uncertain in 
what they say. Since previous research has proposed that we utilise confidence 
heuristically, whereby we associate a person’s confidence with attributes relating to a 
speaker’s competency (Price and Stone, 2004; Thomas and McFadyen, 1995), we may, 
perhaps, seek out the advice of the highly confident person and stop asking the person 
who expresses their uncertainty. In doing so we believe that we are using an effective 
decision-making strategy, using confidence as a heuristic which allows us to determine 
the quality of another person’s information. However, as we interact with other people 
we may also become aware not only of the way in which they express themselves and 
how confident they are, but also of their tendency to judgmental biases. We may learn 
that the highly confident person is not always justified in being so confident as they are 
actually not as accurate as their confidence would suggest, whereas perhaps our 
uncertain friend actually knows more than their chosen level of confidence would 
suggest. How does this affect our use of the confidence heuristic?  
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found that the most confident individual in a group 
exerted the greatest influence even when they were inaccurate, although other than 
utilising their own knowledge participants had no way of knowing whether an 
individual was accurate or not. Hence, participants assumed that a speaker was accurate 
because they expressed confidence in what they were saying. Such overconfidence, and 
conversely underconfidence, on the part of the speaker may be an intentional or 
unintentional bias, with people miscommunicating their confidence for reasons such as 
impression management, motivational factors or individual differences (Thomas and 
McFadyen, 1995). People may therefore use the confidence heuristic to their advantage, 
arguing confidently so as to appear more knowledgeable, competent or credible than 
they really are. However, when feedback regarding a speaker’s performance is made 
available surely the illusion of expertise is shattered? As Thomas and McFadyen warn, 
the future ramifications of exploiting the confidence heuristic may be costly: if the same  
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people interact repeatedly, then arguing confidently when one’s information is 
unreliable could result in a loss of reputation. Hence, even though such a person may 
offer reliable information as often as the next person their, at times, inappropriate 
confidence could mean that their input is no longer sought.  
Price and Stone (2004) considered how we evaluate speakers when feedback is 
provided about the quality of their judgements, finding that an extremely confident, but 
overconfident, advisor was still preferred to a more moderately confident, well-
calibrated, one. A speaker’s confidence was found to have an influence on participants’ 
perceptions of speaker knowledge and accuracy, indicating that people do still use the 
confidence heuristic when they have an awareness of the true state of the world (e.g. a 
speaker’s susceptibility to judgmental biases).  
However, Chapter 6 showed that feedback had more of an effect on how speakers 
were perceived for some people than others, with an individual’s ability to monitor the 
judgmental biases of another person being important. Some people continued to 
associate high confidence with competency, intelligence and accuracy even when there 
was evidence to the contrary, whereas others preferred a speaker who used a more 
moderate expression of confidence. Both high and medium confidence speakers were 
seen as being equally intelligent and trustworthy, but too much confidence was 
detrimental to perceptions of speaker likeability and trust.  
Whilst both of these studies consider how feedback affects our use of the confidence 
heuristic in terms of how we perceive speakers, the question was raised in Chapter 6 as 
to how one’s ability to monitor the judgmental biases of a speaker also affects our 
acceptance of a speaker’s advice. Concurring with previous research (e.g. Sniezek and 
Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), Chapter 3 
has already shown that we do rely on another person’s confidence as a decision-making 
aid when we have no other information available to us. But having previous experience 
of a speaker may affect this. We may not rely so heavily on a speaker’s confidence once 
we get used to the way in which they express their information. Furthermore, if we are 
also made aware of a speaker’s judgmental biases we may rely less on their advice, 
regardless of how confidently they express it. Although the role of feedback regarding 
one’s own performance on a task had been considered in relation to how this effects the 
confidence that we hold in our own decisions (e.g. Bradfield, Wells, and Olson, 2002; 
Sharp, Cutler, and Penrod, 1988), how the receipt of feedback regarding another’s  
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performance affects our decisions, and the confidence that we hold in those decisions, 
has not.  
 
Rationale for Experiment 
The present experiment will therefore consider how prior interaction, in the form of 
observation, with speakers affects the influence of their expressed level of confidence 
on a) the choices that we make, b) the confidence that we have in those choices and, c) 
our choice of team-mate. Whereas the experiment reported in Chapter 6 looked at the 
effect of prior interaction with feedback on how a speaker was perceived, the present 
experiment considers how the presence, compared to the absence, of feedback affects 
the influence of confidence on the three dependent variables noted above. As Paese and 
Kinnaly (1993) have suggested, people appear to be insensitive to the judgmental biases 
of others and so we indiscriminately consume other people’s knowledge when faced 
with uncertainty ourselves. Not being able to receive feedback regarding the 
performance of another person intensifies this, leaving us with few ways of determining 
the quality of another person’s information. To investigate whether we are insensitive to 
other people’s judgmental biases, in the present experiment the three speakers 
demonstrate different levels of bias, being either extremely overconfident, moderately 
overconfident, or low in confidence but fairly well-calibrated. The question is asked as 
to whether feedback reveals this bias to the listeners/observers, or whether the influence 
of a speaker’s confidence prevails.  It is hypothesised that a speaker’s confidence will 
have more of a influence on the above variables when no feedback is available 
compared to when it is, as no evidence will be provided to suggest that a speaker’s 
confidence level is not justified. In particular it is expected that high confidence will 
exert a greater influence in the absence of feedback, with this influence being reduced 
when feedback is made available.   
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Method 
 
Participants 
86 students (26 men and 60 women), ranging in age from 18 to 39 years (M = 20.98, 
S.D. = 4.28) were recruited from the University of Wolverhampton’s participant pool to 
take part in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
feedback conditions.  
 
Materials 
Prior interaction with the speakers was provided in the form of a PowerPoint 
presentation, of which two versions were used in the present experiment: one with and 
one without feedback. The presentation used in the Feedback condition was identical to 
that described in Chapter 6. The presentation used in the No Feedback condition had the 
feedback, in the form of the correct answers appearing, removed. 
A 24-item general knowledge questionnaire was also used. This consisted of difficult 
general knowledge questions, to encourage confidence heuristic use, followed by three 
possible answers. Each of the three speakers who had been shown answering questions 
in the PowerPoint presentation provided an answer to each of the 24 questions, so that 
every question was followed by one answer expressed with high confidence, one with 
medium confidence and one with low confidence. Accuracy was kept constant across 
the questionnaire, with each speaker giving a correct answer an equal number of times, 
resulting in a 33.33% accuracy rate for each speaker. Hence, the high confidence 
speaker displayed extreme overconfidence, the medium confidence speaker showed a 
more moderate level of overconfidence whilst the low confidence speaker was the most 
well-calibrated of the three. The correct answers and the order in which the three 
speakers gave their answers were counterbalanced.  
 
Design and Procedure 
A 3 (Speaker Confidence) x 2 (Feedback Condition) mixed design, with repeated 
measures on the first variable was used. The dependent variables were; the percentage 
of time each speaker’s answers were chosen, the participant’s mean confidence in their 
answers, and their perceptions of each speaker in terms of choice of team-mate.   
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Participants were seated at separate computer monitors and asked to watch a 
PowerPoint presentation. At the beginning of the presentation a series of short 
instructions appeared on the screen detailing the task, which were as follows: 
 
Imagine that you are planning on entering a general knowledge quiz. Three of your friends - 
Alex, Jo and Sam - will be taking part in the quiz with you. You decide to sit the first round 
out but your three friends do take part in the first round. Watch the following presentation to 
see how your three friends performed in the first round. You will then be given instructions 
for the next round.  
 
In the first round your three friends are asked 30 difficult general knowledge questions. 
After each question you will see how each of your three friends responded. Please pay 
attention to how each friend answers. You will then see the correct answer. Please pay 
attention to the performance of each friend. After all 30 questions have been answered you 
will then join the next round of the quiz. Further instructions will be given. Please do not 
make any notes during the presentation. 
 
At the end of the presentation participants were issued with the 24 item general 
knowledge questionnaire along with the following instructions:  
 
You ask each of your three friends 24 general knowledge questions. After every question 
you will read each friend’s response. You must decide which friend has given the correct 
answer. You do not need to choose the same friend every time, just choose who you think 
has given the correct answer. Only choose one answer. Please read the responses carefully. 
Please indicate your selection to each question by circling the name of the appropriate friend 
(Alex, Jo or Sam).  
 
Then please indicate how confident you are that the answer you have chosen is correct by 
choosing any number between 0 and 100, where a score of 0 means that you have no 
confidence at all in that answer being correct and 100 means that you know beyond doubt 
that the answer you have chosen is correct. Please answer each question in turn. Once you 
have answered a question, go on to the next one. Do not return to any previous questions. 
Please pay attention to how each friend answers. 
 
Finally participants were asked to choose one of the three speakers as their team-
mate, by circling the name of the appropriate friend.  
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Results 
  
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Choice 
The percentage of times each speaker’s answers were chosen was calculated. A 
Speaker Confidence x Feedback Condition Analysis of Variance was then conducted, 
with repeated measures on the first variable.  
 
Table 7.1 
Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker in each Feedback Condition  
Speaker Confidence   
High                  Medium                   Low 
No Feedback  54.54 (23.57)  26.70 (13.81)   18.56 (13.48) 
Feedback  38.49 (23.57)  35.12 (13.59)  26.29 (14.16) 
Total   46.70 (23.26)  30.81 (14.27)  22.33 (14.29) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
There was no main effect of Feedback Condition, F(1, 84) = 1.77, p = .67, but the 
analysis did reveal a main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 168) = 29.84, p < .001, 
and a Speaker Confidence x Feedback Condition interaction, F(2, 168) = 9.70, p < .001. 
Table 7.1 shows that across the two conditions, as a speaker’s confidence increased so 
too did the percentage of times that speaker’s answers were chosen, although the extent 
to which this occurred depended upon the Feedback Condition. Separate analyses on 
each condition illustrated this. The main effect of Feedback Condition was largely due 
to the pattern of results in the No Feedback condition, where a significant main effect of 
Speaker Confidence was found, F(2, 86) = 33.11,  p < .001,  ηp
2 = .44. A significant 
linear relationship here indicates that there are distinct increases in agreement with a 
speaker as their level of confidence increases, F(1, 43) = 43.26, p < .001. Paired t-tests 
confirmed that there were significant differences in the extent of agreement between the 
high and medium confidence speakers,  t(43) = 5.14,  p < .001, the high and low 
confidence speakers, t(43) = 6.58,  p < .001 and the medium and low confidence 
speakers, t(43) = 3.54,  p = .001, in the No Feedback condition. When feedback was 
provided the results, whilst still significant, were not as pronounced as for when no 
feedback was given,  F(2, 82) = 4.33,  p = .02, ηp
2  = .10. Again a significant linear 
relationship indicated that speaker agreement increased as speaker confidence increased,  
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F(1, 41) = 6.32, p = .02. However, here there were significant differences in agreement 
between the high and low confidence speakers, t(41) = 2.51, p = .02, and the medium 
and low confidence speakers, t(41) = 3.15,  p = .003, but not between the high and 
medium confidence speakers, t(41) = .69, p = .49. These results support the hypotheses 
that a speaker’s confidence will have more of an influence in the absence of feedback, 
where greater distinctions between each speaker can be seen, than in the presence of 
feedback, where differences between speakers are reduced.  
The hypothesis that the high confidence speaker will exert a greater influence in the 
absence of feedback, with this being reduced when feedback is provided was also 
supported. Figure 7.1 illustrates the Speaker Confidence  x Feedback Condition 
interaction. This shows that feedback had a detrimental effect on the influence that a 
speaker expressing high confidence has on choice, with agreement with this speaker’s 
answers dropping by 16.05% when feedback was given compared to when it was not, 
t(84) = 3.39, p = .001. For the medium and low confidence speakers, feedback led to 
significant increases in agreement, by 8.42% for the medium confidence speaker and 
7.73% for the low confidence speaker, t(84) = 2.85, p = .006 and t(84) = 2.59, p = .011 
respectively. 
 
Figure 7.1. Mean percentage change in agreement with speakers between feedback 
conditions. 
 
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Confidence in Answers   
From Table 7.2 it appears that participants were more confident in their chosen 
answers when feedback was given than when it was not, but their confidence in answers 
does not vary according to the confidence of the speaker whose answers are chosen. 
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However, no main effects of either Speaker Confidence, F(2, 146) = .39, p = .68, or 
Condition, F(1, 73) = 2.05, p = .16, were seen, and the Speaker Confidence x Feedback 
condition interaction was not significant, F(2, 146) = .94, p = .39.    
 
Table 7.2 
Mean percentage of confidence in answers for agreement with each speaker in each 
Feedback Condition. 
Speaker Confidence   
High                           Medium                           Low 
No Feedback  37.54 (21.49)  37.79 (19.09)   38.42 (22.89) 
Feedback  45.94 (20.90)  44.00 (19.86)  41.86 (17.35) 
Total   41.79 (21.47)  40.94 (19.60)  40.16 (20.21) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
Influence of Feedback on Accuracy 
Participants in the No Feedback condition showed accuracy levels no better than 
would be expected by chance (M = 33.75, S.D. = 8.55) whereas those in the Feedback 
condition showed a slight, but significant, improvement in accuracy levels (M = 37.85, 
S.D. = 9.43), t(84) = 2.11, p = .04. It may be that participants considered the questions 
more carefully in the Feedback Condition, after learning that a speaker’s confidence did 
not necessarily mean that they were giving a correct answer, and subsequently chose the 
correct answers more often themselves. Alternatively, the slight improvement in 
accuracy may be because the high confidence speaker’s answers were relied on less 
heavily when feedback was given, and as a result participants simply happened to chose 
the correct answer given by one of the other two speakers.  
 
Influence of Feedback and Confidence on Choice of Team-Mate 
The availability of feedback affected participants’ choice of team-mate, leading to a 
shift in the preferred team-mate from the high confidence speaker in the No Feedback 
condition to the medium confidence speaker in the Feedback condition, χ
2 = 8.36, df = 
2, p = .02. When feedback was made available the high confidence speaker was chosen 
as team-mate 30% less frequently than when no feedback was available (26.8% vs. 
56.8%), whereas the medium confidence speaker was chosen 26.4% more frequently  
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when feedback was available (53.7% vs. 27.3%). The frequency with which the low 
confidence speaker was chosen as team-mate was largely unaffected by the presence or 
absence of feedback (19.5% vs. 15.9%). Hence, the hypothesis that a speaker’s 
confidence will have more of an influence when feedback is not provided than when it 
is was supported for the high and medium confidence speakers, but not for the low 
confidence speaker.  
Figure 7.2. Percentage agreement with each speaker according to chosen team-mate. 
 
Choice of Team-Mate and Speaker Agreement 
To investigate how participants’ choice of team-mate was related to the amount of 
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ANOVA was carried out, with repeated measures in the first variable, on each Feedback 
Condition. There was no significant main effect of Chosen Team-Mate in either the No 
Feedback, F(2, 41) = .37,  p = .70, or the Feedback conditions, F(2, 38) = .12,  p = .89, 
but main effects of Speaker Confidence were seen in these two conditions, F(2, 82) = 
16.57,  p < .001 and F(2, 76) = 5.70,  p = .005, reflecting the earlier results relating to 
choice. Speaker Confidence x Chosen Team-Mate interactions were found for both the 
No Feedback, F(4, 82) = 19.14, p < .001, ηp
2 = .48, and Feedback conditions, F(4, 76) = 
9.75, p < .001, ηp
2 = .34, and are illustrated in Figure 7.2. To further understand these 
interactions the remaining analyses in this section consider the extent to which each of 
the three speaker’s answers are chosen according to participants’ choice of team-mate.  
Differences between each speaker are examined through paired t-tests.  
In the No Feedback and Feedback Conditions, main effects of Speaker Confidence 
were found when participants favoured the high confidence speaker as their team-mate, 
F(2, 48) = 89.22, p < .001, ηp
2 = .79 and F(2, 20) = 9.78, p = .001, ηp
2 = .50. From 
Figure 6.2 it can be seen that these participants chose the high confidence speaker’s 
answers a majority of the time, approximately 70% when no feedback was available and 
60% when it was, whereas the answers given by the medium and low confidence 
speakers were chosen much more infrequently. In the No Feedback condition the 
differences between the high and medium confidence speakers and medium and low 
confidence speakers were significant, t(24) = 8.43, p < .001 and t(24) = 4.10, p < .001. 
In the Feedback condition the differences between the high and medium confidence 
speaker was significant, t(10) = 2.98,  p = .01, but not between the medium and low 
confidence speakers, t(10) = 1.80, p = .10. 
When participants chose the medium confidence speaker as their team-mate in the 
absence of feedback, a main effect of Speaker Confidence was again seen on choice in 
the No Feedback and Feedback Conditions, F(2, 22) = 2.19, p = .14, ηp
2 = .17 and %), 
F(2, 42) = 10.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .33. When there was no feedback available the answers 
given by the high and medium confidence speakers were chosen equally often (39% and 
36%), t(11) = .33, p = .75, with those given by the low confidence speaker being chosen 
less frequently than the medium confidence speaker’s (25%), t(11) = 2.33,  p = .04.  
However, when feedback was made available the medium confidence speaker’s answers 
were chosen significantly more often (43%) than either the high or low confidence 
speakers’ answers were (32% and 26%), t(21) = 2.95, p = .008 and t(21) = 4.77, p < 
.001. For the relatively small number of participants choosing the low confidence  
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speaker as their team-mate, none of the three speakers answers appeared to be favoured 
over the others in either the No Feedback or Feedback condition, F(2, 12) = 1.25, p = 
.32, ηp
2 = .17, and F(2, 14) = .61, p = .56, ηp
2 = .08. 
 
Summary of Results 
In relation to the influence of confidence upon choice, a significant main effect of 
Speaker Confidence, and  a Speaker Confidence  x  Feedback Condition interaction 
indicated that as confidence increased so did the extent to which those speaker’s 
answers were chosen, but the extent of this depended upon whether feedback was given 
or not. When feedback was given there was much less difference in the extent to which 
each speaker’s answers were chosen than when it was not given.  
There were no effects of Feedback Condition in relation to participants’ confidence 
in answers, although there was a sligh increase in accuracy when feedback was given. 
Feedback condition did influence participants’ choice of team-mate, in that there was a 
shift towards the medium confidence speaker and away from the high confidence 
speeaker when feedback was given compared to when it was not. Participants’ choice of 
team-mate was reflected in their choice of each speaker’s answers.   
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Discussion 
 
The results indicate that receiving feedback about the quality of a speaker’s 
performance affects the influence that a speaker’s confidence had upon the choices 
participants made, in terms of answers and team-mate, but had a minimal effect on the 
confidence they had in their choice of answer.  
In the absence of feedback, the extent to which speakers expressing different levels 
of confidence had their answers chosen largely reflected previous findings (see Chapters 
3 and 6). The high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen more than twice as 
frequently as those given by the medium confidence speaker, who in turn had their 
answers chosen more often than a speaker expressing low confidence. As hypothesised, 
the provision of feedback had a detrimental effect on the high confidence speaker’s 
influence upon choice, whose loss was the medium and low confidence speakers’ gain, 
and upon participants’ choice of team-mate. Feedback led to a shift in people’s favoured 
team-mate, from the high confidence speaker, when no feedback is available, to the 
medium confidence speaker when it is; results which confirm previous findings in both 
the absence and presence of feedback (see Chapters 3 and 6). However, the hypothesis 
that a speaker’s confidence will have more influence in the absence than the presence of 
feedback was not supported in relation to participants’ confidence in choice. Overall the 
results lend support to Paese and Kinnaly’s (1993) suggestion that not being able to 
receive feedback regarding another’s performance compounds our insensitivity to the 
judgmental biases of others, hence leading to a great reliance on the confidence 
heuristic. If we do not know an answer ourselves, we will not be able to detect other 
people’s inaccuracies. But when feedback is made available people do appear to pick up 
on the discrepancy between their overall confidence and their accuracy, leading to a 
seemingly reduced, but not obsolete, use of the confidence heuristic.   
However, although the use of confidence as a heuristic appears to be reduced when 
feedback is made available this may not necessarily be the case, or at least not for 
everyone. For instance, people choosing the high confidence speaker as their team-mate 
continue to show a strong reliance on the confidence heuristic, whether feedback is 
given or not. A majority of participants chose the high confidence speaker as their team-
mate when no feedback was given regarding this speaker’s performance, and a 
substantial minority did so when feedback was given, and these participants also opted 
for this speaker’s answers a majority of the time. This would indicate that for these  
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participants at least, the confidence heuristic is deemed a useful decision-making 
strategy, whether this is a conscious decision or not.  
There is less association between participants’ choice of team-mate and the speaker’s 
answers chosen when they choose a speaker other than the high confidence speaker as 
their preferred team-mate. When the medium confidence speaker was the chosen team-
mate and no feedback was given about their performance, the high and medium 
confidence speakers had their answers chosen equally often. However, when feedback 
was given, the medium confidence speaker’s answers were favoured.  It is possible that 
people feel there is some reason for not relying on the highly confident speaker, hence 
the equal spread of answers across the high and medium confidence speakers in the 
absence of feedback. In other words they may pick up on a speaker’s judgmental biases, 
in this case their extreme overconfidence. When feedback is given they may feel more 
justified in this belief, picking up on the high confidence speaker’s continued misuse of 
their chosen confidence level relative to their actual accuracy.  
Although it may appear that the participants choosing the medium confidence 
speaker are less reliant on a speaker’s confidence this is not necessarily the case. As in 
Chapter 6, it is actually the low confidence speaker whose confidence level best 
represents their level of accuracy  – the high confidence speaker is extremely 
overconfident with the medium confidence speaker being moderately so – but the low 
confidence speaker’s answers are chosen least often and they are the least favoured 
choice of team-mate. So why is this speaker not considered? These results would 
indicate that we do use a speaker’s confidence as a way of differentiating between the 
information we are receiving, hence in one way  or another utilising the confidence 
heuristic. Although each speaker was correct an equal amount of times their answers 
were not chosen equally often. In the feedback condition the accuracy level was 
available, if participants chose to attend to this information, but the results suggest that 
they did not fully utilise this information. Instead a speaker’s confidence seems to have 
had more of an influence than their accuracy, as has been suggested in other research 
(Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). We tend to disregard the low confidence speaker’s 
information, certainly far more than that offered by the other, more confident speakers, 
possibly because we have little use for uncertain information – if we are uncertain 
ourselves what use is equally uncertain information to us?  
So it does seem that we are influenced by a speaker’s expressed level of confidence 
but we may possibly use it in different ways. As suggested in Chapter 6, such  
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differences may arise from the amount of effort we put in to differentiating between the 
information that we are receiving. For some people, such as those choosing the high 
confidence speaker as their team-mate, a straightforward use of the confidence heuristic 
is seen whereby they indiscriminately rely on that speaker’s high level of confidence, 
seemingly ignoring their accuracy, particularly when feedback was given. For others, 
such as those choosing the medium confidence speaker as their team-mate, more effort 
is given to differentiating between the speakers’ information, causing us to readjust our 
use of the confidence heuristic in that we search for the best apparent match between 
confidence and accuracy.  Both the speaker’s confidence and their accuracy is given 
some consideration, in that they notice that the high confidence speaker was 
overconfident. This would support the suggestion in Chapter 6 that the participants 
choosing the medium confidence speaker as their team-mate did so because they were 
sensitive to the extreme overconfidence of the high confidence speaker. However, 
whilst the high confidence speaker’s extreme overconfidence was detected the less 
extreme overconfidence of the medium confidence speaker was not. Not only is the 
confidence-accuracy discrepancy more salient for the high confident speaker, the 
medium confidence speaker still provides some level of confidence – possibly more 
than one’s own at least – rather than the doubt expressed by the low confidence speaker. 
As mentioned previously, we would have little use for the latter as it offers us no new 
useful differentiating information.  
Contrary to the hypotheses, the only notable effect of a speaker’s confidence level on 
participants’ confidence in their chosen answers was, surprisingly, in the feedback 
condition, with participants’ confidence in answers increasing as the speaker’s 
confidence did. One would expect confidence to be lower here because the speaker’s 
judgmental biases have been revealed. However, it may be that revealing such biases 
leads to increased confidence because participants are aware of this fact and so have less 
uncertainty about the speaker’s biases. If we are unsure whether a speaker is 
appropriately portraying their confidence, we may be less certain when choosing their 
answers. But conversely if we are aware of such biases, we may feel that we are making 
a more informed choice and so subsequently may be more confident in that choice.  
 
Limitations 
Accuracy was kept constant across the three speakers in this experiment, as it was in 
all the experiments reported in this thesis, and so it may be worthwhile considering how  
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different levels of accuracy would affect participants’ perceptions of the three speakers. 
A useful method to use may be one similar to that of Paese and Kinnaly’s (1993) which 
compared the influence of: a high confidence and high accuracy speaker; a high 
confidence and low accuracy speaker; a low confidence and high accuracy speaker; and 
a low confidence and low accuracy speaker.  
Questions were also raised in the previous chapter regarding the nature of the 
feedback provided, where some issues of ecological validity surrounding this were 
discussed. However, the method used does provide a useful starting point, in that it has 
allowed initial questions to be addressed, and has highlighted future directions that can 
be investigated. In real-life the nature of feedback would be much richer than that which 
was provided in the experiments reported in these two chapters. For instance, in real-life 
feedback may not be limited simply to observing another’s performance, and interaction 
may be two-way: questions can be asked and verifications requested.  
 
Conclusions 
The results confirm the suggestion from Chapter 6 that repeatedly expressing too 
much confidence can lead to a reduction in influence – but only when we know that too 
much confidence is being expressed. The addition of feedback led to a reduction in the 
influence that a high confidence speaker had, but increases in the level of influence 
exerted by medium and high confidence speakers.  
The experiments reported so far in this thesis that directly relate to choice behaviour 
have clearly shown that the addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answers affects 
the level of influence that speaker has over listeners’ choices when compared to 
speaker’s answers given in the absence of confidence cues. However, by comparing 
control and experimental conditions, true choice shifts have not been investigated. In 
Chapter 3 it was noted that the greater our own uncertainty, the more reliant we may 
become on the confidence of another person as a decision-making aid. To investigate 
this issue further it is necessary to adopt a within-subjects design, which would enable 
participants’ own choice shifts to be monitored, and the relation of this to their own 
level of confidence. Chapter 8 adopts  this methodology to take these issues into 
account.  CHAPTER 8 
How Does One’s Own Uncertainty Affect the Influence of Confidence? 
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When seeking advice, a determining factor in whether or not we take heed of that advice 
is how confidently it is expressed. However, the extent to which we are influenced by 
another’s confidence may be mediated by our own level of uncertainty. In a within-
subjects design, 79 participants answered 36 questions of varying difficulty, once 
without advice attached and again with a speaker’s advice attached. In the experimental 
condition the advice was accompanied with confidence cues indicating that the speaker 
had either high, medium or low confidence in their recommended answer. The results 
showed that participants changed their chosen answers towards those expressed with 
high confidence and away from those expressed with low confidence. The extent of 
these changes depended on how confident the participants were in their initial choices. 
The higher the participants’ initial uncertainty was, the more their choices, and 
confidence in those choices, were influenced by a speaker’s confidence.    
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How Does One’s Own Uncertainty Affect the Influence of Confidence? 
 
We often seek information and advice from others to help us in our decisions. In 
seeking advice we aim to improve the accuracy, or quality, of our judgements, and 
expect advice to fulfil this function (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004). 
Furthermore, in seeking, and accepting advice, we may feel that we are sharing 
responsibility for our decisions, a factor that is of particular importance when the 
decisions are important or risky (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004). 
When receiving advice we have three options – we can choose to completely ignore 
it, completely rely on it, or meet somewhere in the middle and integrate it with our own 
opinions. So do we follow the advice that is given to us? Harvey and Fischer (1997) 
believe that we do to a degree, and that we are loathe to totally reject advice that is 
offered to us, even when it comes from a source that is not more experienced than 
ourselves. However, Yaniv (2004) suggests that receiving advice can lead to conflict 
between a decision-maker’s initial opinions and the advice they are receiving, and 
propose a self/other effect, where more weight is placed on one’s own opinion than on 
another’s. The reason for this, it is suggested, is because we can better assess what we 
know, and how strongly we hold that belief than we can assess other’s knowledge and 
strength of that knowledge. A decision-maker is likely to feel more confident about their 
own opinion than they would of another’s opinion, and hence place more weight on 
what they know. 
But what about when we know, or believe we know, how knowledgeable an advisor 
is in their information? Do we still discount this advice? Evidently not, as Yaniv (2004) 
found that people who knew less placed more weight, and hence were more influenced, 
by the advice that they received than those who knew more.  
So how then can we determine what another person knows? The level of confidence 
with which someone expresses their knowledge or opinions is frequently relied upon as 
indicative of the quality of that information (Brennan and Williams, 1995; Harvey and 
Fischer, 1997; Wells and Murray, 1984). Using another person’s confidence to such 
ends indicates the utilisation of a confidence heuristic (Thomas and McFayden, 1995). 
As a result, if someone is very confident in their information, we take that as meaning 
they have the relevant knowledge or expertise in that area, and as such may be more 
inclined to follow their advice than someone who is not so confident. Indeed, many 
studies have found that a determining factor in whether we follow someone’s   
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advice/recommendation is how confidently they express that advice (Lee, 2005; Leippe, 
Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Pulford and Colman, 2005; Sniezek and Van Swol, 
2001; Thomas and McFayden, 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). 
The extent to which we follow confidently expressed advice is not always the same; 
sometimes we are far more influenced by another person’s confidently expressed 
information than at other times. For example, Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found that 
task type mediated the influence of confidence, whereas Sniezek and Buckley (1995) 
found the decision-making environment to be important. A common factor in both of 
these situations however seems to be how much information one can bring to a task. 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) found confidence to exert more influence on intellective 
tasks, such as difficult maths problems, than on more judgmental tasks, such as opinion 
based questions on which it is easier to generate a ‘best guess’ answer. Similarly, 
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) found that in a situation where a decision-maker can bring 
no knowledge of their own, the influence of confidence was far greater than in 
situations where the decision-maker could utilise their own knowledge.  
The key factor in these different situations appears to be the decision-maker’s level 
of confidence. If we know something, then we are entitled to feel confident in that 
knowledge. If we feel that we can bring some information to the task in hand to help us 
reach a solution, then again we may feel confident. Visser, Krosnick, and Simmons 
(2003) suggest that the more confident a person is in a given opinion or piece of 
information, the less they may feel the need to collect or attend to other information 
regarding the topic. Indeed, it does seem that the social influence of confidence is 
determined by one’s own subjective uncertainty, in that people who hold their attitudes 
with certainty are less susceptible to the influence of others (Sniezek and Buckley, 
1995; Visser et al., 2003). 
      
Rationale for Experiment 
When receiving advice, a determining factor in whether or not we follow that advice 
is how confidently it is expressed. But how does a speaker’s confidence interact with 
our own level of confidence? Whether or not we are influenced by another person’s 
advice also appears to depend on how confident we are ourselves about the task in hand. 
It seems that the more confident we are, the less susceptible we are to the influence of 
another person, but we are more influenced when we are more uncertain.    
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The previous experiments reported in this thesis so far do not allow for this issue to 
be fully considered. Whilst there has been evidence to suggest that one’s own 
uncertainty does mediate the influence of another’s confidence, for example in relation 
to the task type results from Chapter 3, the methodology used was a between-subjects 
design, comparing control group choices and confidence in choices to that of an 
experimental group. This meant that participants’ true confidence/uncertainty in their 
choices was not measured. The use of a within-subjects design would address this issue. 
In such a situation the individual would make their initial decision in the absence of 
advice, and then make a final decision in the presence of advice, with (experimental 
condition) or without confidence cues (control condition) being attached to that advice. 
It could be argued that this latter method has the disadvantage of familiarity with the 
questions but the advantage of being able to look at true choice and confidence shifts 
outweighs this. In Chapter 3, and previous research (e.g. Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; 
Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), the extent to which confidence influenced the individual 
seemed to depend upon how much information the individual could bring to the task. 
Therefore, to keep task type consistent this experiment uses general knowledge 
questions only, but across a range of difficulties, to induce a variety of confidence 
levels.  
The aim of this experiment is to find out how our own confidence interacts with that 
of a speaker’s, to find out how uncertain one must be to be influenced by another, and 
how confident that speaker must be to influence us. It is hypothesised that the 
confidence heuristic will be used more the lower a participant’s confidence is and, in 
turn, the higher their confidence is, the less they will use the confidence heuristic. As 
the methodology allows for accuracy information to be taken into account, the effects of 
overconfidence on this are also considered. Specifically, are overconfident people more 
or less influenced by the confidence heuristic than people who are less overconfident?    
  161 
Method 
 
Participants 
79 undergraduate students (20 men and 59 women), ranging in age from 18 to 43 
years (M = 22.77, S.D. = 6.43) were recruited from the University of Wolverhampton’s 
participant pool to take part in the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the control or experimental condition.  
 
Materials 
A 36-item multiple-choice general knowledge questionnaire was constructed, where 
each answer was followed by three alternative answers, one of which was correct. The 
questions ranged in difficulty and included a selection of easy, medium and hard 
difficulty items, which were presented in a random order. A range of questions of 
varying difficulty was included to represent a situation where the confidence of another 
person may be relied upon more or less, as one aim of the present experiment was to 
determine how confident or uncertain one must be to be influenced by another’s 
confidence. Hence questions needed to be selected that would elicit a wide range of 
participant confidence in answers.  
To check that the questions did represent a range of difficulties a pilot study was 
conducted. 20 participants completed a questionnaire containing the 36 items, choosing 
their answer from three available alternatives, one of which was correct. This confirmed 
that the questions covered a range of difficulties with the pilot group’s mean accuracy 
on the 36 items ranging from 5% to 100% (Appendix L).   
Two questionnaires were used in the main study. The first consisted of each of the 36 
questions followed by the three alternative answers. This was designed to give a 
baseline measurement of participants’ chosen answers and the confidence that they held 
in those answers. In the second questionnaire the three alternatives were presented as 
the answers given by different speakers, each of whom was correct an equal number of 
times, giving an overall accuracy rate of 33.33% for each speaker. In the experimental 
condition the three speakers accompanied their answers with confidence cues, so that 
one speaker expressed high confidence, one medium confidence and  one low 
confidence in all their given answers. In the control condition the three speakers did not 
use confidence cues to accompany their answers. This second questionnaire was 
designed to monitor shifts in participants’ answers and confidence in answers, when   
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speaker’s expressed confidence in those answers. A control condition, without the use 
of confidence cues, was included to determine and control for the effects of repeating 
the same questionnaire twice. An example from each version of the questionnaire is 
given below. (Confidence cues added to the experimental condition are underlined). 
 
Questionnaire 1: 
Which planet in our solar system was discovered most recently? 
Neptune          Jupiter          Pluto 
 
Questionnaire 2:  
Which planet in our solar system was discovered most recently? 
Alex said, I suspect it was Neptune           
Sam said, I’m sure it was Jupiter           
Jo said, I guess it was Pluto 
 
Design  
3 (Speaker Confidence) x 2 (Questionnaire) within-subjects design was used. Data 
for the experimental and control conditions were analysed separately, unless stated 
otherwise. The dependent variables were the magnitude of change in chosen answer 
from the first to the second administration of the questions for agreement with each of 
the three speakers, changes in participants’ confidence in their chosen answers, as well 
as changes in participant’s accuracy and overconfidence.  
 
Procedure 
Upon arrival each participant was given written instructions and the first part of the 
experimental booklet, containing the first version of the questionnaire. Participants were 
told that the booklet contained a series of general knowledge questions of varying 
difficulties, some being very easy and some being very hard. They were asked to read 
each question and then choose the correct answer from the three alternatives that were 
provided, as well as indicating how confident they were in their chosen answer and the 
probability that this answer was correct (the probability rating was used to calculate the 
participants’ degree of overconfidence). The following standardised instructions were 
issued to participants detailing how to do this:    
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1.  Indicate your CHOICE by circling ONE of the three answers. Only one answer is correct. 
 
2.  Then indicate how CONFIDENT you feel that your answer is correct (for each question) 
by choosing any number between 0 (no confidence that your answer is correct) and 100 (total 
confidence that your answer is correct). Write this number in the gap in the sentence after the 
question: 
 
I feel _____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer (0 to 100 scale) 
 
3.  After that could you estimate the PROBABILITY/ODDS that the answer you’ve chosen is 
correct (again for each question). As there are three answers and one of them is correct you 
have a .33 chance of being correct (1 in 3), so this is the lowest number you should put, and it 
reflects that you are guessing at random and have no idea which is the right answer. If you do 
know the right answer then the probability of being correct is obviously nearer to 1.0 (which is 
the maximum number you can put).Write this number in the gap in the sentence after the 
question: 
 
The probability that this is the right answer is ______. (.33 to 1.0 scale) 
 
Participants were asked to answer all the questions, even if it meant guessing, in the 
order that they were presented. Upon completion of the first part of the experimental 
booklet, participants were asked to notify the experimenter that they had finished. The 
booklets were then collected from the participants and the second part of the experiment 
was issued. Participants were told that they were to complete another general 
knowledge questionnaire, containing the same questions that they had already answered. 
However; 
 
This time the answers are given by three of your friends – Alex, Jo and Sam. Read each 
question and then choose the correct answer from the three alternatives that your friends 
provide.  Please read each friend’s response carefully before making your choice. 
Indicate your CHOICE by circling the name of the friend who has given the correct 
answer. Only one of them is correct. You do not have to choose the same answer as 
before – just choose the answer that you think is correct. You do not have to choose the 
same friend’s answers on each question. 
 
All further instructions were the same as for the first part of the experiment. Upon 
completion of the second questionnaire participants were asked to notify the 
experimenter again, who collected the questionnaire and debriefed the participants 
before they left.    
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Results 
 
Influence of Confidence on Choice 
Participants answered the same set of questions twice, either with (experimental 
condition) or without (control condition) confidence cues attached to the second set of 
answers. For purposes of analyses a new variable was calculated to take into account 
changes in participants’ choice of answer from initial to final choice. Participants’ mean 
agreement with each speaker on the first questionnaire was subtracted from their mean 
agreement with each speaker on the second questionnaire to give a mean change score 
for agreement with each speaker. Table 8.1 shows the mean percentage of agreement 
with the three speakers’ answers and changes in agreement between the two 
administrations of the questionnaire. Significant choice changes between the two 
questionnaires were established using paired samples t-tests. As a within-subjects 
design was employed for this experiment, data from the control and experimental 
groups was analysed separately.  
 
Table 8.1 
Initial, final and change in choice in the absence and presence of confidence cues 
Speaker Confidence   
  High  Medium  Low 
Control 
Initial (Questionnaire 1) 
Final (Questionnaire 2) 
Change (Q2 – Q1) 
 
40.97 
42.05 
01.08 
 
(7.41) 
(9.30) 
(6.97) 
 
27.62 
27.39 
-0.23 
 
(7.27) 
10.50) 
(6.75) 
 
31.40 
30.48 
-0.92 
 
(7.59) 
(9.52) 
(6.96) 
Experimental 
Initial (Questionnaire 1) 
Final (Questionnaire 2) 
Change (Q2 – Q1) 
 
41.28 
52.71 
11.43 
 
  (6.98) 
(16.09) 
(15.15)
* 
 
26.74 
25.84 
-0.90 
 
(5.25) 
(9.82) 
(8.72) 
 
31.97 
21.25 
-10.72 
 
(6.92) 
(9.71) 
(11.24)
* 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results show significant changes at  
* p < .001  
 
Repeated measures ANOVA on the change scores were conducted. In the control 
condition the main effect of Speaker Confidence was not significant, F(2, 70) = .52, p = 
.60, ηp
2 = .02, whereas it was in the experimental condition, F(2, 84) = 24.56, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .37, indicating that the addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answers made a   
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difference to the amount of times a speaker’s answers were chosen. As Figure 8.1 
shows, when no confidence cues accompanied either questionnaire (control condition) 
participants did not tend to change their answers from their initial choices. However, 
when confidence cues were used (experimental condition) participants did change their 
answers from their initial choices, which were made in the absence of confidence cues. 
Planned comparisons showed that the extent of change in answers for the high 
confidence speaker was significantly more than for the medium and low confidence 
speakers, t(42) = 3.68, p = .001 and t(42) = 5.78, p < .001, with the difference between 
these latter two speakers also being significant, t(42) = 4.81, p < .001. Hence, different 
levels of speaker confidence resulted in a significant linear trend which is illustrated in 
Figure 8.1, F(1, 42) = 33.36, p < .001. The mean changes scores showed an 11.43% 
increase in the amount of times answers expressed with high confidence were chosen, 
virtually no change to the amount of times answers expressed with medium confidence 
were chosen and a 10.72% decrease in the amount of times answers expressed with low 
confidence were chosen.  
 
Figure 8.1. Mean percentage change in agreement with speakers.  
 
Influence of Confidence on Confidence in Answers 
  As with the results for participants’ choice of answers, a new variable was 
calculated for the confidence that participants had in those answers, signifying their 
change in confidence between their initial and final answers. Table 8.2 shows 
participants’ initial and final mean confidence in both conditions as well as the changes 
in confidence.   
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Table 8.2 
Initial, final and change in mean confidence in answers in the absence and presence of 
confidence cues 
Speaker Confidence   
High  Medium  Low 
Control 
Initial (Questionnaire 1) 
Final (Questionnaire 2) 
Change (Q2 – Q1) 
 
60.62 (16.93)
 ** 
63.27 (16.80)
 ** 
2.65   (9.00)
 ** 
 
52.10 (17.66)
 ** 
55.59 (20.79)
 **  
*3.49   (9.17)
 ** 
 
54.58 (18.16)
 ** 
56.32 (19.37)
 **  
*1.74 (11.46)
 * * 
Experimental 
Initial (Questionnaire 1) 
Final (Questionnaire 2) 
Change (Q2 – Q1) 
 
61.88 (13.48)
 ** 
73.26 (15.42)
 ** 
10.66 (11.12)
 ** 
 
55.97 (16.38)
 ** 
67.91 (18.44)
 ** 
 9.92 (12.52)
 ** 
 
57.28 (16.53)
 ** 
67.42 (17.89)
 ** 
 9.16 (14.00)
 ** 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results show significant changes at  
* p < .05  
** p < .001 
      
Repeated measures ANOVA on the confidence change scores found no main effect 
of Speaker Confidence in either the control, F(2, 70) = .35,  p =.71, or experimental 
condition,  F(2, 70) = .25,  p = .78, indicating that in each condition there were 
comparable increases in confidence for agreement with the high, medium and low 
confidence speakers.  
Figure 8.2. Mean percentage change in confidence in answer 
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Speaker Confidence x Condition mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first 
variable.  The main effect of Speaker Confidence was not significant, F(2, 148) = .45, p 
= .64, but the main effect of Condition was, F(1, 74) = 13.66, p <.001, indicating that 
participants’ confidence increased more in the experimental condition than in the 
control condition overall, regardless of which speakers’ answers were being chosen, (M 
= 9.91 vs.  M = 2.63). The Speaker Confidence  x Condition interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 148 = .14, p = .87. 
 
Accuracy 
Table 8.3 shows the mean accuracy scores obtained on the two administrations of the 
questionnaire in each condition. A Questionnaire x Condition ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the first variable was conducted. A significant main effect of Condition, 
F(1, 77) = 5.92,  p = .02, indicated that overall, participants in the experimental 
condition were more accurate in their answers than those in the control condition 
(53.70% vs. 47.32%). The fact that the difference in accuracy between the control and 
experimental conditions occurs with questionnaire 1 shows that this was caused by 
chance even though random allocation of participants to conditions was used. However, 
the lack of a significant main effect of Questionnaire, F(1, 77) = .04, p = .85, and lack 
of a significant Questionnaire x Condition interaction,  F(1, 77) = .39, p = .53, indicated 
that participants did not become any more, or less, accurate in their answers by 
repeating the same questionnaire.  
 
Table 8.3 
Mean accuracy scores 
  Questionnaire 1  Questionnaire 2  Total 
Control  47.61 (12.08)  47.03 (13.02)  47.32 (12.27) 
Experimental   53.55 (11.46)  53.86 (11.64)  53.70 (11.04) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Influence of Confidence on Choice according to Levels of Overconfidence 
It may be that people who are overconfident are more, or less, influenced by another 
person’s confidence. To investigate this, changes in choice and confidence in choice, 
were reanalysed according to participants’ initial overconfidence on questionnaire 1.    
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Although overconfidence was 13.47% on average, participants were divided into 
three even groups based on their overconfidence scores on the first questionnaire. 
Participants who were less than 7.00% overconfident were grouped as ‘low 
overconfidence’, those between 7.00% and 17.12% overconfidence were grouped as 
‘medium overconfidence’ and those who were more than 17.12% overconfident were 
grouped as ‘high overconfidence’.  
A Speaker Confidence x Overconfidence Level ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
the first variable, found no main effect of Speaker Confidence in the control condition, 
F(2, 64) = .36, p = .70, but did in the experimental condition, F(2, 78) = 24.61, p < .001. 
However the lack of any significant main effects of Overconfidence Level in either 
control, F(1, 32) = .53, p = .47, or experimental condition, F(1, 39) = 3.25, p = .08, and 
any Speaker Confidence x Overconfidence Level interactions, F(4, 64) = 1.05, p = .39 
and  F(4, 78) = .70,  p = .60, showed that participants’ overconfidence made no 
difference to participants’ choices.  
 
Influence of Confidence on Choice according to Initial Confidence 
The extent to which the confidence heuristic is used may depend upon how confident 
one is in the first place. As was outlined previously, the questions used in this 
experiment were of varying difficulties to elicit a range of participant confidence in 
answers, thus allowing this suggestion to be investigated. One would expect participants 
to be more influenced by a speaker’s confidence on difficult questions, those that should 
produce low confidence in answers, than on easier questions, where participants should 
be more confident in their choice of answers. By administering the same set of 
questions twice, this could be considered.  
Participants’ mean confidence in answers, across the two conditions, on the first 
administration of the questionnaire was calculated. The questions were then rank 
ordered based on these initial confidence scores (Appendix M). To consider the 
influence of different levels of speaker confidence upon different levels of participant 
confidence, a tripartite split was then performed on the rank ordered questions to create 
three categories, each containing 12 questions, which represented different levels of 
participant confidence: high initial confidence questions (Mean confidence = 80.16%; 
Mean accuracy = 71.31%); moderate initial confidence questions (Mean confidence = 
55.40%; Mean accuracy = 54.32%); and  low initial confidence questions (Mean 
confidence = 33.86%; Mean accuracy = 31.43%). In creating these three categories,   
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subsequent shifts in choice on the second questionnaire from the first could be 
considered in relation to initial levels of confidence. It was hypothesised that changes in 
choice of answer, and therefore participants’ use of the confidence heuristic, would be 
the least on the category of questions that participants had reported the highest 
confidence in initially, and greatest on the category of questions participants had 
reported the lowest initial confidence in. 
All initial, final and change in answer results are shown in Table 8.4. Owing to the 
large number of t-tests carried out an alpha level of .01 was set for the change scores to 
protect against Type 1 error. Speaker Confidence ANCOVAs, with participants’ mean 
initial confidence as a covariate, were conducted on the change scores for each of the 
three categories of questions. After adjusting for participants’ initial confidence there 
were no significant main effects of Speaker Confidence in the control condition for 
either the high, moderate and low initial confidence questions categories, F(2, 68) = .82, 
p = .45, F(2, 68) = 1.58, p = .21, and F(2, 68) = .30, p = .75.  
In the experimental condition, the main effect of Speaker Confidence was nearing 
significance when participants’ initial mean confidence was high, F(2, 82) = 2.70, p = 
.07, ηp
2 = .06, with there being a slight shift (3.88%) towards answers expressed with 
high confidence, and a 3.10% shift away from those expressed with low confidence on 
the second questionnaire. Figure 8.3 illustrates the changes, in the experimental 
condition, in participants’ answers according to their initial confidence (based on the 
three question categories) and the speakers’ confidence. There were significant main 
effects of Speaker Confidence for the questions on which there was moderate, F(2, 82) 
= 4.01, p = .02, ηp
2 = .09, and low initial mean confidence, F(2, 82) = 5.72, p = .005, ηp
2 
= .12. Here significant linear relationships indicated that the choice shifts here were 
higher than those seen when initial confidence was high, for both the moderate and low 
initial mean confidence questions, F(1, 41) = 5.03, p = .03 and F(1, 41) = 8.61, p = .005. 
As Table 8.4 shows, there was a 14.34% shift towards answers expressed with high 
confidence on the category of questions that participants reported a moderate level of 
initial confidence on, and a 16.08% shift towards the high confidence speaker’s answers 
on the category of questions where there was low initial confidence. These results 
indicate that although different levels of speaker confidence led to differences in the 
extent of change from the first to the second administration of the questionnaire, the 
magnitude of these shifts was dependent on the participants’ initial confidence. 
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Table 8.4 
Initial, final, and changes in agreement with each speaker according to initial 
confidence in questions category  
Speaker Confidence  Initial Confidence in 
Questions Category       High     Medium       Low 
Control 
High Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
 
 
50.46 
50.46 
00.00 
 
 
 
(10.34) 
  (9.95) 
  (5.98) 
 
 
26.16 
25.69 
-0.46 
 
 
 (10.19) 
 (12.01) 
   (8.20) 
 
 
 
23.38 
23.84 
c0.46 
 
 
 
 (10.88) 
 (12.62) 
   (7.73) 
Medium Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
35.88 
37.96 
2.08 
 
 (10.51) 
 (12.19) 
 (10.42) 
 
27.31 
27.08 
-0.23 
 
 (12.69) 
 (13.12) 
   (9.45) 
 
36.81 
34.72 
-2.08 
 
 (11.85) 
 (12.52) 
 (10.42) 
Low Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
36.57 
37.73 
1.16 
 
 (14.26) 
 (17.98) 
 (16.44) 
 
29.40 
29.40 
0.00 
 
 (13.43) 
 (17.76) 
 (14.23) 
 
34.03 
32.87  
-1.16 
 
 (14.14) 
 (15.29) 
 (11.98) 
Experimental 
High Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
 
53.10  
56.98 
3.88 
 
 
 (11.79) 
 (15.21) 
   (9.85)
 * 
 
 
25.97 
25.19 
-0.77 
 
 
 
  (8.76) 
  (9.87) 
  (6.25) 
 
 
20.93 
17.83 
-3.10 
 
 
 (7.13) 
 (8.25) 
 (7.28)
 * 
Medium Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
37.21 
51.55 
14.34 
 
 (11.97) 
 (18.83) 
 (18.12)
 ** 
 
24.23 
23.06 
-1.16 
 
  (9.76) 
  (13.47) 
  (12.14) 
 
38.57 
24.81 
-13.76 
 
 (13.12) 
 (13.17) 
 (15.63)
 ** 
Low Confidence 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
33.53 
49.61 
16.08 
 
 (12.79) 
 (24.86) 
 (25.55)
 ** 
 
30.04 
29.26 
-0.77 
 
 (11.52) 
 (18.04) 
 (16.75) 
 
36.43 
21.12 
-15.31 
 
 (14.44) 
 (16.80) 
 (18.27)
 ** 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results showing significant changes 
at 
* p   .01  
** p < .001 
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Figure 8.3. Change in answers according to initial confidence in answers in 
experimental condition. 
 
Changes in Confidence according to Initial Confidence      
Repeated measures ANOVA showed main effects of Initial Confidence Level in both 
the control and experimental condition, F(2, 70) = 10.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28, and F(2, 
84) = 47.90, p < .001, ηp
2 = .53, indicating that answering the same set of questions 
twice led to increases in participants’ confidence. Table 8.5 shows that confidence in 
answers increased significantly when there was moderate and low initial confidence, but 
not where there was high initial confidence, which is to be expected given the high level 
of confidence in these answers anyway.  
The increases in confidence were not to the same extent in the two conditions. The 
small increases in confidence seen in the control condition could have been due to the 
act of answering the questions twice. Alternatively, it may be that in having another 
‘person’ giving answers to the questions, albeit in the absence of confidence cues, raised 
participants’ confidence because they felt that they were agreeing with someone else. In 
the experimental condition the increases were far more substantial, and participants’ 
initial confidence seemed to have a bearing on their final confidence. As Table 8.5 
shows, here there was a non-significant 2.43% increase in confidence when initial 
confidence was high, a 13.06% increase when initial confidence was moderate, and a 
21.82% increase when initial confidence was low. 
 
 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
High Moderate Low
Initial Confidence in Answers
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
A
n
s
w
e
r
 
(
Q
2
 
-
 
Q
1
)
Speaker Confidence High
Speaker Confidence Medium
Speaker Confidence Low  
  172 
Table 8.5 
Initial, final, and changes in confidence in answers according to initial confidence 
Initial Confidence Level   
  High  Moderate  Low 
Control 
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
78.03 (17.36) 
76.15 (18.56) 
-1.88   (8.06) 
 
53.50 (17.99)  
60.89 (22.48)    
  7.38 (10.57)
 ** 
 
34.73 (16.18) 
40.03 (17.93) 
  5.30 (11.51)
 * 
Experimental  
Initial  
Final 
Change 
 
81.85 (12.12) 
84.38 (12.56) 
  2.43 (9.69) 
 
56.99 (16.76) 
70.05 (16.98) 
13.06 (13.59)
 ** 
 
33.13 (18.86) 
54.95 (20.43) 
21.82 (17.56)
 ** 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. t-test results showing significant changes 
at 
* p < .05  
** p < .001 
 
Summary of Results 
In terms of choice behaviour, there was a significant main effect of Speaker 
Confidence in the experimental condition but not in the control condition. Significant 
main effects of Speaker Confidence were also seen in the experimental condition when 
the questions were broken down according to participants’ initial confidence levels. 
This indicates that the addition of confidence cues influenced participants in their choice 
of answers, an effect that is mediated by participants’ initial confidence.  
In relation to the influence of confidence on confidence in answers, there were no 
significant main effects of Speaker Confidence in either condition. However, further 
analysis showed a main effect of Condition, with participants’ confidence increasing 
more in the experimental condition than  the control condition. After breaking the 
questions down according to initial confidence levels, a significant main effect of Initial 
Confidence Level indicated that confidence increased more the lower participants’ 
initial confidence was.  
The lack of any significant main effects of, or interactions with, Overconfidence 
Level indicated that participants’ overconfidence did not effect their choice of answers, 
or confidence in those answers.  
  
173 
Discussion 
 
      The way in which we use the advice that is offered to us depends on how 
confidently expressed that advice is, and how confident we are ourselves in the first 
place. We change our choices, and confidence in those choices, in the direction of 
advice that is confidently expressed, but the extent to which we use this confidently 
expressed advice is mediated by our own initial level of confidence.  
     What was the effect of receiving advice? After receiving advice regarding a 
speaker’s recommendations in an answer, participants only revised their initial choices 
when the speakers explicitly expressed some level of confidence in those answers, and 
hence it is not the mere presence of advice that influences our choices as suggested by 
Harvey and Fischer (1997) but the level of confidence with which that advice is 
expressed.  From the initial choices participants made, there were choice shifts towards 
the answers expressed with high confidence and away from those expressed with low 
confidence. As a rule, repeating the task did not lead to significant increases in 
confidence when advice was given in the absence of confidence cues but participants’ 
confidence in answers did increase when the speaker’s expressed confidence in their 
answers, regardless of the level of that confidence. Hence, the results regarding choice 
and confidence in choice from the previous experiments using a between-subjects 
design were replicated when the within-subjects factor of questionnaire was introduced.  
     A speaker’s confidence evidently exerts a considerable amount of social 
influence, but the question was asked, to what extent is this mediated by one’s own 
confidence/uncertainty? The results indicate that the greater one’s initial level of 
uncertainty is, the more we are susceptible to the influence of another’s confidence, 
supporting previous suggestions (Lee, 2005; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Visser et al., 
2003), and in turn supporting the hypothesis that the lower one’s confidence was the 
more reliance there would be on the confidence heuristic, with this reliance reducing as 
one’s own confidence increased. Regardless of the participants’ initial confidence 
levels, the patterns of changes in choice were the same – towards the high confidence 
speaker’s answers and away from those given by the low confidence speaker. On the 
questions that participants had low initial confidence in, indicating that they found these 
questions difficult, there were substantial changes in choice towards the answers given 
by the high confidence speaker (16.08%). When participants reported a more moderate 
level of confidence, indicating that they found the questions fairly difficult, notable   
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shifts in choice towards the high confidence speaker were again found (14.34%), 
although these were not to the same magnitude as for when initial confidence was low. 
For the questions that participants reported high initial confidence, meaning that they 
found these questions fairly easy, much smaller choice changes were seen (3.88%), 
although these were still following the same pattern, being towards the high confidence 
speaker, and were still significant, indicating that people were still influenced even 
when fairly confident in their first choice of answer. Hence there does appear to be 
some interaction between one’s own uncertainty and another’s confidence in using the 
confidence heuristic. As the amount of information we can bring to a task decreases, the 
social influence of another person’s confidence increases (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; 
Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997).  
It has been suggested that a purpose of seeking advice is the expectation that it will 
improve decision accuracy (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; Yaniv, 2004), although this was 
not the case here. Participants’ accuracy did not improve whether they followed a 
confident speaker’s advice or not, and so utilising the confidence heuristic was not an 
efficient strategy. However, the expectation that accuracy will increase is based on the 
belief that a speaker’s confidence gives some indication of their accuracy. In real-life 
confident speakers may be more accurate than those who are less confident, but in the 
context of this experiment, and the other experiments reported in this thesis, they were 
not, and so choosing to follow the high confidence speaker’s advice on this basis could 
not lead to an improvement in accuracy.  
     In addition to the results mentioned earlier regarding the increases in confidence 
when confidence cues were used, overall changes in confidence in answers were also 
seen on the questions that participants had high, moderate or low initial confidence in. 
This was seen in both the control (with the exception of the high initial confidence set) 
and experimental conditions. Previous research has shown that confidence increases 
with practice (Paese and Sniezek, 1991), which could explain the small increases in 
confidence seen in the control condition. For the experimental group however, the 
changes in confidence were more substantial and followed a more consistent pattern. As 
with the control group, no significant increases were seen when initial confidence was 
high, which is to be expected given the high confidence here anyway (81.85%), 
although confidence did still increase slightly by 2.43%. For the other two sets of 
questions (moderate and high initial confidence), participants’ confidence in answers   
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increased more the lower their confidence was initially, by 13.06% when initial 
confidence was moderate and by 21.82% when initial confidence was low.  
     Clearly then it is not just the act of answering twice that led to these increases in 
confidence in answers. Given the results relating to choice changes for the different 
levels of initial confidence, it is fair to assume that these increases are due to the 
speaker’s confidence as well as the participants’ confidence, given that the lower the 
participants’ initial confidence was, the more they relied on the high confidence 
speaker’s answers. In other words, when there was greater reliance on the confidence 
heuristic, participants’ own confidence increased more. Hence, it would seem that the 
less confident one is initially, the more one’s subsequent confidence increases after 
seeing a speaker’s answer and finding out how confident they are in that information. 
 
Limitations 
     A certain amount of variance in the results could be due to the act of repeating a 
task, rather than the influence of confidence. However, the use of a control group in the 
present experiment indicates that such changes, if and when they do occur, are small. 
Furthermore as the results replicate those found when using a between-subjects design, 
and hence where repetition was not a factor, it is safe to conclude that the results found 
were indeed due to the influence of confidence.  
     However, to more fully explore how one’s own uncertainty interacts with 
another’s confidence it could be beneficial to design an experiment where a 
correlational analysis of these two factors could take place. For instance, if a speaker 
were to express their confidence numerically, then these estimates could be correlated 
with the participants’ own subsequent numerical estimates of confidence in their chosen 
answers to see whether increases in speaker confidence produce parallel increases in 
participant confidence. The problem with using verbal expressions to indicate 
confidence is that, whilst more ecologically valid in terms of their association with daily 
communication, they do not allow for such objective measures of confidence to occur. 
However, their advantages outweigh their disadvantages and the design used in this 
experiment did go some way to addressing this issue.  
 
Conclusions 
     How do we use the advice that is available to us? It seems that we take how 
confidently expressed the advice is as indicating the quality of that advice, and this   
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confidence in turn determines how we use it. The more confident an advisor is the more 
likely we are to follow their advice.  Furthermore, the greater our own uncertainty is, the 
more we are susceptible to the social influence of another’s confidence, in turn leaving 
us more reliant on the confidence heuristic. Subsequently, the more reliant we are on the 
confidence heuristic, the more our own confidence increases.  
The results from this experiment, as with those from previous chapters, have shown 
shifts in choice towards a high confidence speaker’s answers, which has been largely to 
the detriment of those answers offered by a speaker expressing low confidence. This 
chapter has shown that the extent of these shifts depends on participants’ own level of 
confidence, in this case determined by question difficulty, and as their confidence 
increases, the magnitude of the choice shifts decreases. However, it may be that the size 
of the choice shifts seen so far have been artificially inflated on account of participants 
having to make forced-choices, leading to one speaker’s gain being another’s loss. The 
remaining two experimental chapters of this thesis use methodologies to counteract this. 
Chapter 9 addresses the question raised in Chapter 3 regarding confidence heuristic use. 
Specifically, do we use the confidence heuristic to identify the most confident speaker, 
thus ignoring all other speakers, or to eliminate the least confident speaker, and perhaps 
attending to all the speakers and their confidence levels. Introducing a rating 
methodology in Chapter 9 allows for this issue to be considered whilst also addressing 
the methodological problem raised above.  
 
 
 CHAPTER 9 
The Confidence Heuristic: A Positive or Negative Influence of Confidence? 
  177 
 
 
While it is generally assumed that the influence of confidence is due to the most 
confidently expressed information exerting the most influence, it is conceivable that 
there is a negative influence of confidence, whereby the least confidently expressed 
information exerts an equal if not greater level of influence. This possibility is explored 
in this experiment. 70 participants rated the likelihood that the answers given by three 
speakers to a series of 30 difficult general knowledge questions were correct, before 
selecting the correct answer. Speakers’ answers were expressed with high, medium, or 
low confidence in the experimental condition, with no level of confidence in answers 
being stated in the control condition. Participants’ choice of answer shifted towards the 
high confidence speaker’s answers and away from the low confidence speaker’s. 
However, ratings of the correctness of answers increased when both high and medium 
confidence cues were used, marginally decreasingly only for the low confidence 
speaker. A speaker’s level of confidence also affected how they were perceived, and 
expressing low confidence was found to have the most detrimental effect. It is suggested 
that the confidence heuristic can be put to positive and negative use, in turn eliminating 
useless information and searching for useful information to aid our decisions.    
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The Confidence Heuristic: A Positive or Negative Influence of Confidence? 
 
The experiments reported so far in this thesis have shown that when faced with a choice 
between a high, medium, or low confidence speakers’ answers, people’s choices shift in 
the direction of the high confidence speaker’s answers and away from those given by a 
low confidence speaker. In Chapter 3 a number of possible reasons for these shifts were 
proposed. Firstly it was suggested that it may be that it is only the high confidence 
speaker that has any real influence, and the low confidence speaker loses out simply 
because the high confidence speaker’s gain must come from somewhere. Hence the 
high confidence speaker’s answers are simply the most appealing. However, if this were 
the case one might expect the shifts in choice to be away from both the low and medium 
confidence speakers’ answers. Alternatively it may be that the shifts in choice are not 
due to the high confidence speaker’s answers being the most appealing, but that the low 
confidence speaker’s are the least appealing. In this case shifts in choice would be due, 
not to the positive influence of high confidence, but the negative influence of low 
confidence. However, again one would expect to see some gain for the medium 
confidence speaker. Nevertheless, it is feasible that the low confidence speaker is the 
most influential, albeit in a negative sense.  
Additionally the question can be asked as to whether, when we are choosing the most 
confident speaker’s answers, we just identify the most confident speaker and go along 
with them, or do we consider the other speakers and their level of confidence and try 
and distinguish between them? Thomas and McFadyen’s (1995) model of the 
confidence heuristic states that decisions are made following a comparison of the 
confidence with which arguments are presented. The context of this model is within 
dyads where a comparison is fairly straightforward – A is more confident than B, so A’s 
answer is right. But when there are more than two people offering advice what happens? 
Do we just identify A as being more confident than B and C, and so follow their advice, 
or do we compare confidence across all three speakers and conclude that B is more 
confident than C, but A is more confident than B and C? Or do we just compare A and 
C, ignoring the intermediate speaker? Conversely, it may be that C is viewed as being 
less confident than A and B, leaving a comparison just between these two more 
confident speakers before a decision can be made, which ultimately favours the most 
confidently expressed answer.    
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When making judgements under uncertainty we rely on heuristics to reduce this 
uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  These allow us to take cognitive short-
cuts, where we generate the easiest solution to the problem, and then move on to the 
next one. In terms of the confidence heuristic it has been suggested that this involves 
identifying the most confident individual on which to base our decision in dyads 
(Thomas and McFadyen, 1995), in groups (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997), or in situations 
of advisor conflict (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). These all relate to the use of the 
confidence heuristic as a final outcome. However, as discussed above, we may 
sometimes be faced with more than a simple comparison of arguments. It may be that 
there is a more elaborate use of the confidence heuristic involved before reaching this 
final stage whereby we have identified a ‘confidence is best’ strategy.  
 
Rationale for Experiment 
This experiment reported in this chapter aims to see if people’s use of the confidence 
heuristic is positive or negative, and if consideration is given to all available answers, or 
whether the availability of highly confident, or conversely highly uncertain, information 
over-rides this. The methodology used in earlier experiments meant that one speaker’s 
gain was another’s loss, with a forced-choice methodology being used where one 
answer had to be selected out of the three alternatives. However, in using this 
methodology, it is still unclear whether the choice shifts in the high confidence 
speaker’s favour were due to this speaker’s positive influence, or to the low confidence 
speaker’s negative influence. Therefore, a new methodology was added to the present 
experiment as a way of addressing this issue, whereby prior to making a final forced-
choice, as before, the likelihood of each speaker’s answers being correct is rated. In 
doing so it is hoped that some of the questions raised here can be answered. The use of 
the forced-choice methodology, in addition to the rating scales, was kept to allow for 
comparisons to be made with the previous experiments.  
It is hypothesised that choice behaviour will reflect that shown in previous chapters, 
in that there will be a shift towards answers given by a high confidence speaker and 
away from those given by a low confidence speaker when confidence cues are used 
compared to when they are not. It is hypothesised that there will be differences in the 
ratings given to the accuracy likelihood of all three speakers answers when confidence 
cues are used.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
70 students (20 men and 50 women) took part in the experiment in return for 
participant pool time credit. These students ranged in age from 18 to 40 years old, with 
the mean age being 21.63 years (S.D. = 4.58).  
 
Materials 
A PowerPoint presentation was prepared showing, in written format, the responses of 
three speakers to a series of 30 difficult general knowledge questions. Difficult general 
knowledge questions were used to maximise reliance on the confidence heuristic. Each 
question appeared at the top of the screen, followed by the answers given by each of the 
three speakers. The presentation order of the three speaker’s answers was 
counterbalanced across the experiment. As this experiment used general knowledge 
questions, a correct answer existed for each question. As the variable of interest was 
speaker confidence and not speaker accuracy, accuracy was kept constant across the 
three speakers, with each speaker being correct an equal amount of times.  
Two versions of the presentation were prepared  – one with confidence cues 
(experimental condition) and one without (control condition). Figure 9.1 shows an 
example slide from each condition. In the experimental condition one speaker always 
answered with high confidence, one with medium confidence and one with low 
confidence, using the cues developed in a previous pilot study (see Chapter 2, Table 
2.1). In the control condition each speaker gave the same responses as in the 
experimental condition, with the omission of the confidence cues.  
 
 
Figure 9.1. Example slides from control and experimental conditions. 
Example
Question: On which island was Napoleon was born?
Example
Question: On which island was Napoleon was born?
A1. Jo said, Oh, I don’t know, I suppose it was on Corsica
A2. Sam said, I’m positive it was on Sardinia
A3. Alex said, I can’t say for sure, but I think it was on Sicily
Example
Question: On which island was Napoleon was born?
Example
Question: On which island was Napoleon was born?
A1. Jo said, Corsica
A2. Sam said, Sardinia
A3. Alex said, Sicily  
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Design and Procedure 
A 3 (Speaker Confidence) x 2 (Condition) mixed design was used, with repeated 
measures on the first variable. The dependent variables were; the mean likelihood 
accuracy rating given to each of the three speaker’s answers, the percentage of times 
each speaker’s answers were chosen, the participant’s mean confidence in their answers, 
and the ratings of the speakers on a series of questions relating to how they were 
perceived by participants.  
Participants were seated at separate computer monitors and asked to watch a 
PowerPoint presentation. They were informed that the presentation consisted of three 
speakers answering a series of general knowledge questions and their task was to rate 
the likelihood of each person’s answer to each question being correct by choosing any 
number between –5 and 5 using the following 11-point scale: 
 
Completely                               Don’t                          Completely 
Incorrect                                 Know                               Correct 
|------------------------------|-----------------------------| 
-5     -4     -3     -2     -1     0      1      2      3      4      5 
 
Participants were asked to rate each answer independently, being told that they could 
give the same rating to more than one answer to a particular question. After rating all 
three answers to each question participants were asked to indicate which answer they 
thought was correct and how confident they were in their chosen answer being correct 
on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 = not at all confident and 100 = completely confident. 
All three sets of responses (ratings, chosen answer, and confidence in answer) to each 
question were recorded on an answer sheet, set out as follows:  
 
The likelihood that this answer is correct is:                    I think the correct answer is:   
                                 
A1.      -5     -4     -3     -2     -1     0      1      2      3      4      5                         -   
A2.      -5     -4     -3     -2     -1     0      1      2      3      4      5                         - 
A3.      -5     -4     -3     -2     -1     0      1      2      3      4      5                         - 
 
I am ____% confident that the answer I have chosen is correct.   
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After responding to all 30 questions, participants were asked a series of further 
questions relating to their perceptions of the three speakers on the basis of how they had 
answered the questions in the presentation. Firstly, participants were asked to estimate 
the percentage of questions each speaker answered correctly overall. Finally, they were 
asked to rate each speaker according to how confident, trustworthy, intelligent, likeable, 
competent, honest, knowledgeable, friendly and professional they appeared to be on a 
series of 11 point scales, where 0 = not at all and 10 = extremely. Upon completion of 
the experiment, all participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation.    
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Results 
 
Confidence Heuristic Use on Choice of Answer 
After calculating the percentage of times each speaker’s answers were chosen, a 
Speaker Confidence x Condition ANOVA was conducted, with repeated measures on 
the first variable. There was no main effect of Condition, F(1, 68) = .68, p = .41, but a 
significant main effect of Speaker Confidence, indicated that there were differences in 
the amount of times each speakers answers were chosen. A significant Speaker 
Confidence x Condition interaction showed that this was dependent on condition, F(2, 
136) = 39.93,  p < .001. To investigate this interaction further, repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted on each condition. As Table 9.1 shows, without confidence 
cues accompanying the answers, each speakers’ answers were chosen a similar number 
of times, F(2, 68) = 2.73, p = .07. Although this main effect of Speaker Confidence was 
nearing significance, the effect size was small (ηp
2 = .08), and the results do show a 
fairly even distribution of chosen answers across the three speakers that would be 
expected by chance alone. When confidence cues were used however, Speaker 
Confidence had a significant main effect on which speaker’s answers were chosen, F(2, 
68) = 40.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54. From Table 9.1 it can be seen that the high confidence 
speaker’s answers were chosen more than twice as often as the medium confidence 
speaker’s answers, t(34) = 5.30, p < .001, which in turn were chosen twice as often as 
the answers given by the low confidence speaker, t(34) = 5.72, p < .001. Hence, Speaker 
Confidence followed a linear trend, with a speaker’s answers being chosen more often 
as their confidence increased, F(1, 34) = 54.03, p = < .001.  
 
Table 9.1 
Mean percentage agreement with each speaker in control and experimental conditions 
Speaker Confidence   
 
  High                  Medium                  Low 
Control (Without Cues)  29.14  (10.83)  35.05  0(9.02)  35.71  (11.73) 
Experimental (With Cues)  60.00  (24.72)  26.19  (14.10)  13.52  (13.77) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Compared to when confidence cues were not used, Figure 9.2 shows that adding high 
confidence cues to a speaker’s answer led to substantial 30.86% increase in the number   
  184 
of times this speaker’s answers were chosen, t(68) = 6.76, p < .001. The addition of 
medium confidence cues led to a 8.86% decrease in how frequently that speaker’s 
answers were chosen, whereas the addition of low confidence cues resulted in a much 
larger decrease of 22.19%, t(68) = 3.13, p = .003 and t(68) = 7.26, p < .001 respectively. 
Hence, the initial hypothesis that there will be a shift towards answers given by a high 
confidence speaker and away from those given by a low confidence speaker when 
confidence cues are used compared to when they are not, was supported. 
Figure 9.2. Percentage change in choice of speakers’ answers between the control (C) 
and experimental (E) conditions.   
 
Accuracy  
The addition of confidence cues were not intended to provide any cues to the 
accuracy of the answers, with each speaker being correct an equal amount of times. The 
lack of any significant differences in the accuracy rate of participants in the control (M 
= 35.33, S.D. = 8.53) and experimental conditions (M = 33.24, S.D. = 9.98) confirmed 
that this was the case,  t(68) = .94,  p = .35. Therefore it can be assumed that the 
differences between the frequency with which the speaker’s answers were chosen was 
due to their expressed confidence and not the accuracy of their answers. 
 
Confidence in Choice of Answer 
A significant main effect of Condition indicated that the addition of confidence cues 
to the speakers’ answers led to participants being more confident in their chosen 
answers overall than when no confidence cues were used (M = 48.30% vs.  M = 
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28.97%), F(1, 61) = 22.58, p < .001. However, there was no main effect of Speaker 
Confidence,  F(2, 122) = 1.81,  p = .17, nor a Speaker Confidence  x Condition 
interaction, F(2, 122) = .08, p = .93. As Table 9.2 shows, different levels of speaker 
confidence did not lead to differences in participants’ confidence in their answers, with 
participants being equally confident whether choosing the high, medium or low 
confidence speaker’s answers, or equivalent answers, in either condition.   
 
Table 9.2 
Mean confidence in answers for agreement with each speaker 
Speaker Confidence   
 
  High                  Medium                  Low 
Control (Without Cues)  28.93 (16.76)  30.28 (15.03)  27.70 (14.80) 
Experimental (With Cues)  47.95 (16.87)  49.40 (19.51)  47.56 (18.96) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Ratings of Speakers’ Answers 
Participants rated the likelihood of each speakers’ answers being correct on an 11-
point scale, where negative ratings indicated that a speaker’s given answer was judged 
as being more likely to be incorrect than correct and positive ratings indicated that a 
speaker’s given answer was judged as being more likely to be correct than incorrect. 
Neutral ratings of zero indicated no judgement either way.  
 
Table 9.3 
Mean ratings of accuracy likelihood for each speaker 
Speaker Confidence   
 
  High                  Medium                  Low 
Control (Without Cues)  0.55 (0.88)  0.71 (0.84)  0.51 (0.85) 
Experimental (With Cues)  2.62 (1.52)  1.57 (1.09)  0.06 (1.66) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
Table 9.3 shows the mean ratings for each speaker in the absence and presence of 
confidence cues. Speaker Confidence x Condition ANOVA on the ratings revealed a 
main effect of Condition, F(1, 68) = 13.08, p = .001, showing that overall (irrespective 
of the speaker’s confidence level) the ratings given to the answers in the control   
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condition were fairly neutral (M = 0.59) whereas those in the experimental condition 
were significantly higher (M = 1.38). A significant main effect of Speaker Confidence, 
F(2, 136) = 39.13, p < .001, and a Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, F(2, 
136) = 35.58, p < .001, indicated that different levels of Speaker Confidence contributed 
to this difference.  
Figure 9.3. Percentage change in accuracy likelihood ratings of speaker’s answers 
between the control (C) and experimental (E) conditions. 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA were conducted to explore this interaction further. In a 
similar way to the results relating to confidence heuristic use on the choice of answer, a 
main effect of Speaker Confidence was seen in the control condition (where ‘Speaker 
Confidence’ refers to the speaker and their given answers, where there were no cues 
used, rather than the actual level of speaker confidence, as in the experimental 
condition), F(2, 68) = 3.55, p = .033, ηp
2 = .09, which although significant, again only 
had a small effect size. This result simply shows that some of the answers given by the 
medium confidence speaker, in the absence of confidence cues, were judged as slightly 
more appealing and likely to be correct than the other others. However, as Table 9.3 
shows, the ratings given to answers in the control condition were all fairly neutral. In 
the experimental condition however, the addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s 
answers had a substantial influence on the ratings of accuracy likelihood given, F(2, 68) 
= 39.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54, with a speaker’s confidence contributing to 54% of the 
variance in ratings. Planned comparisons using paired samples t-tests showed 
significant differences in the ratings assigned to the high and medium, t(34) = 5.30, p < 
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.001, high and low, t(34) = 7.35, p < .001, and medium and low confidence speakers,  
t(34) = 5.72, p < .001. Hence, the subsequent linear trend, as can be seen in Table 9.3, 
shows that increases in speaker confidence leads to increments in accuracy likelihood 
ratings, F(1, 34) = 41.99, p < .001.  
 The speakers’ use of high and medium confidence cues led to higher ratings relating 
to the accuracy likelihood of the answers being correct than when they did not use 
confidence cues, with ratings increasing by 2.07 points for the high confidence speaker, 
t(68) = 6.99, p < .001, and by .86 points for the medium confidence speaker, t(68) = 
3.72, p < .001. A speaker’s use of low confidence cues led to a non-significant .57 point 
decrease in likelihood ratings, t(68) = 1.80, p = .08. Figure 8.3 illustrates the extent of 
these changes in accuracy likelihood ratings following the addition of confidence cues. 
These results support the hypothesis that there will be differences in the ratings given to 
the accuracy likelihood of all three speakers answers when confidence cues are used. 
 
Perceptions of Speakers’ Overall Accuracy 
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage of questions they thought each 
speaker had answered correctly (see Table 9.4 and Figure 9.4). One participant in the 
control condition did not provide accuracy estimates and so was excluded from the 
analysis. A Speaker Confidence  x Condition ANOVA showed no main effect of 
Condition, F(1, 37) = .04, p = .84, but a main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 134) = 
12.14, p = .002, and a significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, F(2, 134) 
= 6.51, p < .001, signified that the addition of different levels of confidence cue made a 
difference to the speakers’ perceived accuracy. Separate repeated measures ANOVA on 
each condition showed that when no confidence cues were used, each speaker was seen 
as being equally accurate, F(2, 66) = 1.43, p = .25, ηp
2 = .04, whereas when confidence 
cues were added a main effect of Speaker Confidence showed that there were 
differences between the speakers’ accuracy rates, F(2, 68) = 13.17, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28. 
The subsequent linear trend indicated that increasing confidence was taken as indicative 
of greater overall accuracy on the general knowledge test, F(1, 34) = 17.83, p < .001. 
Planned comparisons showed that the high confidence speaker was seen as being more 
accurate than the medium confidence speaker, t(34) = 2.54, p = .02, who in turn was 
more accurate than the low confidence speaker, t(34) = 3.36, p = .002.  
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Table 9.4 
Mean estimates of perceived speaker accuracy (%) 
Speaker Confidence   
 
  High                  Medium                  Low 
Control (Without Cues)  36.12 (19.39)  34.50 (14.06)  39.50 (15.41) 
Experimental (With Cues)  48.23 (21.76)  38.03 (15.84)  25.57 (16.12) 
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses 
 
The addition of confidence cues led to the high and medium confidence speakers 
being perceived as being more accurate than when they did not accompany their 
answers with confidence cues, with accuracy estimates significantly increasing by 
12.11% for the high confidence speaker, t(67) = 2.44, p = .02, and non-significantly 
increasing by 3.53% for the medium confidence speaker, t(67) = .98,  p = .33. Low 
confidence cues had a detrimental effect on a speaker’s perceived accuracy, leading to a 
13.93% decrease in estimates of accuracy for that speaker, t(67) = 3.67, p < .001. 
 
Perceptions of Speakers’ Characteristics 
Participants also rated the three speakers on a series of 11-point scales, and Speaker 
Confidence x Condition ANOVAs were conducted on the ratings. Significant main 
effects of Speaker Confidence were seen for ratings of confidence, F(2, 136) = 15.13, p 
< .001, knowledge, F(2, 136) = 8.73, p < .001, friendliness, F(2, 136) = 3.74, p = .03, 
and professionalism, F(2, 136) = 3.79, p = .025, but not for trustworthiness, F(2, 136) = 
1.71, p = .19, intelligence, F(2, 136) = 1.74, p = .18, likeability, F(2, 136) = 2.21, p = 
.11, competency, F(2, 134) = 2.17, p = .12, or honesty, F(2, 136) = 2.76, p = .07. There 
was a significant main effect of Condition for ratings of competency, F(1, 67) = 6.13, p 
= .02, honesty, F(1, 68) = 8.99, p = .004, and friendliness, F(1, 68) = 4.46, p = .04, but 
not for confidence, F(1, 68) = 3.52, p = .06, trustworthiness, F(1, 68) = 1.52, p = .22, 
intelligence,  F(1, 68) = .66,  p = .42, likeability,  F(1, 68) = 1.45,  p = .23, 
knowledgeability, F(1, 68) = 1.89, p = .17, or professionalism, F(1, 68) = .33, p = .57.  
Significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interactions were seen for ratings of 
speaker confidence, F(2, 136) = 24.24, p < .001, trustworthiness, F(2, 136) = 7.16, p = 
.001, intelligence, F(2, 136) = 9.24, p < .001, competency, F(2, 134) = 12.28, p < .001, 
knowledge, F(2, 136) = 20.56, p < .001, friendliness, F(2, 136) = 3.20, p = .04, and 
professionalism, F(2, 136) = 10.43, p < .001, but not for likeability, F(2, 136) = .62, p =   
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.54, or honesty, F(2, 136) = 1.90, p = .15. Figure 9.4 illustrates the significant Speaker 
Confidence  x Condition interactions, showing that the interactions result from 
differences in ratings given to speakers in the experimental condition, with few 
differences emerging in the control condition as expected. Separate ANOVAs on each 
condition confirm this (see Table 9.5 for F-values). In the control condition, there is 
little variation in the ratings given to the speakers, with no main effects of Speaker 
Confidence emerging (with the exception of competence, F(2, 68) = 3.45, p = .04, ηp
2 = 
.10, and professionalism, F(2, 68) = 3.05, p = .05, ηp
2 = .08). 
 
Table 9.5  
Ratings of speakers in the absence and presence of confidence cues 
Speaker Confidence     
High            Medium            Low  Total 
 
F(2, 68) 
Confidence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
5.03 
7.63 
 
5.66 
6.54 
 
5.63 
3.68 
 
5.44 
5.95 
 
002.94 
0023.79
** 
Knowledgeability 
Control 
Experimental 
 
5.20 
7.17 
 
5.43 
6.31 
 
5.86 
4.11 
 
5.49 
5.87 
 
002.20 
0019.66
** 
Competence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.71 
6.63 
 
4.88 
5.74 
 
5.47 
4.77 
 
5.02 
5.71 
 
003.44
a* 
009.21
** 
Professionalism 
Control 
Experimental 
 
5.17 
6.43 
 
5.23 
5.97 
 
5.66 
4.40 
 
5.35 
5.60 
 
003.08 
007.74
** 
Intelligence 
Control 
Experimental 
 
5.09 
6.40 
 
5.23 
5.74 
 
5.77 
4.63 
 
5.36 
5.59 
 
002.06 
007.52
** 
Trustworthiness 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.46 
5.91 
 
4.77 
5.46 
 
5.11 
4.14 
 
4.78 
5.17 
 
002.40 
004.97
* 
Friendliness 
Control 
Experimental 
 
4.63 
4.80 
 
4.57 
5.77 
 
4.71 
6.14 
 
4.64 
5.57 
 
00.40 
003.78
* 
Note. 
a F(2, 66).
  * p < .05     
** p   .001   
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The addition of confidence cues contributed to differences in how the three speakers 
were perceived. This was most apparent for speaker confidence, F(2, 68) = 23.79, p < 
.001, with partial Eta squared indicating that the different levels of confidence cue 
contributed to 41% of the variance in the ratings. A similarly strong effect of Speaker 
Confidence was seen on ratings of knowledgeability, F(2, 68) = 19.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.37. Main effects of Speaker Confidence were also seen for competence, F(2, 68) = 
9.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21, professionalism, F(2, 68) = 7.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .19, and 
intelligence, F(2, 68) = 7.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18, as well as trustworthiness, F(2, 68) = 
4.97, p = .01, ηp
2 = .13, and friendliness, F(2, 68) = 3.79, p = .03, ηp
2 = .10, although the 
effects sizes were quite small in these latter two cases. 
Speaker Confidence produced a significant linear relationship on all the above 
attributes, indicating that the higher a speaker’s expressed confidence was, the more 
confident, F(1, 34) = 30.74,  p < .001, knowledgeable,  F(1, 34) = 27.54,  p < .001, 
competent, F(1, 34) = 13.40, p = .001, professional, F(1, 34) = 30.711.424, p = .02,  
intelligent, F(1, 34) = 8.56, p = .006, and trustworthy, F(1, 34) = 5.66, p = .02, they 
were perceived as being. The exception to this pattern was seen on ratings of speaker 
friendliness, where higher levels of expressed confidence led to  lower  ratings of 
friendliness being given, F(1, 34) = 4.81, p = .04. 
Planned comparisons, using paired t-tests, were made, setting an alpha level of .01 to 
protect against Type 1 error. At this level, differences in ratings given to the high and 
medium confidence speakers did not reach a sufficient level of significance for 
confidence, t(34) = 2.13, p = .04, knowledgeability, t(34) = 2.15, p = .04, competence, 
t(34) = 2.48, p = .02, professionalism, t(34) = .88, p = .39, intelligence, t(34) = 1.89, p = 
.07, trustworthiness, t(34) = 1.08, p = .29, or friendliness, t(34) = 2.22, p = .03. Ratings 
of trustworthiness did not reach sufficient significance when comparing the high and 
low, t(34) = 2.38, p = .02, and medium and low confidence speakers, t(34) = 2.46, p = 
.02, nor did ratings of friendliness, t(34) = 2.19,  p = .03 and  t(34) = .84,  p = .41. 
Significant differences between the high and low, and medium and low confidence 
speakers were seen for confidence, t(34) = 5.54, p < .001 and t(34) = 5.41, p < .001, 
intelligence, t(34) = 2.93, p = .006 and t(34) = 2.85, p = .007, knowledgeability, t(34) = 
5.25, p < .001 and t(34) = 4.29, p < .001, and professionalism, t(34) = 3.38, p = .002 and 
t(34) = 3.18, p = .003. Ratings of competency reached significance when comparing the 
high and low confidence speakers, t(34) = 3.66, p = .001, but not when comparing the 
ratings given to the medium and low confidence speakers, t(34) = 2.31, p = .03.    
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Figure 9.4. Significant interactions relating to perceptions of speakers expressing 
different levels of confidence. 
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Summary of Results 
In relation to the influence of confidence cues on chosen answers, there was no main 
effect of Condition but there was of Speaker Confidence, as well as a significant 
Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, indicating that the addition of confidence 
cues has a strong influence upon chosen answers. A main effect of Condition was found 
for participants’ confidence in answers, but the lack of a main effect of Speaker 
Confidence, or a significant Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction indicates that 
although confidence was higher when confidence cues were added, this was not effected 
by a speaker’s confidence level. For the ratings of speaker’s answers, main effects of 
Condition and Speaker Confidence, and a significant Speaker Confidence x Condition 
interaction indicated that higher ratings were given to answers when confidence cues 
were added, with the answers being given higher ratings the higher a speaker’s 
confidence was.  
The addition of confidence cues also had significant effects on participants’ 
perceptions of the speakers, in terms of how accurate, confident, knowledgeable, 
competent, professional, intelligent, trustworthy and friendly each speaker was 
perceived as being. With the exception of friendliness, a speaker was viewed more 
positively as their confidence increased. The addition of confidence cues made no 
difference to how speakers were perceived in terms of honesty and likeability.   
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Discussion 
 
The addition of confidence cues, compared to their absence, affected participants’ 
choice of answer, the confidence they had in those answers, their accuracy likelihood 
ratings of the speaker’s given answers and their perceptions of the speakers. In general, 
the higher a speaker’s confidence was the more of a positive influence was seen, 
whereas a detrimental effect was seen the lower a speaker’s confidence was. The 
question was, is this due to the positive influence of high confidence or the negative 
influence of low confidence, in that we find confident answers appealing or uncertain 
answers unappealing?  
The hypothesis relating to choice was supported, in that the answers given by the 
high confidence speaker were chosen a majority of the time, replicating the findings 
from previous chapters. Here, the high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen more 
than twice as frequently as those given by the medium confidence speaker, who in turn 
had their answers chosen twice as often as those given by the low confidence speaker. 
Hence there are marked differences in the influence of different levels of expressed 
confidence. Compared to when no cues were used, where no notable differences were 
seen in terms of choice, the addition of confidence cues resulted in an increase in the 
amount of times the high confidence speaker’s answers were chosen, and decreases for 
the medium and to a greater extent low confidence speakers answers being chosen. Why 
then was there a shift towards confidently expressed answers, and away from those that 
were more uncertain?  
Firstly, participants’ accuracy was not a contributory factor to these shifts, as this 
remained at the chance level both in the presence and absence of confidence cues. 
Neither was participants’ confidence. Although the addition of confidence cues led to 
increases in the confidence that participants had in their answers overall, the was not 
affected by the actual level of the speakers’ confidence, and just the very presence of 
confidence cues of any level was enough to cause such increases.  
How we perceive and interpret different levels of confidence is clearly a contributory 
factor to the extent of influence that different levels of confidence have on choice. 
Despite there being no improvement in participant’s accuracy when cues were added, 
higher levels of speaker confidence were taken as indicating higher levels of speaker 
accuracy, an issue that will be returned to later. Furthermore, a speaker’s confidence 
was taken as a cue to their level of knowledge and intelligence, competence and   
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professionalism as well as their trustworthiness, and the higher a speaker’s level of 
confidence was, the more positively they were rated on these attributes. However, the 
only significant differences were those relating to the low confidence speaker, in that 
this speaker was seen as less trustworthy, intelligent, competent, knowledgeable, and 
professional than both the high and medium confidence speakers. The differences 
between these latter two speakers were not significant in any case, although the high 
confidence speaker was seen as being slightly less friendly than both of the other 
speakers. This latter result can be related to London, McSeveney, and Tropper’s (1971) 
finding that expressing too much confidence can have a detrimental effect in terms of 
feelings of antagonism towards said speaker.  
Besides the finding regarding perceived speaker friendliness, the other results 
relating to the perceptions of the speakers indicate that a greater distinction is made 
between the low confidence speaker and the more confident speakers, than between the 
high confidence speaker and the less confident speakers. This may indicate then that, in 
relation to how the speakers are perceived at least, there is a negative use of the 
confidence heuristic, as this is where the greater distinction on the basis of the speakers’ 
confidence is seen. In other words, the low confidence speaker’s confidence clearly 
marks them out as being (perceived as) the least knowledgeable speaker, for example, 
and hence their information may be discounted on this basis.  
How does this relate, if at all, to the ratings of the speakers’ likelihood of being 
correct? Recall that here the pattern of results was slightly different to those found in 
relation to choice, both in this experiment and in the previous experiments reported in 
this thesis. Whereas for choice there were shifts to the high confidence speaker’s 
answers, away from the low confidence speaker’s answers, with there being no change 
for medium confidence, the ratings of accuracy likelihood increased for both the high 
and medium confidence speakers, decreasing for the low confidence speaker when these 
confidence cues were added.  
Does this mean that we do actually attend to all the information that we have 
available to us? It would seem so. The high confidence speaker’s answers were rated as 
being most likely to be correct and so it is not surprising that this speaker’s answers 
were chosen most often. However, consideration is given to all three speakers’ answers, 
with some distinctions being made between them. If only the high confidence speaker’s 
answers were attended to, one might expect this speaker to receive higher ratings than 
the other two who would both receive similar ratings because their answers do not need   
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to be especially considered as the objective had been reached, i.e. the most confident 
speaker had been found and so the others could be disregarded. However the medium 
and low confidence speakers’ answers are attended to, with differences in ratings 
between these two speaker’s reflecting their different levels of confidence. 
The subsequent ratings indicated that the low confidence speaker’s answers were not 
seen as being completely incorrect. Instead they were viewed as being fairly neutral, 
leaving open the possibility that that speaker may actually be in possession of the 
correct answer. The speaker is expressing low confidence in their given answer, 
suggesting that they think there may be a possibility that they are correct, rather than 
suggesting that they may be incorrect, as an overt expression of no confidence at all 
could convey. Hence, participants do not interpret this speaker’s low confidence as 
indicating incorrectness, which would account for the lack of negative ratings relating to 
this speakers perceived accuracy likelihood. Yet the confidence with which they express 
their answer provides no useful information, still leaving the listener in receipt of that 
advice uncertain. Given these results and those relating to how this speaker was 
perceived, it may be that the general negativity towards this speaker led to their answers 
being discounted. In this case a listener would be left with a straightforward comparison 
between two options – the answers of the high and medium confidence speakers.  
Whereas the accuracy likelihood ratings for the low confidence speaker decreased 
when confidence cues were added, they increased for the high and medium confidence 
speakers. Both of these speakers were viewed as having answers that were more likely 
to be correct than incorrect, although this was more so for the high confidence speaker.  
In fact they were both perceived fairly equally on all accounts, and the only significant 
difference between these two, besides that relating to friendliness which itself did not 
quite reach significance, was how accurate they were perceived as being overall. Here 
the high confidence speaker was seen as most accurate, more so than the medium and 
low confidence speakers, with the difference between the last two also being significant.  
 
Limitations 
Although this experiment introduced a rating scale to determine how participants’ 
perceived the accuracy likelihood of each speaker’s answer, the previous forced-choice 
method was also kept. This may however have had some influence upon participants’ 
ratings of answers as they could have felt it necessary to justify their choice of answer,   
  196 
by giving a much higher rating to their favoured choice than they may have given if a 
forced-choice was not also required.  
The investigation of people’s use of the confidence heuristic is also limited to three 
levels of differing confidence. To more fully consider this issue it would be useful to 
include a choice between a greater number of speakers. This would also allow 
consideration to be given to the use of the confidence heuristic when there is also some 
level of consensus between speakers. For example, participants’ choice behaviour could 
be investigated where two or three medium or low confidence speakers in agreement, 
but one highly confident dissenting speaker.  
 
Conclusions 
What does the results tell us about people’s use of the confidence heuristic? It is 
effortful to distinguish between all the information we are receiving but when making 
our decisions we need to first weight up all the available information. We look for easy 
ways of doing this to make life easier, and making decisions quicker. This is why we 
deploy the confidence heuristic. Yet is it a positive or negative use? It could be argued 
that it is both. Previous research has suggested that we may utilise a confidence 
heuristic strategy to identify the most confident group member (e.g. Sniezek and 
Buckley, 1995; Thomas and McFadyen, 1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). However, 
the results from the present experiment indicate that we may also use the confidence 
heuristic in a negative sense to eliminate information that we deem to be of little use to 
us – in this case that offered by the low confidence speaker. We reach this conclusion 
on the basis of how we perceive the speakers, with this being the only speaker to 
significantly stand out from the rest. By doing so we have already simplified the 
decision-making process, cutting down our options from three to two. We may then use 
the confidence heuristic in a positive sense, searching for the information we believe to 
be most useful. By all accounts, the remaining two options are fairly equal. Both the 
high and medium confidence speakers are thought to be knowledgeable and so on. Yet 
it comes down to the most basic aspect of the confidence heuristic, that is the 
assumption that confidence equals accuracy. Whatever else we think of the speakers, we 
still view the high confidence speaker as more accurate than the others. Given the nature 
of the task, general knowledge questions, fundamentally an intellective task, one on 
which there is a correct answer whether we know it or not, it is not surprising that 
perceived accuracy is the deciding factor. As previous research has noted, informational   
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influence is strongest on intellective tasks, influence that is based on the belief that the 
information one is receiving is accurate, and confidence are a means by which this is 
transmitted (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995; Turner, 1991; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). 
It would be interesting to see if similar results were obtained for a non-intellective task.  
The methodology used in this experiment allowed for participants’ use of the 
confidence heuristic to be more fully explored through the use of a ratings system. As 
with the previous experiments reported in this thesis, the methodology involved making 
choices following a comparison being made between speakers and the level of 
confidence with which they expressed their answers. The results showed that people 
still favour answers given by a highly confidence speaker, but this does not mean that 
they totally dismiss other levels of confidence, with the results indicating that some 
consideration is given to all three speakers. However, we do not always consult more 
than one source when making decisions, and if we do it is not necessarily 
simultaneously. Therefore, it would be worthwhile considering the use of confidence 
heuristic, and what extent of influence is exerted by speakers expressing different levels 
of confidence, when such a comparison is not required. This issue is investigated further 
in Chapter 10. CHAPTER 10 
Influence of Confidence in Different Decision-Making Situations 
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The extent to which we are influenced by another person’s advice, and confidence in 
that advice, may depend upon when that advice is received. 86 participants answered 60 
two-alternative questions in one of two experimental decision-making conditions. In the 
Independent condition, participants answered the questions twice – once without advice 
and once with advice attached. In the Cued condition participants answered the 
questions once only, with advice attached. The advice was the same in both conditions 
and was in the form of a speaker’s recommendation as to which answer was correct, and 
was accompanied by a high, medium or low confidence cue. The results showed that 
while advice was taken when expressed with any level of confidence level, the 
confidence heuristic was also employed, with the most confident speaker being seen as 
the most accurate, confident, knowledgeable and competent. In turn, this speaker’s 
advice was followed the most frequently, and induced the highest confidence in the 
subsequent choices. A  speaker’s advice was followed to different degrees in the 
Independent and Cued conditions and it is suggested that situations that induce greater 
uncertainty make people more susceptible to the influence of another’s confidence.    
  199 
Influence of Confidence in Different Decision-Making Situations 
      
When we are uncertain we may turn to other people for their opinions and advice, the 
expectation being that by doing so the quality of our judgments and decisions will 
improve, although in reality this strategy can be erroneous  (Harvey and Fischer, 1997; 
Heath and Gonzalez, 1995; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Yaniv, 2004). Nevertheless, we 
do base many of our decisions on the information we have been provided by others, 
from lawyers and doctors to friends and family. In addition to improving decision 
accuracy, we may seek advice for reasons of self-presentation, in that advice may be 
sought to justify decisions, and to share responsibility for those decisions (Yaniv, 2004). 
However, the question can be asked, when is the best time to seek advice, or indeed 
give it? Should we seek it before we even attempt to answer a question, or should we 
make a tentative choice first and then seek help? And, if we are the advice giver when 
should we offer advice to maximise its impact? 
When making a decision we have two sources of information available to us  – 
internal and external (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995).  If we attempt to solve a problem 
ourselves we are accessing internal information, or one’s own knowledge concerning 
the task in hand. If we are seeking advice from others, then we are utilising external 
information, or another’s knowledge. In the case of the latter situation, the information 
we receive may serve as a cue, directing us to an answer we may or may not have 
previously considered. Researchers studying overconfidence have shown that cueing 
makes people less accurate, but more confident in their choices, because it reduces 
information processing about the uncued alternative (Ronis and Yates, 1987; Sniezek, 
Paese, and Switzer, 1990). But what is the effect on our decisions when the cue comes 
from another person in the form of advice?  
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) suggest that when we receive another’s input, and thus 
when we are cued, is an important factor in the extent to which we are influenced by 
another person’s advice. If we seek advice after we have tried to come up with a 
solution ourselves, then we will have already accessed our internal information, and 
may have come up with a tentative answer. We can then choose to use or ignore any 
subsequent advice received (external information). In other words, before being cued 
towards one of the alternatives, we will (probably) have considered the uncued 
alternative(s). Sniezek and Buckley class this as an independent decision-making 
condition. If, on the other hand, we receive or seek advice before we have even tried to   
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solve a problem ourselves, we have the opportunity to use information from internal and 
external sources. However this means we could forgo our own knowledge completely 
and just follow the information provided by another – we do not have to access internal 
information at all. In this case, we may attend only to the cue provided, although we 
could still consider the alternatives. This can be seen as a cued decision-making 
condition. In other situations we may have to make a decision blindly, having only 
external information to rely upon, for example when we have no knowledge in a 
particular domain. Here we rely heavily on the cues available to us, and are in a 
dependent decision-making condition.   
A further factor that can affect the weight we place on the advice we receive, and 
thus whether we follow that advice or not, is how confidently it is expressed (Leippe, 
Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001; Thomas and McFayden, 
1995; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997).  The question can therefore be asked, what is the 
influence of confidence in these different decision making environments? Do we follow 
confidently expressed advice more, or less, when we have made an initial, albeit 
tentative decision, before receiving advice than we would do when we receive advice 
before making any decisions?   
Taking decision-making environment into account, Sniezek and Buckley (1995) 
considered the effects of advisor confidence, cueing and cognitive conflict on choice 
accuracy and confidence within a Judge-Advisor System (JAS). They hypothesised that 
when advisors recommend answers to a judge (cueing), the judge will be influenced by 
those recommendations, choosing the consensus recommendation when the advisors are 
in agreement, but basing their choices on the advice of the most confident advisor when 
advisors do not agree (cognitive conflict). 
Confirming previous research findings Sniezek and Buckley (1995) found that giving 
advice did influence the judges’ choices, with the most confident source exerting the 
greatest influence. Under the no conflict condition, where the advisors’ confidence was 
not necessarily a factor in the decision process, there was a strong tendency to choose 
the consensus recommendation across all three decision-making conditions (86.5%  - 
94.9%). Under advisor conflict, however, a ‘confidence utilisation’ strategy was 
employed, with the most confident recommendation being followed. Specifically, 
making a tentative choice prior to receiving advice, led to the most confident advisors’ 
recommendation being followed on 63.1% of the final decisions (independent 
condition). Receiving advice prior to making any form of decision resulted in the most   
  201 
confident advisor’s recommendation being followed on 70.6% of occasions (cued 
condition). This difference in confidence utilisation between the two conditions neared 
significance (p  = .06). Their most dominant finding relating to the influence of 
confidence was in the dependent condition, although this condition was the most 
artificial since choices were made on the answers alone because the actual 
accompanying questions were not provided. When the judge had to rely solely on 
another person’s advice they followed the most confident advisor’s recommendation 
90.2% of the time. All three experimental conditions showed significant differences in 
choice behaviour from the control condition, where the same answers were chosen at 
the chance level (49%). However, the decision-making environment had no influence 
people’s confidence in their choices, and advisor confidence had no bearing on judges’ 
accuracy, with decisions based on advisor confidence being less accurate than decisions 
based on advisor consensus (58.4% vs. 66.6%)  
The results indicate that when there is consensus amongst advisors, this will be the 
determining factor in the judges decision, whereas when conflicting advice is given, an 
advisor’s confidence will be used as a way to distinguish between the alternatives. This 
is regardless of the decision-making condition, although when in time the advice is 
received does mediate the extent of this reliance on another’s confidence. However, 
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) point out that the low validity of these judgements inhibits 
their value because the most confident advisor had only a modest chance of being more 
correct than less confident advisors. 
So, is it worth seeking advice? Receiving advice, or being cued, can be detrimental to 
performance. While Sniezek and Buckley (1995) expected that conflicting 
recommendations would lead to greater consideration of the alternatives in an attempt to 
resolve conflict, this was not the case. They suggest that this may be because people see 
conflict as indicative of task difficulty, leading to a reliance on heuristics, specifically in 
this case the confidence heuristic. As the amount of information one can bring to a task 
decreases, the power of another person to influence and manipulate our choices via their 
confidence level increases.  
 
Rationale for Experiment 
Evidently, it appears that confidently expressed advice does exert a great deal of 
influence when we are uncertain. However, the extent of this influence can depend on 
the sources of information we access to help us make a decision, at what point we   
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receive advice, and whether we totally rely on the advice we receive, or still try and 
solve problems ourselves. Furthermore, whether advisors are in agreement or 
disagreement over their recommendations can determine the influence of confidence. 
As Sniezek and Buckley (1995) found, when there is advisor consensus their level of 
confidence has little influence on judges’ decisions, whereas when there is advisor 
conflict, an advisor’s confidence will be used as a way to distinguish between the 
alternatives. 
However, Sniezek and Buckley’s findings relate to advice received from multiple 
sources. When there is only one advice giver, do we still rely on their confidence to 
assess that information, and what is the implication for more uncertain speakers? This 
issue is investigated in this chapter. The previous experiments reported in this thesis 
have shown that the medium and low confidence speakers lose out when a highly 
confident speaker is present. But we do not always consult multiple sources for their 
advice, nor indeed do we do so simultaneously. Therefore, in addition to decision-
making condition, this experiment also considers how we utilise the advice of people 
expressing different levels of confidence in the absence of such a comparison. In such a 
situation one would expect the available advice to be followed, regardless of the level of 
confidence with which that advice is expressed.  Indeed, Sniezek and Buckley found 
that the tendency to accept advice, when it was from agreeing advisors at least, was so 
strong that it was followed even when the advisors gave confidence assessments of .5, 
which indicated that their answer was just a guess. The question is, to what extent is 
advice expressed with different levels of confidence followed, and is this influenced by 
when in time we receive that advice?  
The hypothesis of the experiment reported in this chapter is that the availability of 
advice, and more specifically a speakers’ expression of confidence in that advice, will 
influence the choices people make. It is expected that any advice, regardless of how 
confidently it is expressed, will lead to an increase in the amount of times an answer is 
chosen, compared to when no advice is given. However, the higher a speaker’s 
confidence level is, the more frequently their recommendations will be chosen. The 
extent to which people follow a speaker’s advice is expected to depend upon the 
decision-making condition, and on the basis of previous research, it is expected that 
advice will be followed more in the cued than in the independent condition. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
86 undergraduate psychology students, recruited from the University of 
Wolverhampton’s participant pool, took part in the study. Participants’ ages ranged 
from 18 to 40 years (M = 21.03, S.D. = 3.91). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions, Independent (n = 42) or Cued (n = 44). Participants 
assigned to the independent condition also formed the control condition (n = 42).  
 
Task Materials 
The task consisted of a set of 60 two-alternative general knowledge questions, of 
which one was correct (A or B). The questions had not been used in any of the previous 
experiments reported in this thesis. Difficult questions were selected to encourage the 
need to utilise the advice offered. A pilot study conducted on 20 participants confirmed 
that the questions were of a sufficient difficulty level, with mean accuracy across the 60 
two-alternative questions being no better than would be expected by chance (M = 
51.22%, S.D. = 6.30). Participants also perceived the questions to be difficult, with 
mean confidence in answers being only 35.74% (S.D. = 22.76).  
 
Figure 10.1. Example slides from the control and experimental conditions 
 
In the main study there were two experimental conditions (Independent and Cued), 
which both used the same task materials, and one control condition. All task materials 
were presented on PowerPoint. Figure 10.1 shows an example slide from the 
experimental and control conditions. In the experimental conditions one of the two-
alternative answers had a speaker’s advice attached to it.  The advice was in the form of 
a speaker’s recommendation as to which answer was correct, and was accompanied by a 
Q1. What is the highest mountain in South America?
A. Aconcagua
B. Huascarăn
Friend Red: 
“I think it’s 
this answer”
Q1. What is the highest mountain in South America?
A. Aconcagua
B. Huascarăn  
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verbal confidence cue. Three speaker’s offered advice, with one always expressing high 
confidence in their choice (Friend Blue), one medium confidence (Friend Red) and one 
low confidence (Friend Green), using cues developed in an earlier pilot study. Only one 
advisor gave advice on each question (as opposed to all three advisors/speakers giving 
an answer to each question in previous experiments), with all three advisors providing 
answers to an equal number of questions (20 each). Accuracy was kept constant across 
advisors, with each speaker recommending the correct answer on 50% of occasions. All 
three advisors also recommended answer A or B an equal amount of times. In the 
control condition, the answers to each question were not accompanied by any advice.  
 
Design and Procedure 
Two experimental conditions were used: Independent and Cued. In the Independent 
condition, participants first answered the questions without receiving any advice 
recommending answers, and then answered the same set of questions again, where the 
answers were this time accompanied by a speaker’s advice. This means that the 
participant must first access their own knowledge (an internal source of information) 
before seeing information from an external source, which they can decide to use or 
ignore. The first administration of the questions in this condition also acts as a control 
condition that any shifts in choice in the two decision-making environments can be 
compared with. Sniezek and Buckley (1995) point out that while this is not technically a 
control group, it does serve as a useful baseline measurement for subsequent choice 
behaviour in the experimental conditions. In the Cued condition, participants answered 
the questions once only, viewing the answers with advice attached. This means that 
participants have access to external information first, but again they can decide to use 
this or ignore it in favour of their own, internal information.  
A 3 (Condition: Control; Cued; Independent)  x 3 (Speaker Confidence: High; 
Medium; Low) mixed design was used, with repeated measures on speaker confidence. 
The dependent variables were; percentage of time each speaker’s answers were chosen, 
participant’s mean confidence in their answers, and their perceptions of each speaker.  
All participants were tested in small groups, without interaction, with each 
participant facing a separate computer monitor. Upon arrival, participants were issued 
with a set of general instructions outlining the nature of the experiment and a booklet in 
which to record their answers. Once participants had consented to take part in the 
experiment they were directed to read specific instructions relating to the experimental   
  205 
condition they were in, which were presented on the computer monitor. In the 
Independent condition, participants completed the task twice  – before and after 
receiving ‘advice’. Participants in this condition were informed that there were two 
parts to the task. They were first asked to imagine that they were entering a quiz, which 
consisted of 60 general knowledge questions. They were told that their task was to 
decide which was the correct answer out of the two alternatives provided, only one of 
which was correct. Participants were asked to make their selection by circling the letter 
corresponding to their chosen answer (A or B) on their answer sheet provided, and 
indicate their confidence in that answer, on a 0 – 100 scale, where a score of 0 meant 
that they had no confidence at all in that answer being correct and 100 meant that they 
knew beyond doubt that the answer they had chosen was correct. Participants were 
instructed to answer each question in turn, and told not to return to any previous 
questions. Upon completion of the 60 questions, participants were asked to notify the 
experimenter that they had finished that section of the experiment. 
The participants in the Independent condition were then given instructions regarding 
the second part of the task, which consisted of the same set of questions, this time with 
advice accompanying the answers. Participants assigned to the Cued condition only 
completed the task once, viewing the questions with advice attached, and so received 
the same set of instructions, as follows.  
Imagine that you have entered a quiz with some friends: Friend Blue, Friend Green and 
Friend Red. The quiz consists of 60 general knowledge questions. You need to decide 
which is the correct answer out of the two alternatives provided, one of which is correct. 
On each question, one of your friends say which answer they think is correct - you can 
choose to take or ignore your friend’s advice. Pay attention to how each friend answers. 
 
All remaining instructions regarding how indicate their choice of answer, and 
confidence in that answer, were as before. Upon completion of the second part of the 
task, participants were asked to answer a few further  questions relating to their 
perceptions of the three speakers who had offered them advice. This post-experimental 
questionnaire asked for participants to estimate what percentage of questions they 
thought they had answered correctly, what percentage of questions they thought each 
speaker had answered correctly, as well as ratings, on a 11-point scale, of each 
speakers’ perceived confidence, knowledgeability, friendliness, competency and 
trustworthiness. Finally, participants were asked which of the three speakers they would 
choose as their team-mate if they were to enter another round of the competition.    
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Results 
 
Influence of Speaker Confidence and Decision-Making Condition on Choice  
A Speaker Confidence  x Condition ANOVA was conducted to establish whether 
there were any differences in the influence of confidence as a result of when the 
speaker’s advice was given. Table 10.1 shows the mean percentage of agreement with 
each speaker.  
 
Table 10.1 
Mean percentage agreement with each speaker 
Speaker Confidence   
Condition  High  Medium  Low 
 
Total 
Control  47.98 (10.36)  48.45   (9.14)  46.67   (9.08)  47.70   (4.87) 
Independent  82.74 (14.36)  72.86 (16.75)  60.00 (19.29)  71.86 (14.29) 
Cued  75.23 (20.94)  65.11 (18.47)  52.61 (17.78)  64.32 (16.18) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
There was a significant main effect of Condition on participants’ choice of answer, 
F(2, 125) = 38.99,  p < .001, indicating that participants relied on another person’s 
advice to differing degrees depending on when they received that advice. In the Control 
condition, which acted a baseline for the experimental conditions, the answers, that in 
the experimental conditions had advice attached to them, were chosen 47.70% of the 
time (in the absence of advice). This result is as would be expected by chance alone, 
given that there were two alternative answers for each question, and hence a 50% 
selection rate for the answers would be expected. Planned comparisons, using 
independent measures t-tests, indicated that when ‘advice’ was offered, in terms of a 
speaker expressing some level of confidence in one of the two alternatives, significant 
increases were seen from the Control condition, indicating that participants took some 
of the advice offered to them. In the Independent condition, where participants had 
made an initial choice before receiving a speaker’s ‘advice’, the speakers’ 
recommendations were chosen on 71.86% of occasions, a significant 24.17% increase 
from the Control condition,  t(82) = 10.37,  p < .001. In the Cued condition, where 
participants had not made an initial choice before receiving the speakers’ advice, 
speakers’ recommendations were chosen on 64.32% of occasions, a significant 16.62%   
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increase from the Control condition, t(84) = 6.38,  p < .001. The extent to which a 
speaker’s advice was taken also differed significantly between the two experimental 
conditions, with the speakers’ recommendations being chosen 7.55% more frequently in 
the Independent than the Cued conditions, t(84) = 2.29, p = .003.  
A significant main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(4, 250) = 61.60, p < .001, and a 
Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction indicated that the extent to which speakers’ 
recommendations were taken depended on how confident they were in that advice and 
whether or not ‘advice’ was attached to the answers, F(4, 250) = 12.71, p < .001. Table 
10.1 shows the mean percentage of agreement with each speaker in each condition.  
In the Control condition no advice and confidence cues were given, but the questions 
were grouped together for analysis so that they corresponded to the questions given by 
the high, medium and low confidence speakers in the experimental conditions, and 
could act as a comparison level. In the Control condition each of the three speakers’ 
answers were chosen equally often, all being around the chance level of 50% because 
the task was difficult, F(2, 82) = .35, p = .70, ηp
2 = .009, whereas in the Independent and 
Cued conditions differences were seen in the frequency with which the three speakers’ 
advice was taken, F(2, 82) = 44.41, p < .001, ηp
2 =  .52, and F(2, 86) = 36.49, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .46, respectively. The manner in which participants took each speaker’s advice 
followed a linear trend in both the Independent and Cued conditions, F(1, 41) = 55.44, p 
< .001 and  F(1, 43) = 48.93,  p < .001, with answers being chosen more often as a 
speaker’s confidence increased.  
Figure 10.2 shows the differences in the frequency with which each speaker’s 
answers were chosen when they expressed their answers with confidence cues attached 
(Independent and Cued conditions) compared to when they did not use confidence cues 
(Control condition). All the scores are positive, indicating higher agreement with the 
answer when advice points to that answer than in the control condition. Answers 
expressed with high confidence were chosen 34.76% more frequently in the 
Independent condition, t(82) = 12.72, p < .001, and 27.25% more frequently in the Cued 
condition, t(84) = 8.39, p < .001, whereas answers expressed with medium confidence 
were chosen 24.40% more often in the Independent condition, t(82) = 8.29, p < .001, 
and 16.66% more often in the Cued condition, t(84) = 5.26, p < .001. Finally, answers 
expressed with low confidence were chosen 13.33% more frequently in the Independent 
condition, t(82) = 4.05, p < .001, and 5.95% more often in the Cued condition, although 
this difference was not significant, t(84) = 1.74, p = .09.   
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Figure 10.2. Changes in using different speaker’s advice according to condition. 
 
These results clearly indicate that the speaker’s recommendations were used to 
differing extents depending on which experimental condition participants were in. 
Indeed, participants in the Independent condition followed the high confidence speakers 
advice 7.51% more frequently than those in the Cued condition, t(84) = 2.10, p = .04, 
and the medium confidence speakers advice 7.74% more frequently, t(84) = 2.03, p = 
.04. Although participants in the Independent condition followed the advice given by 
the low confidence speaker 7.39% more frequently than those in the Cued condition, 
this difference did not reach significance, t(84) = 1.73, p = .09.  
 
Choice according to Speaker Accuracy 
Each speaker gave the correct answer on 50% of occasions. Table 10.2 shows the 
percentage of times each speaker’s recommendations were taken on the correct and 
incorrect answers. A Speaker Confidence  x Accuracy x Condition ANOVA was 
conducted to see if there were any differences in the way in which advice was used on 
correct and incorrect answers. This revealed main effects of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 
250) = 61.60, p < .001, Accuracy, F(1, 125) = 5.12, p = .03, and Condition, F(1, 125) = 
38.99, p < .001, and a Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, F(4, 250) = 12.71, p 
< .001. However, there were no significant two-way interactions between Accuracy x 
Condition, F(2, 125) = .28, p = .76, Speaker Confidence x Accuracy, F(2, 250) = 1.84, 
p = .16, or a significant Speaker Confidence x Accuracy x Condition interaction, F(4, 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Independent Cued
Condition
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
C
h
o
s
e
n
 
A
n
s
w
e
r
 
(
E
%
-
C
%
)
High Confidence
Medium Confidence
Low Confidence  
  209 
250) = .20,  p = .94. Therefore it appears that participants followed the speakers’ 
recommendations regardless of the accuracy of their answers, with inaccuracies not 
being detected. 
 
Table 10.2 
Mean percentage of agreement with each speaker according to speaker accuracy 
Speaker Confidence   
Condition  High  Medium  Low 
Control 
Correct Answers 
Incorrect Answers 
 
50.00 (15.62) 
45.95 (17.12) 
 
49.52 (16.22) 
47.38 (12.26) 
 
48.57 (12.41) 
44.76 (16.11) 
Independent 
Correct Answers 
Incorrect Answers 
 
84.29 (16.25) 
81.19 (15.96) 
 
71.90 (19.66)  
73.81 (18.86) 
 
62.14 (21.59) 
57.86 (21.13) 
Cued 
Correct Answers 
Incorrect Answers 
 
77.27 (19.93) 
73.18 (21.22) 
 
64.32 (21.28) 
65.91 (19.92) 
 
53.86 (21.26) 
51.36 (22.27) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. In the control condition no advice, and thus no 
level of confidence, was given for either answer. 
 
Accuracy 
Following a speaker’s advice, by choosing their recommended answers, did not lead 
to an improvement in participants’ accuracy, with participants in neither the Control (M 
= 51.75, S.D. = 7.21), Independent (M = 50.89, S.D. = 4.80) or Cued (M = 50.81, S.D. = 
4.83) condition showing accuracy levels any higher than would be expected by chance, 
F(2, 125) = .35, p = .70. This was to be expected since the higher confidence speakers 
were not in fact more accurate in this experiment. 
Participants were however more accurate than they thought they were. In the 
experimental conditions, participants were asked to estimate the percentage of questions 
they thought they had answered correctly. Those in the Independent condition thought 
they had answered approximately one third of questions correctly (M = 33.05%, S.D. = 
19.71%), whereas participants in the cued condition gave even more conservative 
estimates of their own accuracy (M = 29.67%, S.D. = 18.70%), although the difference 
between the two conditions was not significant, t(82) = .81,  p = .42. In neither the   
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independent nor cued condition did the participants’ estimates of their own accuracy 
bear any relationship with their actual accuracy, r(40) = .22, p = .17 and r(44) = -.07, p 
= .65.  
 
Influence of Speaker Confidence and Condition on Confidence in Choice  
A Speaker Confidence x Condition ANOVA on participants’ confidence in answers 
found no significant main effect of Condition, F(2, 125) = 2.45, p = .09, indicating that 
as a whole, participants’ confidence in their chosen answers did not increase when 
advice was given. A main effect of Speaker Confidence, F(2, 250) = 30.73, p < .001, 
and a significant Speaker Confidence  x Condition interaction, indicates that 
participants’ confidence in their chosen answers did vary depending on whether the 
answers had advice attached to them, and the level of confidence expressed in this 
advice,  F(4, 250) = 7.17,  p < .001. Separate ANOVAs on each condition were 
conducted to investigate this further.  
 
2  Table 10.3 
Mean confidence in chosen answers  
Speaker Confidence   
Condition  High  Medium  Low 
 
Total 
Control  38.91 (22.40)  37.73 (22.06)  38.65 (24.43)  38.43 (20.96) 
Independent  54.69 (23.94)  45.53 (22.52)  39.58 (20.62)  46.60 (21.04) 
Cued  55.18 (20.43)  45.57 (17.41)  38.62 (18.14)  46.46 (16.06) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
From the Control condition data in Table 10.3 it can be seen that answers chosen in 
the absence of advice, and hence confidence cues, resulted in equal levels of confidence 
in participants’ chosen answers,  F(2, 82) = .12,  p = .89, ηp
2  =  .003. Significant 
differences in participants’ confidence in answers were seen in the Independent and 
Cued conditions, depending on which speaker’s recommendation they were choosing, 
F(2, 82) = 27.45, p < .001, ηp
2 =  .40 and F(2, 86) = 22.05, p < .001, ηp
2 =  .34. In both 
the Independent and Cued conditions, participants’ confidence in answers followed 
significant linear trends, F(1, 41) = 35.44, p < .001 and F(1, 43) = 26.94, p < .001. 
Planned comparison t-tests showed that in both the Independent and Cued conditions 
confidence was higher when following a high confidence rather than a medium   
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confidence speaker’s advice, t(41) = 4.70, p < .001 and t(43) = 4.09, p < .001, a high 
confidence rather than a low confidence speaker’s advice, t(41) = 5.95, p < .001 and 
t(43) = 5.19, p < .001, and a medium confidence rather than a low confidence speaker’s 
advice, t(41) = 3.82, p < .001 and t(43) = 3.93, p < .001. Hence, the higher a speaker’s 
confidence in their recommendation was, the more confident the participants were when 
choosing that answer.  
Despite participants’ confidence following a linear trend, significant increases in 
confidence between the two experimental conditions and the control group were only 
seen for high confidence answers, F(2, 125) = 7.31, p = .001. Here, the addition of high 
confidence cues increased participants’ confidence in their answers by 15.78% in the 
Independent condition, t(82) = 3.12, p = .003, and by 16.25% in the Cued condition, 
t(84) = 3.52,  p = .001. However, although participants were more confident in the 
Independent and Cued conditions than in the Control condition when choosing the 
medium confidence speaker’s answers, this difference was not significant, F(2, 125) = 
2.01, p = .14. Participants’ confidence when choosing to agree with the low confidence 
speaker’s answers was no different to their confidence in the same answers when no 
confidence cues were used, F(2, 125) = .03, p = .97.  Figure 10.3 illustrates the changes 
in participants’ confidence in answers from control to experimental conditions. 
Figure 10.3. Change in confidence in answers according to speaker confidence and 
condition.   
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Influence of Confidence and Condition on Perceptions of Speakers 
In the two experimental conditions, participants were asked a series of further 
questions relating to their perceptions of the speakers who had offered them advice on 
the general knowledge questions.  
3   
4  Speaker Accuracy 
Participants had estimated what percentage of questions they thought each speaker 
(red, green and blue) had answered correctly. This was not done by the control group 
since there were no speakers in that condition. Table 10.4 shows that all estimates were 
lower than actual speaker accuracy (50%). 
A Speaker Confidence  x Condition ANOVA revealed main effects of Speaker 
Confidence, F(2, 164) = 19.69, p < .001, and Condition, F(1, 82) = 4.69, p = .03, but no 
interaction between these two factors, F(2, 164) = .48, p = .62. Table 10.4 indicates that 
in both of the experimental conditions, participants perceived higher confidence to be 
associated with higher levels of accuracy, with the high confidence speaker being seen 
as the most accurate speaker and the low confidence speaker being seen as the least 
accurate speaker, even though all three speakers were actually equally accurate. The 
main effect of Condition shows that participants in the Independent condition estimated 
the speakers to be 7.66% more accurate overall than those in the Cued condition did (M 
= 41.82% vs. M = 34.17%). 
 
5  Table 10.4 
Estimates of speaker accuracy  
Speaker Confidence   
Condition  High  Medium  Low 
Independent  49.27 (26.65)  40.00 (19.47)  36.20 (16.48) 
Cued  44.14 (26.48)  32.25 (17.83)  26.11 (16.44) 
Total  46.58 (26.52)  35.94 (18.92)  30.92 (17.13) 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 
 
6  Speaker Confidence, Knowledge, Friendliness, Competence and Trustworthiness 
To determine whether when participants received advice affected how they perceived 
the speakers, Speaker Confidence  x Condition ANOVAs were conducted on the 
interpersonal perception ratings given in the two experimental conditions (Table 10.5).    
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Table 10.5 
Perceptions of Speakers split by Levels of Speaker Confidence 
Speaker Confidence   
  High  Medium  Low 
Confidence 
Independent 
Cued 
Total 
 
6.85 
6.88 
6.87 
 
5.02 
5.14 
5.08 
 
4.43 
4.09 
4.25 
Knowledgeability 
Independent 
Cued 
Total 
 
6.48 
6.09 
6.27 
 
4.80 
5.02 
4.92 
 
4.93 
4.25 
4.57 
Friendliness 
Independent 
Cued 
Total 
 
5.62 
6.39 
6.02 
 
5.69 
6.16 
5.94 
 
5.62 
6.09 
5.87 
Competence 
Independent 
Cued 
Total 
 
6.18 
6.18 
6.18 
 
5.26 
5.16 
5.21 
 
4.89 
4.70 
4.79 
Trustworthiness 
Independent 
Cued 
Total 
 
5.25 
5.48 
5.37 
 
5.13 
4.34 
4.71 
 
4.97 
4.80 
4.88 
7   
8  Main effects of Speaker Confidence were seen on participants’ perceptions of 
each speaker’s confidence, knowledgeability, and competency, F(2, 162) = 25.28, p < 
.001, F(2, 164) = 14.71, p < .001, and F(2, 160) = 9.49, p < .001. As can be seen from 
Table 9.5, in each case, a linear relationship was seen, so the higher a speaker’s 
expressed confidence was, the more confident, knowledgeable and competent 
participants perceived the speaker as being, F(1, 81) = 55.76, p < .001, F(1, 82) = 22.45, 
p < .001, and F(1, 80) = 17.18, p < .001. The lack of any main effects of Condition, F(1, 
81) = .06, p = .80, F(1, 82) = .99, p = .32, and F(1, 80) = .11, p = .74, or any Speaker   
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Confidence x Condition interactions, F(2, 162) = .20, p = .82, F(2, 164) = .95, p = .39, 
and F(2, 160) = .04, p = .96, indicates that these patterns were consistent in both the 
Independent and Cued conditions. No significant main effects of Speaker Confidence or 
Condition were seen for ratings of speaker friendliness, F(2, 162) = .21, p = .81 and 
F(1, 81) = 3.36, p = .07, and trustworthiness, F(2, 164) = 2.52, p = .08 and F(1, 82) = 
.40, p = .53, and subsequently no interactions with Condition were observed, F(2, 162) 
= .29, p = .75 and F(2, 164) = 1.51, p = .22 . 
9   
10  Team-Mate 
 The extent to which participants chose each speaker as their team-mate was the 
same in both experimental conditions, χ
2 = .53, df = 2, p = .77.  In both the independent 
and the cued conditions the high confidence speaker was the most popular choice of 
team-mate, being chosen by 51.3% of participants in the independent condition and 
59.1% in the cued condition, followed by the medium (28.2% and 22.7%) and then low 
confidence speakers (20.5% and 18.2%), χ
2 = 6.00, df = 2, p = .50 and χ
2 = 13.27, df = 2, 
p = .001.  
 
Summary of Results 
Significant main effects of Condition and Speaker Confidence, and a Speaker 
Confidence  x Condition interaction indicated that the extent to which speakers’ 
recommendations were taken depended on how confident they were in that advice and 
whether or not ‘advice’ was attached to the answers. Further analysis found no 
significant interactions with Accuracy, indicating that a speaker’s accuracy had no 
baring on whether or not their advice was taken.  
In relation to the influence of confidence on confidence in answer, there was no 
significant main effect of Condition, but a main effect of Speaker Confidence, and a 
Speaker Confidence x Condition interaction, indicated that participants’ confidence in 
their chosen answers did vary depending on whether the answers had advice attached to 
them, and the level of confidence expressed in this advice.  
 The addition of confidence cues also had significant effects on participants’ choice 
of team-mate and their perceptions of the speakers, in terms of how accurate, confident, 
knowledgeable, and competent they were viewed as being, but not on how friendly or 
trustworthy they were.    
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Discussion 
 
The results of this experiment show that being in receipt of advice from a speaker 
significantly influences the choices people make in difficult MCQ general knowledge 
tests. In support of the hypotheses stated in the introduction of this chapter, the extent to 
which advice is followed depends on when that advice is received, and how confidently 
it is expressed. However, receiving advice, and subsequently following the given 
recommendations, does not improve the quality of the decisions made, when a speaker’s 
confidence and accuracy are not related, in that decision accuracy constantly remains 
low whereas decision confidence can increase. In real life, however, confidence and 
accuracy may have some degree of correlation and thus following a more confident 
speaker may have some positive impact on accuracy. Future research could investigate 
the degree of relationship between speaker confidence and their accuracy and how this 
influences a listener’s choices in different situations of varying difficulty. 
As expected, making advice available led to shifts in participants’ choice of answers, 
compared to when no advice was given, with the extent to which this advice was 
followed increasing as the speakers’ confidence in their advice also increased. Advice 
expressed with high confidence was followed more than that expressed with a medium 
level of confidence, which in turn was followed more than that expressed with low 
confidence. However, unlike in previous experiments reported in this thesis, all levels of 
speaker confidence led to an increase in the extent to which that recommendation was 
followed, compared to when no advice was given. Reasons for this will be discussed 
more fully in the general discussion.  
These results can be interpreted in relation to Sniezek and Buckley’s (1995) findings. 
They found that when advice came from multiple sources, the tendency was to match 
the consensus opinion when all advisors agreed, but to use a ‘confidence utilisation’ 
strategy when the advisors  did not agree. In the present experiment advice on each 
question came from one speaker only, and hence a comparison was not present, whereas 
in earlier chapters advice came from multiple sources and hence a comparison was 
necessary. Having a single advisor meant that there was not a situation where there was 
cognitive conflict or advisor consensus. However, advice coming from a lone speaker 
can be interpreted as a consensus opinion up to a point, in that it is the only opinion – 
especially when the decision-maker is uncertain or has no firm favourite amongst 
alternatives meaning that they are not in conflict with the speakers’ recommendations.   
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This was certainly the case here. At best the participants’ initial accuracy rates indicated 
that their choices were no more than guesses, and correspondingly their reported 
confidence in those initial (control) choices also showed high uncertainty. Owing to this 
uncertainty, a speaker’s advice was followed even when that advice was expressed with 
lower levels of confidence. As mentioned previously, Sniezek and Buckley did find that 
advice was followed even when the advisor’s confidence indicated they were relatively 
uncertain.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that a confidence utilisation, or confidence 
heuristic  strategy was used. Although advice expressed with all three levels of 
confidence was followed to a certain degree, the extent to which it was followed 
increased as the confidence in that advice increased. As a speaker’s confidence 
increased, incremental increases in participants’ confidence in their chosen answers was 
also seen, with choice confidence being higher when following a high confidence 
speaker’s recommendation than it is when following a medium, and in turn low 
confidence speaker’s answers, although taking advice from the latter two speakers did 
not significantly raise choice confidence from control levels. Furthermore, increasing 
levels of confidence led to a speaker being seen as more accurate, confident, 
knowledgeable and competent than a speaker expressing less confidence in their advice, 
indicating that the underlying assumptions of the confidence heuristic were being 
applied. Hence, although a comparison between speakers, and their confidence level, 
was not needed on individual questions, such a comparison evidently occurred overall.  
Although it was hypothesised that advice, and a speakers’ confidence in that advice, 
would have more of an influence on choice in the cued decision-making environment, 
where advice was received before any tentative choice had been made, than in the 
independent decision-making environment, where a tentative choice could have been 
made, the opposite pattern of results was found. A speakers’ recommendation was 
chosen more often in the independent condition than in the cued condition, overall and 
for each of the three levels of speaker confidence.  
It is suggested that the difference between the present findings and those of Sniezek 
and Buckley (1995) reported earlier may be due to task difficulty. The experiment 
reported in this chapter used difficult questions (with an initial mean accuracy rate of 
51.75%), to maximise confidence heuristic use, whereas the questions used by Sniezek 
and Buckley may have been easier (average item difficulty was .6, ranging from .5 to .8, 
which indicates a fairly moderate difficulty question set). If this is the case, then   
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participants in Sniezek and Buckley’s experiment may have found it easier to generate 
initial answers that they were confident, or at least fairly confident, in. This could have 
made them less susceptible, but not totally resistant, to the influence of another person, 
thus accounting for why a speakers’ answer was followed less often in the independent 
than the cued condition. The opposite may have been true in the present experiment. 
Owing to the difficulty of the task, the participants in the independent condition could 
have had higher uncertainty. Indeed, in the present experiment initial confidence was 
just 38.43% compared to 70.4% in Sniezek and Buckley’s experiment. This higher 
initial uncertainty may have made the participants more susceptible to the influence of 
another’s advice and their expressed confidence in that advice. Since the participants in 
the independent condition had tried to come up with an answer in the absence of advice 
but found the task difficult, the difficulty of the task may have been more salient, hence 
increasing their uncertainty, and in turn increasing their need of advice to aid their 
decision. In other words, they abandoned their own knowledge for that of another, even 
though the quality of the two was no different, with it just being the expression of 
confidence that gave the advice the illusion of being of higher quality. This suggestion 
is lent weight by Sniezek and Van Swol’s (2001) observation that pre-testing can lower 
a decision-makers’ self-confidence. Low self-confidence can make people more likely 
to trust information from another source over their own knowledge (Lee and Moray, 
1994; Sniezek and Van Swol, (2001). Participants in the cued task, while also finding 
the task difficult would not have encountered this initial uncertainty, perhaps because 
the task difficulty was less salient, making them slightly less susceptible to the influence 
of confidence. Thus, this may explain why in this case advice, in particular confidently 
expressed advice, was followed more in the independent than the cued condition. This 
explanation would fit in with the theories of Sniezek and Buckley (1995) and also 
Vissers et al. (2003), who suggest that social influence is mediated by subjective 
uncertainty, the more uncertain we are the more susceptible we are to being influenced.    
Support for this explanation comes from the results relating to aspects of speaker and 
participant accuracy. It seems that speaker inaccuracies were not detected, highlighting 
the difficulty of the task. Advice that pointed towards wrong answers was chosen 
equally as often as that pointing towards correct answers. Given this finding it is not 
surprising that following a speaker’s advice did not lead to an improvement in decision 
accuracy. Although actual accuracy was low, being no better than would be expected by 
chance, participants still underestimated their own accuracy, perhaps because of the   
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difficulty of the questions. Indeed, no relationship was found between actual accuracy 
and estimates of accuracy.  
This discrepancy between actual accuracy and estimated accuracy may be because, 
as Sniezek et al. (1990) suggest, confidence in a single item is determined differently to 
confidence in a set of items (where confidence is viewed in relation to performance, or 
accuracy). For a single item, confidence may be related to the relative amount of 
information one can generate in support of the chosen answer, whereas for a set of 
items, confidence in the proportion correct may depend on a judgment of the difficulty 
of the task, one’s ability, effort, and so on. Hence, one can be very confident about a 
particular item, but not be confidence about the task as a whole.  
 
Limitations 
The present experiment did not include a true control condition for the independent 
or cued conditions, which would have involved advice being given without any 
confidence cues attached. On the basis of previous research (e.g. Harvey and Fischer, 
1997), one would expect advice to be followed when it is present, even without any 
explicit expression of confidence being made in that advice. While it may have been 
interesting to take this into account, the purpose of the present experiment was to 
determine differences between how advice expressed with different levels of confidence 
is utilised, and the differences in how this confidence was utilised in the two decision-
making environments. Therefore, the decision not to include a true control condition for 
each environment was considered justified.  
In the present experiment the advice giver’s confidence was not necessarily 
indicative of their accuracy, particularly so for the more confident speakers. Although in 
real-life this may not always be the case, this method was used so that people would not 
necessarily be agreeing with the most accurate speaker. Keeping accuracy constant 
across the three speakers means that a speaker’s social influence is attributable to their 
level of expressed confidence rather than their accuracy level. This does however reflect 
many real-life situations, as a speaker’s accuracy is only useful to a listener if they know 
an answer - in which case they would be less likely to seek advice – or have some way 
of verifying it. But, as Sniezek and Van Swol (2001) point out, the answers to most real-
world tasks cannot be instantly verified at the time, if at all. Nevertheless, future 
research could investigate the influence of different levels of confidence and accuracy.    
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Furthermore, as stated at the start of this discussion section, the results of this 
experiment relate to choice in relation to difficult questions. The ecological validity of 
this is discussed in the next chapter, the General Discussion, in relation to the 
experimental limitations of the thesis.  
 
Conclusions  
So when is the best time to seek, and give, advice? Our use of another person’s 
advice can vary according to when we receive that advice. However, this may be due to 
the higher level of uncertainty that some decision-making environments induce rather 
than when we are actually given advice. Therefore, if seeking advice we should not let 
our own uncertainty prevail, as this causes us to doubt the knowledge that we do 
actually possess. As such we should avoid, or indeed not dwell, on situations that will 
increase uncertainty, and make us more susceptible to another’s influence.  
If we are giving advice on the other hand, and are motivated to have our advice 
accepted, perhaps because the desired outcome would be beneficial for ourselves, we 
should do so after we have encouraged the advice seeker to attempt a solution 
themselves. In this way we maximise their uncertainty and increase the chances of our 
advice being followed. When we do finally give the advice that is being sought, we 
should do so as confidently as we can. The extent to which we follow a speaker’s advice 
is determined by our use of the confidence heuristic, in that we follow advice expressed 
with high confidence more than advice that is expressed with less confidence, and are in 
turn more confident in these choices. We also place a higher value on advice expressed 
with high confidence, viewing such a speaker as being more accurate, confident, 
knowledgeable and competent than less confident speakers. In using the confidence 
heuristic therefore we assume that a speaker’s level of expressed confidence is 
indicative of the quality of their information, even when this is not the case. 
 CHAPTER 11 
General Discussion 
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Discussion of findings 
The aim of this thesis was to find out if confidence serves as an effective form of 
influence. It has shown that people do rely on a speaker’s level of confidence as a way 
of making judgements and decisions – they use confidence heuristically. The extent to 
which the confidence heuristic is utilised by listeners has been investigated and some 
factors that mediate its use have been identified, along with some of the assumptions 
that listeners make about speakers on the basis of their expressed confidence. Such 
assumptions provide clues as to why people may feel that using the confidence heuristic 
is an effective strategy. A summary of the findings from the experiments that have been 
conducted as part of this thesis will follow, before turning to a discussion of these 
findings in relation to the confidence heuristic.  
Throughout this thesis, although not necessarily simultaneously in each chapter, the 
influence of confidence has been considered in relation to three variables: its influence 
on choice, on confidence in those choices and upon interpersonal perceptions of the 
speakers. Furthermore, in terms of choice, the influence of confidence has been 
considered from two perspectives for much of this thesis: from changes in choice 
behaviour in the absence and presence of confidence cues, to the pattern of influence of 
different levels of confidence when confidence cues are available. In each case these 
variables have been investigated in relation to the influence of a speaker expressing 
high, medium, or low confidence. Previous research has tended to focus on the 
influence of confidence when it is communicated numerically (e.g. Price and Stone, 
2004; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). The research presented in this thesis instead gave 
consideration to the influence of verbal expressions of confidence, identified earlier 
(Chapters 1 and 2) as a more natural and common way of expressing our 
confidence/uncertainty. Additionally this was considered within an interactive decision-
making environment, identified in the literature review as a way in which we make 
many decisions, and one that does not bring with it the complications of group decision-
making. The results will be discussed firstly in relation to the influence of confidence on 
choice, encompassing its effects on confidence in choice (Chapters 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10), 
followed by the results relating to the influence of confidence on interpersonal 
perceptions (Chapters 5 and 6, as well as relevant findings from all chapters).  
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Influence of confidence on choice 
In terms of choice behaviour in the absence and presence of confidence cues, the 
general finding has shown shifts in listeners’ answers from those given by a low 
confidence speaker towards those given by a high confidence speaker. Such choice 
shifts were found in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10, showing a linear relationship between 
a speaker’s confidence level and the extent of influence that speaker has, where 
influence is a speaker’s ability to get listeners to choose their answers, regardless of the 
accuracy of those answers (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). So when a speaker has 
expressed confidence in their answers, listeners have been influenced most by a high 
confidence speaker, followed by a medium confidence speaker and hence, influenced 
least by a low confidence speaker. This pattern was found in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 
and 10. Concurring with Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) then, the social influence of 
confidence was found to be constant, in that high confidence exerts the most influence, 
yet it is not constant in the extent to which the same level of confidence exerts an 
influence on the different tasks. The magnitude of the choice shifts, and the differences 
in the extent to which speaker’s expressing different levels of confidence influence 
listeners in their choice of answers has been found to depend on a number of different 
factors.  
Chapter 3 looked at task type and the influence of confidence, following on from the 
suggestion that the extent of a speaker’s influence is dependent upon the type of task 
being undertaken, in the extent to which a task is intellective or judgmental (Laughlin 
and Ellis, 1986; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). The results support this suggestion within 
a more ecological setting  – verbal expressions in an interactive decision-making 
environment - than the influence of quantitative expressions in a group decision-making 
environment as used by Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997). In Chapter 3 three different tasks 
were used – one representing an intellective task, one a judgmental task, and also an 
extremely judgmental task. A speaker’s (high) confidence had the strongest effect on 
listener’s choices on the external judgement task, a marginally less strong effect on the 
intellective task, with the weakest effect of this speaker’s confidence being seen on the 
judgmental task.  
Chapter 4 indicated that there could be individual differences in the influence of 
confidence, specifically, a listener’s Need for Closure – the general tendency to prefer 
certain to uncertain knowledge. People high in Need for Closure showed a far greater 
reliance on the high confidence speaker’s answers, up to 94% on the external judgement   
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task, than people low in Need for Closure, who as a comparison chose the same 
speakers answers just 69% of the time on the same task. People who were low in Need 
for Closure on the other hand, whilst still influenced by the high confidence speaker the 
most, were not averse to choosing the answers given by the other two, less confident, 
speakers. For instance on the external judgement task, low Need for Closure individuals 
picked the medium confidence speaker’s answers on 21% of occasions, compared to 
just 3% of high Need for Closure individuals.  
 The extreme judgmental task that was used in Chapters 3 and 4 was admittedly 
fairly abstract, particularly when compared to the other tasks used. Yet it achieved its 
purpose and sufficiently mimicked a situation where a listener could bring no prior 
knowledge, as with the intellective task, or opinions, as with the judgmental task, and 
was totally reliant on the speaker’s confidence level. Hence the task allowed for the 
influence of confidence to be considered in the absence of listener knowledge. Sniezek 
and Buckley (1995) created a similar situation, where listener knowledge was 
eliminated, by allowing listeners to view responses given by speakers but not allowing 
them to see the questions that had been asked in the first place, a situation the 
researchers admitted themselves was artificial, but achieved its purpose. It was felt that 
the task used in Chapters 3 and 4 did not appear quite so artificial, since it allowed 
listeners to seemingly have control over their choices given that they had more 
information available to them, i.e. being able to view the questions that generated the 
speakers’ answers.  
In Chapters 3 and 4 the listeners had no way of determining the accuracy of the 
answers they were given by the speakers. Difficult general knowledge questions were 
used in the intellective task, and for many of the experiments reported in this thesis, as a 
way of maximising reliance on the answers given by the speakers and thus allowing for 
the influence of confidence to be considered. The difficulty of the tasks was confirmed 
via the listener’s accuracy, which for the most part were no better than would be 
expected by chance, and so indicated that listener’s answers (in the absence of 
confidence cues at least) were sheer guesswork (see Chapters 3, 4, 7, 9, and 10). At no 
point did the accuracy of a speaker have any bearing on the influence that speaker 
exerted upon the listener’s choices or the accuracy of those choices. Hence it is safe to 
conclude that the level of influence seen was due to the speakers’ confidence.  
Chapter 7 asked what would happen to the influence of confidence when a listener 
was provided with feedback relating to a speaker’s accuracy, given that we often   
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interact with people prior to seeking their advice and hence may become aware of any 
judgmental biases they have during this interaction. Price and Stone (2004) found that 
such information had little bearing on how speakers were perceived, and so it was asked 
if the same would be true when making choices on the basis of a speaker’s 
recommendation. Chapter 7 showed that when feedback was available, giving listeners 
an indication of a speaker’s accuracy, and in turn the appropriateness of their 
confidence, the influence of a speaker’s confidence, particularly a high confidence 
speaker’s influence, was greatly reduced to the extent that a high confidence speaker 
was no more influential than one expressing a medium level of confidence. Indeed, 
feedback had the most detrimental effect on the influence a high confidence speaker 
had, whereas it actually increased the level of influence exerted by the medium and low 
confidence speakers.  
With the exception of Chapter 7, the results summarised so far relating to the 
influence of a speaker’s confidence upon listeners’ choices have shown that adding 
confidence cues to answers leads to choice shifts from the low to high confidence 
speaker’s answers. However, this highlighted a number of methodological limitations 
and generated further issues that needed clarification. Firstly, whilst the choice shifts 
have been robust they obscure true shifts arising from the influence of confidence, in 
that Chapters 3, 4 and 5 considered choice shifts between a control group, who saw 
speakers’ responses in the absence of confidence cues, and an experimental group, who 
saw speakers’ responses with confidence cues attached. While there are a number of 
arguments for using such a methodology, in that it does not allow for task repetition to, 
a) lead to familiarity with the answers/task, and b) obscured the true intention of the 
experiment, it was nevertheless thought to be worthwhile giving this issue some further 
consideration, and so Chapter 8 adopted a within-subjects rather than a between-
subjects design.  
Chapter 8 again showed choice shifts from the low confidence speaker towards the 
high confidence speaker, resulting in a linear relationship between confidence and 
influence upon choice. However, the extent of these shifts was less pronounced than 
generally found in earlier experiments. This is potentially due to one of two reasons, or 
indeed both may contribute to this. Firstly, as opposed to just using difficult general 
knowledge questions, as in other chapters, a range of question difficulties were used. On 
the questions that participants found easier, as indicated by their initial level of 
confidence, there were only small choice shifts around the 3% – 4% margin, whereas   
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for more difficult questions this rose to 15% - 16%. This shift is much smaller than 
found in previous chapters where difficult general knowledge questions were used. 
Indeed, for the equivalent questions in Chapter 3 (the intellective task) the shift towards 
the high confidence speaker’s answers was almost 34%, shifting 16% and 18% from the 
medium and low confidence speakers. Given this difference on essentially the same 
task, it is unlikely that question difficulty is the only factor here that is mediating the 
influence of confidence. A second possibility relates to the choice processes engaged in, 
or that have been engaged in, when receiving a speaker’s answers. In Chapter 8 
participants were required to make an independent choice for all the questions before 
they saw the speaker’s answers, and so participants were required to (possibly) change 
their answers from their initial choices after viewing a speaker’s answer. This was not 
so in Chapters 3 and 4. Here participants had not chosen any initial answers, and their 
choices were made simultaneously with seeing a speaker’s answers. This issue will be 
returned to shortly when discussing the results from Chapter 10.  
A further issue that arose from the earlier experimental chapters was that of the 
pattern of choice shifts. It became apparent that one speaker’s gain, the high confidence 
speaker’s, was another speaker’s loss, most notably the low confidence speaker’s. This 
meant that the influence of a speaker’s confidence seen until now could have been 
artificially inflated. Chapters 9 and 10 used methodologies to counteract this.  
In Chapter 9 participants were required to rate each speaker’s answer to each 
question indicating the likelihood of that answer being correct, prior to making a final 
choice. In terms of choice, the same pattern as previously reported emerged. However, 
in terms of how each speaker’s answers were rated there was a different pattern. While 
still showing a linear relationship, from high to medium to low confidence in being 
rated as most likely to be correct, the changes in ratings when confidence cues were 
added showed gains for the high and medium confidence speakers, and a marginal, but 
non-significant decrease for the low confidence speaker. In retrospect perhaps the 
forced-choice method should not have been used in conjunction with the rating scales, 
as this may have led participants to give more weight to the overall choice process 
rather than weighing each response. Hence this may have obscured true responses. 
However, it can be asked whether it can automatically be assumed that ratings and final 
choices would be associated, and this notion provided the rationale for the said 
methodology used.    
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Sniezek and Buckley (1995) have suggested that confidence is influence when there 
is conflict between advisors. In other words, when more than one person is offering 
advice, and these people all offer conflicting advice, it is the most confidently expressed 
advice that will be most influential. This has been found in the experiments reported in 
this thesis, yet they have brought with them the problem of one speaker’s gain being 
another’s loss. In Chapter 10 the issue of loss/gain was eliminated. In previous chapters 
participants had to choose their answer after comparing those suggested by three 
competing sources – the high, medium, and low confidence speakers. In Chapter 10, 
only one speaker recommended an answer to each question, with some being suggested 
by a high confidence speaker, some by a medium confidence speaker, and some by a 
low confidence speaker. Would confidence still exert influence here, where there is not 
conflicting advice? It seems so.  
As in the previous experiments reported in this thesis, there was a linear relationship 
between confidence and influence in Chapter 10. However, unlike the previous 
experiments, where having to choose one answer after receiving different suggestions 
from three speakers resulted in gains for the high confidence speaker and losses for the 
low confidence speaker in terms of their answers being chosen, expressing confidence 
in answers, be it high, medium, or low, led to increases in the amount of time those 
speaker’s answers were chosen, compared to when no level of confidence was stated.  
The main focus of Chapter 10 however was to consider differences in the influence 
of confidence resulting from when a speaker’s advice was received. As mentioned 
earlier, this is a further possibility that may contribute to differences in the extent of 
influence a speaker’s confidence. Recall that in Chapter 8, participants made initial 
choices prior to seeing a speaker’s answers, whereas in Chapters 3, 4, and 9, choices 
were made after seeing a speaker’s answers. Sniezek and Buckley (1995) suggest that 
when advice is received can affect the influence of confidence, finding that people who 
made initial choices we less susceptible to the influence of confidence than those who 
had not. The opposite pattern was found in Chapter 10, with people who had made their 
own initial choices independently of a speaker’s advice being more influenced by the 
advice subsequently received from that speaker than those who did not make prior 
choices. Potential reasons for this difference will be discussed in the next section.  
The results have clearly shown that confidence is an effective form of influence.  
Concurring with previous research, the higher a speaker’s confidence is the greater their 
level of influence will be upon the decisions a listener opts in and/or out of, and hence a   
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decision-maker is more likely to accept or follow the recommendation of an advisor as 
that advisor’s confidence increases (Gill, Swann, and Silvera, 1998; Lee, 2005; Leippe, 
Manion, and Romancyzk, 1992; Paese and Kinnaly, 1993; Pulford and Colman, 2005; 
Sniezek and Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001). However the extent of this 
influence is not constant (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). As we have seen, there appear to 
be individual differences, with some people being more susceptible to the influence of 
confidence than others (Chapter 4). Not surprisingly too, receiving feedback about a 
speaker’s performance, and hence having clues to their judgmental biases also 
diminishes, if not quite eliminates, the influence of confidence (Chapter 7). However, 
there is also a more constant factor that emerged throughout the course the experiments 
- that of a speaker’s own confidence level. Indeed it would appear that the influence of 
confidence is a two-way process.  
 
Uncertainty and the influence of confidence 
Why were people influenced by a speaker’s confidence to different extremes? 
Chapters 3 and 8 indicated that the listener’s own confidence is just as important in the 
influence process as a speaker’s confidence is. In Chapter 3 it was suggested that 
differences in the influence of confidence between the three tasks were due to listeners’ 
confidence on those tasks. With reference to the control groups, where no confidence 
cues were used, confidence was low on the intellective and external judgmental tasks, 
around 27% - 36%, whereas it was far higher on the judgmental task, being over 60%. 
In the case of the first two tasks this indicates that listeners were simply guessing, as 
these confidence levels are no more than would be expected by chance when having 
three options to choose from. Listeners’ confidence on the judgmental task indicated 
that they felt far more confident here in being able to choose the best answer 
themselves. Not surprisingly, speaker confidence had the least influence on choice on 
this task. In fact, it became clear that the influence of a speaker’s confidence increased 
as a listener’s confidence decreased. Chapter 3 concluded that these differences in 
confidence reflect differences in the amount of information a listener can bring to a task. 
Participants could bring most information to the judgmental task, using their own 
opinions to help them in their decisions. On the intellective task far less information was 
brought by the listener - they could potentially use their own knowledge, but given the 
low accuracy rate, at the chance level, this is unlikely, although they may have thought 
they brought some knowledge to the task. On the external judgement task, where the   
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greatest influence of (high) confidence was demonstrated, listeners could not, or did not 
feel that they could, bring any useful information to help them in their choices, and 
hence their confidence was lowest here. This supports Sniezek and Buckley’s (1995) 
suggestion that as the amount of information one can bring to a task decreases, the 
influence that other people have, via their expression of confidence, increases.  
As it was clear that the listener’s own uncertainty was important, this was 
investigated further. As previously pointed out, true shifts in choice and initial 
confidence could not be investigated in Chapter 3 owing to the use of a between-
subjects design. Using a within-subjects design in Chapter 8 allowed for an 
investigation of how a listener’s confidence mediated the influence of a speaker’s 
confidence. This confirmed that the higher a listener’s initial confidence was, i.e. their 
confidence in answers before seeing a speaker’s answers, the less influence a speaker’s 
subsequent confidence had, and in turn the lower the listener’s initial confidence was 
the greater the speaker’s influence was. This can be taken as support of Visser, 
Krosnick, and Simmons’ (2003) observation that the more confident someone is in their 
information the less need they have to seek or attend to other information on that issue.  
Sniezek and Buckley (1995) hypothesised that there may be differences in the extent 
to which we are influenced by a speakers’ confidence resulting from the sources of 
information we utilise when making a choice - we can use our own information or that 
offered by someone else. Which source of information we use is said to depend on 
when we receive advice. If we make an initial choice before receiving advice 
(independent decision-making), we should be less influenced by that advice and how 
confidently expressed it is than when we have not made an initial decision (cued 
decision-making). This was not supported in Chapter 10, finding instead that a 
speaker’s confidence exerted a (slightly) greater influence in situations where an initial 
decision had been made. Again this result may be due to the listener’s own confidence. 
It was concluded in Chapter 10 that, given the nature of the task used - difficult general 
knowledge questions - higher uncertainty may have been induced in the independent 
decision-making situation as a result of attempting to tackle a difficult task alone, 
consequently leading to a greater need to rely on someone else’s advice. This 
explanation for the differing extent of influence that a speaker’s confidence exerted in 
Chapters 3, 4, 8 and 10 clearly supports previous suggestions that the greater one’s 
initial uncertainty is, the more we are susceptible to the influence of another’s 
confidence (Lee, 2005; Sniezek and Buckley, 1995, Visser et al., 2003).    
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Influence of confidence on confidence 
The listener’s own initial uncertainty clearly played a major part in the extent to 
which they were influenced by a speaker’s confidence in their choices. Chapters 3, 4, 8, 
9, and 10 also showed that the addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answer led to 
listeners having more confidence in their subsequent choices. As with the results for 
choice, the listener’s own initial confidence had a bearing on the extent to which their 
confidence increased. In Chapters 3 and 8 confidence increased more after viewing a 
speaker’s confidence when initial confidence was low, either owing to task type 
(Chapter 3), or question difficulty (Chapter 8). However, despite the larger increases in 
confidence when initially uncertain, these increases were not to such an extent that the 
subsequent increases led to final confidence being higher for the questions where there 
had been initial low confidence than those where initial confidence was higher. Quite 
possibly smaller increases in confidence, when there was high initial confidence, 
resulted from a ceiling effect occurring, and confidence could not increase to the same 
extent simply because it was so high anyway leaving little room for increase.  
In Chapters 3, 4, 8, and 9 the increases in confidence were seen regardless of the 
level of confidence the speaker expressed  – just expressing any confidence was 
sufficient to influence listeners in this way, whether the speaker had high, medium, or 
even low confidence in their answers. Regardless of the speaker’s confidence, listener’s 
confidence rose to similar amounts across all three speakers. However this was not the 
case in Chapter 10. Here confidence in answers only rose significantly from control 
group confidence when choosing the high or medium confidence speakers’ answers. 
Furthermore, the increases in listener confidence were incremental reflecting the 
speakers’ confidence level. Confidence was higher when agreeing with the high 
confidence speaker than when agreeing with the medium confidence speaker, and in 
turn the low confidence speaker (even though there was no increase from control 
confidence, independently there was a significant linear trend). What caused  these 
differences? Recall that in Chapters 3, 4, 8, and 9, choices were made between answers 
expressed with high, medium, or low confidence, with high confidence having a 
considerable influence on choice, particularly in comparison with the influence of the 
other two speakers. In Chapter 10 such a comparison was not required, and listeners 
either chose the speaker’s recommendations or they did not. It would seem that in the 
case of the latter, listener’s own confidence was directly influenced by the speaker’s 
level of confidence. Two potential reasons could explain why the earlier results showed   
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equivalent levels of speaker confidence regardless of who they were agreeing with. 
Firstly, confidence when choosing the answers of the lower confidence speaker could 
have been equivalent to that when choosing the high confidence speaker’s answers 
because when listeners chose these more doubtfully recommended answers they did so 
believing they knew the correct answer anyway, independently of the speaker’s 
recommendation. Hence they would have felt more confident on these questions 
anyway. Alternatively, it may be that incremental increases in confidence are not seen 
when there is a comparison because the act of comparing makes listeners more 
confident when choosing a medium or low confidence answer. Choosing a more 
uncertainly expressed answer means eliminating a confidently expressed one, and so if 
the confident option is considered incorrect a listener may feel entitled to be more 
confident in less certain answers.  
 
Interpersonal perceptions of confidence 
As noted in the review of the literature, research tends to either consider how 
confidence influences decisions/choices, or how it influences the way in which we 
perceive a speaker, generally in relation to speech style research. However, it is 
important to consider both of these issues, as the latter may give an indication as to why 
the former occurs. Chapters 5 and 6 focused on how speaker’s expressing levels of 
confidence are perceived in an attempt to uncover people’s reasons for relying on a 
speaker’s confidence when making decisions. Consideration was also given to this issue 
in other chapters but was not the main aim of those chapters. However 
relevant/important results from these chapters will also be discussed here.  
Given that researchers (e.g. Apple, Streeter, and Krauss, 1979; Erickson, Lind, 
Johnson, and O’Barr, 1978; Lind and O’Barr, 1978; Scherer, 1979) have identified two 
major dimensions of speech cues  – relating to competence and likeability  – the 
influence of a speaker’s confidence in relation to these was considered. These variables 
were investigated via two methodologies, either a forced-choice for most/least 
(Chapters 3, 4, 6) or through the use of ratings scales (Chapters 3, 9 and 10). With the 
exception of Chapter 6, the results have been the same regardless of the methodology 
used. For most factors relating to speaker competence (e.g. competence, intelligence, 
knowledgeability, and professionalism), the higher a speaker’s confidence was, the 
more positively they were viewed. In other words a confident speaker is seen as being 
competent and knowledgeable, whereas an uncertain speaker is not. The exception to   
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this has been where feedback about a speaker’s performance has been made available 
(Chapter 6). Here both the high and medium confidence speakers are seen as competent 
and intelligent, but the low confidence speaker still remains the most negatively 
perceived speaker in these terms.  
  A speaker’s confidence was also taken as being indicative of their accuracy level, 
with a high confidence speaker being seen as the most accurate, and a low confidence 
speaker as the least (Chapters 6, 9, and 10).  However, listeners’ perceptions of speaker 
accuracy did not correspond with the speakers’ actual accuracy. In Chapter 6 listeners 
overestimated speaker accuracy, by 13% for the high confidence speaker, 8% for the 
medium confidence speaker and 3% for the low confidence speaker. Given that the 
actual accuracy rate for each speaker was the same, 33.33%, the estimate of 36% for the 
low confidence speaker’s accuracy was actually the most realistic. What is surprising 
about these results is that listeners actually saw whether the speakers answered the 
questions correctly, and even though they were in principal aware that each speaker 
answered the same number of questions correctly, did not take this information into 
account when judging speaker accuracy. In Chapter 9 the high confidence speaker’s 
accuracy was again overestimated, and the low confidence speaker’s underestimated, 
with there being just a slight overestimate for the medium confidence speaker. Here 
listeners did not have any information regarding any of the speakers’ true accuracy 
levels. In Chapter 10 the accuracy of all speakers was more or less underestimated, 
although higher confidence was still perceived to be associated with higher accuracy.  
For factors relating to speaker likeability on the other hand (e.g. likeability and 
friendliness) the most confident speaker was viewed the most negatively, whether 
feedback was available (Chapter 6) or not (Chapters 3, 5 and 9). Overall, the high 
confidence speaker was considered to be the least likeable speaker. This was on a par 
with the low confidence speaker in Chapter 3, where the medium confidence speaker 
was the most liked, with the high confidence speaker being by far the least liked speaker 
when performance feedback was given in Chapter 6, where a non-significant result was 
gained for the most liked speaker. In Chapters 5 and 9 the high confidence speaker was 
seen as being the least friendly of the three speakers. However, other chapters found 
non-significant results for speaker likeability (Chapters 5 and 9) and speaker 
friendliness (Chapter 10).  
Reasons for the mixed results may be due to the different methodologies used. 
Chapters 3 and 6 used forced-choice scales to investigate how the speakers were   
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perceived whereas Chapters 5 and 9 asked participants to rate the speakers. However, it 
is likely that the mixed results are due to the strength of this factor, as for the most part 
the significant results relating to people’s perceptions of speaker likeability have only 
shown small effect sizes.  
The competency results concur with those found in previous research relating to 
speaker confidence (Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk, 1992; Price and Stone, 2004) 
and speech style (Carli, 1990; Carli, LaFleur, and Loeber, 1995; Erickson et al., 1978; 
Parton, Siltanen, Hosman, and Langrdnerfer, 2002), in that confidence is perceived 
more positively than uncertainty. The likeability results, although less consistent and not 
as pervasive as those relating to the competency dimension do provide support for 
previous research that has found too much confidence to be detrimental to how a 
speaker is viewed (London, McSeveney, and Tropper, 1971; Pulford, 2002; Zarnoth and 
Sniezek, 2002). Indeed, in Chapter 7 many listeners (44% when feedback was given and 
18% when it was not) said they did not choose the high confidence speaker as a team-
mate because they (correctly) thought that speaker was overconfident.  
 
The confidence heuristic 
The summary of the results has shown that there is a general tendency for people to 
base the majority of their choices on the advice/recommendation of the most confident 
speaker. The higher a speaker’s confidence, the more frequently their recommendation 
was chosen. It was hypothesised at the end of the literature review that this was because 
people utilise a confidence heuristic, taking a speaker’s confidence as a cue to their 
accuracy, competence, and knowledge (Price and Stone, 2004; Thomas and McFadyen, 
1995). This notion was supported with the finding that the more confidence a speaker 
expressed the more accurate (Chapters 6, 9, and 10), competent, and knowledgeable 
(Chapters 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10) they were perceived as being, as well as being rated highly 
on other factors relating to competency. The results also indicate that this is considered 
a valid basis on which to base one’s choices, supporting Thomas and McFadyen’s 
(1995) model which suggests that the confidence heuristic is used in situations where a 
‘best’ choice cannot be directly communicated, but is instead signalled via a speaker’s 
confidence. Hence decisions are made following a simple comparison of the confidence 
with which information relevant to that decision is presented. Given that participants’ 
perceptions of speakers and their choice of answers all generally followed a linear 
relationship, increasing from low to medium to high confidence, it certainly seems that   
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people do compare the speakers’ confidence levels before making their judgements and 
decisions. We take a speaker’s confidence as a way of validating the information they 
are supplying us with, and so it would seem, as suggested by Thomas and McFadyen, 
that confidence is a means by which informational influence is transmitted.  
Models of persuasion, such as the Heuristic-Systematic Model (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; 
Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly, 1989) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Petty and 
Cacioppo, 1986) state that people engage in either systematic/central processing, 
whereby a message’s arguments are evaluated, or in heuristic/peripheral processing, 
whereby the surface qualities of a message are attended to. Given that people place 
more weight on the confidence with which an answer is expressed than the accuracy of 
that answer, even when feedback is made available (e.g. Chapter 7), this would suggest 
that people assume confidence to be an indicator of accuracy, and hence use confidence 
heuristically. If people do use confidence to equate accuracy, then this indicates that 
they are using a speaker’s confidence to provide them with information, as suggested by 
Thomas and McFayden. Therefore, if confidence is a means by which informational 
influence is transmitted then suggests that confidence acts as a peripheral cue. 
Thomas and McFadyen (1995) asked whether we can assume that the confidence 
heuristic is a general cognitive heuristic, or whether there are gender or other 
information-irrelevant differences in how speakers are perceived. Similar to the results 
of Price and Stone (2004), no evidence was found in this thesis to support the notion of 
gender differences in confidence heuristic use (Chapter 5; but see Pulford, 2002).  
Individual differences in peoples’ use of the confidence heuristic were found in relation 
to Need for Closure (Chapter 4), but this was still in keeping with the notion that the 
confidence heuristic is a general cognitive heuristic. Need for Closure mediated the 
extent to which the confidence heuristic was relied upon, but not the way in which it 
was used, with high confidence exerting the most influence regardless of a listener’s 
Need for Closure.  
As suggested in the review of the literature, it is important to take into account such 
contextual factors as a listener’s awareness of a speaker’s tendency to judgmental biases 
(Fox and Irwin, 1998). The confidence heuristic is prone to error, as with other 
heuristics, which can result in an inefficient exchange of information (Thomas and 
McFadyen, 1995; Tversky  and Kahneman, 1974). This was the case here. With the 
possible exception of the low confidence speaker, the speakers expressed inappropriate 
levels of confidence relevant to their information. Nevertheless, listeners still based   
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their choices on the speaker’s confidence, even when there was evidence to the 
contrary. For instance, when accuracy information was provided in the form of feedback 
in Chapters 6 and 7, some evidence of confidence heuristic utilisation was seen, and a 
speaker’s confidence was still taken as indicative of a speaker’s accuracy. This would 
support the notion that the social influence of confidence is greater than the social 
influence of accuracy (Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). Although there was an inefficient 
exchange of information, a speaker’s confidence remained an effective form of 
influence, giving speakers the ability to influence listeners in their choice of answer, 
irrespective of their actual accuracy (Sniezek and Buckley, 1995). 
However, this is not to say that we are indiscriminate consumers of a speaker’s 
confidence (Paese and Kinnaly, 1993). There is evidence to suggest that repeatedly 
expressing too much confidence could be detrimental in the long run, as predicted by 
Thomas and McFadyen’s model of the confidence heuristic, given that the high 
confidence speaker, although seen as competent, was not liked particularly. This was 
seen in both the presence and absence of accuracy feedback (Chapters 3, 5, 6 and 9) and 
would indicate that people may have had suspected the high confidence speaker’s 
tendency to judgmental biases at least. Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 5, while this 
latter finding could be detrimental in the long run to a speaker who wishes to have their 
advice taken/recommendations followed in future interactions, in the short-term it does 
not undermine their effectiveness. Not liking a speaker may not particularly deter us 
from taking their advice, especially comparing it to other sources of advice, but it may 
stop us from opting to co-operate with them, or choosing them to help us in a task that 
requires co-operation. 
It may not be that everyone picks up on the speaker’s biases though, and contrary to 
Price and Stone’s (2004) suggestion that the confidence heuristic is used in the same 
way by all people when it comes to discriminating between speakers, this may not be 
strictly the case. Perhaps some people do try and attend to all the information that is 
available, whereas others simply identify the most confident speaker and stick with this 
option regardless of the information that may be disregarded in doing so. Evidence for 
this suggestion comes from looking at how people’s choice of team-mate relates to their 
perceptions of the speakers (Chapter 6) and to the choices they make (Chapter 7) when 
information relating to a speaker’s accuracy was given. 
Some people appear to be highly reliant on the confidence heuristic in its most basic 
sense. These people prefer the most confident speaker, at least in terms of their team-  
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mate, follow this speaker’s recommendations a majority of the time, and give little 
consideration to other differentiating information that is available. In other words, they 
identified the most confident speaker and gave little regard to the other speakers. But for 
others, specifically those opting for the medium confidence speaker, more effort appears 
to be given to discriminating between speakers in an attempt to make better quality 
decisions. These people do not see the other two speakers equally – they simply dislike 
and mistrust the high confidence speaker. Perhaps these people realise that this 
speaker’s confidence is frequently unjustified. Yet despite this they are not totally 
resistant to the influence of this speaker’s confidence. Admittedly they are not as reliant 
on it as those who choose the high confidence speaker as their team-mate, but they do 
not totally discount it either, even though they have picked up on the judgmental biases 
of the speaker. Furthermore, they still do not consider the low confidence speaker as an 
option. This would indicate that, despite their best efforts, confidence is still a powerful 
form of influence over these people, for although the low confidence speaker is 
generally the most well-calibrated, this is ignored purely it seems on the basis of their 
confidence. But this would make sense. After all, why would we opt for the alternative 
that is no more confident, or even less so, than we are ourselves? 
Thomas and McFadyen (1995) presented a game-theoretical model of the confidence 
heuristic whereby two people co-operate to reach a mutually beneficial outcome. In 
such situations it pays to appropriately express one’s confidence relative to one’s 
knowledge. However, we are not always working towards a common goal. Price and 
Stone (2004) considered the confidence heuristic within a more interactive decision-
making environment, whereby an individual assesses information provided by advisors.  
In this situation advisors are essentially competing to have their stance accepted by the 
decision-maker and may be motivated to misrepresent their confidence to achieve this. 
The common thread between these two models is that information provided by two 
speakers is being weighed up and assessed. But as Thomas and McFadyen note, it 
would be interesting to consider how the confidence heuristic works when there are 
more people involved who have conflicting interests. From their perspective this would 
involve group decision-making where the aim is still to reach a consensus. However, as 
stated previously, group decision-making brings with it other factors that may hide true 
choice preferences, and it is more common in daily life to make decisions interactively.    
This thesis considered if and how the confidence heuristic was used when we have 
more than two speakers expressing different levels of confidence offering advice to a   
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single decision-maker. It was found that the confidence heuristic is still utilised even 
when the task involves more than a simple comparison of a confident speaker against a 
more tentative speaker. But are we still just searching to identify the most confident 
speaker, as the confidence heuristic would predict (Thomas and McFadyen, 1995)?  
The more sources of information we have available to us, the more cognitively 
demanding the task becomes. To simply apply a confidence heuristic to identify the 
most confident speaker and follow this person’s advice means we are discounting more 
potentially useful information. It is possible that we use the confidence heuristic in 
reverse too, as suggested in Chapter 9, whereby we identify the least confident speaker 
to simplify our decisions, eliminating information we deem to be useless, based on how 
we perceive the speaker. Although this speaker was actually the most well-calibrated 
speaker in the experiments, they were viewed overall the most negatively (Chapters 3, 
5, 6, 9, and 10). Hence, we believe that this speaker has very little useful information to 
offer us and so discount them. Heuristics are about simplifying our cognitive processes, 
and already we have simplified matters and are now left with a choice between two 
speakers. We can now apply the confidence heuristic in a positive way, searching for 
the information we feel is most useful to us based on a comparison of a speaker’s 
confidence and identify the most confident speaker (Price and Stone, 2004; Thomas and 
McFadyen, 1995). Whether this would occur when there are multiple speakers, more 
than the three used here in an interactive decision-making environment, would be worth 
considering in future. This would also allow an investigation of the confidence heuristic 
when faced with a broader range of confidence expressions, rather than just the two 
levels used in previous research or the three levels used throughout this thesis.  
Using an interactive decision-making environment to test the confidence heuristic 
brings with it another factor, that of the individual decision-maker’s own confidence. 
This was not an issue in Price and Stone’s (2004) experiments, which took place within 
a similar environment to those used in this thesis, as their task involved an individual’s 
assessment of the advisors, in terms of how they perceived them on the basis of their 
confidence level, rather than having to make choices on the same basis. In the latter 
context an individual’s own confidence is certainly a factor and raises two possibilities. 
Firstly, confidence heuristic use is mediated by one’s own confidence. Here, the greater 
our own uncertainty is the more we are susceptible to the social influence of others, 
making us in turn more reliant on the confidence heuristic (Chapters 3, 8, and 10). In 
some situations uncertainty is greater than in others, specifically as the amount of   
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information we can bring to a task decreases. Indeed, some situations foster greater 
reliance on the confidence heuristic because they induce greater uncertainty in the 
listener. This may be due to the type of the task (Chapter 3), the difficulty of the task 
(Chapter 8), or the situation in which we are making our decisions (Chapter 10). 
However, there is a second possibility. The explanation above would suggest that we 
only use the confidence heuristic when we are uncertain, but this may not be strictly 
true. This is not to say that we use the confidence heuristic when totally certain. In such 
(rare) situations, we are unlikely to seek the advice of others. But there is frequently that 
element of doubt, and we may seek advice to eliminate this. Here we may use the 
confidence heuristic, weighing up our own confidence against that of another. Just 
because we seek advice, this does not mean that we have to take it. When a speaker’s 
confidence outweighs our own we may take their advice, but when our confidence is 
equal to or greater than a speaker’s is, we trust our own opinions. It is far easier to 
verify exactly how confident you feel yourself than how confident someone else feels. 
Hence we are still using the confidence heuristic, comparing the confidence with which 
information is held – in this case ours against theirs.  
So is the confidence heuristic a general cognitive heuristic? Evidence has been found 
for people using a confidence heuristic, not only in their choices but also in the way in 
which they perceive speakers. A speaker’s confidence is used as a way of discriminating 
between the sources of information we are receiving, and determining the quality of that 
information, rightly or not. Hence, it would seem that to a certain extent, it is a general 
cognitive heuristic. In different situations and by different people it may be relied upon 
more or less, but the basic principle is still the same – confidence is power, and so the 
most confident option prevails. Yet the extent to which it is used is mediated by 
contextual factors, such as individual differences, task type, and an awareness of a 
speaker’s judgmental biases.  
 
Nonverbal communication of confidence  
It was noted in the literature review that confidence can be communicated 
nonverbally as well as verbally. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is certainly 
an area worthy of further investigation, particularly given that nonverbally expressed 
confidence has previously been shown to enhance persuasion (London, 1973). Indeed, 
Kimble and Seidel (1991) suggest that listeners are more likely to be convinced by   
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nonverbal signs of confidence than by verbal expressions of confidence, as overt 
indications of confidence are sometimes mistrusted.  
What then are the nonverbal signs of confidence? Kimble and Seidel (1991) suggest 
that they may be defined as those that indicate composure or a lack of nervousness or 
anxiety. Research has shown that confidence, in comparison to uncertainty, may 
manifest itself in nonverbal behaviours such as direct eye contact, longer glances and 
more decisive gestures, such as pointing or head nodding (Brinol and Petty, 2003; 
Manusov and Trees, 2002; Timney and London, 1973; Walker, 1977). Confidence may 
also be expressed via nonverbal aspects of speech, with a confident speaker speaking 
quicker, with great energy (i.e. strong, loud voice), greater pitch variation (i.e. 
expressive intonation) and shorter pauses, than an uncertain speaker (Apple, Streeter, 
and Krauss, 1979; Brennan and Williams, 1995; Erickson, Lind, Johnson, and O’Barr, 
1978; Kimble and Seidel, 1991; London, Meldman, and Lanckton, 1970; Mehrabian 
and Williams, 1969; Miller, Maruyama, Beaber, and Valone, 1976; Moore, Harris, and 
Patriquin, 1993; Scherer, London, and Wolf, 1973; Smith and Clark, 1993; Walker, 
1977). Future research should take the nonverbal communication of confidence into 
account, investigating the influence of confidence using different modes of 
communication, in addition to the written mode used in this thesis. It would be 
interesting to see how the confidence heuristic is used when this additional information 
is made available as different communication modalities bring with them additional 
cues to which a listener can attend, cues that may diminish or enhance other cues thus 
making a speaker’s verbal expression of confidence more, or less, salient to a listener 
(Chaiken and Eagly, 1976; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001). 
 
Age differences 
Another related area worthy of further research would be an investigation of age 
differences in the influence of confidence/use of the confidence heuristic. Children’s 
understanding of belief terms, such as know and think, as  modulators of certainty 
develops around the ages of four to six years old (Moore, Pure, and Furrow, 1990; 
Moore, Harris, and Patriquin, 1993; Olson and Astington, 1993). Moore, Harris, and 
Patriquin (1993) found that young children use cues to evaluate the reliability of the 
information that they are receiving. Specifically, prosodic cues to a speaker’s 
confidence were used, with children as young as five being able to interpret falling 
intonation as indicating greater certainty than rising intonation. It is suggested that   
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children of this age judge a speaker’s confidence according to verbal cues when these 
are clear, with prosody serving to modulate the interpretation of these cues. However 
when there is ambiguity, the prosodic cues may be used in place of the verbal cues as 
indicators of a speaker’s certainty.  
Age differences in the influence of confidence have also been found later on in life. 
For example, Feezel (1974) found that college students were more willing to accept 
internal expressions of confidence (e.g. I know, I  believe) than high school students. 
However, Whittaker and Meade (1967) found that the extent to which someone was 
persuaded decreased as their age increased. Future research could focus on identifying 
at what age people develop the rule of the confidence heuristic, and if people’s use of it 
changes as they get older. 
 
Further Research 
 In addition to the areas identified above that may benefit from additional 
investigation, a number of suggestions for further research have been made throughout 
this thesis. Whilst some of these have been addressed in subsequent chapters of this 
thesis, the main points of remaining suggestions are summarised below.  
Throughout the experiments reported in this thesis, speaker accuracy has been kept 
constant across all three speakers. As discussed later on, in relation to experimental 
limitations, in the context of the research presented within this thesis this method was 
considered necessary and justified. In real-life a speaker’s confidence may be more 
corresponding to their accuracy than was presented here (however, see section on 
applications of research for potential exceptions to this in relation to eyewitness 
confidence). For this reason further research should consider the influence of confidence 
across a range of accuracy levels. It would be beneficial to compare the influence of 
confidence in situations where confidence equals accuracy against those in which it 
does not, allowing the relative influence of these two factors (confidence and accuracy) 
to be considered. 
Within this discussion chapter it has clearly been identified that one’s own 
confidence is an important determinant of the influence that another person’s 
confidence will have upon our judgements and decisions. Further research should 
explore this issue in more detail to identify exactly what the nature of the own/other’s 
confidence interaction is, and what factors may affect this. The context in which a 
speaker is seeking advice or being given information may be important here.     
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It has been acknowledged that the context in which a speaker is communicating their 
confidence, and for what purpose, needs to be taken into account. Different decision-
making environments may highlight a greater, or a lesser, need to rely on a speaker’s 
confidence by which to evaluate their information. The importance of the task being 
completed, or the decision that is required to be made, may have a significant upon the 
influence of speaker’s confidence. One would hope that a listener engages in more 
systematic processing of information, thus relying less on speaker confidence, when 
making an important decision, such as whether the person on trial is guilty, than when 
answering general knowledge questions. However, more systematic processing may 
also be seen in the case of general knowledge questions, such as when motivation is 
high. For example, if entering a pub quiz where the prize is £100 for the winning team, 
the team members are going to be far more motivated to generate correct answers, and 
so should engage in more systematic, and less heuristic processing of information, than 
if no rewards for being correct are offered. Thus, when motivation for being correct is 
increased more effort should be given in such a situation to identifying the correct 
answer than to identifying the most confidently expressed answer.  
Further research should also investigate issues surrounding the source of information. 
Preliminary consideration was given to this in Chapter 5, where the influence of a 
speaker’s and listener’s gender was considered. It would be worthwhile extending this 
line of research to also further considered who the speaker/listener is in terms of their 
status, age, experience and profession. A brief discussion of this, in relation to Doctor-
Patient communication can be found in the section on applications of research.  
 
Experimental limitations 
The situations in which the influence of confidence has been investigated in this 
thesis, and hence those in which the confidence heuristic have been found to be applied, 
have been limited to multiple-choice tests. Previous research has found that individual’s 
confidence may be sensitive to the question format used, with confidence on open-
ended questions being more predictive of accuracy than on multiple-choice questions 
(Koehler, 1994; Pallier, Wilkinsons, Danthier, Kleitman, Knezevic, Stankov, and 
Roberts, 2002). This may be because MCQs evoke a bias that causes individuals to 
neglect the alternatives to the focal hypothesis, in that they may be less likely to 
consider why a chosen response is incorrect, whereas open-ended questions provide 
more opportunity to consider alternatives. However, this was the intention of the   
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research reported in this thesis – to see if a speaker’s confidence biased listeners in their 
choice of answers, and hence the use of MCQs was necessary in the current context. As 
Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1980) suggest, when making a choice our 
information search is directed toward evidence supporting a preferred alternative. The 
aim of this thesis was to discover if people used a speaker’s confidence as such 
evidence. Clearly they did.  
For a majority of this thesis the MCQs have been limited to difficult general 
knowledge questions, used to maximise confidence heuristic use (but see Chapters 3, 4, 
5 and 8 for exceptions to this). It has already been shown that the influence of 
confidence is mediated by the type of task used (Chapter 3; Zarnoth and Sniezek, 1997). 
However, while general knowledge questions are theoretically intellective tasks, 
Zarnoth and Sniezek (1997) point out that a task outside one’s knowledge domain may 
involve a judgement, as noted in Chapter 3. Furthermore as Sniezek and Van Swol 
(2001) note, most real-life tasks do not have a demonstrably correct answer that can be 
proven at the time of interaction, and so many tasks are not straightforward intellective 
ones, as those used in this thesis. Hence, the findings can be extrapolated to other types 
of task to a certain extent. Additionally, the intention of this thesis was to see if 
confidence was an effective form of influence, regardless of the speakers’ accuracy, 
following Sniezek and Buckley (1995). A speaker’s accuracy is only useful as a way of 
determining the quality of a speaker’s information if we can prove that accuracy. Hence 
the tasks used in this thesis were designed to maximise reliance on a speaker’s 
confidence as way of differentiating between alternative sources of information, and 
sufficiently fulfilled this role. Given that an empirical investigation of confidence 
heuristic has not been done before, as Thomas and McFadyen did not test their 
theoretical model, the use of difficult MCQs allowed for specific questions to be asked 
to test the assumptions of the confidence heuristic. Nevertheless future research should 
consider the influence of confidence in a wider context, as this research can be applied 
to many real-life situations.  
 
Applications of research 
Besides the communication of general knowledge and opinions, confidence is taken 
as indicative of accuracy in other realms, such as eyewitness testimony (see Wells and 
Murray, 1984 for a review). As was noted in the literature review, decisions based on a 
speaker’s confidence can have far more serious consequences here, and many   
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miscarriages of justice have resulted from the testimonies of extremely confident, but 
mistaken, eyewitnesses (Wells et al., 1998).  
Leippe, Manion, and Romanczyk (1992) considered the role of confidence in relation 
to eyewitness persuasion. Their general finding was that people over-used expressions 
of confidence on which to base their judgements, supporting the notion that in the 
absence of any other differentiating information, the more confident one is the more 
influence they exert. The fact that jurors often rely on the confidence of a witness as 
being a predictor of accuracy has been found by others too (e.g. Bothwell and Jalil, 
1992; Penrod and Cutler, 1995). It would therefore be useful to train juries to be 
cautious of a witness’s confidence. On the other hand, witnesses are taught to use 
effective testimony delivery skills, both verbal and nonverbal, prior to the trial so that 
they appear both credible and persuasive (Boccaccini, 2002). Hence a person taking the 
witness stand could be given coaching in how to appear more confident  and thus 
increase their chances of a jury believing them. Hopefully this would be applied to those 
people who may not come across as appropriately confident for reasons such as their 
predisposition to a lack of self-confidence, rather than because they are not being 
truthful. However, as Marshall (1995) warns, while a witness in a trial must convey a 
certain sense of confidence in their abilities and actions to the jury, an arrogant witness 
is the one most likely to be quickly discounted by the jurors. 
 There is also a need for a better understanding of the communication and influence 
of confidence in the training of new doctors. Formalised medical training rewards 
students for being confident and getting answers “correct” (Godolphin, 2003). Ogden, 
Fuks, Gardner, Johnson, McLean, Martin, and Shah (2002) note that doctors will often 
ignore their uncertainty, instead presenting a confident face to patients as a means of 
maintaining patient confidence, although they are beginning to be encouraged to express 
their uncertainty to patients where necessary.  
However ignoring uncertainty and just being extremely confident is unlikely to foster 
a situation in which choices are offered to the patient and a shared decision-making is 
engaged in. Patients have difficulty asking doctors questions, which they attribute 
mostly to the doctors’ traits (Towle, Godolphin, Manklow, and Wiesinger, 2003). For 
instance, a doctor’s confidence may cause the patient to feel intimidated and unable to 
express their concerns. As Chapter 7 showed, people are wary of a speaker expressing 
too much, and conversely too little confidence, perceiving a more moderately confident 
speaker to be more open to discussion. Therefore if a doctor was not so extremely   
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confident all the time, without being too uncertain, a patient may feel that they have 
more input into the decision-making process. Indeed, doctors should be aware of how 
they are perceived by patients. “If doctors want to communicate risk effectively to their 
patients and the public they need to be aware that they are just one source of 
information and may no longer be most trusted” (Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones, 2003, 
p. 730). Being accurate and clear may not be enough, making how one is perceived in 
relation to values relating to competency and likeability also important (Edwards, 
2003). Finding the right balance when expressing one’s confidence between accuracy, 
competency and how positively one is received can be beneficial to both the speaker 
and the listener. 
 
Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis was to take a more ecological approach to research relating to 
the influence of confidence, focusing on confidence as it is commonly expressed in our 
day-to-day lives. The literature review highlighted the fact that in previous research the 
importance of how confidence is communicated has been relatively ignored in relation 
to the influence of confidence, with the focus being on how subjective probabilities and 
confidence ratings influence people’s judgements and decisions. In real-life people 
more commonly communicate their confidence via verbal expressions, such as I know 
and I think, rather than via numerical expressions such as 90%, or a .6 chance, and so it 
is important to address this issue. To rectify this the experiments reported in this thesis 
used confidence cues to investigate the influence of verbal expressions of confidence 
found commonly in natural language as opposed to numerical expressions of than a 
subjective probability. In doing so the findings from this research can be applied more 
directly to the communication and influence of confidence in real-life situations.  
This thesis has provided evidence that confidence is an effective form of influence 
and people do seem to apply a confidence heuristic, using a speaker’s confidence as a 
way of evaluating the quality of the information. We assume that a speaker’s confidence 
is a valid cue to their accuracy, competency and knowledge level. Hence the more 
confidently expressed that information is, the more likely it is that it will be followed. 
Our use of the confidence heuristic when receiving advice from others, and deciding 
whether or not to take that advice is mediated by our own uncertainty, and the greater 
this is the more reliant we become on a speaker’s confidence. Some situations foster   
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greater uncertainty, and hence greater confidence heuristic use, whether due to the type 
of the task, its difficulty, or the situation in which we are making the decisions.  
It was noted in the introduction to this thesis that although we may base our decisions 
on how confidently someone expresses their information, the question can be asked as 
to whether we are right to use confidence in such a way? This thesis has presented 
evidence to suggest that this is not always an effective strategy, as decisions based on a 
speaker’s confidence can lead to erroneous decisions being made. However, in everyday 
life there may be much less miscommunication of confidence than was presented in this 
thesis, and it would be a sorry state of affairs if we went through life  mistrusting 
everyone we met, and everything they said, no matter how confident they were in 
saying it. Indeed, if this were the case, having to verify each piece of information we 
received before using it, life would be far more cognitively taxing – hence the need for a 
confidence heuristic. Using the confidence heuristic is acceptable, as long as we are 
aware of the dangers of being too reliant on another person's confidence and are 
prepared to take all of the available information into account.   
Unfortunately, this is where the problem lies - confidence is, at times, relied upon far 
too heavily - and so perhaps this thesis should be seen as a cautionary tale. On an 
everyday level, using the confidence heuristic can make life that little bit simpler, but 
the context in which a speaker’s statement of confidence is embedded, along with the 
importance of a decision based upon that confidence must also be considered. 
Miscommunication of confidence does occur, although this is often unintentional, as a 
speaker may truly believe they have a right to be confident in what they are saying. 
However, the consequences of this can be devastating. Take the story of Jennifer 
Thompson, who was the victim of rape in 1984. Recounting her ordeal and the events 
leading up the conviction of the accused in The New York Times in 2000 she said, “I 
identified my attacker. I knew this was the man. I was completely confident. I was 
sure….I picked the same man in a lineup. Again, I was sure. I knew it”. Based on 
Jennifer’s testimony, Ronald Cotton was sentenced to life imprisonment. Eleven years 
later, DNA evidence proved conclusively that Cotton was not the man who had raped 
Jennifer. To quote the title of Jennifer’s article, “I was certain, but I was wrong”. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
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 APPENDIX A 
Pilot study questionnaire 
 
 
Please read each of the following statements carefully and then decide how confident 
you think a speaker using these expressions would be in their answer. Indicate how 
confident you think each speaker is that their answer is correct by ticking one of the 
seven boxes to the right of each statement.  
                                                                             
 
           Statement                                                I think the speaker is:              
 
                                                                         Not at all            Moderately           Highly  
                                                                          Confident            Confident        Confident 
 
1.  It must be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
2.  Is it…?  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
3.  I could be wrong but I think it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
4.  I should say it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
5.  Err, I think it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
6.  Perhaps it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
7.  It could be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
8.  I’m certain it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
9.  I’m not sure but it may be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
10.  There’s a good chance it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
11.  I’m positive it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
12.  I think it’s…. but I can’t be sure.  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
13.  I’m sure it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
14.  I’m not completely confident,   1        2        3       4        5        6        7   
 
     but I think it’s…      -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
15.  I suppose it could be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
16.  Well, it’s…. I guess.  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
17.  I’m not sure, it’s kind of…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
18.  If I remember correctly, it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
19.  I’m fairly confident it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
20.  I know it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
21.  It may be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
22.  It’s obviously…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
23.  I suspect it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
24.  It’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
25.  I’m not certain, but it could be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
26.  It might be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
27.  There are, I believe…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
28.  I’m guessing, but I would say it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
29.  Erm, I think it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
30.  I would say it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
 
31.  I think it’s…. isn’t it?  1        2        3       4        5        6        7   
 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
32.  It’s…. I think.  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
33.  I could be mistaken but I’m sure it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
34.  It’s possibly...  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
35.  I’m not sure but it could be…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
36.  As far as I can recall it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
37.  I have no doubt, I mean I’m sure it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
38.  I guess it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
39.  It’s definitely…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
40.  Yes, it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
41.  I’m confident that it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
42.  I seem to recall it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
43.  It’s around about…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
44.  I think, I think it’s….  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
45.  Oh yes, it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
46.  Chances are it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
47.  It’s probably…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
 
48.  I know for a fact that it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7   
 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
49.  I think it’s  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
50.  Oh, I don’t know, I suppose it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
51.  I believe it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
52.  I remember, it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
53.  It could be…. but I don’t know.  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
54.  Isn’t it…?  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
55.  I have no doubt it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
56.  Oh, I think it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
57.  Could it be…?  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
58.  It’s…without a doubt.  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
59.  I’m absolutely certain it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
60.  I can’t say for sure, but I think it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
61.  It’s certainly…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
 
62.  Surely it’s…  1        2        3       4        5        6        7 
    -      -      -      -      -      -      - 
     
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and effort in completing this questionnaire, it is greatly 
appreciated. 
 APPENDIX B 
Descriptive Statistics and t-tests comparing ratings for confidence cues in 
past/present tense 
 
 
Q No.   TENSE  N  Mean  S.D.    Q No.   TENSE  N  Mean  S.D. 
Q1  past  13  4.62  1.39    Q32  past  13  3.08  1.38 
   present  13  4.92  1.50       present  13  3.15  1.34 
 
Q2  past  13  2.85  1.46    Q33  past  13  3.92  .86 
   present  13  3.08  1.38       present  13  3.85  1.28 
Q3  past  13  3.15  1.21    Q34  past  13  3.46  .97 
   present  13  3.15  1.46       present  13  3.62  1.04 
Q4  past  13  4.00  1.15    Q35  past  13  3.15  1.21 
   present  13  3.77  1.01       present  13  3.46  .78 
Q5  past  13  2.46  1.20    Q36  past  13  3.69  .95 
   present  13  1.85  .55       present  13  4.08  .95 
Q6  past  13  3.08  .86    Q37  past  13  4.85  1.57 
   present  13  3.00  .71       present  13  4.54  1.76 
Q7  past  13  3.00  .82    Q38  past  13  3.15  1.28 
   present  13  3.54  .88       present  13  3.15  .90 
Q8  past  13  5.54  1.66    Q39  past  13  6.38  .87 
   present  13  6.38  .87       present  13  6.38  .96 
Q9  past  13  2.92  1.12    Q40  past  13  6.31  .85 
   present  13  3.31  1.18       present  13  6.08  1.04 
Q10  past  13  4.08  .95    Q41  past  13  6.46  .66 
   present  13  4.62  .96       present  13  6.23  1.01 
Q11  past  13  6.00  1.53    Q42  past  13  4.62  1.19 
   present  13  6.54  .88       present  13  4.46  .78 
Q12  past  13  3.46  .97    Q43  past  13  3.92  1.04 
   present  13  3.69  1.03       present  13  3.92  1.04 
Q13  past  13  5.54  1.05    Q44  past  13  3.23  1.01 
   present  13  5.62  1.19       present  13  3.08  1.19 
Q14  past  13  3.85  .90    Q45  past  13  5.46  1.13 
   present  13  3.69  .63       present  13  5.31  1.44 
Q15  past  13  2.69  1.03    Q46  past  13  4.00  .91 
   present  13  2.77  .93       present  13  3.46  .97 
Q16  past  13  3.00  1.29    Q47  past  13  4.15  1.07 
   present  13  2.62  .87       present  13  4.00  1.15 
Q17  past  13  2.62  1.26    Q48  past  13  6.23  1.09 
   present  13  2.46  1.05       present  13  6.31  1.11 
Q18  past  13  4.31  1.03    Q49  past  13  4.00  1.15 
   present  13  4.38  .96       present  13  3.85  .80 
Q19  past  13  5.23  .93    Q50  past  13  2.85  1.21 
   present  13  5.00  1.35       present  13  2.77  1.01 
Q20  past  13  6.00  1.58    Q51  past  13  4.23  .83 
   present  13  6.23  1.24       present  13  4.08  1.32 
Q21  past  13  3.77  .93    Q52  past  13  5.00  .91 
   present  13  3.38  1.04       present  13  4.38  .96 
Q22  past  13  6.08  .76    Q53  past  13  2.92  1.32 
   present  13  6.00  1.22       present  13  3.08  .86 
Q23  past  13  4.08  1.04    Q54  past  13  2.92  1.44 
   present  13  3.92  1.12       present  13  3.15  1.14 
Q24  past  13  5.92  1.55    Q55  past  13  6.08  1.26 
   present  13  5.23  1.54       present  13  5.62  1.26 
Q25  past  13  3.69  1.32    Q56  past  13  4.23  1.48 
   present  13  3.46  1.20       present  13  3.62  1.04 
Q26  past  13  3.54  1.27    Q57  past  13  3.46  .88 
   present  13  3.54  .97       present  13  3.62  .65 
Q27  past  13  4.62  1.04    Q58  past  13  6.15  1.14 
   present  13  4.54  1.13       present  13  5.54  1.61 
Q28  past  13  2.54  .88    Q59  past  13  6.54  .78 
   present  13  3.08  .86       present  13  6.23  1.36 
Q29  past  13  2.85  1.41    Q60  past  13  4.00  .82 
   present  13  2.85  1.34       present  13  3.85  1.14 
Q30  past  13  3.77  1.09    Q61  past  13  6.00  1.00 
   present  13  4.00  .82       present  13  6.15  1.14 
Q31  past  13  2.54  1.20    Q62  past  13  4.54  1.27 
   present  13  2.92  1.50      present  13  4.85  1.14 
   
 
Independent Samples Test
-.543 24 .592 -.31 .57 -1.48 .86
-.413 24 .683 -.23 .56 -1.38 .92
.000 24 1.000 .00 .53 -1.09 1.09
.542 24 .593 .23 .43 -.65 1.11
1.680 24 .106 .62 .37 -.14 1.37
.249 24 .806 7.69E-02 .31 -.56 .72
-1.620 24 .118 -.54 .33 -1.22 .15
-1.625 24 .117 -.85 .52 -1.92 .23
-.853 24 .402 -.38 .45 -1.31 .55
-1.434 24 .165 -.54 .38 -1.31 .24
-1.102 24 .281 -.54 .49 -1.55 .47
-.588 24 .562 -.23 .39 -1.04 .58
-.175 24 .863 -7.69E-02 .44 -.99 .83
.505 24 .618 .15 .30 -.47 .78
-.200 24 .843 -7.69E-02 .38 -.87 .72
.891 24 .382 .38 .43 -.51 1.28
.338 24 .738 .15 .46 -.79 1.09
-.197 24 .846 -7.69E-02 .39 -.88 .73
.507 24 .617 .23 .46 -.71 1.17
-.415 24 .682 -.23 .56 -1.38 .92
.993 24 .330 .38 .39 -.41 1.18
.192 24 .849 7.69E-02 .40 -.75 .90
.364 24 .719 .15 .42 -.72 1.03
1.143 24 .264 .69 .61 -.56 1.94
.468 24 .644 .23 .49 -.79 1.25
.000 24 1.000 .00 .44 -.91 .91
.181 24 .858 7.69E-02 .43 -.80 .96
-1.578 24 .128 -.54 .34 -1.24 .17
.000 24 1.000 .00 .54 -1.11 1.11
-.610 24 .547 -.23 .38 -1.01 .55
-.723 24 .477 -.38 .53 -1.48 .71
-.144 24 .887 -7.69E-02 .53 -1.18 1.03
.180 24 .859 7.69E-02 .43 -.81 .96
-.390 24 .700 -.15 .39 -.97 .66
-.770 24 .449 -.31 .40 -1.13 .52
-1.031 24 .313 -.38 .37 -1.15 .39
.470 24 .643 .31 .65 -1.04 1.66
.000 24 1.000 .00 .43 -.90 .90
.000 24 1.000 .00 .36 -.74 .74
.619 24 .542 .23 .37 -.54 1.00
.688 24 .498 .23 .34 -.46 .92
.390 24 .700 .15 .39 -.66 .97
.000 24 1.000 .00 .41 -.84 .84
.355 24 .725 .15 .43 -.74 1.05
.304 24 .764 .15 .51 -.89 1.20
1.460 24 .157 .54 .37 -.22 1.30
.353 24 .727 .15 .44 -.75 1.05
-.178 24 .860 -7.69E-02 .43 -.97 .81
.395 24 .696 .15 .39 -.65 .96
.175 24 .862 7.69E-02 .44 -.83 .98
.355 24 .725 .15 .43 -.74 1.05
1.674 24 .107 .62 .37 -.14 1.37
-.352 24 .728 -.15 .44 -1.06 .75
-.452 24 .655 -.23 .51 -1.28 .82
.935 24 .359 .46 .49 -.56 1.48
1.225 24 .233 .62 .50 -.42 1.65
-.508 24 .616 -.15 .30 -.78 .47
1.122 24 .273 .62 .55 -.52 1.75
.707 24 .486 .31 .44 -.59 1.21
.395 24 .696 .15 .39 -.65 .96
-.365 24 .718 -.15 .42 -1.02 .72
-.650 24 .522 -.31 .47 -1.28 .67
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Q6
Q7
Q8
Q9
Q10
Q11
Q12
Q13
Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19
Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24
Q25
Q26
Q27
Q28
Q29
Q30
Q31
Q32
Q33
Q34
Q35
Q36
Q37
Q38
Q39
Q40
Q41
Q42
Q43
Q44
Q45
Q46
Q47
Q48
Q49
Q50
Q51
Q52
Q53
Q54
Q55
Q56
Q57
Q58
Q59
Q60
Q61
Q62
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference Lower Upper
95% Confidence Interval
of the Difference
t-test for Equality of Means
 APPENDIX C 
Instructions issued to participants and example questions for tasks used in  
Chapters 3 and 4 
 
Male/Female          Age:                                                                                                                 
 
Imagine that you are entering the first round of a competition, The Millionaire 
Fortunes Game, with three friends. There are three parts to this round: 
 
·  One part of the game involves answering difficult general knowledge 
questions – such as on the game show “Who wants to be a Millionaire?”  
 
·  One part of the game involves picking the ‘top answers’ given in a public 
opinion poll – such as on the game show “Family Fortunes” 
 
·  One part of the game is a memory game where you must make decisions 
based on your friend’s memory for objects. 
 
Further instructions will be given at the start of each part of the game.  
  
Each part of the game contains 12 questions. As you are allowed to confer on the 
questions each friend will give you their answer to each question in turn. 
However, as you have paid the competition entrance money the final decision on 
each question is yours. 
       
Can you and your friends get enough questions right to go through to the next round 
of the competition? If you were to get through to the next round, you would take one 
of your friends with you.  
 
Instructions: 
 
You ask each of your three friends the twelve questions in each part of the game. 
After every question you will read each friend’s response to that question. You must 
then decide which of your friends has given the correct or most likely answer.  
 
You do not need to choose the same friend every time, just choose who you think has 
given the most accurate or likely response for each question. Only choose one answer. 
 
Please read the responses carefully, paying attention to who said it, as you will be 
asked questions relating to each friend later on.  
 
Please indicate your selection to each question by circling the name of the 
appropriate friend (A, B or C).  
 
Then please indicate how confident you are that the answer you have chosen is correct 
by choosing any number between 0 and 100, where a score of 0 means that you have 
no confidence at all in that answer being correct and 100 means that you know beyond 
doubt that the answer you have chosen is correct.  
 
Please answer each question in turn. Once you have answered a question, go on to the 
next one. Do not return to any previous questions. Please pay attention to how each 
friend answers, as you will be asked question relating to this later on. Once you have 
completed all three parts of the game, you will receive instructions as to what to do 
for the remainder of the experiment. 
 General Knowledge Game 
 
 
 
Note. Underlined words show changes in responses given by the speakers between the 
control and experimental conditions. 
 
 
In this part of the game you be asked twelve difficult general knowledge questions.  
 
You ask each of your three friends the questions. After every question read each friend’s 
response carefully and then decide which friend has given the correct answer.  
 
·  Indicate your selection by circling the appropriate letter (A, B or C).  
·  Please also indicate your confidence in that answer, as previously instructed.  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.  What is the highest mountain in South America?   
Friend A said I’m certain the highest mountain is Ojos del Saládo 
Friend B said I believe Aconcagua is the highest mountain 
Friend C said Well, the highest mountain is Huascarán, I guess  
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
2.  What is the longest river in Asia?  
Friend C said I think the Indus is the longest river, isn’t it? 
Friend B said I suspect the longest river is the Yenisei 
Friend A said I know the longest river is the Yangtze 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
3.  On which island was Napoleon was born?  
Friend C said Oh, I don’t know, I suppose it was on Corsica 
Friend A said I’m positive it was on Sardinia 
Friend B said I can’t say for sure, but I think it was on Sicily 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
4.  Who was the first woman to swim the English Channel? 
Friend B said I think Durrell was the first woman 
Friend A said I have no doubt that the first woman was Ederle  
Friend C said I suppose the first woman [was] could have been Hammett 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
5.  What was the last name of Billy the Kid? 
Friend C said Billy the Kid’s last name [was] could be Bonney but I don’t know 
Friend B said I would say Billy the Kid’s last name was Burnley 
Friend A said I’m confident that Billy the Kid’s last name was Browne 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 Opinion Poll Game 
 
 
 
In this part of the game you will be asked to pick the ‘top’ answers given in a opinion poll, in 
which people were asked to answer questions such as “Name a fruit beginning with A”. 
 
You ask each of your three friends in turn what they think the ‘top’ answer is for each 
question. After every question read each friend’s response carefully and then decide which 
friend has given the most likely ‘top answer’. 
 
·  Indicate your selection by circling the appropriate letter (A, B or C).  
·  Please also indicate your confidence in that answer, as previously instructed. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
What’s the top answer? In the opinion poll, we asked people to…  
 
1.  Name a famous Saint.  
Friend A said I know that the top answer is Saint Patrick  
Friend B said I believe that the top answer is Saint Paul 
Friend C said I’m guessing but I would say that the top answer is Saint Christopher 
 
Who has chosen the 
‘top’ answer? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this is the ‘top’ answer? 
 
____ 
 
 
2.  Name a flavour of crisps.  
Friend C said Oh, I don’t know, I suppose the top answer is Cheese & Onion flavour 
Friend B said I would say that the top answer is Salt & Vinegar flavour 
Friend A said I have no doubt that the top answer is Smokey Bacon flavour 
 
Who has chosen the 
‘top’ answer? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this is the ‘top’ answer? 
 
____ 
 
 
3.  Name a planet in the Solar System.  
Friend B said I suspect that Jupiter is the top answer 
Friend C said Well Venus is the top answer, I guess 
Friend A said I’m confident that Mars is the top answer 
 
Who has chosen the 
‘top’ answer? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this is the ‘top’ answer? 
 
____ 
 
 
4.  Name an animal you might see in the zoo.  
Friend A said I’m absolutely certain that the top answer was lion  
Friend B said I can’t say for sure but I think the top answer was elephant 
Friend C said I suppose the top answer [was] could have been monkey 
 
Who has chosen the 
‘top’ answer? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this is the ‘top’ answer? 
 
____ 
 
 
5.  Name a TV chef.  
Friend C said The top answer [is] could be Delia Smith, but I don’t know  
Friend A said I’m certain Ainsley Harriott’s going to be the top answer 
Friend B said I think the top answer is going to be Jamie Oliver 
 
Who has chosen the 
‘top’ answer? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this is the ‘top’ answer? 
 
____ Memory Game 
 
 
 
 
This part of the game is a memory game. Your friends were shown 12 pictures of objects. 
You are not shown these pictures. Your task is to correctly identify which object was shown 
in which position, e.g. 1
st, 9
th, 5
th and so on. As you have not seen the pictures of the objects 
you need to rely on your friends’ answers to make your decisions. 
 
Your friends are asked which object was in which position in a random order. After every 
question read each friend’s response to that question and then decide which of your friends 
has given identified the correct object in the correct position. 
 
·  Indicate your selection by circling the appropriate letter (A, B or C).  
·  Please also indicate your confidence in that answer, as previously instructed.  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1.  What was the fourth object you were shown?   
Friend B said I would say that the fourth object was the book 
Friend A said I have no doubt that the fourth object was the wine bottle 
Friend C said I suppose the fourth object [was] could have been the clock 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
2.  What was the seventh object you were shown?  
Friend C said I think the seventh object was the hammer, wasn’t it? 
Friend A said I’m certain the seventh object was the vase 
Friend B said Oh, I think the seventh object was the dart board 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
3.  What was the second object you were shown?  
Friend A said I know the second object was the scales 
Friend B said I think the second object was the clock 
Friend C said I’m guessing but I’d say the second object was the boomerang 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
4.  What was the tenth object you were shown? 
Friend A said I’m positive the tenth object was the magnifying glass 
Friend C said Well the tenth object was the book, I guess 
Friend B said I can’t say for sure but I think the tenth object was the wine bottle 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____ 
 
 
5.  What was the first object you were shown? 
Friend C said Oh I don’t know, I suppose it was the top hat 
Friend B said I suspect this was the guitar 
Friend A said I’m confident that this was the light bulb 
 
Which friend is 
correct? 
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
How confident are you that  
this answer is correct? 
 
____  
 
 
Could you now please answer the following questions regarding your impressions of 
each friend. 
 
 
 
1.  Based on their performance over the last three games which friend would you 
take with you to the next round of the competition if you were to get through? 
      (please circle your answer) 
 
A         B         C 
 
 
 
2.  Based on how they answered the questions, what sex do you think each friend 
was? (delete as appropriate) 
 
Friend A:  Male/Female 
Friend B:  Male/Female 
Friend C:  Male/Female 
 
 
 
3.  Which friend do you think is the most competent?              A         B         C 
 
4.  Which friend do you think is the least competent?              A         B         C 
 
 
 
5.  Which friend do you like the most?           A         B         C 
 
6.  Which friend do you like the least?           A         B         C 
 
 
 
7.  Which friend do you think is the most confident?           A         B         C 
 
8.  Which friend do you think is the least confident?           A         B         C 
 
 
 APPENDIX D 
Chapter 3 data 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing 
 
 
This research project is looking at how other people’s confidence influences the 
decisions we make and our perceptions of other people. This may depend on what 
type of task is involved and who is communicating that confidence. There may also 
be individual differences in this, which is also being considered.  
 
If you have any questions then please ask the investigator. Individual participants 
results will not be released, but if you would like further information regarding the 
aims and results of the experiment, then these can be obtained from the experimenter 
(contact details below) at a later date, to be confirmed. 
 
Thank you for your participation.  
 
 
 
Caroline Wesson  
University of Wolverhampton, Room MC220 
Tel: Ext. 1391  
E-mail: c.j.wesson@wlv.ac.uk 
 APPENDIX E 
Personality Questionnaires used in Chapter 4 
 
Need for Cognition 
 
Instructions:  For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you.  If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) 
please circle the “1” to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you 
(very much like you) please circle the “5” next to the question.  Of course, a statement may be 
neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely characteristic of you; if so, please use the number 
in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit.   
 
     Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below:   
1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain;  
4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
1.  I would prefer complex to simple problems.  1    2    3    4   5 
2.  I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot 
of thinking. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
3.  Thinking is not my idea of fun.  1    2    3    4   5 
4.  I would rather do something that requires little thought than something 
that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
5.  I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will 
have to think in depth about something. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
6.  I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.  1    2    3    4   5 
7.  I only think as hard as I have to.  1    2    3    4   5 
8.  I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.  1    2    3    4   5 
9.  I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.  1    2    3    4   5 
10.  The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.  1    2    3    4   5 
11.  I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to 
problems. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
12.  Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.  1    2    3    4   5 
13.  I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.  1    2    3    4   5 
14.  The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.  1    2    3    4   5 
15.  I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one 
that is somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
16.  I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a 
lot of mental effort. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
17.  It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or 
why it works.  
 
1    2    3    4   5 
18.  I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect 
me personally. 
 
1    2    3    4   5 
  Need for Closure 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 
Circle any number from 1 to 6, choosing the one that best reflects the extent to which each 
statement applies to you. Where; 1 = Strongly Disagree to 6 = Strongly Agree 
  
                                                                                                                       Strongly             Strongly 
                                                                                                                                                              Disagree                 Agree 
1  I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
2  Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a 
different opinion. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
3  I don't like situations that are uncertain.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
4  I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
5  I like to have friends who are unpredictable.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
6  I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.      1  2  3  4  5  6 
7  When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to 
expect. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
8  I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
9  I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
10  I hate to change my plans at the last minute.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
11  I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
12  When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I want.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
13  When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
14  When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
15  I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
16  I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
17  I would describe myself as indecisive.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
18  I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
19  I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
20  My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
21  In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
22  I tend to struggle with most decisions.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
23  I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of 
a good student. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
24  When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be 
right. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
25  I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
26  I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them  1  2  3  4  5  6 
27  I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
28  When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
29  I like to know what people are thinking all the time.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
30  I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things   1  2  3  4  5  6 
31  It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
32  I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
33  I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
34  I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
35  I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
36  I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
37  When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
38  I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
39  I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty.     1  2  3  4  5  6 
40  I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
41  I dislike unpredictable situations.  1  2  3  4  5  6 
42  I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies).  1  2  3  4  5  6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IPIP 
 
On the following pages there are phrases describing people’s behaviours. Please use the rating scale 
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are 
now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to 
other people you know of the same sex as you, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe 
yourself in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read each 
statement carefully, and then circle the number that corresponds with your response.  
 
Response options: 1 = Very inaccurate; 2 = Moderately inaccurate;  
3 = Neither inaccurate or accurate; 4 = Moderately accurate; 5 = Very accurate 
 
I… 
1  Am the life of the party.  1  2  3  4  5 
2  Feel little concern for others.  1  2  3  4  5 
3  Am always prepared.  1  2  3  4  5 
4  Get stressed out easily.  1  2  3  4  5 
5  Have a rich vocabulary.  1  2  3  4  5 
6  Don't talk a lot.  1  2  3  4  5 
7  Am interested in people  1  2  3  4  5 
8  Leave my belongings around.   1  2  3  4  5 
9  Am relaxed most of the time.  1  2  3  4  5 
10  Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas.  1  2  3  4  5 
11  Feel comfortable around people.  1  2  3  4  5 
12  Insult people.  1  2  3  4  5 
13  Pay attention to details.  1  2  3  4  5 
14  Worry about things.  1  2  3  4  5 
15  Have a vivid imagination.  1  2  3  4  5 
16  Keep in the background.  1  2  3  4  5 
17  Sympathize with others' feelings.  1  2  3  4  5 
18  Make a mess of things.  1  2  3  4  5 
19  Seldom feel blue.  1  2  3  4  5 
20  Am not interested in abstract ideas.  1  2  3  4  5 
21  Start conversations.  1  2  3  4  5 
22  Am not interested in other people’s problems  1  2  3  4  5 
23  Get chores done right away.  1  2  3  4  5 
24  Am easily disturbed.  1  2  3  4  5 
25  Have excellent ideas.  1  2  3  4  5 
26  Have little to say  1  2  3  4  5 
27  Have a soft heart  1  2  3  4  5 
28  Often forget to put things back in their proper place.  1  2  3  4  5 
29  Get upset easily.  1  2  3  4  5 
30  Do not have a good imagination.  1  2  3  4  5 
31  Talk to a lot of different people at parties.  1  2  3  4  5 
32  Am not really interested in others.  1  2  3  4  5 
33  Like order.  1  2  3  4  5 
34  Change my mood a lot.  1  2  3  4  5 
35  Am quick to understand things.  1  2  3  4  5 
36  Don't like to draw attention to myself.  1  2  3  4  5 
37  Take time out for others  1  2  3  4  5 
38  Shirk my duties.  1  2  3  4  5 
39  Have frequent mood swings.  1  2  3  4  5 
40  Use difficult words.  1  2  3  4  5 
41  Don't mind being the centre of attention.  1  2  3  4  5 
42  Feel others' emotions.  1  2  3  4  5 
43  Follow a schedule  1  2  3  4  5 
44  Get irritated easily.  1  2  3  4  5 
45  Spend time reflecting on things.  1  2  3  4  5 
46  Am quiet around strangers.  1  2  3  4  5 
47  Make people feel at ease.  1  2  3  4  5 
48  Am exacting in my work.  1  2  3  4  5 
49  Often feel blue.  1  2  3  4  5 
50  Am full of ideas.  1  2  3  4  5 APPENDIX G 
Task materials used in Chapter 5 
 
Background 
 
 
A small but valuable painting has been stolen from a side room at an art gallery. Unfortunately at 
the time the painting was stolen the security cameras in that part of the gallery were out of order 
following a technical fault – whether this is coincidence or was planned as part of the theft is, as 
yet, unknown. This does however mean that the culprit remains unidentified.  
 
The time of the theft has been narrowed down to half an hour - the room had been checked by a 
security guard at 10.30 a.m. and again at 11.00 a.m. at which time the painting, which had been 
cut out of its frame, was reported missing. 
 
The police want to identify all of the visitors to the gallery who went into the rooms near where 
the painting was located during that time and at what time they went in there. They are not 
necessarily suspects but they do all need to be identified in case they saw anything suspicious. 
Any one of these people may have some important information, no matter how minor it may 
seem to them, that could help the police in their investigation. 
 
Three people, Sarah, Nikki and Laura, who were working near that area of the gallery are giving 
statements to the police of what they saw that day.  
 
 
Plan of Gallery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After giving their descriptions of each of the people they saw the witnesses are asked if they can 
pick out the person they’ve described from a photo line-up made up of images taken from the one 
working security camera in the gallery at the time. This was positioned in the entrance of the 
gallery. Before 11 a.m. 18 people were filmed entering the gallery, all of which are included in 
the photo line-ups. As all 18 people were in the gallery that morning all 3 witnesses could have 
seen each visitor at some time. Not all of the visitors however went into the rooms near where the 
painting was stolen from between 10.30 and 11.00 a.m. What the police want to know is which of 
the visitors did. 
 
From the descriptions given and the identifications made can you work out which of the 18 
visitors to the gallery went towards the room during that half an hour period and at what time?  
 
Please read each of the three witness’s statements carefully. After you have read all three you 
will be asked some questions relating to the events of the day and the three witnesses.
Main  Exit 
 
Working Security Camera.  
Images taken from this camera 
were used in the photo line-up 
Painting stolen from this room.  
The police want to identify who went into 
this room and the five adjacent rooms 
Sarah, Nikki & 
Laura were working 
in this corridor  
 
This photo line-up is made up of images taken from a security camera in the entrance 
of the building. The following 18 people entered the art gallery before 11.00 a.m. on 
the day in question. 
 
  Number 1            Number 2             Number 3             Number 4             Number 5 
 
 
 
  Number 6            Number 7              Number 8               Number 9          Number 10 
 
 
 
 Number 11            Number 12          Number 13           Number 14          Number 15 
 
 
 
   Number 16         Number 17            Number 18 
 
 
 Testimonies 
 
 
Sarah gave the following testimony:  
On the day that the painting was stolen I was on duty in the east sculpture hall. I’d been there 
since the gallery had opened at 10 a.m. I’m certain that 8 people had entered the rooms in 
question since the gallery had opened, although obviously not all of them went into them 
between 10.30 and 11 a.m. During that time I’m positive that I did see three people go in 
there.  
 
     It was 10.40 when I saw the first person go in. I know for a fact that it was a woman who 
was about fifty. I’m absolutely certain that her hair was brown and chin-length.  Out of the 
photo line-up from the visitors to the gallery that day I’d say it was certainly number 1. 
 
     I’m sure it was 10 minutes later the next person came in, which was a man. He was 
definitely with another man when I saw him but I don’t recall what the other man looked 
like. I’m positive though that the man I did see was in his twenties and I know he had long, 
messy hair. He was white and I’m certain he was about 5ft 10” and thin. I’m confident that it 
was number 2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Nikki gave the following testimony:  
I had been working in the east sculpture hall on the day that the painting was stolen and had 
been ever since I’d started work at 10 that morning. I seem to recall that 6 people had so far 
gone into those rooms you’re asking about since the gallery opening that day and some of 
these had probably gone in there between 10.30 and 11 a.m. I remember two people going in 
there between those times.  
 
     It was around about 10.45 when I first saw someone go towards the room. If I remember 
correctly the first person was a woman of about thirty years old. I could be mistaken but I’m 
sure she had bobbed dark hair. Judging by the photo line-up, I’d say it was probably number 
9.  
 
     I believe it was 15 minutes later when the next person went in. It was a man and he was 
probably alone when I saw him. I remember that he was of average build, about 6ft 2” in 
height, and I believe his hair was short and ruffled looking. I think he was in his early 
thirties. I suspect it was number 6. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Laura gave the following testimony:  
I started my shift in the east sculpture hall at 10 a.m. that day. I’m guessing but I would say 
that 7 visitors went into the rooms near the painting since I’d started that day, although some 
of these had perhaps gone in before 10.30. Between 10.30 and 11 a.m. I’m not sure, but there 
could have been four visitors in there at some point.   
 
     It could have been 10.35 when the first person went in, I suppose a woman who, I could 
be wrong, but I think was in her forties. I’m guessing but I’d say she had dark curly hair. 
Looking at the photos, I’d say it was number 7, wasn’t it? 
 
     Well, it was 5 minutes later, I guess, when the next man came in. He wasn’t alone, he 
could have been with another man and a woman when I saw him, but I don’t know what they 
looked like. I suppose that the man I saw was in his fifties, I guess he was about 6ft in height 
and of medium build. I could be wrong but I think he had short greying hair. I’m not sure but 
it could have been number 15.IPIP 
 
 
On the basis of the above testimonies given by the witnesses to the police could you 
now please answer the following questions regarding the day’s events (you may refer 
back to the testimonies if necessary).  
 
Please tick the box corresponding to your answer.  
 
 
1.  How many visitors to the gallery had entered the rooms near the painting before 11 
a.m.?    
 
6  -        7  -          8  - 
 
 
2.  How many visitors to the gallery had entered the rooms between 10.30 and 11 a.m.?      
 
2  -          3  -          4  - 
 
 
3.  What time did the first person enter the rooms?                     
 
10.35  -          10.40  -          10.45  - 
 
 
4.  Who was the first person to enter the rooms?                        
 
Number 1 -          Number 7  -          Number 9  - 
 
 
 
5.  When did the second person enter the room?                    
 
5 minutes later  -          10 minutes later  -          15 minutes later  - 
 
 
6.  Were they alone?                
 
Alone  -          With another man  -          With a man and a woman  - 
 
 
7.  Who was the second person to enter the room?                    
 
Number 2  -          Number 6  -          Number 15  - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.  For each of the following questions please indicate your answer on the seven-point 
scale provided, by circling the relevant number. Please rate each friend independently  
 
on the basis of their statements – you can give then same rating to more than one friend 
if you need to. You may refer back to their statements if necessary.  
 
How intelligent was:                         Highly                             Average                         Not very 
                                                        Intelligent                                                                Intelligent 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How honest was:                                Very                                Average                           Very 
                                                          Honest                                                                    Dishonest 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How competent was:                      Extremely                         Average                         Extremely  
                                                       Incompetent                                                             Competent 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How nervous was:                          Very Nervous                     Average                       Very Calm 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How optimistic was:                     Completely                         Average                        Completely  
                                                       Optimistic                                                                Pessimistic 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How knowledgeable was:                Not very                           Average                             Very 
                                                     Knowledgeable                                                    Knowledgeable 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How polite was:                              Extremely                         Average                         Extremely  
                                                           Polite                                                                      Impolite 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
How friendly was:                           Not very                            Average                             Very 
                                                          Friendly                                                                    Friendly 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
 
 
 
How self-confident was:                  Highly                            Average                          Lacking 
                                                     Self-confident                                                      Self-confidence 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How trustworthy was:                   Completely                        Average                        Completely 
                                                      Untrustworthy                                                          Trustworthy 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How professional was:                     Very                                Average                           Very 
                                                       Professional                                                       Unprofessional 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How likeable was:                         Extremely                          Average                        Extremely 
                                                          Likeable                                                                Unlikeable 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
How credible was:                           Not very                          Average                            Very 
                                                          Credible                                                                   Credible 
Sarah  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Nikki  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Laura  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
               
               
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this experiment. 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX I 
Examples of difficult general knowledge questions used in Chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10. 
(Correct answers in bold) 
 
 
1.  What is the highest mountain in South America?   
a)  Aconcagua     
b)  Huascarăn      
c)  Ojos del Salădo 
 
2.  What is the name of the island on which Napoleon was born?  
a)  Corsica 
b)  Sardinia 
c)  Sicily 
 
3.  What is the last name of the first woman to swim the English channel? 
a)  Ederle 
b)  Hammett 
c)  Durrell 
 
4.  The ELO system is used to rate leading players of which board game? 
a)  Chess 
b)  Scrabble 
c)  Monopoly 
 
5.  Benthos are plants and animals living where? 
a)  Water 
b)  Soil 
c)  Snow 
 
6.  Worn in Ancient Greece, what was a ‘petasus’? 
a)  Hat 
b)  Belt 
c)  Robe 
 
7.  What is the capital city of Lithuania? 
a)  Vilnius 
b)  Riga 
c)  Tallinn 
 
8.  Who was the first ever winner of the Booker prize for Fiction? 
a)  P H Newby 
b)  A S Byatt 
c)  J M Coetzee 
 
9.  Port Louis is the capital of which island state in the Indian Ocean? 
a)  Mauritius 
b)  Maldives 
c)  Madagascar 
 
10. What was the name of the English riots of 1780? 
a)  Gordon Riots 
b)  Gilbert Riots 
c)  Graham Riots 
 
  
 
11. A ‘dybbuk’ is an evil spirit in which folklore? 
a)  Jewish  
b)  West African  
c)  Irish  
 
12. Douglas Bader was a hero of which world war? 
a)  First World War  
b)  Boer War 
c)  Second World War 
 
13. ‘The Scarlet Letter’ is a novel by which American writer? 
a)  Jack London  
b)  Nathaniel Hawthorne 
c)  Herman Melville 
 
14. Which sporting events first took place in 1903? 
a)  Tour de France  
b)  US Masters Golf 
c)  Monte Carlo Rally 
 
15. Madame Tussaud, the waxworks founder, was born in which city? 
a)  Paris 
b)  Strasbourg 
c)  Geneva 
 
16. Lake Eyre, Australia’s lowest point, is in which state? 
a)  New South Wales 
b)  South Australia  
c)  Western Australia 
 
17. Which religious order was founded by Saint Bruno? 
a)  Franciscan  
b)  Dominican  
c)  Carthusian  
 
18. In which language was the poem ‘Beowulf’ written? 
a)  Welsh  
b)  Old English  
c)  Latin 
 
19. Ray Manzerek was the keyboard player with which band of the 1960s? 
a)  The Beach Boys 
b)  Jefferson Airplane 
c)  The Doors 
 
20. Who was Prime Minister in the year Queen Victoria married? 
a)  Viscount Melbourne  
b)  Earl Grey  
c)  Lord Grenville 
 
 APPENDIX I 
Overconfidence questionnaire used in Chapter 6 
 
Below are some general knowledge questions. You need to choose the correct answer from the 3 alternatives provided.  
 
1)  Please circle only ONE of the three answers given. One of them is correct. 
 
2)  Next: indicate how confident you feel that your chosen answer is correct (for each question) by choosing any 
number at all between 0 (no confidence that your answer is correct) to 100 (total confidence that your answer 
is correct). Write this number in the gap in the sentence after the question:  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer (0 – 100 scale) 
 
3)  After that we would like you to estimate the probability/odds that the answer you’ve chosen is correct – since 
there are three answers and one of them is correct you have a .33 chance of being correct (1 in 3), so this is the 
lowest number you should put, and it reflects that you are just guessing at random and have no idea which is 
the right answer. If you do know the right answer then the probability of it being correct is obviously nearer to 
1.0 (which is the maximum number you can put).  
 
If, for example, you said the probability of being correct was .8 on ten different questions this would mean that you 
would expect to be correct 8 times out of 10. If you say 1.0 on all ten questions then you would expect to be right 
10/10 times. If you say .5 on all ten questions then you would expect to be right half of the time and get 5/10 
correct. Etc. 
 
You can use any number then between .33 and 1.0 to indicate the probability that your chosen answer is correct. 
 
Write this number in the gap in the sentence after the question: 
 
The probability that this is the right answer is _____. (.33 to 1.0 scale).  
 
Please answer all of the questions, even if you have to guess on all of them you could get 33% correct by chance.  
 
NOTE: Please answer all the questions one by one in the order that they are presented in the booklet. Guess at any 
answers you don’t know. Please do not jump around the questionnaire or go back to questions to change your 
answers after you have filled them in; we are interested in your first answer.  
 
Please ask if you have any questions.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
GENERAL KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
 
C3  What zodiac sign is the crab? 
Sagittarius     Aquarius    Cancer  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C11  What nationality is racing driver Jean Alesi? 
Canadian    French    Italian 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C17  What is the name of Michael Schumacker's brother, 
who also drives in Formula 1 racing?   
  Rolf     Ranulf     Ralf 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
C24        Ghee is a clarified butter popular in the cuisine of which 
country? 
Italy     India     Israel  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C27  Who played the lead role in the sitcom Shelley? 
Ronnie Barker     Leonard Rossiter     Hywel Bennett 
  
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C36  What is the star sign of someone born on Leap Year day? 
Taurus     Capricorn     Pisces 
  
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____.  
 
C38  ‘Digger' was a nickname given to World War II 
Allied soldiers of which country? 
Australia     Belgium     USA 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C42   Who wrote the TV sitcom 'Butterflies'? 
Carla Lane     John Sullivan     Johnny Speight 
  
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C51  Julie Andrews married which film director in 1969? 
Sydney Pollack     Blake Edwards     Mike Nichols 
  
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C57  What kind of fruit is a Ribstone pippin? 
a pear     an apple     a cherry  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C59  Which of these is a cricket term for a delivery by a left-
handed spin bowler to a right handed batsman? 
Chinaman     Prussian     Laplander 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C65  Alf Ramsey was manager of which football team from 
1955 to 1963? 
Southampton     Ipswich Town     Aston Villa 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C66  Which of these spices comes from the Myristica 
Fragrans tree? 
cloves     nutmeg     paprika  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C68  During World War II, Anderson and Morrison were 
types of what?   
an air-raid shelter     a bomb     a gas mask 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
C69  Which cake is a marzipan-covered sponge that cuts 
into pink & yellow chequered squares? 
a Battenberg     a Strasbourg…..a Nuremburg  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C80  Which football team won the FA Cup, 
Worthington Cup and UEFA Cup in 2001? 
   
Sunderland     Liverpool     Chelsea 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C92  Robbie Fowler captained which football team in 
2001? 
Liverpool     Tottenham Hotspur     Arsenal 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C98  Where does a military person wear an epaulette? 
on the shoulder     on the cuff     on the cap 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C101  Who trained the 2001 Derby winner Galileo? 
Michael Stoute     Aidan O'Brien     Tony Balding 
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____. 
 
C108  A Parmentier dish is garnished with which vegetable? 
carrot     potato     onion  
 
I feel ____% sure that I’ve chosen the correct answer. 
The probability that this is the right answer is ____.
 
 APPENDIX L 
Pilot study accuracy results for easy, medium, and hard difficulty questions  
used in Chapter 8 
(Correct answers in bold) 
 
 
Q.  Question  Answers  Mean   S.D. 
11  Thor is the God of Thunder in which mythology?  Roman           
Norse           
Greek 
 
5.00 
 
22.36 
 
24  Prue Leith is a famous what? 
 
Cookery writer 
Tennis player 
Photographer       
    
10.00 
 
30.78 
 
35  Who composed the opera ‘Boris Godunov’? 
  
Mussorgsky 
Rimsky-Korsakov           
Borodin 
 
10.00  30.78 
 
36  Of which country was Salvador Allende president? 
 
Peru           
Chile           
Venezula 
 
15.00 
 
36.63 
 
25  Castle Howard is in which county? 
 
Gloucestershire           
Suffolk           
North Yorkshire      
      
20.00 
 
41.04 
 
31  Who would use an ‘embouchure’ in their work?  Pilot           
Seamstress           
Musician 
 
20.00 
 
41.04 
 
26  Who was the wife of Henry VI of England?  Catherine of Aquitaine           
Margaret of Anjou           
Eleanor of Aachen        
    
20.00  41.04 
 
33  ‘Night of the Hunter’ was the only film directed by 
which actor? 
Charles Laughton           
Boris Karloff           
James Mason       
     
25.00 
 
44.43 
34  In Greek mythology, the nymph Callisto was turned 
into which creature? 
Spider           
Peacock           
Bear 
 
25.00 
 
44.43 
 
27  What is a linnet? 
 
Bird           
Poem           
Musical instrument 
 
30.00 
 
47.02 
 
8  What is the name of the national anthem of 
America? 
 
America the Beautiful           
Stars and Bars           
Star-Spangled Banner    
        
30.00 
 
47.02 
19  What type of creature is a pollack? 
 
Beetle           
Fish           
Deer           
 
30.00 
 
47.02 
 
12  How many are there in a baker’s dozen? 
 
11           
13           
12 
35.00 
 
48.94 
  
 
32  Which Russian word means ‘openness’? 
 
Perestroika           
Glasnost           
Pravda 
 
35.00  48.94 
 
2  Which English king was known as ‘The Great’? 
 
Harold           
John           
Alfred 
 
40.00 
 
50.26 
 
21  Which planet in our solar system was discovered 
most recently? 
Neptune           
Jupiter           
Pluto 
 
40.00 
 
50.26 
29  The chemical ethylene glycol is most commonly 
used as what? 
 
Nail varnish remover           
Starch           
Antifreeze 
 
40.00 
 
50.26 
 
22  Charcoal is made by heating what? 
 
Coal           
Wood           
Chalk          
  
45.00 
 
51.04 
 
7  In which London building are the Crown Jewels 
kept? 
 
Tower of London           
Buckingham Palace           
Houses of Parliament 
 
50.00 
 
51.30 
 
17  What nationality was Louis Braille, who devised the 
reading system for the blind? 
German           
French           
Dutch   
         
50.00 
 
51.30 
 
13  A dime is equal to how many cents? 
 
25           
10           
50 
 
55.00 
 
51.04 
 
14  What kind of bird is a poussin? 
 
Chicken          
Quail           
Pheasant       
     
55.00 
 
51.04 
 
20  What is dermatophobia the fear of? 
 
Skin           
Dentists           
Crowds        
    
55.00 
 
51.04 
 
30  Who replaced Charles Dickens on the Bank of 
England £10 note? 
 
Charles Darwin           
Rudyard Kipling           
Francis Drake 
 
55.00 
 
51.04 
 
4  Which Soho street was a centre of London fashion 
in the 1960s? 
 
Wardour Street           
Berwick Street           
Carnaby Street 
 
60.00 
 
50.26 
 
28  The Rosetta Stone was discovered in which 
country? 
 
Israel           
Egypt           
Yemen 
 
60.00 
 
50.26 
 
6  What is the capital of Northern Ireland? 
 
Dublin           
Belfast           
Derry 
65.00 
 
48.94 
  
 
9  How many fish represent the zodiac sign of Pisces? 
 
Three           
Two           
One 
 
65.00 
 
48.936
0 
 
10  What flavour is the drink Pernod? 
 
Aniseed           
Hazelnut           
Peach 
 
65.00 
 
48.94 
 
18  In which city is the Royal Mile? 
 
Cardiff           
Bristol           
Edinburgh 
 
65.00  48.94 
 
15  What is the colour of the maple leaf on the 
Canadian national flag? 
 
Green           
Gold           
Red 
 
75.00 
 
44.43 
 
23  In German towns, what is the S-Bahn? 
 
Motorway           
University           
Railway 
 
75.00 
 
44.43 
 
1  What is the male equivalent of a mermaid called? 
 
Merman           
Merlord           
Merboy       
     
80.00 
 
41.04 
 
3  Which race is run annually at Aintree? 
 
London Marathon           
Grand National           
Boat Race 
 
80.00 
 
41.04 
 
5  Damon Hill is a past world champion in which 
sport? 
 
Motor racing           
Rowing           
Sailing 
 
95.00 
 
22.36 
16  In which country are ‘fajitas’ a traditional dish? 
 
Mexico           
Thailand           
Lebanon 
100.00  0.00 
 
 APPENDIX P 
Conference Abstracts 
 
 
 
Wesson, C. (2004) Factors mediating the influence of another’s confidence: The role 
of task type on choice and confidence in choice. Paper presented at the PsyPAG 
Annual Confidence, July 2004. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When we are uncertain we may turn to other people for their advice or opinions. The level of 
confidence with which they express themselves can influence the choices we opt in or out of and 
the subsequent confidence we have in those choices. However the extent to which another’s 
confidence influences us may be mediated by a number of factors. This research investigates the 
role of task type upon the influence of confidence. In a mixed factorial design 116 participants 
completed three different tasks, each consisting of 12 questions with three alternative responses 
from which participants selected their answer. Each response was given by a different ‘speaker’. In 
the experimental condition speaker’s answers were preceded by confidence cues; one speaker 
answered each question with high confidence, one with medium confidence and one with low 
confidence.  In the control condition speaker’s answers were given in the absence of confidence 
cues. A significant interaction between speaker confidence (high/medium/low) and condition 
(confidence cues/no confidence cues) showed that the addition of high confidence cues had the 
most positive influence upon choice, and low confidence cues had the most negative influence, on 
all three tasks. A significant speaker confidence, condition and task type interaction indicated that 
the extent of this influence depended upon task type. Speaker confidence of any level also served 
to increase participant’s confidence in their answers with the extent of this influence again 
depending on task type. The results indicate that when we are uncertain we use another person’s 
confidence level as a way of distinguishing between information we are receiving, taking high 
confidence as representative of the ‘best’ answer. However the extent to which we rely upon 
another’s confidence to help us in our choices depends upon our own level of confidence or 
uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Wesson, C. & Pulford, B. (2005). Individual differences in the influence of confidence: 
The effects of Need for Closure and Need for Cognition [Abstract]. Proceedings of the 
British Psychological Society, 13(2), 163. 
 
Abstract 
Objectives: The influence of expressed confidence was investigated in relation to the choices 
people make and the confidence they have in those choices, to ascertain whether individuals use 
the confidence with which a person expresses their answers as a heuristic. To determine whether 
the confidence heuristic is a general cognitive heuristic or is mediated by individual differences, the 
influence of Need for Closure and Need for Cognition was also considered.  
Design: The experiment used a 3 (‘speaker’ confidence: high, medium, and low) x 2 (Need for 
Closure: High vs. Low) x 2 (Need for Cognition: High vs. Low) x 2 (condition: confidence cues vs. no 
confidence cues) mixed design, with repeated measures on the first variable.  
Methods: 110 undergraduates took part in the experiment in which they were required to choose 
the correct/most likely answer to a series of questions belonging to three different task types, and to 
indicate their confidence in their chosen answer. Participants were given three alternative answers 
to each question to choose from. In the experimental group these were accompanied by high, 
medium or low confidence cues developed in a previous pilot study, whereas in the control group 
there were no cues as to the speaker’s confidence. Participants also completed two personality 
questionnaires measuring Need for Closure and Need for Cognition. 
Results: The addition of confidence cues to a speaker’s answer resulted in a shift towards 
choosing answers expressed with high confidence and away from those expressed with low 
confidence.  Regardless of a speaker’s confidence level, the addition of confidence cues led to an 
increase in participants’ confidence in their answers. However, the extent of these effects was 
dependent on task type.  In relation to the personality measures used, Need for Closure had an 
effect on participants’ choice of answer whereas Need for Cognition affected participants 
confidence in their chosen answers. High (vs. low) Need for Closure participants showed a greater 
shift towards answers expressed with high confidence and away from those expressed with medium 
confidence. High (vs. low) Need for Cognition participants were more confident in their chosen 
answers.  
Conclusions: People do appear to use a heuristic that uses the confidence of a person as an 
indicator of the validity of their information. People use the heuristic when they are uncertain as a 
means of making choices and having confidence in those choices. However, the extent to which the 
confidence heuristic is used, and the way in which it is used, is influenced by individual differences.  
 
 